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ABSTRACT 
This phenomenological study firstly examines the 
concept of the 'therapeutic community' as it appears within 
contemporary British psychiatry. It argues that certain 
confusions and contradictions which are exhibited within 
this area of practice arise as an inevitable consequence of 
the medicalistic and psychologistic epistemologies upon 
which these communities are predicated. 
Secondly, it proposes a number of informing sources 
whereby the practices of a therapeutic community might be 
more soundly guided. Amongst these are the ethical writings 
of Aristotle, and the discussions of 'dwelling' which are to 
be found within recent European philosophical writings. In 
particular, certain writings of Heidegger, Levinas and 
Bachelard are seen to be important. Informed by these 
sources, it is argued, we may find ourselves in a position 
to embody theorizing in a manner which more befits the 
subject matter of the therapeutic community. 
In the third part, an illustration is offered, of one 
therapeutic community household within which these questions 
of 'dwelling' were raised, and whose therapeutic gesture 
was understood in terms of the hospitality of dwelling, 
rather than the application of psychological method. 
Discussion is devoted to the founding of this household, 
the embeddedness of its conversations within the fabric of 
the ordinary, and the issues which were raised in the course 
of its finding its own way. In the final chapter of this 
thesis, attention is paid to the matter of the evaluation 
i 
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of such therapeutic households, and to their relevance to 
the current social policy of psychiatric 'care in the 
community'. 
iii 
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PREFACE 
The present study is offered as a contribution to 
the literature on the psychiatric therapeutic community. 
In its pages I propose to consider a number of questions 
and problematics crucial to an understanding of the nature 
of a therapeutic community, which hitherto have remained 
insufficiently examined. As a consequence of these omissions, 
I argue, the fundamental inspiration behind the therapeutic 
community movement has fallen far short of any adequate 
realization. 
The main emphasis of the 'therapeutic community' 
approach to the treatment of psychiatric disorders is upon 
the central importance of the patient's setting, environment 
or context, and in particular, his immediate social context. 
This, it is argued, may itself be therapeutic, or may itself 
constitute a therapeutic treatment. This emphasis upon the 
social context may be contrasted with that of traditional 
psychiatric practice which is concerned primarily with the 
administration of medications and physical treatments, and 
only secondarily with the 'interpersonal context' to treat- 
ment. So it is that the therapeutic community approach is 
usually described as an alternative to orthodox or tradi- 
tional treatments. More than that, these approaches are 
commonly felt to be founded upon a more progressive ideology 
than that of traditional psychiatry, and so have come to 
be seen as 'radical alternatives', having arisen largely 
in response to the realization that traditional forms of 
institutional care for the mentally ill are seriously 
flawed. 
viii 
But these 'alternative' forms of treatment are 
themselves seriously flawed. In part one, I shall discuss 
some of the general and far-reaching faults, errors and 
sources of confusion which typify the therapeutic community 
literature. These may be very briefly summarized under 
three main headings. 
Firstly, therapeutic community epistemology is pre- 
dominantly medicalistic; and this epistemology does not 
lend itself to any thinking through of what it is about 
communality, or about community as community which may be 
conducive to personal and interpersonal well-being. The 
explicit movement of the therapeutic community approach 
to treatment is away from the traditional medical model, 
where professionally distanced doctors and nurses provide 
packaged treatments for passive patients. In fact, most 
therapeutic communities simply update the medical model by 
allowing the patient more 'say' in his treatment, and 
including a wider range of therapeutic devices on the list 
of medicines. The notion of medical treatment is expanded 
until the community itself becomes the doctor. 
Secondly, insofar as there is a shift from a medical 
to a non-medical 'frame of reference', it takes the form, 
for the most part, of a slide into psychologism. Psycho- 
logism, in this context, illustrates the principle of being 
'too clever by half'. Psychologism reduces the person and 
his social, cultural and interpersonal world to psychological 
processes, forces, vectors and dynamics - and ends up with 
a world inhabited by no-one. Therapeutic communities 
frequently commit a double psychologistic error. They 
ix 
first of all reduce the lived world to a ghostly stage of 
psychologistic abstraction, and then proceed to construct 
models out of these abstract elements which are then applied 
in the running of the community. 
Finally, therapeutic community thinking and practice 
is predominantly technological. It reduces psychothera- 
peutic practice to technique, being to process, and 
'community' to 'organization', whose resources may be 
utilized or exploited towards therapeutic goals which are 
not themselves subjected to any critical examination. We 
are left, therefore, with a notion of community, whose 
politics, in the absence of any telos beyond that of indi- 
vidual growth or adjustment, reduce to the crudities of 
control and toleration. 
These fundamental errors are deep errors of appraisal, 
or epistemology; they are not errors of method. That is, 
given the assumptions from which therapeutic communities 
start, the procedures which ensue are often logical and 
consistent. These errors cannot therefore be remedied by 
tinkering with the methods, introducing finer and finer 
tunings and adjustments, or devising alternatives to the 
alternative. They call instead for a fresh appraisal of 
the phenomena, which must first of all be brought into 
view. Where the phenomena are adequately brought into 
view, a way does show itself, which is a radical departure 
from any structure of treatment alternatives. 
In part two, I offer a radically different orientation 
towards the therapeutic community. I first of all propose 
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that the nature of 'theory' and 'theorizing', insofar as 
it is to contribute to a better understanding of thera- 
peutic communities, must itself be re-thought. An appropriate 
'theorizing' must, I argue, incorporate a radical and 
critical reflexivity, particularly insofar as theorizing 
bears upon questions of 'fundamentals'; questions, for 
example, to do with first principles and final goals of 
human conduct. Here, 'theory' cannot be worked out in 
advance and then 'applied'; any person who is a member of 
a therapeutic community will therefore be engaged (unless 
it is after all merely human engineering) in an exercise 
that is at once and as much 'theoretical' as practical. If 
a therapeutic community is, as I argue, to be thought of 
not as a 'thing' but as a 'way', this must at the same time 
be a way which enlightens or shows its own way, in its own 
way of 'questing' or questioning. 
Two closely related considerations lead me to choose 
the dwelling as the place within which to take up the 
inquiry into therapeutic community. Firstly, I argue, 
'madness' is 'homelessness'. That is to say, the symptoms 
of 'mental illness', what used to be called 'alienation', 
speak of ontologically threatened or insecure modes of 
being, where ontological security is the sureness of being 
at home in the world. And secondly, paraphrasing Heidegger, 
I argue that man's being is 'dwelling'. The place of 
habitation, the abode or dwelling, therefore, is not simply 
an empirically convenient shelter, but is the place where 
first questions come most originally into view, the place 
where first things show themselves most primordially. 
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According to the popular aphorism, it is also where 
charity begins. 
A central task of part two is to discuss the nature 
of dwelling - what it means, 'to dwell' - and the signifi- 
cance of the place of dwelling. In this discussion, and 
with our earlier discussion of ethics in mind, I refer to 
the writings of Heidegger and Levinas, as well as Bachelard. 
From these writings, although in different ways, we are led 
towards a thinking of that concern, and those concerns, 
which most befit a therapeutic community. 
In part three, I consider at some length a therapeutic 
community which was a member household of the Philadelphia 
Association, a charity set up by R. D. Laing and colleagues 
in 1965. I choose this example not as a model or blueprint 
of how a therapeutic community should be run - for it is 
central to my argument that a community must evolve its own 
style and find its own way. Rather, I choose this household 
because of its originality in raising the question of 
dwelling, the suggestiveness of the guiding principles which 
it offered, and for the far-reachingness of the issues which 
it raised, issues about which the well-being of any thera- 
peutic community may pivot. 
Part three is divided into four chapters. In the 
first of these, under the heading of 'foundations', I 
introduce matters to do with the opening up and founding of 
a household. I discuss this particular household's coming 
into being, the make-up of its membership, and some of the 
considerations which entered the conversation which was 
xii 
opened up by a person's wanting to join the house. In 
discussing these conversations, I have laid particular 
emphasis upon their contextualization, or embeddedness, in 
matters of the everyday. Amongst these ordinary matters 
we may consider food, nourishment and provision, boundary 
and protection. 
In the second chapter, I introduce questions to do 
with the manner in which this house was inhabited, con- 
cerning myself particularly with the 'ambiance' of the house, 
illustrated by the manner in which people who lived there 
treated one another, and aspired to treat one another. 
I discuss the importance of 'manner' and 'habit', finally 
turning to the question of 'friendship'. 
In the third chapter I bring to a fuller articulation 
themes which have already been touched upon, and which run 
through the preceding chapters, and which we might refer to 
as the provocation of the Other. In this chapter I speak 
of the therapeutic gesture of the household as the response 
of hospitality. And finally, in the last chapter of part 
three, I describe the way in which this household extended 
hospitality to individuals who were undergoing acute 
psychotic episodes - or, in the vernacular of the times - 
freaking out. 
In the final part of this study - chapter twelve - 
I spell out the particular relevance of my argument to the 
presently fashionable social policy of returning the 
psychiatric patient from the hospital to the community - 
the policy of 'care in the community'. I conclude by 
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showing how my own study suggests ways in which this 
policy might be more effectively thought through. 
Approximately speaking, the form of this thesis is 
one whose theorizing in the first parts is fleshed out in 
the course of providing an extended illustration or example, 
which makes up the bulk of part three. And despite my 
preparedness to let it be judged as it stands, this work 
retains, to some extent, the quality of being a composite 
of two separate works. Each of these might have been 
considerably expanded - at the expense of the other. A 
study of 'dwelling and hospitality' might well have been 
written which made no attempt to grapple with the diffi- 
culties of presenting something of the homelife in which 
was its gestation. On the other hand, approaching these 
same themes might well have been possible precisely through 
a more th6rough and uncompromising account of Portland Road 
- and for all its intrinsic difficulties, such an approach 
might well have something to recommend it. For in such a 
study space could be made to permit discussion of questions 
which, in the present case, have of necessity been passed 
over. However, to have taken on, fully, some of the deeper 
intimacies and intricacies of Portland Road would not simply 
have required more space: it would have called for a different 
orientation between the writer and his text than seemed 
appropriate for a dissertation of this nature. If questions 
to do with Portland Road present themselves to the reader, 
which remain undiscussed within the text, these limitations 
must be borne in mind. He may, however, confidently assume 
that within Portland Road the central issues which motivate 
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this inquiry were clearly and resoundingly voiced; and 
thus it is hoped that the reader will have no difficulty 
in seeing something of the writer's indebtedness to the 
founder and guide of this household, Dr Hugh Crawford, 
inscribed throughout these pages. 
What might be termed the 'fieldwork' for this study 
was completed over two periods, from 1971 until 1976, and 
from 1978 until 1980, during which times I was a member of 
the Portland Road community. To talk of 'fieldwork' where 
it suggests a researcher's formal investigations might be 
misleading; better perhaps is 'homework'. For the idea 
of incorporating my experiences in this household in any 
formal account was not my reason for joining, nor did this 
idea crystallise - except perhaps upon the most distant 
of horizons - during the times of my stay there. 
The writing of this study occupied the two years 
from 1982 until 1984. Its being completed within this period 
was made possible by a research grant provided by Sir Clive 
Sinclair. At that time, when it had become clear to me 
that the writing of this work could no longer be deferred; 
but when at the same time each door to which I turned for 
financial assistance seemed to be closed, Sir Clive's most 
generous offer came as a Godsend. I am pleased to be able 
to thank him here. 
My studies were supervised by two people, each-of 
whom has contributed significantly to whatever merits the 
final work may possess. Professor Brian Lewis, of the 
Department of Educational Technology at the Open University, 
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gave me his full-hearted encouragement at every stage of 
the project. The generosity with which he made his time 
available to me, the confidence with which he let me go 
my own way, and at the same time the thoughtfulness of 
his provocation when the traces which I left were less 
than illuminative made my task greatly more enjoyable than 
it might otherwise have been. The latter stages of this 
work were somewhat clouded by Brian Lewis-suffering a 
severe illness; it is a source of pleasure to me that its 
completion should co-incide with his recovery. 
I was fortunate in having in Dr John Heaton a second 
supervisor, whose considerable experience as a psycho- 
therapist, household therapist and phenomenologist bears 
precisely upon the interests of my own study. To Dr Heaton 
I am not only grateful for the encouragement and critical 
comment with which he responded to earlier drafts, but to 
initial suggestions which assuredly influenced the direction 
which my writing took. It was at Dr Heaton's suggestion, 
for example, that I came to read the Nichomachean Ethics. 
To both Brian Lewis and John Heaton I express my thanks. 
I should like, finally, to express my thanks to 
those friends and colleagues who have read earlier drafts 
of the manuscript, and from whose constructive criticism 
it has benefitted. In particular, I would like to express 
my indebtedness to fellow-members of the Philadelphia 
Association, not only for their criticism and comment, 
but, more importantly, for their partnership in that work 
to which this study is addressed. 
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It seems to me that we can also say of other 
institutions that they have ceased to live 
when they show themselves incapable of carry- 
ing on a poetry of human relations - that is, 
the call of each individual freedom to all the 
others. 
M. Merleau-Ponty. 
PART ONE 
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Introduction to Part One 
In 1981 a book, consisting of a collection of writings, 
was published under the title of The Therapeutic Community. 
So far as I know the first book of its sort to be published 
in the U. K., it is an anthology of therapeutic community 
perspectives and prospectives. It contains contributions 
which express a range of viewpoints, from exponents, for 
example of the Richmond Fellowship, Kingsley Hall, and Phoenix 
House 'models' of community. it includes an article by Tom 
Main, one of the founders of the therapeutic community 
'movement', on 'basic concepts', an article by Joseph Berke, 
representing the 'alternative' approach, and several by Elly 
Jansen, director of the rather influential Richmond Fellow- 
ship, in whose copyright the book is held. The jacket 
illustration of this book, furthermore, is acknowledged to 
be courtesy of the Richmond Fellowship, and this illustration 
will serve as a good point of departure for my introductory 
remarks. 
The illustration consists of a photograph, taken from 
the ceiling of a room in which eight people are seated 
around a table. They are all facing towards the centre of 
the table, around which they are all more or less evenly 
spread. There appear to be five men and three women; the 
position from which the photograph was taken makes it 
difficult to discern any facial expressions. 
We see nothing of the room other than the square area 
of its floor, of stripped and sealed wood. The table top 
above which we are suspended is of glass, and transparent, 
so that through it we see the quadrant of its supporting 
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frame, emphasising again our impression of regularity, 
sectionalization, opposition. Nine other furnishings are 
visible: eight identical chairs upon which sit what we must 
assume to be the residents; and one empty, metal waste-paper 
basket placed between two of them, the only interruption of an 
otherwise relentless symmetry. 
The participants who are gathered round the table 
display an arrangement which we might expect to be typical of 
a very rigidly set up, and formal, therapeutic group. They 
are the perfectly photographed enactment of the logo of the 
Institute of Group Analysis, a logo which is in itself quite 
inoffensive. But here, on this cover, its flesh and blood 
representation tells us quite insistently that the chosen icon 
of the therapeutic community is one which represents a 
situation of analysis, of confrontation, of pure, hard-core 
therapy. This is emphasised by the utter starkness of the 
surroundings, which bear no evidence at all of being lived- 
in, or worn by any familiarity. In fact, now there is nothing 
to block our view of one another, there is nothing in the 
way. Now we can get down to the heart of the matter. We 
have all we need: our psychological problems, the see-through 
table to place them on, and the waste-paper basket for the 
bits and pieces which this analysis will not manage to 
dissolve. The photograph depicts the situation of an ideal 
of mental hygiene; every surface is immaculately scrubbed, 
and everyone is neatly in place. In this treatment environ- 
ment there are no little hidden corners, and no whispered 
secrets; for this is above all a sanitary practice. How 
easily, looking at the photograph, might we be excused for 
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not remembering that the 'therapeutic community' is, first of 
all, a place where people are expected to live. 
The photographer looks down on it all from above; he is 
condescending. He is the invisible spectator who sees 
everything - and is above it all. His is the objective eye; 
he takes note, he keeps score. He is there to make sure 
Everything Is In Order. This, after all, is 1984. 
In this heartless little photograph I find an icon to 
which the 'therapeutic community' literature rather 
peculiarly pays unceasing homage. What in the photograph 
invites the accusation of heartlessness, appears in the 
literature perhaps more as 'thoughtlessness'. - It is thought- 
lessness which imagines that the way into the world is 
through an analysis of the processes of one's own and other 
people's minds, or that the world is these processes writ 
large. It is thoughtlessness which attempts to understand 
the business of living together, or doing our best to live 
together, within the parameters of 'treatment'; which expands 
the notion of the 'therapeutic situation' to include every 
minute of the day, so that everything is now a 'part' of 
this treatment. It is thoughtlessness which, in accordance 
with the prevailing psychological or psychoanalytic concepts, 
constructs or designs a therapeutic milieu or environment and 
exploits, towards therapeutic goals, the human resources of 
this environment, or uses the relationship between people as 
part of the treatment. It is a thoughtlessness whose notion 
of 'community' is requiring people to be a certain way. 
These are the sorts of thoughtlessness which I shall be 
discussing in the following three chapters. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
COMMUNITY AS DOCTOR 
The Therapeutic Community 
It is quite beyond the scope of the present study to 
show, in any completeness or fullness, the concept of the 
psychiatric therapeutic community, or to submit this concept 
to any rigorous and detailed analysis. Steps in this 
direction have in any case already been taken; and they 
prepare us to accept the fact that this concept may be a very 
muddled one indeed. Based upon his own, rather thorough 
analysis of the literature of the 'therapeutic community', 
Thompson1 concludes 
that as a general concept its meaning is vague, 
confused and ambiguous. At almost every level 
of inquiry its nature, type, scope and function 
escape adequate definition, with the result 
that almost any vaguely 'progressive' attempt 
to include the environment of the psychiatric 
setting in notions of 'treatment' can be inter- 2 
preted as an example of a therapeutic community. 
Recognition of some of the confusion which surrounds the use 
of the term is commonplace; and it is by no means atypical 
that advocates of the 'therapeutic community approach' should 
1Thompson, R. D. (1976) p. 169. 
2According 
to Thompson (1976), the term 'therapeutic community' has been 
used to describe the following groups of phenomena, 'to name but a few': 
A West African Yoruba village community, the military, the school and 
the church, the prison, the remand home, the halfway house, rehabili- 
tation centres for drug addicts, social work community care programmes, 
the wider social community, the general hospital and the mental hospital, 
psychiatric wards or wings of hospitals treating special groups of 
patients, a mode of social therapy, a model for group therapy and 
patient government, the focus of a form of administrative therapy, a 
psychoanalytically oriented hospital, a 'socio-therapeutic' milieu for 
the treatment of psychopathy, a setting for multiple child-patient 
therapy, admission units, chronic wards in hospitals, geriatric 
hospital care, and by allusion, 'corrective camps'. 
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themselves refer to the therapeutic community as "one of the 
most misused and misunderstood terms in modern psychiatry". 
' 
The main emphasis of the 'therapeutic community' 
approach to the treatment of psychiatric disorders is upon 
the central importance, in the treatment, of the patient's 
setting, environment or context, and in particular, his 
immediate social context. This, it is argued, may itself be 
therapeutic, or may itself constitute a therapeutic treatment. 
This emphasis upon the social context may be contrasted with 
that of traditional psychiatric practice, which is concerned 
primarily with the administration of medications and physical 
treatments, and only secondarily with the 'social context' of 
treatment. So it is that the therapeutic community approach 
is usually described as an alternative to orthodox or 
traditional treatments. More than that, these approaches 
are commonly felt to be founded upon a more progressive 
ideology than that of traditional psychiatry, and so have 
come to be seen as being 'radical alternatives', or even as 
representing a 'true revolution'2 in psychiatric practice. 
Indeed, the therapeutic community has been referred to as 
revolutionary psychiatry's 'brightest star', 
3 
or 'one of the 
brightest stars in the social psychiatric firmament'. 
4 
It is important to note at the outset that different 
therapeutic communities direct themselves to quite different 
1Whiteley, J. S. and Gordon, J. (1979) p. 105. 
2Clark, D. H. (1974) p. 11. 
3Sharp, V. (1975) p. 21. 
4Rapoport, 
R. N. (1960) p. 10. 
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tasks, deal, for example, with different 'categories' of 
patient or 'client group', and consequently adopt quite 
dissimilar stances and practices. For this reason alone, it 
is far from being a simple matter to provide an accurate 
characterization of the movement as a whole. In the three 
chapters which follow, I shall be for the most part concerned 
with general assumptions, prevailing tendencies and broad 
themes pertaining to therapeutic communities, as these arise 
and recur within the therapeutic community literature. By no 
means will all of the assumptions which I shall critically 
examine hold true of all therapeutic communities, or to the 
same degree. Their discussion will, however, bring into view 
some important areas of epistemological confusion which do 
pervade the literature, and issues which, within this 
confusion, remain insufficiently discussed or followed 
through. 
There may be found a number of attempts within the 
literature - and with varying degrees of success - to minimise 
some obvious sources of confusion by procedures of taxonomy. 
Writers have disentangled some different senses in which the 
term itself is used, have indicated important distinctions 
between seemingly related 'therapeutic community approaches', 
or between different sorts of goals towards which their 
methods are directed. In the course of these various attempts 
at clarification or towards 'the further analysis and 
refinement of therapeutic community practice'1 the following 
distinctions have been made: 
1Whiteley, 
J. S. and Gordon, J. (1979) p. 113. 
8 
Between the therapeutic community 'proper' and the 
therapeutic community 'approach', 
' between the therapeutic 
community and milieu therapy (concerned respectively with 
'synthetic' and 'executive' functions of the ego, 
2 
or with 
'intrapsychic' as against the 'social' significance of 
situations); 
3 between the goals of rehabilitation (social 
orientation) and treatment (antra-psychic re-organization); 
4 
between the psychotherapeutic and the socio-therapeutic 
processes; 
5 between various therapeutic community models, 
such as the 'self-actualization'. and self-adjustment models; 
6 
and between the Institutional (therapeutic community 
approach), the Democratic-analytic (the therapeutic community 
proper), the Concept based (the ex-addict self-help communi- 
ties of the Synanon type), and the Alternative Asylum 
(anti-psychiatric communities or households), 
7 
as examples of 
the four main types of therapeutic community venture. That 
these various attempts have led to no consistency of usage 
is clear from the co-existence, within the literature of 
claims such as the following: 
The phrase... therapeutic community has now 
had so much currency that it has been almost 
rubbed smooth of meaning. 
8 
1Clark, 
D. H. (1971). 
2Sharp, V. (1975) p. 23. 
3Stauble, W. J. (1971). 
4Rapoport, 
R. N. (1960). 
5Whiteley, 
J. S. and Gordon, J. (1979) p. 114. 
6Sharp, 
V. (1975) p. 22. 
7Kennard, D. (1983) p. 6 and p. 99. 
8Clark, D. H. (1971) p. 42. 
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and 
The therapeutic community is therefore a 
specific treatment method, as specific as 
psychoanalysis or somatic therapy. 1 
As a counterpoint to these attempts to draw informative 
and discerning distinctions between different interpretations 
of the notion of 'therapeutic community', we may now mention 
the equally insistent attempts to articulate the essential 
'therapeutic community impulse'2 which motivates all of these 
diverse endeavours, or try to gather together the various 
'basic assumptions' or guiding principles which are shared by 
all, or at least most of those who find themselves identified 
with the 'therapeutic community movement'. 
Included amongst these we might consider the 'certain 
characteristics' which 'have been seen in most therapeutic 
communities' proposed by Clark; 
3 the 'common attributes' and 
'basic ideals' of Kennard, 
4 
which illustrate the 'similar 
ideas and procedures' in the mind of 'all who have used the 
term therapeutic community'; the six 'core features' of 
Rapoport which, according to Caine and Smail, 
5 
can be taken 
as being widely accepted by the main pioneers of the move- 
ment; the 'four fundamental themes' suggested elsewhere by 
Rapoport as characterizing the therapeutic community, and 
which 'are still worthy of general acceptance'; 
6 the 
1Hoffman, H. A. (1980) p. 75. 
2Kennard, D. (1983) p. (vii). 
3Clark, D. H. (1971) p. 44. 
4Kennard, 
D. (1983) p. 7 ff. 
5Sharp, V. (1975) p. 24. 
6Morrice, 
J. K. W. (1979) p. 49. 
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'operating principles' of Hoffman which, according to Jansen1 
are 'common to all therapeutic communities' within the 
hospital setting; the 'common principles' of the therapeutic 
community suggested by Jansen; 
2 
and perhaps, too, the 
'fundamental benefits' of Schwartz. 
3 
Here I shall consider briefly the 'common attributes' 
of therapeutic communities, as proposed by Kennard. 
4 I 
choose his list because it is an up-to-date conception of 
what a therapeutic community is or should be, and in a short 
space, introduces the reader well to the contemporary 
therapeutic community ethos. This account of therapeutic 
community attributes, which is considerably abridged, begins 
with those features which are most obviously visible or 
immediately apparent. 
1. Informal and communal atmosphere, 'homelike rather than 
institutional'. People are dressed informally., The 
visitor to a hospital wonders: 'Who are the patients? 
Who are the staff? ' Although informal, the atmosphere 
may not be relaxed - argument, laughter, tears are all 
possible - all out there in the open where anyone can 
see or even join in. Residents and staff are not clearly 
and immediately visible. Events of a rather private 
nature seem to be going on in public. 
1Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 24. 
2Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 32. 
3Schwartz, M. (1957). 
4Kennard, 
D. (1983) pp. 7ff. 
freely from the original. 
In the following description I have quoted 
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2. Central place of group meetings in the therapeutic 
programme. The purpose and sophistication of these 
meetings will vary considerably from one community to 
another, and the goals may not always be fully stated 
or even recognized. These meetings help to fulfill the 
following functions: 
(i) To maximise the sharing of information. 
(ii) To build a sense of cohesion. 
(iii) To make open and public the process of 
decision making. 
(iv) To provide a forum for personal feedback. 
(v) To provide the vehicle for community 
members to exert pressure on individuals 
whose attitudes or behaviour are dis- 
turbing or upsetting to others, or threaten 
their own well-being. 
3. Sharing the work of maintaining and running the community. 
Such work is important for the following reasons: 
(i) Participating in the community's daily 
tasks helps members to feel part of the 
community, to feel it is their community. 
(ii) People who have never learned to lead 
independent, responsible lives can begin 
to acquire the necessary skills and 
confidence to use them. 
(iii) Working with others in ordinary everyday 
tasks will bring to light many inter- 
personal problems which might remain 
12 
dormant in group meetings. 
(iv) In addition to its practical or thera- 
peutic merits, participation in 
constructive work also has certain 
moral connotations. The inclusion of 
shared communal tasks in the daily 
programme of modern therapeutic 
communities reflects not only. their 
therapeutic value for the individual, 
but also the moral values of social 
responsibility and good citzenship. 
4. The recognition of patients or residents as auxiliary 
therapists, commenting on, and influencing each other's 
behaviour and attitudes. In a therapeutic community, 
deliberate use is made of the effectiveness of this 
informal source of influence. 
In addition to these 'common attributes' which are 
concerned with 'practice', there are, according to Kennard, 
certain 'values' or 'beliefs' which characterize such 
communities, "basic ideals or points of view that are shared 
by all therapeutic communities". He lists three; again 
these are very much abridged. 
1. The acceptance of some basic psychodynamic principles. 
For example, the belief that an individual's difficulties 
are mostly in relation to other people. Or, that 
psychological symptoms are the outward expression of 
conflicts and tensions in an individual's relations with 
others. Again, therapy is essentially a learning process; 
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both in the sense of learning about oneself and others, 
and learning how to relate to others, for example how to 
be more open and assertive. 
2. The recognition of the basic equality of all members, 
whether staff or residents, professionals or non- 
professionals, therapists or patients. This equality 
has two aspects, the 'human' and the 'psychological'. 
Human equality refers to the belief that we should treat 
others as we would like to be treated. Psychological 
equality is the recognition that all members, whatever 
their role, share many of the same psychological qualities. 
To put this in the context of the hospital, staff are not 
completely 'well' and patients are not completely 'sick'. 
Staff members can at times feel upset, anxious or help- 
less; patients can at times be caring, creative and 
competent. 
3. The third value refers to an ideological aspect. 
Therapeutic communities do represent a moral value for 
those who work in them. "By this I mean that the various 
principles and procedures described in this chapter have 
developed not only because they are considered to be 
therapeutically useful, but because they also express 
certain beliefs about relationships, about how people 
ought to treat each other, and in particular about how 
professional workers ought (and ought not) to treat their 
patients or clients. " 
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This therapeutic community 'composite', which illus- 
trates common therapeutic community ideas and procedures, 
seems on the face of it to be perfectly straightforward, and 
even to be stating no more than the most obviously desirable 
considerations, which must apply to any up-to-date and 
liberal therapeutic unit or clinic. Yet I believe precisely 
this obviousness and reasonableness glosses over a number of 
questions, which far from being straightforward and amenable 
to any easy solution, are extremely problematic. A discussion 
of some of these questions will occupy part one of this 
thesis; for the moment I shall merely indicate some areas of 
unease which are suggested by Kennard's account. 
There is first of all a major contradiction which runs 
throughout this description of the therapeutic community. 
The most apparent thing about a therapeutic community is its 
homelike atmosphere. We are told very little about w this 
sort of atmosphere should be so important, and even less 
about what might be the salient features of such an atmosphere, 
beyond its informality and casualness. On the other hand, 
almost everything which Kennard goes on to tell us, in this 
extract, about the therapeutic community, suggests an 
atmosphere which is most decidedly unhomelike. The homelike 
atmosphere is illustrated by residents and staff being 'not 
clearly and immediately distinguishable', being made of 
basically the same psychological stuff - and by the capacity 
of the latter to feel at times upset, anxious and helpless. 
(When patients stray from their norm they become caring, 
creative and competent. ) The homelike atmosphere is 
characterized by 'therapeutic programmes', residents 
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conducting themselves towards one another as 'auxiliary 
therapists', assessing 'their own and each others progress', 
and using group meetings as therapeutic vehicles. How 
vividly this contrasts with the one resounding, actual, 
homelike image which appears in the book, where in the final 
paragraph of the preface Kennard refers to his toddler son 
playing with his father's typewriter. 
1 In this one image is 
condensed so much that one might well consider to be crucial 
to a 'homelike' atmosphere - creative play, a thing about 
which there is a merging of perspectives, a bond which is 
not merely in the service of therapeutic goals. 
Secondly, there is an assumption that entirely 
different notions to do with living and working together 
therapeutically may co-exist, or be gathered together under 
the umbrella concept of 'therapeutic community'. The concept 
of therapeutic community is defined by its 'common attri- 
butes'. It is first of all highly questionable whether this 
concept is adequately brought to light by this attributive 
approach. But in any case it is not quite apparent that 
these 'common attributes' are in many cases no more than 
superficial similarities? For example 
the third element common to all therapeutic 
communities is sharing the work of maintaining 
and running the community. This may vary from, 
at one extreme, residents doing virtually 
everything... to the other where hospital 
residents may help in serving meals and 
washing up, but leave most of the chores to 
the paid staff. 2 
1Kennard, D. (1983) p. (x). 
2Kennard, D. (1983) p. 9. 
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Is there not more than a degree of sharing suggested here: 
and are we not forced to conclude that the concept of 
sharing itself calls to be examined critically? 
"Participating in the community's daily tasks helps 
members to feel part of the community, to feel it is their 
community. "1 Whether this is in fact the case of someone 
who is cajoled into doing the washing up in the 'therapeutic 
community' wing of a large institution is very far from self 
evident: and to suppose that this notion of communality has 
anything in common with the manner in which people may share 
a home, or enjoy a homelike atmosphere, seems presumptious in 
the extreme. 
The Background 
Those institutions which emerged during the early years 
of the nineteenth century, and which are associated with the 
era of 'moral treatment', may be taken as the precursors of 
the contemporary therapeutic community. The best known of 
these was the York 'Retreat', founded by the Quaker William 
Tuke in 1792. 
Over the next twenty years Tuke developed 
an approach that had a profound effect on 
the treatment of the insane as practised 
at that time. In place of physical re- 
straints and enforced idleness, common in 
the eighteenth-century madhouses, he showed 
how treating the insane as near as possible 
as normal people and giving them useful 
occupations could produce unimagined 
1Kennard, D. (1983) p. 9. 
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improvement in their mental state. This 
approach came to be known as moral treatment. 
A term difficult to translate into modern 
concepts, it implied the treatment of the 
character of the individual, the whole person 
in his social environment. 1 
For the moment, I would like merely to draw attention to 
two points to do with moral treatment. 
Firstly, the 'retreats' and 'asylums' or 'santuaries' 
of 'moral treatment' arose, in part at least, as a response 
or challenge to the medical profession, from whose ranks the 
experts in the management of madness were now increasingly 
being drawn. 
Tuke had explicitly not sought to create or 
train a group of experts in moral treatment. 
He and his followers were deeply suspicious 
of any plan to hand the treatment of lunatics 
over to experts. In the words of William 
Ellis (the superintendent of one of the new 
moral treatment asylums) 'Of the abuses that 
have existed, the cause of a agreat proportion 
of them may be traced to the mystery with 
which many of those who have had the manage- 
ment of the insane have constantly endeavoured 
to envelope it. ' Those who had developed 
moral treatment claimed that the new approach 
was little more than an application of common 
sense and humanity; and these were scarcely 
qualities monopolised by experts. 2 
On the matter of medical persons being allowed to assume the 
role of 'inspectors' or 'controllers' within these moral 
'asylums', one lay witness to these select committees had the 
following to say: 
1Kennard, D. (1983) p. 16. 
2Skull, A. (1979). Quoted in Kennard, D. (1983) p. 19. 
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I think they are the most unfit of any class 
of persons. In the first place, from every 
enquiry I have made, I am satisfied that 
medicine has little or no effect on the 
disease, and the only reason for their 
selection is the confidence which is placed 
in their being able to apply a remedy to the 
malady. They are all persons interested more 
or less. It is extremely difficult in 
examining either the public institutions or 
private houses not to have a strong impression 
upon your mind, that medical men derive a 
profit in some shape or form from these 
different establishments... The rendering 
therefore, of any interested class of-persons 
the Inspectors and Controllers, I hold to be 1 
mischievous in the greatest possible degree. 
Secondly, the decline of 'moral treatment', and its 
failure to build upon its successes, is attributable in part 
precisely to this reluctance of Tuke et al to establish a 
new profession of experts, a "coherent body to challenge the 
claim of the medical profession to responsibility for the 
mentally ill". 
2 
Moral treatment, because of its non- 
technicality, did not encourage the emergence 
of an organized professional group which 
would seek to prevent other groups from 
adopting it. In addition, exponents of moral 
treatment proved largely incapable of con- 
fronting the medical profession both at a 
theoretical level and at a descriptive 
(linguistic) level. The language of madness 
remained that of medicine. These factors 
combined to make moral treatment vulnerable 
to a takeover bid from the medical profession - 
and this, as Skull carefully documents, is 
precisely what happened. 3 
In 1817, the recommendations of the Select Committees, that 
these asylums should be supervised by laymen and not doctors, 
1Ingleby, 
D. (1981) p. 129. 
2Kennard, D. (1983) p. 23. 
3ingleby, D. (1981) p. 128. 
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were defeated by the House of Lords. 
The years following the era of moral treatment saw the 
consolidation of the profession of psychiatry, and of the 
medical control over the institutions for the treatment of 
the insane. 
The profession's first clear-cut victory 
came with the passing of the 1828 Act, which 
contained the stipulation that all asylums 
should have medical supervision... With the 
passing of the 1845 Lunatics Act, the medical 
profession's claims to have the sole right 
to treat the mentally disordered received 
statuary endorsement - doctors now controlled 
the only legitimate institutions for the 
treatment of the insane, and also began to 
profoundly influence the way the mental dis- 
order was to be construed by lay opinion. ' 
Some dawning awareness of the importance of the social 
context of psychiatric treatment - the motivating insight of 
the 'moral treatment' movement - was again finding clear 
articulation in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Of some importance were the writings of humanitarian 
reformers such as Clifford Beers, who, following his 
experience of hospitalization, and the success of the book 
in which he described the conditions he encountered, went on 
to establish an influential educational group which lobbied 
for reforms in mental health. Of more lasting significance 
was the growing influence of psychoanalysis, and the new 
science of sociology, which was to some extent inspired by 
psychoanalytic researches. Common to each of these sciences 
was a concern with the interaction between persons; and it 
1Ingleby, D. (1981) p. 129. 
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was largely through their influence that the therapeutic 
situation of the hospital came to be seen, and spoken of, in 
interactional, or interpersonal terms. Of particular 
importance in the bringing together of these two influences 
was H. S. Sullivan, who wrote in 1931, in connection with 
schizophrenic disorders, that "not sick individuals, but 
complex, peculiarly characterized situations were the subject 
matter of research and therapy. "1 Sullivan's interest was now 
turned not only to the patient-therapist relationship, but 
also the 'social milieu' in which this relationship was set; 
his subsequent studies led him to hypothesise that the 
milieu was one of the major factors contributing to therapeutic 
outcome. And, according to Thompson, it was in his lectures 
of 1938-40 that Sullivan is reported to have first used the 
term 'therapeutic community', "to describe the nature of an 
experimental psychiatric milieu in which the intrinsic 
features of the living situation were seen to play a major 
role in patient progress., 
2 
Despite these formative influences, it was not until 
the years following the Second World War that the therapeutic 
community 'movement' became established as a significant and 
articulate voice within British Psychiatry. Several 
factors may be mentioned as having a direct bearing upon the 
emergence and growth of this 'new force'. Amongst the first 
of these we may consider the 'open door' policy and the new 
'Sullivan, 
H. S. (1931) p. 977-991. Quoted in Thompson, R. D. (1976) p. 96. 
2Thompson, R. D. (1976) p. 99. 
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notion of 'voluntary admission'. 
The 1953 W. H. O. report on mental health was already 
speaking of the 'proper role' of the mental hospital as 
being that of a therapeutic community. "If the psychiatric 
hospital is to be a therapeutic community it must gradually 
impose upon recovering patients the responsibility which 
citizenship of the wider community implies... life within the 
hospital, should as far as possible, be modelled on life 
within the community in which it is set. "1 It must be 
remembered that when these proposals were introduced, most 
hospitals subscribed to the notion that mentally ill people 
should be locked up for their own good, if not for the safety 
of others around them, and it was only gradually that these 
locked door policies came to be more or less abandoned by the 
end of the fifties. It is, incidentally, a mistaken belief 
that the opening of the wards was brought about by the co- 
incident introduction of tranquillizers, since discharge 
figures show a rise that antedates the 'success rate derived 
from drug use' .2A further turning point in this movement 
away from the hospital as a largely custodial institution was 
the 1959 Mental Health Act which gave status to the notion of 
the voluntary in-patient, and which stipulated that "as much 
treatment as possible, both in hospital and outside should be 
-W. H. O. Report, 1953. Quoted in Thompson, R. D. (1976) pp. 107-108. 
2See Thompson, R. D. (1976) p. 109. See also Clark, D. H. (1974). 
Writing of Bell and his colleagues at Dingleton Hospital, Melrose, 
who were innovators in the 'open door' mental hospital policy, 
Clark says that they 'were an example to all of us. They showed 
it was possible; when we had tranquillizers it became easier'. 
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given on an informal and voluntary basis". 
1 
A second, and most important influence upon the emergence 
of 'therapeutic communities' was provided by the new group 
analytic approaches to psychotherapy, whose methods grew out 
of the expediencies of having to treat numbers of patients 
within military neurosis units during and immediately following 
the Second World War. The now legendary stories of Bion, 
Foulkes, and Tom Main at Northfield Hospital, and of Maxwell 
Jones at Mill Hill have been extensively written up else- 
where; in reading them we are left in no doubt as to the close 
intertwining of the group analytic and therapeutic community 
movements. 
2 
A third factor was the influence of occupational 
therapy, and the growing recognition of the potential thera- 
peutic value of 'work situations'. Modern occupational 
therapy begins with the work of Harmann Simon in Germany, 
which was subsequently taken up with particular interest by 
the Dutch. Following a study of the Dutch work by British 
psychiatrists, arranged by the English Board of control in 
1933, the introduction of workshops, the establishment of the 
role of occupational therapist, and the expansion of 
occupational therapy facilities continued to be a feature of 
psychiatric hospitals throughout the late forties and early 
fifties. 
1Quoted in Thompson, R. D. (1976) p. 114. 
2See, for example, Kennard, D. (1983) pp. 42ff. and Main, T. (1977). 
23 
The overall contribution that these examples 
of teamwork made to later milieu therapy 
projects can be guaged from the consistent 
emphasis that was laid upon stimulation of 
patients rather than neglect, joint consult- 
ation and delegation of responsibility, social 
rehabilitation rather than institutional 
isolation, and significantly, sexual integration 
during 'working hours' - considered by many 
administrators at the time to have been 
unmanageable. It was found that not only did 
occupational therapists find it easier to 
manage mixed groups but that 'once patients 
began to miygle, it began to look like a normal 
community'. 
Fourthly, we may mention the growing tide of empirical 
studies which questioned the efficacy of psychiatric insti- 
tutions. By the late 1950s, a growing number of disquiets 
as to the effects of long term institutionalization were 
being voiced. There was already, for example, Barton's well- 
known study of 'institutional neurosis', a state said to be 
characterized by "loss of interest, especially in things of 
an impersonal nature, submissiveness, apparent inability to 
make plans for the future, lack of individuality and sometimes 
a characteristic posture or gait". 
2 Barton claimed that after 
four years in hospital most patients suffer from two con- 
ditions: schizophrenia and 'institutional neurosis'. This 
latter condition was described as a 'secondary symptomology' 
in that it derived from the negative effects of incarceration 
3 
and was not diagnosable on admission to hospital. 
The discovery of iatrogenic features of mental 
hospital treatment co-incided with - and in some ways 
1Thompson, R. D. (1976) p. 112. 
2Barton, R. (1959). 
3See Thompson, R. D. (1976) p. 124. 
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reflected - the growing influence of sociological thinking 
upon psychiatric practice. The earlier sociological studies 
of mental hospital life of Deutsch (1948), 
1 Stanton and 
Schwartz (1954) 2 and Caudill (1958) 
3 
were followed by the 
definitive work of Goffman, who, in a series of studies 
carried out between 1956 and 1962,4 demonstrated quite 
unequivocally the pathogenic features which mental hospitals 
share with other 'total institutions' such as prisons. At 
the same time, a number of lesser studies, this time con- 
ducted by psychiatrists themselves, contributed to a growing 
awareness that the involvement of doctors and nurses itself 
played an important part in the treatment process of mental 
patients. 
There was, for example, the Insulin story. Introduced 
by Sakel in 1935, insulin coma therapy became widely adopted 
as a form of treatment for schizophrenic patients. 
Many chronically ill patients, given up as 
hopeless, made dramatic recoveries; many 
acutely ill patients recovered far quicker 
than was expected. Because it was a dangerous 
and occasionally fatal treatment, a well- 
organized and highly trained staff team was 
necessary. Many hospitals set up an 'insulin 
unit'; because this was often the most exciting 
and rewarding section of the hospital, it 
attracted the keen, eager well-qualified young 
doctors, nurses and attendants. They formed 
tightly knit teams, working together through 
crises and long dramas of life-saving so that 
they came to know and trust one another as 
colleagues and comrades... To the visitor it 
'Deutsch, (1948). 
2Stanton, A. H. and Schwartz, M. S. (1954). 
3Caudill, W. A. (1958). 
4See 
e. g., Goffman, E. (1961). 
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was striking how different the relationships 
in a good insulin unit were from the rest of 
the hospital. The staff were on easy, confi- 
dent terms with one another, with private 
jokes and a special jargon; the patients were 
spoken to warmly by their Christian names, 
spoon-fed, and encouraged; all played games 
together in the afternoon, patients, nurses and 
even doctors. But little of this was mentioned 
in the publications, which still discussed 
varieties of insulin, dosages, potentiators, 
frequency and depth of comas, symptomatic prog- 
nosticators, and such individual, unemotional 
'objective' considerations. This treatment con- 
tinued in vogue for nearly twenty years, despite 
a few critical voices. Then Bourne voiced the 
growing challenge, and Ackner, Harris and Oldham, 
in a classic study, showed that whatever the 
effective agent was, it was not insulin. 
Attention then turned to the intensive group 
experiences provided in an insulin unit and the 
possibility of understanding and using them. ' 
And subsequent studies indeed confirmed that insulin treatment 
recoveries from schizophrenic conditions owed more to the 
attentions of the medical staff administering the drug than 
to the properties of the drug itself. 
One final factor must be mentioned. It was not so 
much a conceptual breakthrough, nor even a full-bodied 
realization of the utter inappropriateness of the 
traditional mental hospital as a place of healing for the 
troubled mind, which was concretely, perhaps, to prepare the 
way for the acceptance of an 'interpersonal' approach to 
psychiatric treatment. It was, rather, the development and 
application of an increasingly sophisticated psycho- 
pharmacology. Pyschiatry's revolution was also chemistry's. 
It was, as Thompson puts it, "advances in psychopharmacology 
which provided the breakthrough that was needed to ensure the 
1Clark, D. H. (1971) pp. 6-7. 
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stability of the milieu in which the patient was to be 
treated". 
' 
Whether or not we conclude at this point that the 
'humanization' of psychiatry is little more than a 'tran- 
quilization', is irrelevant to this evident truth: that a 
great deal of soundness underlies most of the insights which 
have led to the development of therapeutic communities. It 
is perhaps, ironically, the very soundness, common-sense 
obviousness of these insights which contributes to the fact 
that, in many important regards, they remain insufficiently 
thought through, their implications insufficiently recognized 
or realized. It is thus that one might speak of sensing, 
within the therapeutic community movement, a latency which 
remains obscured, an argument which everywhere is touched 
upon, yet nowhere is heard through. 
There is, in fact, throughout the literature on 
therapeutic communities, a tension between two fundamentally 
opposed tendencies or inclinations. First of all, therapeutic 
communities, almost without exception, propose a de- 
medicalization, de-technologization, de-institutionalization 
of psychiatric treatment. This movement, followed through, 
leads quite logically to an abandonment of the hypothesis of 
mental or psychological illness as a condition people suffer 
from, and to a complete revision of the way in which the 
facts giving rise to these notions are seen. At this point, 
a radical transformation of thinking and practice does 
indeed become possible. 
'Thompson, R. D. (1976) p. 106. 
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But this movement cannot be followed through, since it 
remains locked within a wrong epistemology. What was 
referred to as the therapeutic community 'impulse' remains 
sedated within an epistemology appropriate to the treatment 
of illness and psychological disorder, but quite inappro- 
priate to an elucidation to the meanings and textures of 
ordinary life, which constitute the context and ground 
whereupon we might understand its variations. So long as 
therapeutic communities remain embedded within this epistemo- 
logical framework, they will continue to represent alternative 
forms of treatment. An adequate approach to a community that 
is to be authentically therapeutic, however, requires a 
radical departure precisely from this structure of alterna- 
tives. 
A Culture of Inquiry 
The term 'therapeutic community' is usually acknow- 
ledged to have been coined by Dr. Tom Main, in describing 
the work done at Northfield Hospital during the latter part 
of the Second World War. 
1 
In 1946 he wrote: "The experiment 
is an attempt to use a hospital not as an organization run 
by doctors in the interests of their own greater technical 
efficiency, but as a community with the immediate aim of full 
participation of all its members in its daily life". 
2 
Writing more than thirty years later, Main suggests that 
1See, 
e. g., Clark, D. H. (1974) p. 29. 
2Main, T. (1946). 
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the therapeutic community "involves the total community in 
a culture of inquiry into the nature of the social processes 
within, and how far these truly succeed or fail in caring 
for the specific individuals in it, both patients and staff". 
l 
In this same article, he proposes that "the treatment and 
administration can be thought of as one total clinical 
activity". Main fails to notice that 'culture of inquiry' 
and 'total clinical activity' belong to very different 
epistemologies. 
The medical model, of which 'total clinical activity' 
speaks, assumes the existence of - or sees as self-evidently 
given - 'mental illness', as a substantive entity-condition, 
causally determinative of behaviour. To this condition, 
which the other is seen to be suffering from, or to the other 
as 'the owner of the illness', treatment is offered or 
applied as a means towards an end. This means of proceeding 
assumes, or takes as self-evidently given, the nature of the 
condition, the desired goal of treatment, and the appropriate- 
ness of certain specified means to bring about these goals. 
Now in fact each of these 'givens' continues to be the source 
of much critical and often impassioned debate amongst social 
scientists and philosophers, as well as between the various 
professionals concerned - psychiatrists and 'anti-psychiat- 
rists', psychoanalysts and psychotherapists, and it would be 
quite erroneous to suppose that these matters have in any 
way been 'resolved'. Whatever such 'resolution' might turn 
-Main, T. (1980) p. 55. 
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out to be, it clearly does not simply await 'further find- 
ings' or definitive studies. There is no shortage of 
'material' fed into the psychiatric debate, which is less 
uninformed than unreasoned. No student of the state of 
psychiatry capable of scientific impartiality and reasonedness 
could fail to recognize the role which vested interest plays 
in obscuration of reason. On the face of it, therefore, 
there would indeed seem to be very good grounds to welcome 
Main's call for a 'culture of inquiry'. But it is curious 
logic which both calls for a 'total culture of inquiry' and 
at the same time incorporates this as yet another ingredient 
contained within the overall directives of a pre-existing 
clinical activity brought to bear upon the 'owner of the 
illness', 1 since it is precisely the nature of 'mental ill- 
ness', and the assumption that it is the sort of thing which 
people 'have' which demands most especially to be questioned. 
Every inquiry is guided by a question. The question 
which initially guided Main's inquiry essentially was this: 
to what extent is the clinical effectiveness of the psychiatric 
unit, hospital or community within which treatment is applied 
to patients, impeded by the interpersonal difficulties and 
problems which beset all of its members, staff as well as 
patients. His conclusions are quite clear. 
When I got there I found the usual hospital 
convention of regarding all the staff as 
being totally healthy, and if wayward, over- 
ridden, reproved or disciplined; and all 
patients as being totally ill, and if 
wayward to be tolerated as not real people 
and treated with charity, drugs or psycho- 
therapy - that is to say social splitting and 
1Main, T. (1980) p. 54. 
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the projection of health and illness were part 
of the social order... One evening I suddenly 
realized the whole community, all staff as well 
as all patients, needed to be viewed as a troubled 
larger system which needed treatment. 
' 
As examples of disorders common to the community as a 
whole, staff at all levels as well as patients, Main refers 
to: 'unconscious fantasies', 'blind mutual projection of 
evil', 'distorted perceptions', 'defensive use of roles', 
'resistances', 'unthinking staff-based discipline', 
'unbearable anxieties', and 'rigid defences against them', 
'projection of hostilities', 'loss of the hope of insight', 
'creation and maintenance of various split-off sectors', 
into which are projected 'evil and disorder', 'projective 
defences against studying more painful interpersonal con- 
flicts in depth', 'persecutory anxiety', 'disownment of 
responsibility', 'the fear of being attacked', 'acting out 
of anxieties', 'suspiciousness', 'collusive splitting and 
protective defences against pain', and 'social splits, 
especially insofar as patients may be used as containers 
of childishness and helplessness'. 
2 
Main is making a diagnosis of those treatment units 
with which he is familiar, and he is indicating in no un- 
certain terms that their 'interpersonal life' is far from 
being healthy. It is, he says, precisely the resolving of 
such 'social splits' which is the "never ending task in any 
hospital aiming to be therapeutic". 
3 The 'troubled larger 
1Main, T. (1977) p. 6. 
2Ibid. 
p. 17. 
31bid. 
pp. 13-14. 
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system', therefore, itself needs treatment if it is to be 
therapeutic for all. The treatment which Main proposes is 
the creation of a 'total culture of inquiry', "to examine, 
understand and resolve the tensions and defensive use of 
roles which are inevitable in any total system". 
1 
According to Main, a 'culture' or 'folkways' of 
'patient honest inquiry into difficulties'2 is the single 
most important element in a community that is to be truly 
therapeutic, a community whose 'hallmark is not a particular 
form of social structure but a culture of inquiry'. 
3 
It is not the structure but the culture which 
is decisive for the relations on offer. 
4 
Over and above efficiency and social structure, 
the culture, the ways people in the structure 
relate to one another - is decisive for whether 
people in the structure treat one another's 
roles with distance or warmth, emnity of 
friendliness, respect or contempt, concern or 
coldness. 5 
It is the culture, then, which is decisive for the thera- 
peutic community. And it is what Main calls a culture of 
inquiry which in effect provides a 'treatment' for the 
community as a whole, staff as well as patients, a treatment 
whereby the interpersonal difficulties which beset all 
members of the community may be 'understood' and 'resolved'. 
1Ibid. 
p. 11. 
2Ibid. 
p. 15. 
3Ibid. 
p. 16. 
4Ibid. 
p. 15. 
5Ibid. 
p. 15. 
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At this point, we may mention two difficulties which 
seem to have arisen. The first concerns the manner in which 
Main is using the world 'culture'. The second, to which we 
shall return in the following section, introduces a certain 
amount of confusion which surrounds the notion of 'treatment'. 
The sense in which Main is speaking of cultural 
experience is not clear. When he speaks of the culture of 
a hospital, a unit or a battalion, he seems to have in mind 
something like the spirit or ethos of the place; and in this 
sense the claim that this ethos is important is clearly 
intelligible. But at the same time, Main speaks of the 
culture rather as an instrument, an 'instrument of inquiry', 
by claiming for example that 'the culture aims at freeing 
the initiative of patients so that they may undertake 
responsibilities, it has the same aims for staff'. 
1 The 
question now presents itself, who sets these cultural aims? 
Who aims the culture? The answer is clear: 'culture spreads 
from the top in any hierarchy'. 
2 The culture follows the 
leader: 
it is decisively influenced by the ways the 
organizational heads relate to others. As 
they relate to their immediate sub-heads, so 
will these relate to their staffs, and their 
staff to their juniors. In a therapeutic 
community, where a culture of patient, honest 
inquiry into difficulty is needed, with 
interest in understanding in depth the per- 
sonal systems, the systems, group systems and 
the community system, it seems essential that 
the culture be initiated by the heads of the 
community organization. 3 
'Main, T. (1980) p. 61. 
2 Ibid. p. 55. 
3Main, 
T. (1977) p. 15. 
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But if the culture is administered from the top, and has 
accordingly a specific purpose and aim - in what senses may 
we still speak of it as a culture? 
Within Main's discussion of culture, one emphasis may 
clearly be discerned: it is a unitary culture whose imple- 
mentation or initiation proves to be decisive. This contrasts 
with the 'two cultures' - staff and patient - more typically 
associated with hospital life. Here, in this case 'it is one 
culture for all - an entity'. 
The nurses or their counterparts do not seek to 
do things to patients or for patients, but with 
patients. Their patients are theirs, and they 
are their patients... the culture is one entity, 
a patient/staff culture and not1one for staff 
and another one for patients... 
Informed patient participation in organizing ýnd 
running the ways of a hospital is possible... 
The way staff members are cared for and taught, 
related to and recognized as singular people, 
is their 3odel for how they will treat their 
patients. 
This cultural entity is further characterized by its stress 
upon informality. By no means does Main wish to suggest by 
this that the efficiency of the organization as a whole will 
be increased by the 'blurring of roles'. On the contrary, 
he is most explicit in stating that 'efficiency requires 
clear, unshakeable roles for all'. 
4 The informality of the 
culture, rather, will be reflected in the manner in which 
1Main, T. (1980) p. 61. 
2Main, 
T. (1977) p. 13. 
3Main, 
T. (1980) p. 61. 
4Main, 
T. (1977) p. 15. 
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the duties and responsibilities accorded to each of these 
roles will be discharged. 
Whether the responsibilities in such a clear 
system will or will not be discharged in an 
authoritarian or a humane manner will not be 
the result of the structure's clarity but will 
depend on the character of people and the 
culture, the folkways of the organization. 
Clarity of structure and of roles actually 
enhances efficiency and minimizes conflicts 
between roles and about responsibility and 
allows examination of remote manoeuvre. I 
join the inability of Raskin to regard roje 
blurring as therapeutic, for a community. 
The culture, then, is the 'folkways of operating an 
organization, including the informal ways people relate to 
each other'. 
2 But are we not again forced to question Main's 
choice of his key term - culture? Is he not recommending a 
policy with a view to the more efficient running of an 
organization, a policy which, at the same time as underscoring 
the notion of 'unshakeable roles for all', suggests that the 
enactment of these roles may more fruitfully be approached 
within an ambiance of a carefully contrived informality. 
But a culture does not merely allocate our roles and the 
parameters within which they may be enacted; it is rather a 
source from which we all draw, and whose traditions, in 
their cultivation and handing on, enable us creatively to 
express the ambiguities of freedom and commitment, of 
originality and faithfulness. 
This notion of tradition is touched upon, again in the 
context of a discussion of therapeutic work, by Winnicott, 
who proposes that originality is possible only on the basis 
1Ibid. 
p. 15. 
2Ibid. 
p. 15. 
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of a cultural tradition of which he writes: 
In using the word 'culture' I am thinking of 
the inherited tradition. I am thinking of 
something that is in the common pool of 
humanity, into which individuals and groups 
may contribute, and from which we may all1draw 
if we have somewhere to put what we find. , 
But does not this stress upon tradition - the common pool of 
humanity - contrast with the professionalised expertism of 
which Main speaks, where 
it seems essential that the culture be initiated 
by the heads of the community organization. 
They are thus required to practise true pro- 
fessional respect and professional concern for 2 
each other and for their immediate subordinates. 
For how, in the initiation of this culture, do these pro- 
fessionals show the source from which they draw, and further- 
more, its commongroundedness, and accessibility to us all? 
When in the name of 'total inquiry' a 'culture' 
excommunicates certain powerful areas of cultural experience, 
by aiming its very inquiry as an instrument of treatment, do 
we not approach that privative cultural domain, that of the 
cult? In Main's account, the therapeutic community was a 
sudden insight, a major conceptual shift, a 
new way of viewing events in a hospital. It 
also demanded appropriate viewing instruments. 
At this level of system -a whole community - 
techniques of investigation gnd intervention 
had still yet to be devised. 
1Winnicott, D. W. (1974) p. 116. 
2Main, T. (1977) p. 15. 
3Ibid. 
p. 11. 
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This 'where' of cultural experience is a long way indeed 
from the 'potential space', the between, the space of 
creative play and originality of which Winnicott writes. 
Where, in his telling phrase, do we put what we find, if 
what awaits it is an appropriate viewing instrument in the 
service of intervention. 
Treatment 
A certain amount of confusion seems, typically, to 
surround the notion of treatment, as it arises within the 
therapeutic community literature. Consider the following 
statement by Main: "The way the staff members are cared for 
and taught, related to and recognised as singular people, 
is their model for how they will treat their patients". 
' 
The confusion here seems to arise between two quite different 
stands or orientations: between 'treating' someone (e. g. 
providing a 'treatment') and treating someone, for example, 
'well'; or between 'treating' someone, and noticing how we 
are treating each other. This distinction is crucially 
important in the context of an inquiry into the 'culture' 
of a community, and how such a culture may be therapeutic. 
For when one person is treating another with respect to his 
mental illness, very severe limitations indeed are placed 
upon the likelihood of these two persons getting to know 
one another, or arriving at the possibility of finding them- 
selves upon a common ground. 
1Main, T. (1980) p. 61. 
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A doctor treats his patients. He brings special skills to 
bear upon particular conditions - which may sometimes only 
be visible to his trained eye, or with the help of medical 
technology - and with a defined end in view. Here, the 
word 'treat' is being used in a very specific sense. 
But all human beings, whether they like it or not, are, 
in one way or another, 'treating' each other all the time. 
Treatment in this broader sense refers to our manner of 
conduct towards the other. It reflects our degree of concern 
or involvement with the other and the manner in which this is 
lived out. Thus we speak of being treated considerately or 
thoughtfully, or on the other hand unkindly or selfishly. 
Treatment in this sense of behaviour towards is not something 
we do sometimes and not other times, for we cannot do other- 
wise than to conduct ourselves towards others, to treat them 
in one fashion or another. 
We may of course be more or less mindful of the ways in 
which we treat others, or one another. It is possible not 
to realize that someone is being treated badly until this is 
pointed out to us. It is possible, moreover, to treat someone 
quite badly oneself without being particularly aware of it. 
Similarly, one may be more or less aware of the ways in which 
other people are treating oneself; it is not uncommon for 
a person to put up with appalling treatment at the hands of 
others, whilst at the same time indicating very little 
awareness that this is the case. 
This sense of treatment is quite distinct from the 
sense in which a doctor, dentists or nurse might offer 
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treatment. A doctor is free to treat his patients, or 
withhold treatment. He is certainly not free to withhold 
his behaviour towards his patients. He might find himself, 
under certain circumstances, saying "I'm not going to treat 
any more patients tonight" or "I refuse to treat Mrs Jones", 
but these remarks of course speak of a certain manner of 
treating his patients. 
My treating someone well or badly refers to my conduct 
towards that person, as a person. It makes very little sense 
to say that I treated someone's head badly, even if I punched 
him unconscious. A doctor, on the other hand, might quite 
reasonably say that he was pleased or dissatisfied with the 
way he had treated a broken leg. This sort of treatment 
always has an end in view, whereas I might well treat someone 
thoughtfully or decently without having any end in view at 
all. Not only are many of our conducts towards one another 
'for their own sake'; some conduct or modes of conduct can 
only (if authentic) be for their own sake, and cease to be 
what they are when they are performed or engaged in for some 
ulterior purpose. 
We have seen that Main, in his notion of culture, is 
drawing some degree of attention to the ways in which people 
treat one another, and to the relevance of this to the 
overall context of treatment. He has indicated some of the 
difficulties between persons which call for this contextual 
treatment. We may now ask whether there are any 'especial' 
difficulties which beset those who are specifically 
designated as patients. And whether any specific treatments, 
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in addition to the 'treatment for all', are required by these 
patients. 
Main does not - at least in the articles from which I 
have quoted - spell out in any detail the sort of character- 
istics whereby patients may be distinguished from staff, other 
than claiming that they are mentally ill, 'sick', 'ill', 
'liable to distort reality', and 'fail to understand others', 
although he adds that 'such failures are as common among 
staff as among patients'. He refers also to 'annoying 
inefficiencies' of patients, and gives as an example of 
'inefficient individuals' those who were "recognizably pre- 
occupied with intrapersonal problems such as personal 
mourning for multiple comrade loss, and other such intra- 
systemic problems which were not primarily disturbances of 
relations with the present objects". 
' 
Is the treatment of the community as a whole - the 
culture of inquiry - sufficiently effective a therapy to heal 
these specific sicknesses, mental illness proper? Main feels 
not, although it helps. Main divides the sick person into 
two parts, one of which may directly engage in the therapy 
of the treatment culture, while the other part benefits in- 
directly, as a consequence of the staff being able to do 
their job more efficiently. 
Psychiatric patients are sick as people, but 
not sick all through... Their skills and 
healthy parts need not be ignored in daily 
life in hospital as in the medical model which 
-Main, T. (1977) p. 10. 
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concentrates only on the sick parts. 
1 
The healthy parts of the sick personality may therefore take 
part in the culture of inquiry which is the hallmark of the 
effective community. "Informed patient participation in 
organizing and running the ways of a hospital is possible., 
2 
The sick part continues to be treated medically. Thus: 
By altering the relations sought by staff and 
patients a hospital can become less anti- 
therapeutic and more therapeutic for all, and 
yet still allow room for the appropriate 
practice of the medical model. 3 
Certain staff, usually medical or psycho- 
therapeutic, may be required to investigate 
especially the illnesses and incapacities of 
patients and to prescribe and monitor drugs; 
for the concept of a therapeutic community 
does not exclude these. Indeed, they operate 
best in a society which is concerned with 
. 
'+ whole people 
Finally, Main informs us that "this attempt to create an 
atmosphere of respect for all and the examination of all 
difficulties would be a long way from the medical model". 
5 
A very similar equivocation of position, which may be 
seen again to pivot around the notion of 'treatment' is to 
be found in the writings of Maxwell Jones, who, along with 
Main, is one of the pioneers or founding fathers of the 
therapeutic community. Maxwell Jones appears on the face of 
it to adopt a critical stance towards the medical treatment 
1Ibid. 
p. 13. 
2Ibid. 
p. 13. 
3Ibid. 
p. 13. 
4Main, T. (1980) p. 62. (My italics. ) 
5Main, T. (1977) p. 11. 
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of mental illness, which indeed seems to infuse his whole 
conception of the therapeutic community. 
It is difficult to understand why in the past 
psychiatry has been content to imitate the 1 
practices and principles of general medicine... 
In a manner typical of the arrogance which 
characterizes the modern mental health movement, 
the term 'psychopathology' was coined so that 
certain forms of deviancy, later to be elaborated 
into ever more diagnostic categories, were created2 
as types of 'illness' and so 'treated' by doctors. 
We note the placing of the word 'treated' in inverted commas, 
and the implied radicalness of his critical position. Writing 
of the resistance to his early work, Maxwell Jones states 
that 'an approach to 'treatment' based on social organization 
and using the social environment of the 'patient' to effect 
change had little appeal for academic psychiatry'. 
3 
Maxwell Jones writes that "the social structure and 
function of the psychiatric hospital need to be examined 
critically... indeed the word hospital with its implications 
of sickness is inappropriate to psychiatric practice". 
4 In 
a manner reminiscent of Main's culture of inquiry, Maxwell 
Jones proposes that all 'treatment units' might 'attempt a 
fresh start, questioning all their basic prejudices and 
preconceptions and involving the 'patients' as people right 
from the start". 
5 Jones proposes, then, that psychiatry 
turn to the 'therapeutic potential' of the community. Yet 
IJones, 
M. 
2 
Jones, M. 
3Ibid. 
P. 
4 
Jones, M. 
5 
Jones, M. 
(1968) p. (xii). 
(1979) p. 4. 
2. 
(1968) p. 127. 
(1979) p. 7. (My italics. ) 
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what does this radical departure from tradition actually 
amount to? 
The trend now is wherever possible to maintain 
the mentally sick person in the community, 1 
rather than incarcerate him in an institution. 
It is our conviction that the setting in which 
treatment occurs is extremely important. At 
times it may determine whether or not a particular 
treatment method (psychological or physical) is 
effective. So far hospitals and community treat- 
ment programmes have paid remarkably little 
attention to this significant aspect of treatment, 
and the therapeutic community represents an attempt 
to correct this state of affairs. 2 
Maxwell Jones' thinking of the therapeutic community 
clearly is essentially medicalistic throughout, notwith- 
standing his preference, in his later writings, to talk of 
'deviancy' rather than 'illness'. His writings do, however, 
place an inflection upon the concept of 'therapeutic 
community' which differs from that of Main. Whereas Main 
is proposing a communalization of the hospital, Jones 
proposes the hospitalization of the community. 
The family and work situations are seen as having 
increasing possibilities for the treatment of 
mental illness. 3 
Hospital treatment plays only a small part in 
the care of the mentally sick. Precare and 
after care are equally important if the treatment 4 
of the patient and his family is to be successful. 
Maxwell Jones proposes "to improve communication between 
hospital and community", 
5 
and finally speaks of the community 
1Jones, M. (1968) p. 111. 
2Ibid. 
p. (xiv). 
3Ibid. 
p. 111. 
4Ibid. 
p. 111. 
5Ibid. 
p. 112. 
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at large as the 'extra-hospital dimension'. 
1 
Now interwoven within this predominantly medicalistic 
thinking - and at the same time unable to find any coherent 
expression within the constraints of its particular episte- 
mology - there runs a perfectly coherent thread of argument, 
which may be picked up and developed quite independently. 
It is an argument which does not 'take' well within a medical 
culture. It proposes simply that the ways in which people 
treat one another, and are treated by one another has a 
direct bearing upon, and may be determinative of their health 
and well-being. This surely is precisely what Main is 
claiming when he suggests that "a community may become thera- 
peutic as a social organization no matter what individual 
treatments were or were not offered". 
2 For the salient 
characteristics of a 'social system' which might be thera- 
peutic for all are articulated in terms such as 'joint 
recognition of each individual's capacities and limitations', 
'respect for the other', 'getting to know the other well as 
a person', and 'the attempt to create an atmosphere of 
respect for all', all of which refer to 'the ways in which 
people relate to each other'. Now there is of course 
nothing particularly 'medical' about any of these ideas, 
which are simply a part of the vocabulary of everyday life. 
In effect Main is proposing here that what is determinative 
for 'mental health' is the ethical stand which people take 
up with respect to one another; whether, and how they care 
1Jones, M. (1968) p. 110. 
2Main, T. (1980) p. 53. (My italics. ) 
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for one another. And these sentiments are echoed throughout 
the therapeutic community literature, where words like 
'brotherly love', 'honesty', 'openness', 'directness', 
'concern', 'sharing', 'relating', and so on, are incessantly 
invoked in the attempt to characterize the ethos most con- 
ducive to the restoration and maintenance of mental and 
emotional well-being. 
One may detect in the use of these words a fleeting 
reference to a 'concern' before it becomes medicalized. Any 
therapy is predicated upon care or concern. The 'latent' 
argument which I have pointed out returns to the meaning of 
concern in its more original and pre-medicalized form; it 
would regard as crucially important the question of what 
people living together in a community mean to one another. 
This line of argument does not lead to the conclusion that 
'ordinary human decency', or 'caring' is all there is to 
psychotherapy, or to living in a therapeutic community. But 
it does bring more clearly into view what usually is merely 
assumed, an ethical ground; and it suggests furthermore that 
the therapeutic attitude most proper to a therapeutic 
community might consist most fundamentally of an elaboration, 
opening up, or 'cultivation' of this ground. But within the 
ethos of treatment characteristic of therapeutic communities, 
the ground of these actions whereby concern may be realized 
undergoes a subtle but crucial transformation, so that we 
arrive at the point where "the ability to value others and 
at the same time relate honestly" becomes a "therapeutic 
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tool ". 
1 
The Medicalization of Concern 
Where people turn to medical expertise for instruction 
as to the easing of the burden of life's misfortunes and for 
the relief of their life's suffering; or for instruction as 
to how to conduct oneself towards another in the face of his 
misfortunes or sufferings; when the availability of some 
solution or prescription is assumed which meets the occasion 
of any of life's problems, and so much so that it becomes 
'unethical' to allow a person to suffer what now can be 
'avoided', then we may speak of concern having become 
medicalized. 
We may also speak of concern having become 'medicalised' 
when the 'mental health' of the members of a community - 
rather than being seen as a well-being which is generated in 
the warming-to-one-another of 'communality' - is thought of 
as being 'delivered' by members of a 'team' (where patients 
or residents make effective use of their roles as auxiliary 
therapists) and targeted on the pathologies of each of its 
members. 
Consider the following proposition, again taken from 
the writings of Main. 
Different pathologies need different social 
processes, especially designed for the special 
nature of the people they treat. 2 
'Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 9. 
2 
Main, T. (1980) p. 62. 
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Notice that this claim - notwithstanding the author's 
explicit and much repeated concern for 'the ways people 
relate to one another', which presumably is a matter of how 
people act towards and interact with one another - belongs 
to a different order of statement entirely from that which 
speaks of personal action. It does not say, for example, 
that it might be appropriate to conduct oneself differently 
towards different people according to the states of mind and 
circumstances in which they find themselves. Nor does it 
suggest that the cultivation of sensibility towards the 
distresses of others in the positions at which they arrive 
might be of any relevance to the question of what constitutes 
appropriate conduct. Instead it informs us that 'specially 
designed' 'social processes' 'treat' the 'psychopathologies' 
of people of a 'special nature'. Such a statement, so 
skilfully designed to avoid any reference to persons, or to 
what might arise between persons, is particularly paradoxical, 
emerging as it does from within a context expressly concerned 
with the 'folkways' of human relationship, and their relevance 
to health. One is left with the impression that for main the 
folkways of human relationship, within a therapeutic community 
at least, consist of learning to recognize different pathologies 
and apply the appropriate 'social processes'. 
The medicalization of concern is a narrowing of concern, 
to the provision of a solution to a task at hand. It pre- 
empts the question 'What is the matter? ' with an answer that 
is already written out before the patient has spoken, a 
prescription for treatment, consisting in this case of 
'specially designed social processes'. It is also a 
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transposition of concern, whose object is no longer the 
other, co-present with self, but the other as bearer of a 
'special condition'. Medicalized, concern, moreover, meets 
its object upon an operational and probabilistic ground, 
rather than upon a ground of possibility: given the nature 
of the condition and the treatment resources available, there 
is a certain probability that cure will be successful. 
The pervasively medicalistic framework of therapeutic 
communities is neatly alluded to in the slogan 'community as 
doctor'. 'Community as Doctor' is the title of a book by 
Robert Rapoport; 
l 
although published more than twenty years 
ago, this work remains one of the key texts of the therapeutic 
community literature and one which still has a considerable 
influence. The work 'Community as Community' has yet to be 
written; such a volume might inform us, or remind us of the 
intrinsic features of community without which human well- 
being is unimaginable. By contrast, 'community as doctor' 
suggests that a community is therapeutic insofar as it offers 
treatment, and that such a community proceeds in some way 
analogous to a doctor, bringing special skills and knowledge 
to bear upon the sufferer of mental pain, and thereby returning 
him to a state of health. 
Now this formulation obscures the distinction between 
what is administered by and what is generated between. 
Consequently the nature and ground of health is left-un- 
examined. Treatments may be administered but health cannot 
1Rapoport, R. N. (1960). 
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be administered. An administrative notion of health as a 
service or a product - it is significant that therapeutic 
community patients are frequently referred to as 'consumers' 
- is predicated upon a conception of health either defined 
negatively, as the absence of disease, or defined normatively. 
Such notions do little to bring forward or show the concept 
of 'health', to illuminate the senses in which health may be 
a 'wholeness', or a unitary phenomenon to do equally with 
bodily, mental and emotional, personal and interpersonal well- 
being. 
A doctor treats his patients, he administers to them, 
and he may succeed in getting rid of their ailments, but he 
cannot possibly provide them with health. The relationship 
between doctor and patient may be a factor vital to the 
patient's well-being, but the relationship is not admini- 
stered, nor is it a treatment. What takes place between, 
that is, what is generated between people, may be healthy and 
wholesome, or may be tasteless and tawdry, or some mix of all 
these. Accordingly, quite different states of well-being 
may be engendered, quite different possibilities may come of 
it. There is all the difference in the world between a 
community as a doctor or treatment resource, and a community 
as a generative matrix or source, within which and from 
which health may flourish. Where this comes about, it is 
not through the administration of technical procedures, but 
by the nourishment of the roots of health, which are 
inseparable from freedom and responsibility, neither of 
which may be either administered or organized. 
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Ivan Illich, perhaps more than any other contem- 
porary thinker, has drawn attention to the phenomenon of 
disabling medicalization. One of the ways in which 'health 
services' become sickening and disabling, according to 
Illich, is that whereby they expropriate "the power of the 
individual to heal himself and to shape his or her environ- 
ment". The powers of medicine, and the agents of these 
powers become disabling equally where they undermine the 
capacity of any community to look after its own affairs, or 
subvert whatever tendency there may be among its members 
to turn to one another in their hour of need. Illich has 
argued that the health of a community resides precisely in 
its capacity to look after itself, and to integrate within 
its ordinary life its own illness and madness. 
There is, however, no more than the most superficial 
kinship between this idea, and that which underlies 'commu- 
nity as doctor'. Community as doctor represents a double 
sleight of hand, which, in the name of returning to the 
community its capacity to heal, merely endows its experts 
with the franchise to treat. 
" Therapeutic communities often seem to be proposing 
what is essentially an ecological approach to mental health. 
From ecological studies we learn of the intricate inter- 
connectedness between the state of any part of an eco-system, 
and the state of the system as a whole. It is perfectly 
in accordance, therefore, with the insights gained from 
such studies to propose that a person will be more likely 
1Illich, 
I. (1975). 
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to realize well-being if he belongs to a healthy community, 
and one whose members enjoy one another's company, than if 
he belongs to a sick or a miserable one, or if he belongs 
to no-one at all. But 'community as doctor' fails to speak 
either of the health or of the generative possibilities of 
community. It proposes a very peculiar ecological system 
indeed; one with neither the ordinary roots or soil whereby 
a healthy life may be maintained. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TECHNIQUES OF PERSUASION 
Psychologism 
The discovery of the 'therapeutic potential of the 
psychiatric environment' might be said to be the guiding 
inspiration behind the therapeutic community movement. 
This potential is seen for the most part as a 'treatment 
potential'; therapeutic communities being assessed according 
to their capacity to treat or cure mental illness. I have 
accordingly characterized the prevailing therapeutic commu- 
nity ethos as medicalistic. By this, I refer to the 
assumption that what is fundamentally the same sort of 
theoretic-practical attitude as has been adopted with 
certain success towards disorders of the physical organism 
can profitably be extended towards the amelioration of the 
various confusions, distresses, sufferings, torments and 
agonies which beset human beings, as beings. 
Although this interpretation of the community as a 
context or modality of treatment is essentially medicalistic, 
there is an important sense in which therapeutic communities 
do in fact propose, and indeed realize, a move away from the 
hard line medical model. The shift of emphasis is from 
mental illness as a medical problem to mental illness as a 
psychological condition, or psychological problem. 
This shift, which at first glance might seem to 
suggest a significant departure from the medical model, 
amounts in fact to little more than a shift of emphasis. 
For 'psychological problems' are seen, either implicitly 
or explicitly as having an origin or location in the 
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psyche, or as reflecting the damaging effects upon the 
psyche of its environment; in either case it is now the 
mind which has become the disordered organ in need of 
attention or repair. 
The currently fashionable and anti-stigmatist catch- 
phrases, 'problems of living' or 'problems of relating' 
themselves reflect this psychologistic epistemology. That 
is to say, 'problems of living' are interpreted as mani- 
festations or consequences of psychological problems seen 
as underlying causes or conditions. Once the root problem 
comes to be located thus it has undergone a crucial trans- 
position. The problem is now no longer a phenomenon of 
ordinary living, contextualized in the everyday world and 
intelligible to any thoughtful person who is attentive to 
the vicissitudes of everyday living. Instead, it is 
located within an impersonal and quasi-scientific domain, 
'the psychological', whose disorders require the specialized 
methods and applications of one school or another of 
psychology. It is, I believe, as Ingleby and others have 
suggested, quite correct to regard the physiological-disease- 
process model and the psychological-disorder models of mental 
illness as being 'simply two sides of the same positivist 
coin'; 
1 
but in order to make this more clear we must first 
discuss the psychologism upon which the latter model, in 
particular, is predicated. 
The term 'psychologism' refers broadly to a 'family' 
1Ingleby, D. (1981) p. 34. 
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of assumptions as to the nature of 'mind', consciousness 
or subjectivity. Popularly, psychologism is usually 
understood as indicating that position which a person takes 
up when he proposes that 'it's all in the mind'. Whilst 
this formula does indeed reflect somewhat crudely the 
general tendency of psychologistic thinking, it fails to 
bring out an important sense in which empirical psychology, 
which regards consciousness as the result of objective 
processes in the natural world, and 'psychological disorders' 
as being caused by environmental factors - and which there- 
fore seems to be adopting a position quite antithetical to 
psychologism - is in fact equally psychologistic. 
'Psychologism' was first used to describe that 
philosophical position, sometimes called 'logical psycho- 
logism', which argued that the laws of logic are contingent 
truths which reflect the structures of the human mind, and 
that inquiry into the nature of logic should take the form, 
therefore, of empirical psychological research. This 
position is clearly illustrated by John Stuart Mill: 
Logic is not a science distinct from, and 
co-ordinate with, psychology. So far as it 
is a science at all, it is a part or branch 
of psychology. Its theoretical grounds are 
wholly based on psychology. 1 
More generally, logical psychologism seeks the basis of 
reason, not just the thoughts we think but the ground 
whereby we distinguish truth from falsity, in purely 
psychological processes, amenable to empirical study. 
1See 
Natanson, M. (1983) p. 49. 
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'Truth' becomes an affair of the mind, the province of 
psychology - the science of the mind. Psychologism thus 
becomes a scientism. 
The subjectivistic tendency of Western thinking, 
culminating in the technological view of the present age, 
which interprets the world as an object-resource at man's 
disposal, has with Descartes already flowered into 
psychologism. For the bifurcation of being into res extensa 
and res cogitans leads inescapably to a conception of mind 
as a private realm in which the world appears. It is now 
the contents of our minds to which we have direct or imme- 
diate access; the world no longer is directly known or 
encountered, but is mediated, whether through the 'experi- 
ence' of Locke, the 'sensations' of the introspectionists, 
the representations of causal chain theories of perception, 
the 'information' of contemporary cognitive theories, or 
the 'psychic images' of psychodynamic theories. 
It is in this sense that Cartesianism, whether it 
develops in the form of empiricism or idealism, is psycho- 
logistic. "I thus clearly see that nothing is more easily 
or manifestly perceptible to me than my own mind". 
1 
Descartes avoids the skeptical consequences of logical 
psychologism by invoking a transcendent God, an avenue of 
escape which is not so readily available to modern psycho- 
logists, even those of a deeply religious bent such as 
Jung, for whom all that remains of God is a 'psychic image'. 
1Descartes, 
Meditations on First Philosophy. Second Meditation. 
In Anscombe, E. and Geach, P. (eds. ) (1971) p. 75. 
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Within the contemporary human sciences, examples of 
epistemologies which are deeply psychologistic are not hard 
to find. Compare the well-known statement of the nineteenth 
century biologist Karl Vogt: "The brain secretes thought as 
the liver secretes bile"1 with that of Carl Jung: "As the 
plant produces its flower, so the psyche creates its 
symbols". 
2 Thus a symbol for Jung is a psychic reality 
which rises from the unconscious, whence it derives its 
power. If different people are affected by the same symbol 
this is because they share a collective unconscious; we meet 
in the dark. According to Jung, the world of substance is 
an inferred world. 
Far from being a material world, this is a 
psychic world, which allows us to make only 
indirect and hypothetical inferences about 
the real nature of matter. The psychic alone 
has immediate reality... 3 
Psychic existence is the only category of 
existence of which we have immediate knowledge 
since nothing can be known unless it first 
appears as a psychic image. Only psychic 
existence is immediately verifiable. To the 
extent that the world does not assume the form 
of a psychic image, it is virtually non- 
existent. 4 
According to Jung, all the powers that govern over our 
lives are psychic powers: 
The world powers that rule over all mankind, for 
good or ill, are unconscious psychic factors, 
and it is they that bring consciousness into 
1See 
Natanson, M. (1973) p. 49. 
2Jung, C. (1971) p. 3. 
3Ibid. 
p. 6. 
4Ibid. 
p. 10. 
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being... we are steeped in a world that was 
created by our own psyche... the psyche 
creates reality everyday. l 
Compare with Freud: 
The events of human history, the interaction 
between human nature, cultural development, 
and the precipitates of primaeval experience 
(the most prominent example of which is 
religion) are no more than a reflection of 
the dynamic conflicts between the ego, the 
id and the superego, which psychoanalysis 
studies in the individual - are the very 2 
same processes repeated upon a wider stage. 
From this point of view, a critical or extra-psycho- 
logical philosophy becomes debauchery. 
It does not surprise me that psychology 
debauches into philosophy, for the thinking 
that underlies philosophy is after all a 
psychic activity which, as such, is the 
proper study of psychology. I always think 
of psychology as encompassing the whole of 
the psyche, and that includes philosophy 
and theology and many other things besides. 
for underlying all philosophy and religion 
are the facts of the human soul, which may 
ultimately be the arbiters of truth and 
error. 3 
According to these accounts of Freud and Jung, the 
world reflects the mind, and displays the contents, dynamics 
and processes of the mind 'writ large' as history, culture 
and religion, the principles and laws of which are derivable 
from a comprehensive empirical psychology. It is more 
characteristic of Freud, however, to describe consciousness 
as an inner screen upon which physiological processes or 
1Ibid. 
p. 7. 
2Freud, 
S. (1936) pp. 133-134. 
3Jung, C. (1971) p. 5. 
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occurrences are registered, when for example physical 
energies having their sources in real objects, impinge upon 
the senses. Here Freud inclines to an empiricist view, 
that the mind reflects the world. Such a position, equally 
predicated upon a Cartesian dualism, is just as much 
psychologistic, since, whilst the world is now assumed, it 
is seen only in its reflection or image in the mind, as a 
mental representation of the real. Once again the immediate 
datum of consciousness is an endopsychic representation, or 
'experience'. The 'real world' which 'causes' experience is 
now defined by our experience of it. 
So thorough and far reaching are the various 'critiques' 
of psychologism which have been developed in the course of 
this century - beginning with the classical mathematical 
works of Frege and Husserl in the 1890s - that we can do no 
more than mention them here, in passing. The early work of 
Husserl, culminating in Logical Investigations published 
in 1900, may be regarded as formally inaugurating the 
phenomenological movement, which, more than any other 
philosophical voice, has clearly recognized and articulated 
both the errors and the dangers of psychologism. To take 
up this story, we might turn in particular to the writings 
of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, where the implications as 
well as the shortcomings of Husserl's arguments are 
elaborated at very considerable depth. For the moment we 
may note merely that psychologism, in a variety of forms, 
continues to prosper. We may say that psychologism is 
evidenced where accounts of human action, behaviour and 
experience are couched in terms of hypothetical, underlying 
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'psychological processes' - where reasons, for example, 
become causes, and where the attempt to render life more 
intelligible takes the form of empirical investigations 
which result in a-historical a-cultural 'laws' which are 
supposed to govern our lives. Implicit in these accounts 
is the assumption that the language of psychological pro- 
cesses furnishes a more final and complete explanation of 
action and reason than may be offered by any thoughtful 
person, in the same way as the theory of thermodynamics 
enables the physicist to understand the behaviour of certain 
physical systems better than the layman. 
Whatever regional successes there may be to scientific 
psychology, there seems to be little evidence to suggest 
that people have come to understand themselves better, or 
to lead richer or more fulfilling lives since its invention 
a hundred or so years ago. And to expect that this should 
be otherwise suggests a possible misunderstanding of the 
nature of this particular scientific enterprise. There is 
no logical reason why the study of psychology should give 
rise to self-understanding or lead to personal fulfilment 
any more than the study of geology or astrophysics. Any 
science, for example, 'must use a formal language, whose 
terms are quite explicitly defined within that particular 
scientific community. But scientific language is language 
by analogy only; and there is all the difference in the 
world between the use of this technical language and the 
'role' which ordinary language plays in self-understanding. 
It is an error, or a misunderstanding, to expect or demand 
of psychology that it generate practices, exercises or 
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services of one sort or another with a view to making life 
more bearable, happy, or fulfilling. It is an error which 
seems to show itself precisely when therapeutic communities 
understand the nature of their work to consist of the appli- 
cation or putting into practice of psychological theories 
of one sort or another, or providing a special treatment 
context within which such theories may be applied. 
The Psychologization of Concern 
We may speak of a community becoming 'psychologized' - 
whether or not it be a 'therapeutic community' - where its 
'self understanding' becomes more and more indelibly couched 
in terms of psychological theory, or derivatives of psycho- 
logical theory. This tendency may become seriously wayward 
when its psychologistic epistemology obscures rather than 
bringing into view, the primary phenomena with which a 
therapeutic community is concerned, namely, the vicissi- 
tudes, variations, achievements and sufferings of ordinary 
living, and of living together. 
One form of this psychologization is illustrated by 
the taking up of the position that a therapeutic community 
might be derived from some or other psychological theory. 
If... social defence systems are capable of 
radically interfering with the internal 
psychic structure of an individual, the 
possibility arises that a social system 
might be devised in which psychological 
growth is promoted rather than inhibited. 
The structure of the institution might then 
encourage the introjection of creative 
objects, rather than their projection and 
ultimate loss. The 'therapeutic community' 
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is thus generated in principle from the 
conception of institutionally structured 
psychodynamics. 1 
The author adds that "what the empirical structure of such 
a community might be remains an open question". 
2 
Perhaps more commonly, the 'psychologization' of the 
therapeutic community is illustrated by the unrelenting 
preoccupation with the 'psychological processes' that are 
alleged or supposed to occur intra- and inter-psychically: 
and the assumption that therapeutic outcome depends upon the 
correct harnessing of these processes or dynamics. Again, 
this preoccupation is at the expense of attention being paid 
to the ordinary affairs of community, which include such 
things as friendship, conviviality, enjoyment, and the nitty- 
gritty of the everyday which furnishes their context. It 
seems to be rather generally assumed that the 'psychological' 
provides a deeper and more 'scientific' level of analysis, 
and consequently, basis for understanding. 
When therapeutic attention is directed predominantly 
towards the contents and processes that are alleged to 
occur within the mind, or towards the interpersonal dynamics 
and psychological processes that are alleged to take place 
between people, as they are articulated in terms of 
psychological theories; or when the goal of therapy becomes 
psychological insight, meaning the patient's understanding 
of these various contents, processes and dynamics, we 
arrive at a prevailing ethos which may be referred to as 
1Wilson, S. (1979) p. 98. 
2Ibid. 
p. 98. 
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the psychologization of concern. Concern, for example, 
has become psychologized when all psychopathology and 
psychotherapy is assumed to be based on 'antra-psychic pro- 
cesses in their interaction'. 
1 Perhaps more starkly, 
concern has become psychologized when the concept of the 
therapeutic community is seen to be 'fairly clear cut': 
We bring a group of people together, first 
by organizing suitable accommodation, then 
persuading (or compelling) them to come 
there, after which we make use of the 
ensuing internal2transactions for thera- 
peutic purposes. 
So pervasive is this tendency of thinking that examples 
might be taken more or less arbitrarily from the literature. 
Consider, as one instance, the following: 
The task is to do with the investigation by 
each person of his inner world of thoughts, 
feelings and attitudes with the intention 
of increasing self-understanding (including 
permitting expression of the - often intense - 
feelings which may block this process) and 
such re-construction of the individual's view 
of himself and his world as leads to improved 
social compentence. 3 
Here the patient is engaged in what is at the same 
time an 'investigation - psychic detective work - and a 
process, which in either case is directed towards his 
inner world, the workings and disfunctions of which are 
better understood by the staff. Feelings block this process; 
so their 'expression' must, within limits be allowed. When 
1Foulkes, S. H. and Anthony, E. J. (1965) p. 30. 
2Crocket, R. (1979) p. 138. 
3Blake, R. and Millard, D. (1979) p. 5. 
62 
subsequent 'reconstruction' is completed the patient will 
be deemed 'socially competent'; he may now have 'disengaged 
from morbid family dynamics', and will more successfully be 
'working or parenting'. 
The notion that a therapeutic community is some psycho- 
logical treatment method, or a setting within which 
psychological treatment methods may be applied, again 
illustrates that which I am calling the psychologization of 
concern. One of the aspects of this phenomenon is that of 
its applicative sense of theory. That is, the community it- 
self, as a treatment method, or the treatment methods of 
which it makes use are invariably described as being 
applications of some or other psychological theory, such as 
personal construct theory, cognitive theories, learning 
theory, systems theory, psychodynamic theories (Freudian, 
Kleinian, Jungian, etc. ) or humanistic theories. 
And here we may note that the belief that psycho- 
therapeutic practice consists in the application of 
psychological or psychotherapeutic theory is by no means 
peculiar to therapeutic communities. It is very commonly 
assumed by therapists that psychological theory provides a 
body of knowledge or 'theoretical model' which refers to 
the workings of the mind, and of the ways in which, and 
circumstances under which the mind might fail to work 
properly. The art or science of psychotherapy, therefore, 
consists of the correct application of this general know- 
ledge to each particular case. Thus any therapy, it is 
felt, stands in the same relation to its theory as behaviour 
therapy does to learning theory; the therapy is the practical 
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application of the theory. This applicative understanding 
of psychotherapeutic theory is common even within the 
critical discipline of psychoanalysis, where theory thus 
generates some or other therapeutic technique which allows 
the patient to discover for himself the workings of his 
mental apparatus, and thereby come to see reality more 
'correctly'. 
We know something about the distortions in 
ego-development due to anxiety ridden object 
relations and defensive processes directly 
affecting the wholeness of the ego, such as, 
for instance, splitting, fragmentation, patho- 
logical projective identification. The 
analysis of these processes restores the ego's 
capacity for a more correct perception of 
objects and enables it to achieve a more con- 
structive object relationship... It is only 
through insight into one's own psyche that a 
better object relationship can be established 
in relation to both internal and external 
reality. The search for psychic realities 
remains the prime object for the psychoanalytic 
process. 1 
We shall discuss more fully the nature of psycho- 
therapeutic theory in chapter four. For the moment we may 
merely propose that psychotherapy might better be thought 
of as the opening up of the lived, and interpersonal, 
world, in and through the relationship between persons. 
This is not an ordinarly relationship, yet it is character- 
ized, paradoxically, by its particular concern with the 
ordinary. The vehicle of psychotherapy is the movement or 
play of what is going on between the two persons, as it is 
articulated in language. The condition of its 'getting 
somewhere' is the mutual desire to enter into the spirit of 
that play. 
1Segal, 
H. (1975) p. 123. 
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There is, of course, a considerable body of literature 
which could be said to constitute psychotherapeutic theory. 
Psychoanalytic theories, for example, are capable of 
throwing light upon aspects of behaviour which otherwise 
might remain obscure, or lacking in 'meaning'. They have 
extended our understanding of 'meaning', to include, for 
example, dreams, parapraxes and symptoms. They are capable 
of showing that aspects of our life which otherwise might 
seem to have little to do with one another - for example 
childhood and adult experience, antithetical feelings, and 
so on - belong together, or within a unitary structure. They 
also are rhetorically powerful in their capacity to invoke 
through a particularly evocative language. The image of the 
paranoid-schizoid baby destroying the breast might have 
considerable power to bring to the attention of therapist 
and patient alike the meaning of envy, and the part which 
it might play in the impoverishment of life. Psychotherapy, 
however, does not consist of a theory and a method, the 
latter being some application of the former. Insofar as we 
may speak of a method of psychotherapy, it is a dialogical 
method, which is entered, not applied. The preoccupation 
with methods and techniques which is so characteristic of 
the therapeutic community literature obscures the much more 
fundamental questions to do with the positions which people 
take up with regard to one another. There could be no 
applicative method of finding one's position with another, 
that is, where one stands with another - since any appli- 
cation already presupposes a position. One takes up a 
position; and where the position one takes up is one of 
some openness to the possibility of finding one's way with 
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the other, some degree of mutual negotiation of the twists 
and turns of some common path is entailed. This path will 
be negotiated in accordance with sensibility and attentive- 
ness to the various situations which unfold. And in this 
sense, there could be said to be all sorts of ways of finding 
out where one stands, for example, playing golf together, 
chatting over a drink - or engaging in the more formally 
structured dialogical situation of psychoanalysis. 
The patient who asks of a therapist with whom he 
proposes to enter psychotherapy: What method do you use? 
suggests that his problem is not at all what he takes it to 
be. It is more serious. 
When psychotherapy becomes an applied psychology, it 
exemplifies a technological mode of practice. A great many 
of the tinkerings and practices of therapeutic communities, 
including these which illustrate what I have called the 
medicalization and psychologization of concern, are more 
or less crudely technological. That is, they are devices 
designed to produce 'change', correct 'deviation', lead 
to 'insight', and so on, where these various goals, as well 
as the appropriateness of the means to bring them about, 
are approached quite uncritically. We shall now discuss 
this technological mode, under the heading of the 'thera- 
peutic community process'. 
The Therapeutic Community Process 
In their more extreme forms, the 'socio-technical 
systems' which serve as 'theoretical models' of therapeutic 
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communities, come close to self-parody. Consider, for 
example, the following "The human institutions... deal with 
human beings as their throughput... ". 
l In the case of 
therapeutic communities, "their object is therapy. What 
exactly does that mean? How clear is the typical therapeutic 
community about the precise change it hopes to achieve in its 
client population? "2 These institutions 
are orientated to producing more effective 
members of society but what they mean by that 
differs considerably... The basic model is an 
open system where the organization imports 
material from the environment, converts the 
material into something different and re- 
exports it to the environment. In the case 
of humane institution the most significant 
import is, of course, the human import of 
clients who must be 'converted', i. e. changed, 
and sent back to the outside environment 
hopefully more able to sustain life there 
effectively .3 
One of the characteristics of these 'socio-technical systems' 
which this author identifies is the conflict between 'task' 
and 'anti-task' factors; since people pursue needs which 
'are both positively task oriented and potentially anti-task'. 
Insofar as they are task oriented, they 
include the satisfactions arising from 
being able to employ oneself positively 
and fully in relation to task, co-operating 
effectively with others and experiencing 
both personal and institutional success in 
task performance... Unfortunately for task 
performance, members of institutions are 
also likely to seek satisfaction of personal 
needs that are anti-task; very often they 
need to mitigate the stresses and strains of 
the task itself and confrontation with the 
1Menzies, I. (1979) p. 198. 
2Ibid. 
p. 200. 
3Ibid. 
p. 201. 
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human matyrial on which the task is 
focussed. 
Good management, therefore, requires a certain ruthlessness 
in 'struggling with task definition' and 'sustaining the 
values that go with it' and mitigating 'anti-task phenomena 
such as in the socially structured defence systems or 
sub-cultures'. 
The management of an institution requires 
some measure of that ruthlessness but this 
concern for task need not and should not 
necessarily be linked with lack of concern 
for people. In the main, it is likely to 
prove the contrary. Much of the task 
oriented activity is, in fact, directly 
good for people. ' 
In this example we see, in a rather stark form, 
fundamental structures of what I am choosing to call the 
'therapeutic community process': input - change - output. 
As one writer bluntly puts it: 
The work is for change; the model was a 
change-agent model. 
3 
The overall process is in the service of some therapeutic 
goal of one sort or another, articulated variously, but 
which generally as in the present example, is seen to be 
self-evidently 'good for people'. 
This same process may have more benign forms, or forms 
which are much less conspicuously 'technological'. Whitely 
1Menzies, I. (1979) p. 202. 
2Ibid. 
p. 207. 
3Manning, N. and Blake, R. (1979) p. 144. 
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and Gordon, for example, claim that "the course through 
the therapeutic community follows a predictable path". 
1 
Following admission 
the customary interpersonal behaviour in the 
living situation, for which the new patient 
has probably been referred for treatment, soon 
appears... The early weeks are the most 
difficult for the rest of the community which 
must tolerate this, but at the same time 
gently and supportively confront and attempt 
to curtail it... The new patient reaches a 
stage in a matter of two or three weeks when 
either it is put to him bluntly that he must 
change, or else he realizes himself that in 
order to stay he has to alter. 
The treatment process may be summed up: "A deviant pattern 
of interaction with his fellows has been set up and in 
treatment we seek to replace this through a relearning 
process". 
One further example may serve to illustrate what I 
am calling the 'therapeutic community process'. In an 
article entitled 'Personal growth in the Therapeutic 
Community', which sets out to make clear 'precisely how 
this relationship between experiences in the community is 
to be described', Kirk and Millard write: 
The authors view the residential institution 
as an open system exchanging materials with 
its environment, and having a human through- 
put. They suggest that what makes the 
institution a living system is the interplay 
between resources and throughput (that is, 
the activities through which an intake is 
required, processed and transformed into an 
output). The stage of residence or through- 
put is broken up into 'conversion processes' 
which require the provision of both human 
and physical resources. The task of the 
1Whiteley, 
J. S. and Gordon, J. (1979) pp. 119 ff. 
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institution as a whole is understood in 
terms of the relationship of the activities 
of the three systems of intake, throughput 
to each other, and to the environment. 1 
Why should we refer to the 'therapeutic community 
process' as a 
, 
technological mode of thinking, and of pro- 
ceeding? For here there is very little talk of hardware, 
and no explicit mention even of psychiatric drugs. For the 
present purposes, we may define a technological system very 
simply as one where a goal is posited and then some method 
or means is devised or worked out so as to bring about this 
goal as expediently or efficiently as possible. The terms 
of the goal and the method remain within the same conceptual 
framework, and reciprocally justify one another; a techno- 
logical system is therefore a closed system of means and 
ends. 
A technological system of 'psychotherapy', for 
example, produces 'change' in some predefined direction or 
other in the patient, in accordance with what is known to 
be 'good for people'. it thus mirrors the technological 
mode which characterizes much of medicine, where, for 
example, "the definitions of health and sickness mutually 
confirm one another". 
2 It remains a closed system of ends 
and means so long as its concepts fail to generate any 
critique of the 'ends', the 'means' to bring these about, 
and the appropriateness of the means-end mode of procedure. 
In this sense, the 'humanistic' and 'growth movement' 
1Kirk, J. D. and Millard, D. (1979) P. 115. 
2Heaton, J. M. (1972) p. 13. 
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schools of psychotherapy are often equally technological. 
Behaviour therapy is perhaps a more obvious example of a 
crudely technological therapy, whose means and ends fit, 
and form a complementary system which produces required 
results, but which is at the same time a closed and non- 
reflective system which reduces the 'laws of living' to 
the laws of learning theory. Any therapy which is designed 
to produce change by the employment of some technique, 
whether it be an 'interpretation of reality', a 'corrective 
emotional experience'1 or a 'relearning process' - or by 
the application of some method, such as the 'therapeutic 
community method' or even the 'all-out application of full 
therapeutic community methods'2 - is most decisively diffe- 
rent from a therapy which generates its own evaluative 
criteria. A critical therapeutic discipline, for example, 
cannot simply proceed on the basis of what is known to be 
'good' for people, since precisely this acquiescent mode 
of living constitutes for many patients a central 'symptom'; 
rather it must include the disclosure of what is good as 
the essential movement of therapeutic inquiry. 
I shall discuss some of the prevailing methods and 
goals of therapeutic communities in the subsequent sections 
of this chapter. Here, however, one further feature of the 
therapeutic community process deserves to be mentioned. 
Whilst technological systems are closed systems, they tend 
at the same time to be particularly extensive or incorporative, 
1Morrice, J. K. W. (1979) p. 57. 
2Whiteley, J. S. (1979) p. 20. 
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in the sense of 'making use of' everything at hand, at 
their disposal, as means - in the present case towards 
some or other therapeutic goal. In a technological world, 
everything finally becomes a resource to be exploited; and 
in the frenzy to develop and maximise these resources the 
distinction between resource and source becomes obscured. 
1 
Within the therapeutic community literature, where we might 
hope to find some discussion bearing upon origins, to do, 
for example, with the coming into being of an intersubjective 
world, we find instead an unrelenting emphasis and pre- 
occupation with the maximal exploitation of 'therapeutic 
resources', to the extent that there is finally nothing and 
no one who is left untapped. The following quotations may 
serve to illustrate this: 
A therapeutic community is a way of tackling 
the puzzle of individual disturbance and 
human relations that seeks a more creative 
and affective solution than before, princi- 
pally by attempting to harness natural human 
responses and social forces, rather than 
ignoring them or discounting 2 them as 
'non- 
specific treatment factors'. 
This chapter will describe how the environ- 
ment can be used as a direct resource in 
therapy... to an organization wishing to use 
every possible resource... I believe th 
environment can be used fairly easily. 
The utilization of every form of therapy 
available requires planned and systematic 
use of the whole environment, consisting of 
both physical resources and social inter- 
actions between all categories of staff and 
patients ... 
4 
1See Heidegger, 'The question concerning technology'. Heidegger, M. 
(1978) pp. 287-317. 
2Kennard, D. (1979) p. 192. 
3Bishop, J. (1979) p. 59. 
4Clark, 
D. H. (1971) p. 27. 
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In how many (therapeutic communities) are the 
social dynamics and interpersonal interactions 
of the members fully utilized in the pursuit 
of growth1towards personality and emotional 
maturity. 
All relationships within the hospital - even 
those of patients among themselves as well as 
patients with staff - are regarded as poten- 
tially therapeutic. Some way is provided to 
make use of therapeutic potentialities in 
other kinds of relationship beside the doctor- 
patient relationship. 2 
In response to the proposition: 'Everything 
the patients say and do while in hospital 
should be used for treatment', the staff 
majority chose 'strongly agree'. This is, 
clearly, an extension of the psychoanalytic 
ideas of psychic determinism and the use of 
free-association. 3 
From the earliest studies of formal organisa- 
tions it has been recognised that all such 
social institutions have an 'under-life', 
unacknowledged and without a formal 'map', 
which participants must discover for themselves. 
It has been one of the central tenets of the 
therapeutic community that such behaviour must 
be brought into the official 'public arena' of 
the community meeting for analysis in the 
pursuit of treatment. 
4 
"The institution's total resources", writes Maxwell 
Jones, "both staff and patients, are self-consciously pooled 
in furthering treatment". 5 According to these various 
interpretations, the community is understood as a repository 
of resources - including processes and forces of one sort or 
another - which may be utilized in the service of therapeutic 
goals by the application of specialized skills. What we 
wish to draw attention to here is the totality of the 
1Whiteley, 
J. S. (1979) p. 20. 
2Rapoport, 
R. N. (1960) p. 22. 
31bid. 
p. 61. 
4Manning, 
N. and Blake, R. (1979) p. 154. 
5Quoted in Clark, D. H. (1971) p. 43. 
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treatment environment, which is such as to include within 
its totalizing every nook and crannie of space, every 
available moment of time. And it is the distinctive feature 
of therapeutic communities to emphasize the human element 
of this treatment environment, to stress the importance 
of all members of the community as intrinsic components of 
this process of treatment. 
All these contributions point to the human 
element in the resources of the staff. 
That element can be maximised or it can 
be neglected. This may be the major factor 
in the degree of efficiency displayed by an 
institution working with 'human material'. 
' 
Staff have to use themselves as part of the 
technology to be applied. 
2 
The social system is itself part of the 
technology, and as part of the experience 
the institution provides for its clients it 
has a therapeutic or anti-therapeutic effect. 
3 
What is wrong? we may ask, with this technology of 
community, or community process - so long as it 'works'. 
Our answer to this question, in some senses, occupies the 
entirety of this thesis. We shall continue with the dis- 
cussion of particular notions in subsequent sections. For 
the moment we may notice that what seems so conspicuously 
to be ruled out of court within the totality of 'treatment 
process' is any recognition of the importance of those 
things which may be pursued and enjoyed for their own sake. 
Is it not unimaginable, for example, to think of a community 
prospering, where its members do not enjoy some degree of 
1Hinshelwood, 
R. D. and Manning, N. (1979) p. 195. 
2Ibid. 
p. 195. 
3Menzies, I. (1979) p. 203. 
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friendship? And is it not essential to friendship that 
it be enjoyed for its own sake, and not just for the 
'therapeutic benefits' we might gain from it? The same 
might be said too of conversation, and play. Yet no 
sooner are these recognized to be of importance to communal 
well being than they are seized upon for their therapeutic 
usefulness. 
The next element is the 'integration and 
rehabilitation'. Most therapeutic commu- 
nities, being reality oriented, see work 
and play as important facets of life; 
therefore social and vocational rehabili- 
tation activities are seen as integral 
parts of the total treatment plan. l 
Or consider the following, where, fleetingly, 'commu- 
nication' seems to be valued for its own sake. "A high 
value is placed upon communication per se". 
2 But no sooner 
is this claim made, than it is contradicted: 
One basis for this value is an administrative 
one. It is considered valuable for people 
in one part of the organization to know what 
people in other parts are doing, thinking 
and feeling. Furthermore, the act of 
communicating is thought to have an impor- 
tant moral and therapeutic effect for staff 
as well as patients. The content of commu- 
nication is also considered valuable for 
treatment by making available, through a 
variety of channels, data supplementing the 
limited information that emerges in the 
doctor-patient relationship. 
1Hoffman, H. A. (1980) p. 79. 
2Rapoport, 
R. N. (1960) p. 22. 
75 
Models 
Our discussion in these chapters is concerned largely 
with the sort of 'theorizing' which is characteristically 
exhibited within the therapeutic community literature. 
Theory, I have suggested, is commonly understood as con- 
sisting of a systematized body of knowledge which is applied 
in the course of the therapeutic practice. For example: 
Freudian theory has become the cornerstone 
of psychological understanding within most 
personal therapeutic systems, including 
the therapeutic community. Salient concepts 
have proved to be the significance of in- 
direct and non-verbal communications and the 
operating of ego defences against anxiety 
aroused by unacceptable feelings. Such in- 
sights have always been available to 
perceptive observers of human behaviour. 
The contribution of psychoanalysis has been 
to clarify and adduce clinical evidence for 
these insights, and to create a coherent 
system which enables them to be systematically 
and widely applied. 
1 
Much of the 'theory' of therapeutic communities is 
rather of the 'cook book' variety: it is taken up with a 
discussion of the manner in which the various different 
therapeutic and psychological theories - ranging from 
psychodynamic theories to behaviour therapy - may be 
applied in their different settings, their suitability for 
different client groups, and so on. 
Theory is often used, however, in the rather different 
sense of 'model'. The 'models' or 'theoretical models' of 
therapeutic communities outline or describe their various 
practices or procedures and attempt to gather them together 
'Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 26. 
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in a rational and systematic fashion. Theoretical work 
here consists of developing or working out a model appro- 
priate to the particular requirements that it will meet, 
and incorporating this within an overall rationale of 
procedure. 
I shall offer a theoretical model of thera- 
peutic community practice. The foundation 
for such a model must be centered firmly1on 
what constitutes treatment for patients. 
The practical work of the therapeutic community comes 
to consist very largely of finding and applying the right 
model, which therefore is seen as being an indispensable 
part of the equipment of the therapeutic community personnel. 
"We were without a model at first but definitely committed 
to finding one". 
2 Since it is claimed that the 'residential 
facility' "suffers from a lack of suitable models", 
3 it is 
understandable that the search for better and better models 
should be such a dominant theme within the literature. 
Rigorous models of therapeutic process in a 
community were missing... in the mid 1960's, 
more fundamental attempts to find theoretical 
models began to appear. 4 
Sometimes it is felt that this search might lead to a 
'general model', capable of embracing the many sub-models 
of therapeutic communities: 
1Hinshelwood, 
R. D. (1979) p. 107. 
2Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 115. 
3Ibid. 
p. 19. 
4Hinshelwood, 
R. D. and Manning, N. (1979) p. 91. 
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Only by studying and comparing these intra- 
community processes on a wider scale... can 
we build up a more reliable and general 
model of the therapeutic community. 
l 
Or consider the following: 
What is needed is a balanced unifying concept 
of the various personal learning processes and 
its particular application to therapeutic 
communities. The most useful model to date 
has been developed by people working in the 
existential-humanistic fields of psychology 
and sociology, and is most usefully developed 
by Charles Hampden Turner (1971): 
(a) Man exists freely through 
the quality of his PERCEPTION 
(b) the strength of his IDENTITY 
N 
(i) Each attempt to INTEGRATE (c) and the synthesis of these 
the FEEDBACK from this into his anticipated and 
process into mental matrices experienced COMPETENCE 
of developing COMPLEXITY I 
. ý- vt 
(h) and through a dialectic (d) he INVESTS this with 
achieve a HIGHER SYNERGY intensity and authenticity 
nvironment in his human 
`e (g) he seeks to make a SELF- (e) by periodicially SUSPENDING 
CONFIRMING; SELF-TRANSCENDING his cognitive structures and 
IMPACT upon the other(s) RISKING himself 
(f) in trying to BRIDGE THE 2 
DISTANCE to the other(s) 
These various therapeutic community models are all 
alternatives to the traditional medical model. 
Starting with this medical frame of reference 
puts severe restrictions on the scope of a 
social environmental approach to change... 
we propose that a different model be developed 
for the care of those individuals who have 
been traditionally labelled as mentally ill. 
3 
'Manning, N. and Blake, R. (1979) p. 157. 
2Hawkins, P. (1979) p. 221. 
3Jones, M. (1979) p. 4. 
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Now such a shift, from a medical model to an alternative 
model, by no means betokens a more sound understanding or 
clear seeing of that which these various models are 
supposed to represent. Therapeutic communities repeatedly 
confuse model-building with critical thinking, and assume 
that, because'they produce 'models' which are alternative 
to 'wrong' models, which fit in with what is vaguely seen 
as a 'progressive' ideology, and which produce 'results', 
some theoretical work has been done. 
In fact, the very first theoretical labour to which 
the 'model' schools of therapeutic communities might address 
themselves, would be that of showing how the concept of 
'model' itself is to be understood and used. What is the 
'model' for model? Psychologists, over the years, have 
devoted much discussion to the nature of their models, the 
place of models in their theories, and so on. But within 
the literature we are considering here, the concept and 
its usefulness are both taken for granted. This is despite 
the fact of the concept clearly being used in quite diffe- 
rent ways (e. g. as an ideal of how the therapeutic community 
should be, as a blueprint or a type, a working model suitable 
or suited for certain conditions, as a theory of how thera- 
peutic communities work). What is perhaps the most obvious, 
uncontentious, and possibly instructive use of 'model' very 
rarely appears. This is the pedagogic use of the concept, 
where a 'model' is used in the communication of ideas 
between those already familiar with them and those to 
whom they are new, that is where the model clearly is a 
device or a metaphor to illustrate graphically some or 
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other feature of the domain in question. The familiar 
model of billiard balls to explain the atom might be a 
simple example. In the present context, we might wish to 
say that in some ways communities are rather like families, 
or to suggest that it might be helpful sometimes to think 
of communities ecologically, and exploit the notion of an 
eco-cycle, or feedback models. But this is quite different 
from the dogged search for a 'theoretical model of thera- 
1 
peutic community practice'. Here, as in the example cited 
on the previous page, or as in the cases of the 'psycho- 
analytic model', or 'behavioural model' of the therapeutic 
community, we arrive at what has been termed a 'parasitic' 
use of 'model'. 
The pedagogic function of models is clearly 
very valuable, but it is also fundamentally 
trivial, in that the role of the model here 
is to serve as an illustration not as a 
source of ideas. Which brings me to the 
second, much more serious, and dangerous, 
parasitic use of models - whereby one 
discipline, as it were the 'host', provides 
the conceptual and intellectual structure 
for the dependent other discipline. And so 
we have models of man as an information- 
processing system, or man to be understood 
through the common ancestral ecology he 
shares with wolves, or man the scientist, 
or man to be conceived as conditioned by 
processes manifested in dogs, rats, or 
pigeons, or as a product of his social 
environment or economic system - and so 
forth through the plethora of models which 
may be derived from the physical, biological, 
engineering and social sciences. 2 
How will the right theoretical model of the thera- 
peutic community represent the manner in which its 
1Hinshelwood, R. D. (1979) p. 107. 
2Kelvin, R. P. (1980) p. 345. 
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inhabitants live with, and are present to one another? And 
how will such a model subsequently be applied, especially 
where the 'applier' of the model is himself a part of the 
system that the model is supposed to represent? We conclude 
that the search for the right theoretical model is somewhat 
of a fool's errand, and that the person who conducts himself 
most thoughtfully, and with the finer sureness of touch, 
within the therapeutic community, is not one who happens to 
have stumbled upon this particular philosopher's stone, 
but simply someone who sees rather more of what is there in 
front of his eyes. 
Method 
The discussion of therapeutic community methods 
occupies a central position within the literature. The 
claim, for example, that "the fundamental problem for 
social psychiatry is the instituting of a spontaneous and 
critical therapeutic method"1 is rather typical. 
The word 'method' derives from the Greek 'hodos' 
meaning a way, a road or a path, hence a journey, hence a 
way or manner of going about something. Thus we arrive at 
our common use of the word as a way of going about things. 
We may speak, for example, of a method of getting children 
to go to bed, by reading them a story before tucking them 
up. Or swimmers may talk of different methods of entering 
cold water, for example by wading in gradually or by 
1Hinshelwood, R. D. and Manning, N. (1979) p. 47. 
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suddenly taking the plunge. Or we can speak of our 
method of work, referring for example to the sort of 
rituals we go through, such as tidying desk tops or arranging 
furniture. Here we are speaking of a way which is familiar 
to us, which we follow, which may be 'second nature' to 
us, and which may be more or less 'methodical'. 
Any group of people who spend time together, including 
families and communities and people who live together, will 
evolve their own way of going about things. Like 'cultures' 
or societies, they will over time shape their own traditions, 
and evolve their own characteristic customs and style. 
Some communities more than others show themselves to be 
conspicuously more considerate or 'caring' - and particularly 
towards their weaker members - than others, and in this 
sense, more therapeutic. But if asked 'What method of 
caring do you use? ' they would probably be stumped for a 
reply, preferring to answer simply by showing or explaining 
their way of going about things. 
When writers speak of the methods of therapeutic 
communities they do not usually use the word in this sense, 
but rather in the sense of a technique, or system of 
techniques, which are applied, or instituted. 
For some researchers, the community itself is a 
method. The following statements make this clear: 
The therapeutic community is therefore a 
specific treatment method, as specific as 
psychoanalysis or somatic therapy. 1 
1Hoffman, H. A. (1979) p. 75. 
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We take the view that the therapeutic 
community is a specific treatment process, 
utilizing the psychological and socio- 
logical phenomena inherent in the large, 
circumscribed and residential group. 
There has been some tendency for the term 
Therapeutic Community to become debased, 
and for a wide range of residential and 
day care centres to lay claim to it. We 
are referring to a sophisticated, skilled 
and often difficult application of the 
method. 
2 
Some variations upon this notion of the community as 
a method may be noted. Some writers speak, for example, 
of the community as a force to be employed or applied. See, 
for example, Rapoport: "The social organization is not 
regarded as a routinized background to treatment, but as 
a vital force, useful for creating a milieu that will 
maximise therapeutic effects". 
3 
Maxwell Jones speaks of 
"applying social forces" to "therapeutically desirable 
ends". 
4 He speaks, too, of the community as bringing into 
play the 'social dimension' as an additional component of 
therapeutic method. "The main thesis of this book is that' 
one must add to the familiar psychiatric methods, both 
psychological and physical, the relatively neglected 
social environmental dimension". 
5 
There is another way in which therapeutic communities 
are seen. According to this, the community is not itself 
a method, but rather a specific sort of setting within 
'Whiteley, J. S. and Gordon, J. (1979) p. 105. 
2Blake, R. and Millard, D. (1979) p. 6. 
3Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. 22. 
4Jones, M. in Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. l. 
5Jones, M. (1968) p. (xii). 
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which particular therapeutic methods and techniques may be 
applied. Insofar as these various methods are systematically 
combined in accordance with an overall 'model' of community 
practice, this sort of approach is not so very different 
from those we have mentioned. The distinction is between 
the community as a specific treatment method, or 'therapy', 
and what has been referred to as a 'metatherapy', that is, 
"a context within which various treatment modalities and 
techniques including psychopharmacological, behavioural, 
individual psychotherapy and group processes of all kinds 
are all systematically organized and utilized to meet 
specific treatment goals". 
' 
And there can be few techniques which are not to be 
found included within the 'therapeutic machinery'2 of such 
communities. Part of the value of the therapeutic community 
approach resides in its capacity to bring together this 
range of equipment within one 'framework', under one roof. 
And so "the great advantage of the therapeutic community 
model is that it allows multi-dimensional experiences". 
3 
Claims are repeatedly made that the methods of one school 
may fruitfully be combined with those of another, even when 
the orientations of the schools concerned - let us say 
psychoanalysis and 'social learning' - seem on the face of 
it to be entirely different. The fundamental importance of 
psychoanalytic teachings seems to be assumed by everyone. 
1Whiteley, J. S. and Gordon, J. (1979) p. 105. 
-Morrice, J. K. W. (1979) p. 56. 
3Manning, 
N. and Blake, R. (1979) p. 145. 
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"The acceptance of some basic psychodynamic principles... 
is shared by all therapeutic communities". 
l 
Psychodynamic 
methods will, however, be found to be combined with 
behavioural methods, 'existential-humanistic' methods, 
and the methods of the 'new therapies'. 
2 "At the risk of 
souding frightfully intellectual", Jansen writes, "it seems 
worth pointing out that our methods are psychoanalytic, 
our goals behavioural, and our language humanistic". 
3 
Therapeutic communities are nothing if not eclectic. 
4 
Different writers understand the precise nature of 
the therapeutic environment, within which these various 
methods are combined, differently, and place varying 
emphases upon the precise role that it plays in treatment. 
For some, it is the 'locus of treatment', for others, an 
'aspect of treatment' which has 'important influence upon 
treatment outcome', or a 'foundation' upon which the more 
specialized techniques of the therapeutic community may be 
built. 
There is, however, fairly widespread agreement on a 
number of principles whereby this environment may be 
characterized. Associated particularly with the 'therapeutic 
community proper', or the Maxwell Jones type of community, 
but of a very general influence, are the four 'fundamental 
concepts' first spelled out by Rapoport: Democratization, 
1Kennard, D. (1983) p. 12. 
2See, 
for example, Badaines, J. and Ginzburg, M. (1979). 
3Jansen, 
E. (1980). Quoted in Richmond Fellowship brochure. 
4As 
a further example of this eclecticism, see Kennard, D. (1983) 
p. 30. 
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Permissiveness, Communalism and Reality Confrontation. 
These may be very briefly summarised by quoting from 
Rapoport. 
Democratization refers to the view "that each member 
of the community should share equally in the exercise of 
power in decision making about community affairs - both 
therapeutic and administrative". 
1 
Permissiveness refers to the belief that the community 
"should function with all its members tolerating from one 
another a wide degree of behaviour that might be distressing 
or seem deviant according to 'ordinary' norms". 
2 
Communalism refers to the belief that "its functioning 
should be characterized by tight-knit, inter-communicative 
and intimate sets of relationships. Sharing of amenities, 
informality (e. g. use of first names) and 'freeing' communi- 
cation are prescribed". 
3 
Reality confrontation refers to the belief "that 
patients should be continuously presented with interpretations 
of their behaviour". 
4 
These 'fundamental concepts' are regarded as distinctive 
elements of therapeutic community ideology; they refer to 
political structures of community which are thought to be 
of particular importance or relevance to the realization of 
1Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. 55. 
2Ibid. 
p. 58. 
3Ibid. 
p. 61. 
4 
1bid. p. 63. 
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therapeutic goals. These concepts or principles are 
realized through the implementation of a variety of prac- 
tices or methods which have come to be seen as 'hallmarks'- 
of the therapeutic community approach. So in addition to 
the formal therapies or therapeutic methods which are 
practised within, or adapted to the community setting - such 
as psychoanalysis, group-analysis, behaviour methods, the 
new therapies, encounter, and so on - we find a number of 
more loosely defined therapeutic practices typically 
identified with the therapeutic community approach. 
These practices include: 'freeing of communication', 
'flattening of the authority pyramid', 'sharing of responsi- 
bility', 'participatory decision-making', 'analysis of 
events', 'examination of role and role relationship', 
'provision of living-learning opportunities', 'role diffusion', 
and 'limit-setting'. 
These activities are commonly described in semi- 
technical terms, and in some cases as more or less specific 
techniques. For example, what Maxwell Jones calls the 
'living-learning situation', Clark, following Erikson, 
refers to as 'ego growth through successful crisis resolu- 
tion' and describes as follows: 
A major function of the therapeutic milieu 
is to provide opportunities for the egos of 
damaged and crippled people to face challenges 
and crises and to find new and more effective 
methods to resolve them and grow. This means 
that a therapeutic milieu should offer 
challenges graduated to the patient's ability 
and should protect him when he tackles them. 
It should not protect him so much that he 
becomes dependent and incompetent, or so 
little that he is overwhelmed. If he masters 
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that challenge and grows, the milieu must 
allow him further freedom to face his next 
challenge. 
1 
The practice of 'freeing of communication' is 
described by Clark as follows: 
A constant effort is made to open communications 
and to free the many blocks that exist, both 
between individuals and between different status 
levels within the community. This gives the 
senior staff some chance to know of significant 
emotional happenings directly from those involved; 
it lets patients and junior staff know what 
senior medical or nursing policy is. This of 
course is an endless process; new blockages of 
information and collusions are forever developing 
and must be loosened and examined in their turn. Z 
This little extract already makes it quite clear that 
freeing of communication is by no means the same as opening 
of dialogue, or for that matter, speaking. The reporting 
of happenings is quite different from the telling, or 
speaking of, that which happens. In rather the same way, 
'getting to know of' someone's emotional happenings is 
entirely different from getting to know the someone. See 
for example Heaton: 
Now there is a big difference between the 
logic of telling someone something and reporting 
it. If a girl said that her lover 'reported' 
to her the night before that he loved her, we 
would think it odd and probably interpret her 
statement as meaning that she thought there was 
something peculiar about him. But if he told 
her he loved her there would be a sense of 
personal revelation and intimacy appropriate 
to the avowal. In telling someone something it 
is for us to say what we had in mind. This 
contrasts with reporting which always, in 
1Clark, D. H. (1974) p. 58. 
2Clark, 
D. H. (1971) pp. 44-45. 
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principle, can be verified or corrected by 
someone else. - 
This apparent failure to notice the distinction 
between communicating and speaking is equally obvious in 
the following extract, where 'open communication' is more 
or less equated with 'honest feedback to the leadership' 
or 'sharing observations or suggestions'. 
The second element in therapeutic communities 
I want to mention is that of 'open communica- 
tion'. This is a simple concept but difficult 
to implement. In the therapeutic community, 
all transactions have therapeutic potential; 
that is, patient/staff, patient/patient, and 
staff/staff.... Many therapeutic communities 
allow most of their meetings to be attended by 
patients.... Case discussions, planning sessions, 
and staff meetings all may be held in the 
presence of patients who are interested. This 
can allow the patient to interact with the staff 
around the staff's perception of his behaviour, 
while also helping unmask some of the mystique 
that accompanies psychiatric treatment... 2 
The article continues: 
To achieve open communication, the bureaucratic 
model of communication must be overcome. This 
is where position talks to position, rather 
than people talking to people. In the thera- 
peutic community we attempt to flatten the 
vertical administrative hierarchy for communi- 
cation purposes. It is important, of course, 
that the administrative structure remain vertical 
in order for staff members to know their 
responsibilities, but for the purposes of 
communication it must be made horizontal. There- 
fore staff at all levels are not only encouraged, 
but are expected, to give honest feedback to 
the leadership. When staff at all levels feel 
responsible for sharing their observations and 
suggestions, there can truly be an opportunity 
for creative innovation. The staff in thera- 
peutic communities are encouraged to-be 'real' 
1Heaton, J. M. (1979) p. 180. 
2Hoffman, H. A. (1980) p. 77. 
89 
people utilizing, rather than hiding, their 
own personalities. Staff are encouraged to 
recognise and express their own feelings and 
to give feedback, The patient then has a 
chance to learn about the impact he is 
having on others. ' 
Goals 
We can see that therapeutic communities character- 
istically describe themselves in 'goal-oriented' terms; 
that is, they see their purpose and function as that of 
bringing about therapeutic aims or goals which are more or 
less precisely articulated. The particular aims or goals 
vary to some extent from one therapeutic community to 
another; according to Kennard, goals vary from those of 
'institutional' therapeutic communities - 'reduce socially 
undesirable behaviour', 'increase levels of functioning' - 
to those of the 'alternative asylum' - re-emergence or re- 
birth from period of regression in more integrated state', 
'being freed from the need to conform'. 
2 
Commonly listed therapeutic community goals include: 
adjustment, removal of disorder, learning or re-learning 
of social skills, growth, actualization, insight, self- 
knowledge. Some writers draw distinction between the 
attention to the goals of 'treatment' or 'treatment proper' 
- "all these measures, by any legitimated personnel (and 
this can include patients in the therapeutic community) 
that have as their principal immediate aims the alteration 
'Hoffman, 
H. A. (1980) pp. 77-78. 
2Kennard, 
D. (1983) pp. 102-103. 
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of the individual personality toward better intra-psychic 
integration" - and 'rehabilitation' - "the fitting of a 
particular personality to the demands of an ongoing social 
system". 
l Effectively this same distinction is made 
between adjustment and 'actualization'. The goals of an 
'adjustment-oriented' community might be 
to reduce the patient's level of overt 
disturbance so that he can return home as 
soon as possible. Added to this is often 
the goal that the patient will learn to 
behave in an acceptable way and will not 
make use of his illness as an excuse for 
anti-social behaviour which is in fact 
within his control. 2 
The 'therapeutic process' of an actualization-oriented 
community is directed towards goals which 
attempt to facilitate realistic, open, 
honest communication and expression of 
feelings; facilitate meaningful social 
interaction with greater satisfaction and 
security; reduce anxiety and distortion 
of reality; and increase the sense of worth 
and self-esteem. An effective community 
would also mobilize an individual's initiative, 
and realize his fullest potential for crea- 
tivity and productivity. A therapeutic 
community provides an environment conducive 
to learning new, more adaptable, behaviours, 
and achieving greater self-understand and 
awareness and increasing self-responsibility. 
3 
Typically, these two orientations are combined. 
Therapeutic communities "combine efforts at both intra- 
psychic and behavioural change", 
4 
or "common principles 
1Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. 28. 
2Test, 
M. A. & Stern, L. I. (1978) p. 50. 
3Badaines, J. and Ginzburg, M. (1979) p. 74. (Italics mine. ) 
4Manning, 
N. (1979) p. 311. 
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dictate that the therapeutic community, whatever its 
context, should provide a communal living experience which 
encourages open communication, and promotes intra-psychic 
and social adjustment, to the maximum capacity of the 
individual". ' 
One further list of therapeutic community goals - 
and one which has been approvingly cited by other authors - 
has been provided by Morris Schwartz. Schwartz' list 
includes the following benefits which a therapeutic community 
should offer: 
2 
Provide the patient with experiences that will 
minimize his distortions of reality. 
Facilitate his meaningful and realistic commu- 
nicative exchange with others. 
Facilitate his participation with others so 
that he derives greater satisfaction and 
security therefrom. 
Reduce his anxiety and increase his comfort. 
Increase his self-esteem. 
Provide him with insight into the causes and 
manifestations of his mental illness. 
Mobilize his initiative and motivate him to 
realize more fully his potentialities for 
creativity and productivity. 
Throughout the therapeutic community literature are to 
be found references to goals such as these, which usually are 
regarded as being self-evidently desirable. In fact, there 
1 Jansen, E. (1980) pp. 32-33. 
2Schwartz, 
M. (1957). Quoted in Jansen E. (1980) and Rapoport, R. N. 
(1960). 
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is very little 'self-evident' about any of these 'goals', 
since what they mean is defined by the very particular 
contexts in which they are introduced. Take away the 
context, and what have we left of 'open communication'. Is 
'open communication' first of all open to the possibility 
of its own closedness? Is the value of 'self-esteem' 
higher than that of (say) humility? What sort of 'initia- 
tive' is it that must be 'mobilized'? What sort of 
'creativity' is it that must be 'motivated'? In what sort 
of 'reality' is it that people find themselves attempting 
to remove the distortions of reality, as a goal? Does not 
this very goal generate a rather peculiar reality, which is 
conspicuously different from 'ordinary' reality, for example? 
If we regard 'meaningful relations with others' as a goal 
which can be set out in advance and worked towards step by 
step, perhaps making progress reports on the way, have we 
not laid out a very particular or specific notion of 
'meaningful' social interaction, whose meaning and meaning- 
fulness may be very far from self evident? Indeed, does 
not the predominant 'goal orientedness' which we find 
expressed in the following rather typical extracts suggest 
a rather peculiar way of going about things with others. 
On the first visit... there is an informal 
meeting... in which aims, programme and style 
of the community are explained. This is 
followed by a sharing of experience about 
entry, and an examination of how the applicant 
views his life and what his goals are. The 
latter may be unknown at this stage. Following 
this half hour meeting the applicant relaxes 
prior to joining one of the small groups. 1 
1Blake, 
R. and Millard, D. (1979) p. 10. 
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But is is central to the operation theory 
of therapeutic communities that no action 
based programme is successful unless the 
gains (however small) made by patients are 
brought to some form of conscious recognition 
and verbal expression, and no verbal approach 
is complete unless the gains are tested and 
reinforced in action. 
' 
While ample time is given to the exploration 
of obstacles to coping with life in society 
(including early and contemporary ways of 
expressing conflict) from the start the stress 
is laid on the question: What do you want to 
achieve whilst you are here? What are the 
problems that make it impossible to cope and 
what therefore should be the ultimate and 
intermediate goals? 
2 
It matters finally, perhaps, very little whether the 
patient is told the direction in which he must change (e. g. 
through reality confrontation, corrective emotional experi- 
ences and so on), whether he is encouraged to find his own 
goals ("The director must take great care to make no 
suggestion as to what course of action might be preferable")3 
or whether he simply follows the general goals of the 
community (open communication, sharing of feelings, 
honesty, etc. ) so long as the patient continues to be 
encouraged in his uncritical acceptance of the extremely 
dubious notion that therapeutic 'achievement' consists in 
the pre-visioning of particular ends and the following of 
specific techniques and practices to bring these ends about. 
Rather than generate any critical inquiry into the nature of 
the therapeutic project - at which point we might say 
therapy begins - communities for the most part simply offer 
1Blake, 
R. and Millard, D. (1979) p. 5. 
2Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 47. 
3Moreno, 
quoted in Badaines, J. and Ginzburg, M. (1979) p. 75. 
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a hodge-podge of recipes to bring about these various 
'self-evident' goals. Not only are these goals frequently 
highly contradictory, for example, 'mobilize his initiative' 
and at the same time 'increase his comfort'; 'reduce his 
anxiety' and 'motivate him to realize more fully his 
potentialities', 'increase his self-esteem' and 'provide him 
with insight into the causes and nature of his mental ill- 
ness'; but they illustrate, furthermore, a consistent 
muddling of different therapeutic idioms, metaphors, and 
theoretical positions. 
One consequence of this eclecticism is that words 
which have a quasi-technical 'psychological' meaning come 
to be used in entirely different senses. Take insight. 
The notion of 'insight into the causes and manifestations 
of one's mental illness' suggests that insight is a seeing 
of oneself as one is seen by a trained observer who believes 
he has correctly identified the malfunctionings of one's 
mind. Insight here is normatively defined; that is, one 
has acquired insight when one sees correctly or accurately 
the pathological processes occurring within oneself as they 
are identified and defined by trained experts. 
This is different from the sense in which this word 
is used, also within this literature, to refer to idio- 
graphic knowledge about oneself, the workings of one's 
mind, one's patterns of behaviour, and so on. This sort 
of self-knowledge may be - factually - perfectly correct. 
An example of this sort of insight might be the following: 
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My stutter is really a manifestation of 
tension, which stems from anxiety, and 
also resistance. My experience with my 
mother has made me extremely anxious about 
whether my efforts at communication, 
especially with women, will be successful, 
and so I often defeat my own efforts 
through trying too hard. On the other 
hand, I recognize that a part of me feels 
punitive towards my mother and doesn't want 
to talk: why try so hard when she can never 
be pleased? This aspect of myself I 
experience as an onlooker who1taunts me: 
Go on, make a mess of things. 
A modified or expanded version of insight thus 
understood is often employed by psychoanalysts, when they 
use 'insight' to refer to knowledge of processes and 
workings of the mind, which ordinarily are said to be un- 
conscious, but which are brought to awareness in the course 
of analytic treatment. This notion of 'insight', as 
putatively factual knowledge about oneself or one's mental 
or 'psychological' processes differs again from the insight 
which comes as a direct realization of truth. We speak of 
insight of this sort dawning. Such insight is not a 
condition of change in oneself, a knowledge about oneself 
which might lead to a change of behaviour, nor is it a 
knowledge of changes in oneself. This insight is a trans- 
cendence; it is itself a transformation of one's being. 
Confronting Realit 
Let us return to the first of the benefits which, 
according to Schwartz, a therapeutic community should provide. 
1Quoted in Jansen, E. (1980) p. 182. 
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It should "provide the patient with experiences that will 
minimise his distortions of reality". It is difficult at 
the outset to see how a community might be able to provide 
a person with experiences of this nature. Experiences are 
not any sort of entities which might be offered or served 
up. Neither is experiencing the representing or recording 
of events or objects, a picturing which might be more or 
less accurate or true to reality, aspiring to the ideal of 
a 'pure' experience of reality. In the course of commenting 
upon the importance of the 'sharing' of experience - itself 
a rather confused notion - Hawkins stresses the need to 
"separate out the actual experience from emotive or inter- 
pretative responses to it". 
1 
But our experience is inter- 
pretative, that is we experience things as... This notion of 
pure experience, untainted by context or culture, or 
language, as a final touchstone of validity, and the 
subjectivization of meaning that it implies, serves to 
illustrate again the psychologistic epistemology which per- 
vades this literature. 
We do indeed usually experience things and other 
people as real; when we talk of reality we refer primarily 
to the actual presence of things set in the world. But the 
world onto which our experience is an opening is not an 
object which we might see more or less clearly, but rather 
a fabric woven of the real and the imaginary, the visible 
and the invisible, the literal and the mythic; it is a 
world whose meanings can never be exhausted, a world 
'Hawkins, P. (1979) p. 225. 
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haunted by ambiguities and indeterminacies which, like the 
horizon, can never be overcome. 
Our experience is strictly speaking not so much a 
relation to the world, as an entwinement in its folds. To 
speak of distortions of reality, in this fashion, is subtly 
misleading, since we do not experience reality at all. We 
cannot see it, taste it, touch it, or even dream it. 
Reality must be unimaginable. Hence the futility of getting 
patients 'in touch with reality' as a therapeutic goal. 
'Realities' precipitate, as realization of projects, as the 
other comes into being for me in the realization of the 
relation between us, or what we mean to one another. 
If this implies the relativism of 'reality is what 
we make of it', it must be emphasised that the idea of the 
independently real is crucially important. There are a 
great many things in the world which exist independently 
of our knowledge of them, including things yet to be 
discovered. Science is made up of various activities which 
are concerned to discover the real properties or powers 
of real things which exist independently of us. But it 
is important to see that the checking of the independently 
real is not solely the province of science. 
' And further, 
although science is concerned with the real, the question 
of man's relation to reality takes us far beyond science. 
It is not an empirical question but a conceptual one. It 
is not a matter of a demonstrating, confronting or empirical 
showing, but has to do with the force of the concept of 
1See Winch, P. (1958). 
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reality. Showing the real now is showing what we mean by 
the real, a showing which we may sometimes accomplish 
very effectively by meaning what we say. 
Reality is not what gives language sense. 
What is real and what is unreal shows itself 
in the sense that language has. Further, 
both the distinction between the real and 
the unreal and the concept of agreement with 
reality themselves belong to our language. 
Perhaps Schwartz is doing no more than proposing that 
members of a community should be as straightforward with 
one another as they are able, and try not to mystify one 
another. If this is in fact what he is trying to say, then 
he is couching his proposal in an extremely mystifying way. 
He is suggesting that there is some special function that 
a community run on therapeutic principles can provide, 
rather than reminding us of a simple decency. 
Similar considerations apply to the notion of reality 
confrontation, which is perhaps the sort of method that 
Schwartz has in mind. Reality confrontation is a very 
important term in therapeutic community literature. We are 
all familiar with the idea of 'reality confrontation' as it 
is colloquially understood. For example, if I have plans 
to build a mansion and my friend points out that I have 
no money in the bank, then he might claim to be confronting 
me with reality. But 'reality confrontation' is not used 
in this colloquial sense, but rather as a quasi-scientific 
or technical term, as a main ingredient in an overall 
1Winch, 
P. (1972) p. 12. 
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therapeutic project, as a means towards the goal of 
realistic or accurate experience. 
Whilst insufficient reality confrontation 
is undesirable therapeutically because it 
allows patients to maintain their patterned 
distortion, too great reality confrontation 
may be so disturbing to patients with weak 
defences as actually to work against the 
patient's progress. l 
Reality confrontation is effected largely by 'interpre- 
tation'. 
Reality confrontation... seems to apply to 
all types of therapeutic community - 
patients should be continuously presented 
with interpretations of their behaviour as 
it is seen by others. 2 
Reality confrontation implies that the 
individual's conduct is reflected back to 
him, in the hope that he will accept inter- 
pretation and modify offending behaviour. 
3 
Here too reality confrontation is depicted as a specialized 
therapeutic activity; for we do not ordinarily go around 
continuously presenting one another with interpretations 
of behaviour, any more than we ordinarily find our way with 
others, or arrive at some sense of the real in this fashion. 
Interpretation, of course, can be assumed to have a 
technical meaning within psychotherapeutic writings, and 
especially in writings whose orientation professes to be 
psychodynamic. As a simple example of a psychoanalytic 
interpretation I shall repeat the story told by the psycho- 
logist Gordon Allport of his one meeting with Freud. 
4 
'Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. 70. 
2Kennard, D. (1979) p. 183. 
3Morrice, J. L. W. (1979) p. 55. 
4Recounted in Hogan, R. (1976). 
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In the summer of 1920, after finishing his under- 
graduate degree at Harvard, Allport had occasion to find 
himself in Vienna. Wishing to make the most of this 
opportunity, and "with a callow forwardness" he wrote to 
Freud asking for an interview, which Freud graciously 
granted. When the hour of his appointment came, Allport 
was welcomed, and led into the inner office, where he took 
his seat. Freud merely gazed at him silently but expectantly. 
At this point it suddenly dawned on Allport, in some panic, 
that he had no idea why he was there; desperately he invented 
some conversational gambit. "I told him of an episode on 
the tram car on the way to his office. A small boy of about 
four years of age had displayed a conspicuous dirt phobia. 
He kept saying to his mother: 'I don't want to sit there... 
don't let that dirty man sit beside me"'. Because the boy's 
mother was a fastidious and domineering German mother, 
Allport thought the point of the story was obvious. Freud, 
however, seeing the prim and compulsive young man sitting 
opposite him, quietly inquired: "And was that little boy 
you? " 
How do we interpret this interpretation? It seems 
quite clear that Freud was allowing himself to play with a 
truth, which he found expressed nowhere else than in 
Allport's discourse with him. But interpretation does not 
end with one interpretative utterance. Freud's interpre- 
tation was as much an invitation. It was an invitation to 
enter a conversation; and a rather peculiar conversation at 
that - one which suddenly turns the world upside down. The 
truth of Allport's situation - to which Freud's gesture was 
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an invitation - was not quite the same as its 'reality' - 
since Allport was palpably not, in fact, that little boy. 
When interpretation is understood as "attempting to 
bring a reality picture" to the attention of the patient, 
in order to correct or modify his own distorted or confused 
experience of the world, it is clearly not interpretation 
as this is understood within the hermeneutic discipline of 
psychoanalysis. For here the context of interpretation is 
as much a 'part' of the interpretation as its 'content'. 
An interpretation is contextualized first and foremost in 
the relationship between the persons engaged in the inter- 
pretation. An interpretation as a picturing of reality 
can no more reflect this context than a mirror can reflect 
its frame. What this conception of interpretation reflects 
most accurately is a notion of reality which is disassociated 
from what is in fact going on. 
This rather peculiar sense of 'interpretation' 
becomes more clear when we consider another 'basic concept' 
of the therapeutic community: permissiveness. Within this 
literature, permissiveness is usually regarded as the 
'other pole' of reality confrontation. For example: 
"Reality confrontation and permissiveness are separate 
poles of a single dimension", 
l 
or "the principles of 
permissiveness and reality confrontation go together"2 or 
"there are conflicts between permissiveness and reality 
confrontation". 
3 
1Morrice, J. K. W. (1979) p. 58. 
2Kennard, 
D. (1983) p. 54. 
3Rapoport, R. N. (1960). 
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In what fashion do these two belong together? We 
recall that 'permissiveness' refers to the toleration of 
a wide range of behaviour, behaviour which might ordinarily 
seem 'deviant'. The idea, however "is not to accept deviance 
uncritically or indifferently. On the contrary, suppression 
by regulation or decree is avoided in order that the 
behaviour may be available for examination". 
l 
When patients 
reveal real life problems in an open fashion, then per- 
missiveness "serves its purpose". "What results (so it is 
hoped) is relevant new social learning for both individual 
and group". 
2 Thus this principle is 'closely linked' with 
that of reality confrontation. 
The two go hand in hand, and one has little 
use without the other. As patients interact 
they reveal socially inept patterns of 
behaviour which are often characteristic of 
them, not only in the life of the therapeutic 
community, but also in terms of outside 
relationships... Reality confrontation implies 
that the individual's conduct is reflected 
back to him in the hope that he will. accept 
interpretation and modify the offending 
behaviour". 3 
What Morrice has to say here is more or less echoed 
by Kennard: "It is useful to realize that the principles of 
permissiveness and reality confrontation go together: 
patients can do what they like but whatever they do will be 
a matter for confrontation and discussion if it interferes 
with their relationships with others". 
4 Kennard goes on 
to propose that "this combination of permissiveness with 
1Morrice, J. K. W. (1979) p. 53. 
2Ibid. 
p. 53. 
3Ibid. 
p. 55. 
. 11 'Kennard, D. (1983) p. 54. 
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confrontation and interpretation is central to all therapies 
based directly or indirectly on psychoanalysis". And here 
we find more difficulty in following him. 
If we understand by 'permissiveness' - 'letting be', 
and if we understand by 'reality confrontation' - inter- 
pretation, then we might more readily see the belongingness 
of these terms in their relation to psychoanalysis. Letting 
be is by no means an abandonment of concern. One can only 
let be what one is concerned to allow to be. Letting be 
has very precise connotations of engagement, as the anti- 
thetical structure of the word 'let' informs us. (Let: 
allow, and hinder, cf. love and leave). Letting be is an 
allowing or freeing of something into its being, not a 
casting to the winds. In flying a kite, one lets it into 
its being as a kite, by a holding which is a letting or 
freeing: a freeholding. But these images can be very 
misleading. 
There can be no purpose to letting be: that is why 
it is a freeing. 'Permissiveness' on the other hand is 
very clearly and explicitly purposeful. It serves the purpose 
of reality confrontation. "In community terms, permissive- 
ness means the toleration of deviant behaviour"; 
l 
reality 
confrontation corrects it. At this point, an underlying 
structure does present itself, an oppositional structure 
whose terms are the 'control' of deviance (reality con- 
frontation) and the toleration of deviance (permissiveness). 
Confrontation becomes the means whereby this normative 
1Morrice, J. K. W. (1979) p. 53. 
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structure is regulated, a structure whose parameters are 
defined in terms of what can be tolerated or what can be 
put up with. And here we see how there may be more back up 
to 'confrontation' than mere 'interpretations of behaviour 
as seen by others: 
The intelligent and constructive use of a 
permissive orientation is not always easy 
to maintain.... It is something of a con- 
juring trick to keep the right proportion 
of support and confrontation. There may 
come a point when a group is failing to cope 
with a disruptive subgroup or individual. 
The decision about how to proceed may then 
be complicated by inflexible notions that 
the group, and only the group, must handle 
its own problems, and that to use drugs, 
individual psychotherapy or other techniques 
is an abandonment of principle. The author 
does not share that view and it is becoming 
increasingly outmoded. It seems more useful 
when dealing with a range of psychiatrically 
disturbed patients to accept that a similarly 
wide range Iof techniques may well be 
necessary. 
The manner of regulation of a normative structure may 
be further illustrated by reference to the notion of 
negative feedback. 
Institutions generally have an implicit 
scale of degrees of freedom of authority 
within the rules. A rise of emotional 
temperature might be represented by in- 
creasingly aggressive or acting out behaviour. 
The thermostat in this case would be perhaps, 
another member of the community who, at 
some point, will react or impose some sanction 
to turn down the heat so that the resident 
knows at which point his behaviour is no 
longer tolerated, and ay regulate his 
behaviour accordingly. 
IIbid. 
p. 54. 
-Kirk, J. D. and Millard, D. (1979) p. 121. (Italics mine. ) 
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The important words are 'no longer', for they suggest 
that up to that point his behaviour was merely tolerated. 
Insofar as most people who live as patients within thera- 
peutic communities do indeed deviate from the desired norms 
of mental health, if only because they choose to live thus, 
we may assume that the attitude of toleration is a widely 
prevailing one within such communities. An ambiance of 
toleration must be distinguished from, for example, one of 
ordinary conviviality, where people enjoy one another's 
company for its own sake. A community of people held to- 
gether in a modality of 'toleration' is in a state of unstable 
equilibrium; hence there is a constant need for 'confronta- 
tion' to restore the modus vivendi. The dynamics of 
toleration are, so to speak, stressful. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
COMMUNITY AND ORGANIZATION 
Community 
Therapeutic communities such as we have discussed 
address themselves to the task of facilitating or enabling 
patients to arrive at a state of more adequate mental 
functioning, a state which, variously defined, constitutes 
the unquestioned goal of the therapeutic endeavour. In 
the service of this goal, a range of techniques, methods 
and practices are employed. These methods mostly bring 
about 'personal change' in a therapeutically desirable 
direction by providing the patient with an increased under- 
standing of the nature of his problems and difficulties, 
or with insight into the nature of his condition. The role 
of the staff is not however limited to the implementation 
of these therapeutic methods, but includes the facilitating, 
in other ways, of a therapeutic ambiance conducive to 
personal growth. This is brought about partly by the 
putting into practice of therapeutic community 'principles' 
such as democratization, permissiveness, and 'communalism', 
and partly by the capacity of the staff to act as models 
by which patients may be guided, and to offer support and 
encouragement "1 
I have shown something of the way in which therapeutic 
communities work towards the realization of these goals, or 
ways in which these communities are 'used'. I have for 
"'Staff 
therefore provide a model of how to display emotions, form 
opinions, and arrive at decisions. " Jansen, E. (1980) p. 167. 
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example, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, distinguished between 
descriptions of communities which emphasise either their 
being a treatment process or a treatment process setting. 
In the first place, the therapeutic community is a repository 
of forces to be harnessed, a technical procedure to be 
followed, a method, a treatment modality, a doctor - in the 
second, a setting in which specific therapeutic procedures 
may be most effectively implemented, a setting or context 
which is itself directly implicated in these procedures and 
structured according to therapeutic community principles. 
We now shift our own emphasis more towards a dis- 
cussion of this treatment setting; from the 'therapy' to 
the 'community'. How do we find the nature of 'community' 
to be understood within this literature? And what is it 
about community as community that may be seen to be thera- 
peutic? 
A certain confusion possibly arises from the tendency 
to think of a community as a large group; and a therapeutic 
community as a large therapeutic group, made up of people 
who are also involved in an 'ongoing living situation'. 
Right across the literature, the importance of the large 
group, as the occasion of community meeting, is stressed. 
"As part of the therapeutic community the large group has 
a multiple function. It is the common meeting ground, 
where faith in the treatment process is daily affirmed; it 
is the communications centre, the control agent and a teach- 
ing situation". 
1 
1Whiteley, J. S. and Gordon, J. (1979) pp. 129-130. 
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According to this author, the daily large group is 
the 'keystone of a therapeutic community'. "Without it 
the patients would merely wait for their 'treatment session' 
with the group therapist, occupying one-and-a-half hours 
each day, and 'the other 23 (or 22}) hours' of the patient's 
day that Stanton and Schwartz (1954) refer to would be lost. 
The community meeting draws together the therapeutic strands, 
but exactly how it should be run or on what theoretical 
model it should be based is in considerable doubt. Much more 
exploratory research is required about the precise nature of 
the community meeting". 
' 
It remains, however, 'an integral 
part of the therapeutic community practice'. 
Daily, formalized large group meetings take 
place in a therapeutic community. They have 
a special relationship to the other activi- 
ties of the day and it could well be said 
that the twenty four hours of the therapeutic 
community is one kind of continuous large 
group. 
This tendency to think of the community as a large 
group may again be noticed in the following extracts: 
A therapeutic community is a consciously 
contrived large group of people through 
which individual treatment is supplemented 
as far as possible by therapeutic community 
relationships. 3 
Just as one may make less differentiation 
between sociotherapy and psychotherapy, so 
one makes less distinction between the 
events occurring in the large group meeting 
and events occurring in the therapeutic 
community's overall interaction throughout 
IIbid. 
p. 131. 
2Ibid. 
p. 128. 
3Crocket, R. (1979) p. 138. 
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the day. The basic characteristics of the 
therapeutic community group are evident in 
the large group community meeting... 
We consider that the large group is the 
most significant event in the therapeutic 
community, all the other groups and activi- 
ties being seen only as lateral outcroppings 
of the large group. Their function has to 
be constantly under observation, because they 
contain and control important operations which2 
are at the centre of the process of mentation. 
But a community is not the same as a social group. 
People may group or be grouped in this way or that; but the 
word 'community' resists utterly this sort of use. One 
does not belong to a community as one belongs to a group. 
Community is a deceptive social term. People 
speak of a 'community of interest' - for 
instance, men who do the same kind of labour or 
depend on each other to make money. There are 
also 'communities of affection', like churches 
or ethnic groups whose members feel emotional 
ties to one another. Yet, even in everyday 
language, the idea of a community is not inter- 
changeable with the idea of a social group; 
a community is a particular kind of social group 
in which men believe they share something to- 
gether. The feeling of community is fraternal, 
it involves something more than the recognition 
that men and women need each other materially. 3 
We might add to 'materially' psychologically. "The bond of 
community", the author goes on, "is one of sensing common 
identity, a pleasure in recognizing 'us' and 'who we are"'. 
The notion of the fraternal bond introduces the idea of 
enjoyment which people might find in one another's company, 
for its own sake, and of the fulfilment which might come of 
belonging to a structure of mutual recognition, where each 
'Whiteley, J. S. (1975). 
2Grunberg, S. (1979) p. 253. 
3Sennett, R. (1971) pp. 30-31. 
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person may be seen to take his own place within or upon a 
common ground. When we speak of a community of people we 
suggest a body, a fellowship; and in this the notion of 
what is held in common seems to be central. (Munis, L., 
'gift' or 'exchange'). A group, of course, might gather 
about some common interest or purpose; and this is precisely 
where we might wish to make some distinction between 'group' 
and 'community'. For the common 'gift' or 'exchange' of 
community seems to be intrinsic to the fellowship, and not 
merely an occasion for its coming about. 
Belonging 
The manner in which individuals 'partake of' community, 
including the community at large, is belonging. This 
belonging is not a possessive belonging, in the sense that 
my goods belong to me, or the slave belongs to his master. 
1 
Neither is it a categorical belonging, in the sense that I 
might be said to belong to a statistical sample, or to a 
'set' of the population. It refers rather to an existential 
belonging, a belonging in which one's very singularity is 
grounded, and a belonging which is, most profoundly, inter- 
personal. 
'Compare Main's account of 'participation in full community life', where 
the doctor 'no longer owns his patients'. "They are given up to the 
community which is to treat them, and which owns them and him. Patients 
are no longer his captive children, obedient in nursery-like activities, 
but have sincere adult roles to play, and are free to reach for responsi- 
bilities and opinions concerning the community of which they are a part. " 
Main, T. (1946). 
111 
We may speak of belonging to an area, or to a tradi- 
tion. But these forms of belonging are no less 'inter- 
personal', since the very possibility of belonging in any of 
these senses is that we originally belonged to someone who 
initiated us into the world and prepared a place for us, who 
opened language and tradition, and who gave us our name - 
which speaks equally of our singularity and our belongingness. 
And of course our subsequent sense of belonging to a place 
is likely to be rather insubstantial and even uncanny in the 
absence of any community of others with whom we might be 
said to belong. See, for example, the story of Rip van 
Winkle. 
This familiar sense of belonging is brought out quite 
clearly when we speak of two people belonging to one another, 
or children belonging with their parents. When a person 
speaks of belonging to his friends or family, he speaks of 
a world to which he is drawn, where he feels familiar and 
at home. The word itself suggests a longing, and a pro- 
longing, which is a staying. Belonging also suggests what 
is fitting or 'right', as when we speak of someone being in 
his element. When we say of someone that he belongs in 
prison, we imply that is where, secretly, he wishes to be. 
Belonging is not, of course, an activity or a doing. 
I cannot simply decide to belong somewhere, or with someone. 
However devotedly T. E. Lawrence surrendered himself to its 
customs, he could never, finally, belong to the Arab world. 
In my case, the effort for these years to 
live in the dress of Arabs, and to imitate 
their mental foundations, quitted me of my 
English self, and let me look at the West 
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and its conventions with new eyes: they 
destroyed it all for me. At the same time 
I could not sincerely take on the Arab skin; 
it was an affectation only. Easily was a 
man made an infidel, but hardly might he be 
converted to another faith. I had dropped one 
form and could not take on the other, and was 
become like Mohammed's coffin in our legend... 
Sometimes these selves would converse ii the 
void; and then madness was very near... 
Neither can anyone, as an activity, bring another 
person into their world, or into belonging. I may be able 
to put someone at ease, but I cannot put them at home. When 
we do put someone 'in a home' we are saying very precisely 
that they no longer have a home, or home is no longer where 
they belong. Likewise when we put a child in care, we are 
responding to the breakdown of an original structure of 
belonging, or care. 
My sense of belonging to or with others can be arti- 
culated in terms of what they mean to me. The infant's 
sense of belonging unfolds according to what he means to his 
mother and father and what they mean to one another. If 
they finally 'mean nothing' to one another, what sense can 
he make of his own origins? Where does he 'come in'? 
Where does he belong? 
We will of course see the world differently according 
to the sense of belonging that we have. It is very clear, 
for example, that the child who has little sense of 
belonging, or who does not feel at home with his family 
or know what he means to them, may find himself unable to 
assume the world as his birthright; the world does not open 
1Lawrence, 
T. E. Quoted in Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) p. 188. 
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up for him as it might do for a happy and secure child. 
"Psychiatric patients with chronic illness have lost 
their social matrix and have an inability to maintain their 
own social matrix; and therefore, either for a short period 
of time or for the rest of their lives, need a social matrix 
ready made for them. "' Here, I should prefer to emphasise 
rather differently what this author is saying. First of 
all, precisely this disarticulatedness of or from 'social 
matrix' - in its full temporality - is the psychiatric 
illness. This, and nothing else. Hence the importance of 
being clear about the nature of the 'treatment'. Secondly, 
the oppositional structure which the author suggests 
between 'maintaining one's own social matrix' and having 
one 'ready made' obscures what is most central to inter- 
personal belonging: its being to do with what arises between. 
The psychiatric patient is - in different ways, with 
differing degrees of severity or chronicity - disarticulated 
from interpersonal belonging. The madman - as Lawrence sugg- 
ests - belongs to no-one; and hence his vulnerability to 
institutional predatoriness. For some people, this sort of 
disarticulation may 'simply' take the form of a chronic 
loneliness, a life of 'quiet desperation'. Others may 
find their desperation less containable, and may for example 
show 'psychiatric symptoms' of one sort or another which 
may speak both of and to the absence of 'matrix'. They 
may find their way to therapeutic communities; and where 
they do the question of whether or not they come to feel, 
1Huessy, H. (1980) p. 367. 
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in the course of time, less lonely, depressed and dis- 
articulated must depend to a very great extent upon the 
degree to which they have been able to articulate into a 
structure of belonging. Communities' vary enormously in 
the degree to which these sort of possibilities make sense. 
According to whether people meet sufficiently in a spirit 
of openness to what they might have in common or between 
them, or whether they meet in service of the goal of 
treatment, entirely different openings and possibilities 
will arise. 
Openings between people are not created by techniques 
or methods - there could be no technique whereby one person 
could open himself to the other - but by gestures, actions, 
words, and rituals (which may be more or less honest, more 
or less contrived). These gestures do not arise out of 
nowhere, but out of a living context, or intentional matrix. 
The intentional matrix which is of interest to the present 
study is that of a community of people who live together. 
How might we think of the 'belonging' which most 
befits a community of people who live together? Where people 
live together and enjoy some sense of belonging in their 
living together, we might propose that this is a feeling 
at home with one another. Among many considerations which 
would seem to have bearing upon what it is to feel at home 
with others, in the way one lives with them, two seem to 
be particularly important. Firstly, the various rituals of 
domestic life, which are shared 'at home'. Of these probably 
the most important are those associated with eating together; 
not only the 'sharing of bread', but equally the various 
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rituals which culminate in gathering together round the 
table. Secondly, we might mention the various 'things' - 
whether they be 'activities' or more 'concrete' things of 
one sort or another which draw together people who live 
together, and about which domestic life is woven. Play, 
conversation, shared belongings are obvious examples. 
One of the most conspicuous shortcomings of the 
entire therapeutic community literature is the almost 
complete absence of any discussion of any of these matters. 
For all their emphasis upon 'shirt sleeved informality', 
and 'folkways', for example, there is no attention paid at 
all to the'domestic', the nature of the 'domestic', and 
the place of the domestic within the 'residential'. The 
newcomer to this literature cannot help but notice the 
phenomenon, in striking contrast to our ordinary experience 
of cultural life, which is the exclusion of all matters to 
do with the kitchen sink from all but the most peripheral 
mention. To reply that many or most therapeutic communities 
are so organized that these matters are unobtrusively taken 
care of is precisely to beg the question. Where these 
matters are given mention, it is likely to be in terms such 
as these. 
To facilitate sharing, and perhaps to signal 
that the culture is accepting, trusting and 
does not stand on ceremony or status, every- 
day duties and facilities are also shared. 
For example, tea and coffee breaks may be 
taken by patients and staff together, and 
dining room and recreational facilities may 
be used in common. 1 
1Morrice, 
J. K. W. (1979) p. 57. 
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Therapeutic communities, we are told, have a 'higher 
potential for normalcy' than hospitals. 
1 What could be 
more normal than a sense of belonging in which some 
importance is attached to the 'nitty-gritty' of domestic 
life? The table, the kitchen stove, the hearth, the 
furnishings - these now become things about which life is 
geared, and around which conversation is woven. But let 
us look at one of the few statements on 'belonging' which 
appears within the writings. 
It has always been necessary in therapeutic 
communities to establish the visible presence 
of the community and of the individual's 
membership of it by instituting the community 
meeting. Without such a regular face to face 
manifestation of the community it seems to be 
difficult to establish the members' awareness 
of anything. It is the demand to belong that 
creates the therapeutic dynamic. But only a 
genuine need of the community as a whole leading 
to necessary contributions from members can 
establish a sense of belonging. In this way 
the community meeting has now become the only 
resource left to an over-endowed community to 
establish belonging and prevent anomie in the 
membership. 2 
Here we see again the extraordinary load which is 
carried by this vehicle - the community meeting, or 
community 'large group' experience. The community meeting 
is almost unanimously felt to be 'the central event in a 
therapeutic community'. Its main functions are seen as 
therapeutic, and effecting 'social control'. 
The staff agree... on the small group and the 
community group as the essential groups... 
'Jansen, E. (1980) p. 223. 
2Christian, 
A. and Hinshelwood, R. D. (1979) p. 180. 
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staff depend heavily on the small group for 
therapy and the community meeting for social 
control; and the patients increasingly concur 
with this arrangement. ' 
Or again: the large group 
is not predominantly seen by either staff or 
patients as a treatment group in the same 
sense as the smaller therapy groups. While 
it is recognized that treatment occurs here, 
and that there are powerful social forces at 
the disposal of treatment aims in such a 
group, the principal aims of the community 
meeting are those of social control. 
If the community meeting, or community large group 
(it has also been called the 'community personality') is 
indeed the main instrument, or vehicle, or 'resource' to 
'establish belonging', and it is. at the same time a thera- 
peutic instrument and the main means of social control, 
then we seem to arrive at a peculiarly 'shortcircuited' and 
'unearthed' notion of community. "It is perhaps surprising", 
writes Jansen, "that we do not have more staff who have 
themselves participated as residents in the therapeutic 
process". 
3 How does one reside in a 'therapeutic process'? 
How does one make oneself at home in a community where 
"Ideally a therapeutic community is a 'place of mirrors' for 
all involved"? 
4 How does one belong to a community which, 
in its 'fullest form' is "a consciously contrived large 
group of people, made up of patients and staff, to which 
both patients and staff are asked to relate for therapeutic 
purposes to the maximum degree possible, rather than to 
'Manning, N. and Blake, R: (1979) pp. 151-152. 
2Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. 92. 
3Jansen, E. (1980) p. 119. (My italics. ) 
4Hawkins, 
P. (1979) p. 227. 
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individual therapists", 1 or where the 'ideal' is "a twenty 
four hour treatment environment". 
2 
By the same token, how can one belong to a community, 
where one's relation to the community is at the same time 
that of a consumer to a product: "The consumers, in their 
interviews, gave some indication of those qualities and 
abilities which are experienced as helpful; good staff are 
perceived as warm and undogmatic, they 'help me get in touch 
with my feelings'... "3 This is one of many references to 
the member of a therapeutic community as a 'consumer', or 
which distinguishes between "the consumer of therapeutic 
community methods and the providers (healers)". 
4 
To speak of madness as a disarticulatedness from 
belonging, is to emphasize, as being a central concern of 
a therapeutic community, the possibility of generating 
conditions within which people on the margins might begin 
to pick up again some of the threads of belonging. This 
is by no means to make some claim of the order of 'people 
need people', or to suggest that the role of the therapeutic 
community is to meet this need. The nature of interpersonal 
belonging requires for its understanding an entirely 
different epistemology than that which is invoked by inter- 
personal consumerism, the provision of caring services, 
and so on. 
1Crocket, R. (1979) p. 138. 
2Manning, N. and Blake, R. (1979) p. 154. 
3Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 163. 
4Badaines, 
J. and Ginzburg, M. (1979) p. 69. See also Jones, M. (1979) 
p. 6. 
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Tom Main writes: 
Experiments in sensory deprivation have shown 
unequivocally that bereft of information from 
the world around him and thrown back only on 
his internal resources an individual is liable 
to become hallucinated, deluded and psychotic. 
To put this in another way, relations with the 
environment are essential to mental health. 
One identifies oneself and experiences one's 
resources and minimizes distortions of reality 
through relations with others. 
He goes on to make the proposal that "for mental health the 
personalized individual needs active collaborative relations 
with personalized others". 
2 In this he is, of course, in 
a sense, quite correct. But he is at the same time thoroughly 
misleading. His statement seems to be of the order: a person 
needs relationships rather like the body needs salt. Inter- 
subjectivity is reduced to natural processes of an objective 
world; processes expressed in terms of 'information', 
stimulation, input. Main seems to see no problematics 
surrounding the notion of a 'need' for a 'personalized 
other', nor with the 'satisfying' of this need, nor with 
the idea of staff being provided to satisfy this need, 
to be a 'personalized other' for him, and thereby put him 
back on the road to mental health. 
Language 
Consider the following remarks on the attributes of 
a therapeutic community. 
1Main, T. (1980) pp. 58-59. 
2Ibid. 
p. 60. 
120 
The other feature concerns the use made of 
what goes on within and between groups of 
people working and living together. In any 
treatment or rehabilitation setting there 
is a choice (not always recognised) of whether 
to try to understand and harness the group 
dynamics which are operating, or allow them 
to work informally and often unseen. The 
former option marks the therapeutic community 
approach. Treatment settings established for 
the specific purpose of creating these 
dynamics, to use them as the main agent of 
change, have been termed the therapeutic community 
proper or the psychotherapeutic community. More 
recently, the language of systems theory has 
enabled this, perhaps the most sophisticated 
aspect of therapeutic community practice, to be 
further elaborated using the concept of higher- 
and lower- order systems, which extend from the 
individual's psyche through to the community at 
large. l 
This idea is now familiar. A therapeutic community 
consists of creating, using, harnessing and understanding 
group dynamics which otherwise would work 'informally and 
unseen'. In a 'lay' community, where people live together 
simply for the worthwhileness of living together, or 
because they have some interest or passion in common, there 
reside dynamics which are neither understood nor tapped. 
In a therapeutic community these forces are understood, 
at least by the staff, and systematically applied. More 
than that: the therapeutic community exists for the specific 
purpose of this exercise. 
Implicit in this view is the assumption that the 
specialized languages of 'group dynamics' refer to what 
ordinarily goes on between people, and to what ordinary 
people recognize as going on between themselves. The 
conceptual schemata and languages of psychodynamics and 
1Kennard, D. (1979) p. 183. 
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group dynamics, however, grasp and comprehend these 
occurrences more thoroughly, precisely and comprehensively. 
Examples of technical-psychological language abound. 
I shall choose one which "attempts to describe a realistic 
application of ideas derived from systems theory to under- 
standing therapeutic processes in residential care". 
' This 
extract is taken from a chapter entitled 'Personal growth 
in the residential community', under the heading of 'personal 
growth'. 
Let us suppose that A is a resident in an 
institution, and B is a staff member, because 
this is the interaction we choose to be 
interested in. I is an environmental event, 
eA and eB represent the total input to A and 
B respectively, tBA and tAB represent the 
transformation of the interaction between A and 
B, fA and fB represent the feedback for A and 
B respectively, and OA and oB the outcomes of 
A and B respectively. Obviously, it is oA that 
we ultimately wish to modify; and it is possible 
to express oA in terms of all the other factors. 
B-fB+tAB 
Viz. OA = OB 
I 
A 
fA+tBA 
These authors conclude: 
The theoretical approach outlined here would 
then form a basis for practical investigation 
of therapeutic processes in residential care, 
based upon a coherent account of institutional 
functioning and such that explicit guidance 
might be offered to staff members concerning 
1Kirk, J. D. and Millard, D. (1979) pp. 118-119. 
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those behaviours which would favourably in- 
fluence the outcome of care for residents. 
' 
Why, it might be asked, do these authors go to such 
lengths to translate what are (we must assume) otherwise 
recognizable goings on into an abstract language of this 
nature? Presumably such a technical language is chosen for 
the same reason that a physicist, qua physicist, prefers 
to talk of mesons and quarks rather than tables and chairs. 
For such a language will, it is argued, provide the thera- 
peutic community theorist with a framework of greater 
explanatory and predictive power than is furnished by ordi- 
nary language. 
Scientific language is a 'thinned out' language, 
whose terms - it is to be hoped - mean only one thing. 
They are, in this sense, more 'accurate' than the terms of 
ordinary language; for here one word, or phrase or expression 
can mean a great many things, and may be nuanced in extremely 
subtle ways. This relatively high degree of 'accuracy' of 
scientific language follows from the very considerable 
theoretical labour which has gone into the production and 
showing of its terms, in accordance with carefully evolved 
scientific conventions. 
If this 'narrowing' and 'thinning' of scientific 
language succeeds in bringing into view phenomena, where 
ordinary language fails precisely because of its richness or 
'thickness', this is in marked contrast to the pseudo- 
scientific psychologism of a great deal of therapeutic 
IIbid. 
p. 127. 
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community 'theory', which seems to go to great pains to 
say very clumsily what ordinary language says very well. 
A very simple example of a statement which seems to say 
less in trying to say more, and which is a very typical sort 
of statement is this. "In establishing a therapeutic commu- 
nity, immediately there is a potentially anti-therapeutic 
component". 
1 Rather than speaking of difficulties which 
anyone involved in starting a therapeutic community might 
find himself beset by or up against, this author recommends 
the identification of 'anti-therapeutic components'. How 
these are anti-therapeutic is difficult to see, since 
presumably in their absence the notion of the 'therapeutic' 
would never have arisen in the first place. The first one 
of these which is mentioned is: "A degree of dependence is 
invited and the question arises, will it result in conformity 
and stagnation... or can a transference of dependency needs 
onto the community be used to release the individual's 
potential for maturation". 
2 The author's stated orientation 
is psychoanalytic, and so we suppose that 'transference' is 
here being used in a technical sense. But then what does it 
mean? 
A further problem to do with the language of thera- 
peutic communities, insofar as it shows itself in 'theory', 
is now apparent. 
The therapeutic community views treatment 
as located not in the application by 
specialists of certain shocks, drugs or 
Jansen, E. (1980) p. 33. 
2Ibid. 
p. 33. 
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interpretations, but in the normal 1inter- 
actions of healthy community life. 
It is precisely this, the 'normal interactions of healthy 
community life' that the quasi-scientific jargon of thera-_ 
peutic communities fails so conspicuously to disclose. The 
therapeutic community language follows that of psychiatry 
and psychology. It is predominantly a terminology of 
function rather than a language which speaks of human being. 
It is difficult, from within this terminology, even to allude 
to the distinction between function and being. 
Human disorders are seen in terms of loss of function 
or impairment of function, rather than vicissitudes of being 
in the world. Therapeutic methods are brought in to repair 
these faculties or functions: 
When a man has his arm cut off, there is no 
question of his ever growing another. In 
psychiatry, on the other hand, if a patient 
loses some of his ego functions, he may 2 
recover them as a consequence of treatment. 
Or therapeutic methods are mobilized to help patients acquire 
the various social skills will enable them to function 
properly, or to perform 'social functioning'. 
The process of learning new functions may 
involve periods of regression, disorgani- 
zation and inability to function and 
therefore facilities for such periods should 
be provided. 3 
'Watson, G. (1953). Quoted in Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. 10. 
2Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. 28. 
3Harris, S. (1980) p. 127. 
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Factors... may take over life management 
functions to the extent that an individuals 
own personality functions atrophy. 1 
We have seen that communities themselves come to be 
seen in purely functional terms, according to the services 
they provide, the forces they harness, the dynamics they 
utilize, and so on. Communities, for example, are character- 
ized as 'treatment modalities'2 which 'fully utilize' the 
"interpersonal interactions of the member in the pursuit of 
growth towards personality". What we now wish to stress is 
that language itself is seen as a function, predominantly 
as a function of 'communication', although also as a 'means' 
of 'expression'. There is endless talk, for example, of 
disorders of communication, unrealistic communication or 
blocked communication between occupants, or of the 'commu- 
nication skills they have learned as sick people'; but in 
all this, the possibility of seeing language except as another 
tool to be exploited or used becomes foreclosed. 
And language by no means exhausts itself in its 
'communicatory' function, or as a vehicle for the transfer 
of information. Language may not only represent; it has a 
power to evoke, incant, body forth, present or disclose. 
This power is not simply a resource to be used; in many 
senses we follow language, or reply to language, or submit 
to language (e. g. as in parapraxes), or speak, in reply to 
a world which already speaks to us. 
'Test, M. A. and Stein, L. I. (1978) p. 4. 
2Whiteley, S. (1979) p. 20. Also see Test, M. A. and Stein, L. I. (1978) 
p. 13. 
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A poetic language reveals the power of words to 
bring a world into view, to evoke by naming. Poetry is 
not a special use of language, but rather shows an essen- 
tial power of language, to reveal the world and uncover its 
meanings. Originary or authentic speech shares with poetry 
this power to awaken a 'creative' experience of the world. 
We embody a stance or position simultaneously in 
the world and in language. According to how or where we 
stand in language, quite different worlds may be brought 
into view. The 'first word' of the baby (that is, the first 
word to be recognized), the avowals of the lover, and the 
sergeant-major on parade each speak of, and call forth 
quite different worlds. One person may say everything in 
a word - or even in a withholding from speaking - whilst 
another may say nothing in an entire 'lecture'. A person 
may be at one time communicating a fact, and at another 
be speaking a truth, and at another be saying what he 
means; but these are of course by no means the same. 
'Communicating' is not the same as saying, and a world in 
which people are predominantly 'communicating' or 'trying 
to communicate' is crucially different from a world in 
which people are speaking to one another, or trying to 
speak. 
Reference is made to 'communication between occu- 
pants'. 'Communication between occupants' may occur when 
people 'share residential accommodation'. It does not 
arise where people live together. Sharing residential 
accommodation is not the same thing as living together; 
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they are worlds apart. When people live together they 
usually speak, and in speaking, say things to one another. 
Heidegger has pointed out the essence of saying, as 
showing. 
1 When I am indeed speaking, I am not just 
communicating information, but I am showing the presence- 
absence to me of what I am speaking of, and my presence 
to those to whom I am speaking. 
The world which is shown when people speak is the 
world they inhabit, the familiar word in which they are 
at home. In speaking of the 'lived world' the world itself 
is shown, or opened up. The world is opened up, therefore, 
depends very much upon the sort of things that people say 
to one another; or rather, what their saying, and equally 
their refraining from saying, shows. Here both gesture and 
silence - each of which partake of language - may equally 
be seen as 'telling'. Merleau-Ponty offers us the image 
of two people building a wall between themselves, each 
placing a brick in the opening left by the other. There 
is every reason to suppose that gestural conversations of 
this nature are very common occurrences within therapeutic 
communities. 
It often seems to be assumed that those 'psychological' 
terms which I have cited earlier refer directly to the 
everyday world which people ordinarily inhabit; they simply 
represent a sharpening of the tool of language, thereby 
providing it with a power, an edge, adequate to the particular 
task at hand, that of clarifying what it is that people, 
1Heidegger, M. (1982) p. 111. 
128 
unbeknown to themselves, may be experiencing or doing. 
Group dynamics, it would be argued, are going on all the 
time between people, but the layperson refers to them and 
understands them in the rather 'imprecise' terms of 
ordinary language. 
This is misleading. It is not, I believe, the case 
that group and interpersonal dynamics are going on between 
Australian aborigines, but that they have not yet evolved 
or discovered a science capable of detecting them, and then 
harnessing them. As they gather in conversation, or other- 
wise engage with one another, they will obviously be seen 
to be acting with and towards one another in ways, some of 
which will be perfectly clear to most Western people, others 
of which will seem very odd or unintelligible to someone 
who does not understand their culture. But there are not 
areas of darkness in their own self-understanding which 
await the importation, if not the spontaneous self-discovery, 
of group dynamics. 
No doubt aborigines have psychotherapists or medicine 
men who have evolved their own healing metaphors and 
rhetorical devices - their own system of psychodynamics - 
which, depending upon its tiredness or freshness, may have 
enormous potency to heal their acute or chronic cases of 
derangement. It is unlikely, however, that these healers 
will build dwellings out of these metaphors, and then ask 
their patients to live in them, as a means to confronting 
them with reality. 
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Similar sorts of assumptions as are made to language 
are sometimes held to apply to the rules which may be 
directed to the regulation of life within communities. 
That is, it is claimed that these merely represent a more 
precise articulation or a more formal elaboration of the 
sort of rules that govern social life in the community at 
large. Formal rules and regulations are an explication of 
regulative structures which ordinarily are left implicit. 
A very simple example would be that of a community which 
institutes a rule that residents must be up and about by 
8.00 a. m., and arguing that the same sort of rules, but 
implicit, apply to everyone; that in the world at large 
people are not expected to lounge around in bed all day - 
it interferes with getting a job, leading a productive life, 
and so on. This is in accordance with the claim made by 
many therapeutic communities to provide a 'reality oriented' 
preparation for life outside the community. 
We are now led to a consideration of order. 
Order 
Some of the essential features of therapeutic community 
ideology arise from a recognition of the limitations, 
shortcomings, and 'counterproductivity' of the traditional 
mental hospital. The traditional institution contains, as 
it is said, 'anti-therapeutic elements'. But it is not just 
the 'content' of orthodox treatment that is seen to be 
deficient. The very structure of the mental hospital with 
its bureaucratic administration, militaristic hierarchies, 
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rigid staff boundaries and fixed roles is itself an impedi- 
ment to therapeutic endeavour. It is the very antithesis 
of the informal, face to face encounter, confrontative 
approach which is associated with therapeutic communities. 
The whole therapeutic community 'movement' is towards the 
loosening of rigid authoritarian boundaries and structures, 
and the encouragement of person to person and group inter- 
action, across the formal boundaries of status and rank. 
Furthermore, it is felt to be of some importance to let 
patients have a much greater say in the running of the 
community than they would do in an ordinary hospital. It is 
also felt to be important to allow patients more 'leeway' 
as regards, for example the 'expression of unacceptable 
feelings', or the 'acting out' of undesirable behaviour. 
Thus it is that we arrive at 'permissiveness', 'democrati- 
zation', and 'communalism' as 'basic therapeutic community 
concepts', which refer to principles and practices which are 
felt to constitute fundamentally important aspects of the 
therapy. 
We have already noticed that these notions are far 
from being free from contradiction. Occasionally, we find 
explicit acknowledgement of these contradictions. In a 
refreshingly candid statement, for example, Mawson writes: 
An institution such as a therapeutic community 
may have as its professed aim the liberation of 
its patients from the limitations and constraints 
of neurotic illness or personality disorder, in 
order that they may go back into the world able 
to live a freer, more effective and richer life. 
Closer examination of how such a community 
actually operates (e. g., its social organization, 
values, rituals, what behaviour and attitudes it 
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reinforces) may show it to be directing more 
energy to satisfying the staff's need to be 
needed and the patient's desire for a pro- 
fessionally sanctioned retreat from the stress 
of responsibility for themselves and others. 
In other words, a contemporary therapeutic 
community may operate the same sort of 
defensive-collusive system that characterized 
the old style asylum, differing only in that 
the system is dressed up in a new set of socio- 
political attitudes and tricked out with a 
different set of rituals. 1 
Mawson points to apparent inconsistencies such as 
the following, which appear within the same articles by 
Maxwell Jones: 
The emphasis on free communication both 
within and between staff and patient group, 
and on permissive attitudes which encourage 
free expression of feeling, implies a demo- 
cratic egalitarian rather than a traditional 
hierarchical social organization... 
But at the same time ... 
In no sense do the staff or the doctor in 
charge relinquish their ultimate authority, 
which remains latent and can be evoked when 
necessary. 2 
Again: 
The democratic egalitarian structure of the 
therapeutic community implies delegation of 
authority from the central administration to 
the problem area itself... 
But at the same time ... 
a daily meeting of the hospital secretary 
principal nursing officer and physician 
superintendent-as well as a daily meeting 
1Mawson, 
A. (1979) p. 170. 
2Ibid. 
p. 170. 
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of the senior staff committee... deal with 
all the administrative problems of the day 
as well as Problems bearing on patient 
management. 
It is, I believe, inevitable that, given the episte- 
mology upon which therapeutic communities are predicated, 
a politics will emerge which is a libertarian and psycho- 
logically enlightened social control. This is, in effect, 
merely the counterpoint to the ethics of personal growth, 
the cultivation of the self, the consumerism of psycho- 
logical health. In the absence of any broader or deeper 
cultural, ethical or epistemological questionings it is 
furthermore inevitable that the political formulations 
which are arrived at will be highly contradictory. Here 
I shall illustrate one small area of contradiction which 
characterizes therapeutic communities by drawing attention 
to some different senses in which a community may be said 
to be ordered. 
It is taken for granted, as being self-evidently true, 
that a community must be administered or organized. In a 
traditional hospital the administration of the community 
is performed by an administrative hierarchy within which 
everyone is expected to know his place and what is expected 
of him. In therapeutic communities an ideal is strived 
towards whereby everyone has some opportunity to voice 
issues about which he feels concerned; and whatever his 
status or rank, this voice will be heeded. An important 
vehicle for this - which has been seen as the defining 
characteristic of the therapeutic community - is the large 
1Ibid. 
p. 170. 
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group, the 'control agent' of the organization. Whilst 
the community still needs to be organized, ordinary members 
now have some say in the organizational processes; they 
partake of the 'agency of control'. 
The community has to be organized. It has 
to make decisions about its form and pro- 
cedures. Limits have to be put on its 
members, and the breaking points allowed 
for. It has in fact to be managed. When 
these management tasks are handed over to 
the community as a whole, then we have the 
administrative therapy of the therapeutic 
community. It could loosely be referred to 
as management of the community by the 
community. 
The question of the degree to which management tasks 
may be handed over to the community is at the centre of 
therapeutic community politics. And indeed, a major area 
of discussion within the literature concerns the matter of 
how far democratization should go; how far, for example the 
principles of communalism, flattening of the authority 
pyramid etc., should be taken. How far, to what extent, 
may bureaucratic, administrative, organizational structures 
be relaxed without the community degenerating into complete 
anarchy or chaos? To what extent should patients and staff 
be prepared to meet person to person, bearing in mind that 
"when such efforts succeed and close relationships are 
formed, transference and counter transference problems 
abound". 
2 
1Christian, A. and Hinshelwood, R. D. (1979) p. 179. 
2Morrice, J. K. W. (1979) p. 57. 
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These notions to do with 'handing over' authority to 
a community, and 'flattening the authority pyramid' deserve 
careful discussion. 
1 Authority in this connection is 
usually understood to be the power which is invested in 
some particular position, for example, professional, 
administrative or bureaucratic - and this may indeed be 
contrasted with 'informality', or the more 'informal' 
powers which we may possess, such as the capacity to make 
people laugh, or to command attention, and so on. Yet it 
is difficult to see how even 'formal' authority can simply 
be handed over, for it is grounded in common social under- 
standings and conventions, is a part of the power structure 
of the professions and indeed of the stratification of 
British society. What does it mean here, then, to 'flatten 
the authority pyramid'? Maxwell Jones saw democracy as 
giving residents "the degree of responsibility which is 
compatible with their capacity at any one time". 
2 So he 
still retains the authority to decide when they are ready 
for 'responsibility'. 
Doctors and nurses in English therapeutic 
communities were busy dismantling some, if 
not all of their authority, sharing decisions 
with patients and striving towards greater 
informality and equality... 
3 
What does it mean here to be dismantling authority? How 
does their Regional Health Authority take to being dis- 
mantled? Does this mean that these doctors and nurses 
1See, for example, David Cooper's discussion of 'authentic' authority. 
Cooper, D. (1967) pp. 96 ff. 
2Quoted in Kennard, D. (1983) pp. 53-54. 
3Ibid. 
p. 5. 
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should disown whatever legitimate or proper expertise they 
possess, and 'dismantle' the authority which this gives 
them to speak? Is the authority which comes of obedience 
to reason to be flattened in the same way as authority 
which is obedience to the latest directives of the hospital 
administrator? 
Authority - of one sort or another - is assumed to be 
responsible for the degree of order which prevails within 
any therapeutic community. Whilst we must agree that the 
notions of authority and order are in many ways very closely 
intertwined, we surely must reject any temptation to think 
of either of them as being dimensions between which corre- 
lations may be discerned. Merely-to propose, or to 
describe, a movement from authoritarian to democratic 
structures of organization may tell us very little about 
the different authorities which may be in play. And further- 
more, the distinction which is arrived at within this 
literature, between these different manners of organizing, 
or imposing order upon a community is finally less important 
than a distinction we might make between different sorts of 
order or ordering. 
Let us consider in the first instance the sort of 
order that one can institute by following a plan. It might 
be termed an administrative or organizational ordering, 
and it proceeds in a linear fashion. Tidying my desk 
might be a simple example. I have in mind an idea or 
picture of what constitutes a sufficiently tidied desk, 
and then I simply arrange or remove the objects on it 
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until the top of the desk corresponds to the required 
state. A social administrator provides a more complex 
example, or any organizer or bureaucrat who takes his 
patch or area to be 'in order' when his desk is clear. 
The notion of 'law and order' understands order in roughly 
this same fashion: implementation of the law is the means 
to remove disorder and thereby maintain 'order'. 
Such orders as these - brought about by formal ordering 
or arranging - are by no means the only sorts of order which 
may be recognized in human affairs. It may escape the 
notice of the cleaner who sees to his room, but to the 
scholar who has spent the day at his studies the piles of 
paper, documents, books and manuscripts which have precipi- 
tated in this or that fashion upon and around his desk may 
exhibit a very particular order. This sort of order, which 
takes shape, is of a rather different sort from that which 
is produced by having an image and then following a plan. 
A person may have a greater or lesser sense of these 
particular orders as they arise within his life, and of 
the circumstances which may have to be fulfilled if this 
order is to appear. 
An ordered life might be an example of this sort of 
ordering. An ordered life cannot be achieved, as the 
obsessive supposes, by more and more careful organization. 
It is not achieved by the elimination or removal of its 
disorders, but by carefully and thoughtfully attending to 
their forms, structures and meanings, to the order within 
disorder, or the sense within nonsense. Disorder plays, 
therefore, a different part in this sort of order; it is a 
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positive and regulatory phenomenon. 
While most human actions are gove 
rules, each of these sorts of order is 
different sorts of rules. Learning to 
and learning to march as a soldier are 
but in quite different ways; similarly 
and learning a foreign language. 
rued by many different 
associated with 
walk, as a baby, 
each rule governed, 
learning to speak, 
Writing an academic dissertation is a relatively simple 
example of an activity which is ordered and rule-governed 
at many levels. Some of these illustrate the administrative 
or organizational: it must'be typed in a certain fashion, 
distributed to the right people, and on time, and so on. 
There are quite explicit rules which lay out all these sort 
of details. There are other rules which are not laid down 
in the same sort of fashion, but which govern equally the 
writing of the thesis; rules of grammar, rules of syntax, 
rules of logic. And are other rules which are not spelled 
out at all, anywhere, which are to do with such matters as 
taste and style. A thesis is obviously expected to remain 
within certain bounds of decency; it is not expected to be 
full of jokes, although academic dryness, irony or drollery 
may be quite 'in order'. We might describe the business of 
writing a thesis in the same sort of way, but this time 
citing some of the different authorities to which the 
student is subject, on the way to demonstrating his own 
authority. 
There is a widespread assumption that the sort of 
order which pertains mostly to the successful setting up and 
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running of a therapeutic community is an administrative or 
organizational order. Structure, therefore, is imposed, 
procedures instituted, programmes implemented. The only 
alternative to this imposition of structure is assumed to 
be the 'absence' of structure. There is very little 
attention paid to the intricate interweaving of different 
orders, or to the importance of those orders which are 
arrived at simply in the course of people'going about their 
business or finding their own way with one another. 
This sort of thinking is well illustrated in the 
following example, which was offered by its author as a 
contribution to the 'debate' as to "the value or otherwise 
of a structured or a totally unstructured community". 
There is the theory that people must give 
expression to the way they feel and there- 
fore if they feel depressed, their clothes 
will be on the floor, their shoes dirty and 
their bed unmade. This also works the other 
way, and in that case you have a very 
depressing effect and a circular one. If 
people can be helped to adopt reasonable 
habits and to create some structure, this 
has a good effect, as I have witnessed. And 
the structure does not have to be imposed in 
an autocratic way... 
Total absence of structure is, I believe, not 
just asking for the kind of trouble which some 
people think is therapeutic, but is really 
creating a situation that is literally not 
liveable in (besides being unhelpful to patients)2 
The most important point in this is not, I think, the 
question of whether or not one subscribes to the 'theory' 
that people must give expression to the way they feel - and 
1Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 117. 
2Ibid. 
p. 115. 
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it is usually very far from clear what people mean by 
this - nor is it the question of the desirability or 
otherwise of messiness. It is rather than the notion of 
a 'totally unstructured community' is a complete nonsense. 
A heap of clothes on the floor, dirty shoes, an unmade bed - 
these by no means speak of a situation which is lacking in 
order. This little collage which is so saturated with 
meaning, speaks, without question, of a whole structure of 
reciprocal intentionalities, of contexts and orders which 
the author does not feel necessary to articulate. 
' 
"Doubts have been raised", writes Jansen, "as to the 
therapeutic value of the absence of boundaries, which for 
disintegrated people may have the effect of intensifying 
their terror. "2 Now Jansen is quite right to stress the 
importance of boundaries, and the dangers to which the 
ignoring, or forgetting or denying of boundaries may lead, 
particularly in the case of people who are very 'untogether' 
or out of it. A very keen awareness of boundaries is 
crucial to any therapy, or any therapeutic community. But 
'boundary' is not by any means the same as 'rules'; for a 
very important part of boundary is to do with what can and 
what cannot be spelled out in rules, with what can be put 
into words, and what must remain unsaid. It is a very 
central 'symptom' of a great many psychiatric patients that 
they believe that they can be told the right way to live; 
1"Disorder is an excess of order; it occurs when there are too many 
orders imposed upon a set of entities. Like the contradiction, 
something is both a cat and not a cat, it faces us not with nothing, 
but with too much. " Weiss, P. (1967). 
2Jansen, E. (1980) p. 30. 
140 
that other people know this but are unable or unwilling to 
tell them what it is. And so they seek psychotherapy, or 
perhaps make their way to a therapeutic community. Now a 
good therapeutic community might be able to open up 
boundaries - and indeed an understanding of the notion of 
boundary - in such a fashion that people who live there 
might find themselves freed to some degree or other, such 
that they are able to find their way about with one another 
through these ambiguities of interpersonal being. Rules 
such as Jansen proposes, i. e. house regulations, programmes, 
procedures which 'exert pressure on members to adhere to 
the house programme" arise for the most part precisely when 
members of a community no longer are able to find their way 
with one another, or no longer know where they stand with 
one another. It is surely a central theme of psychoanalysis 
that there is no way that one may rediscover these boundaries 
of where things belong and where people belong among them 
and with one another, by following rules. 
Our lives are very intricately ordered, just as are 
the lives of communities, societies, cultures, and so on. 
This order gives rise to our sense of where things belong; 
where we belong among them, what is in order, what is out 
of order, what is 'on' and what is 'not on', and so on, 
without this usually having to be spelled out explicitly. 
Part of what is included within this notion of 'order' is 
suggested by 'style' or 'way'. A person's style will 
1Ibid. 
p. 33. 
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usually show through everything he does. 
l 
A person's 
handwriting is recognizably the same whether he is writing 
with a pen at a desk or with chalk at a blackboard, although 
of course quite different muscles are involved. The most 
causal, or intimate, of activities partake of order, just 
as much as the formal. Rituals, gestures, nods and winks 
speak of order just as surely as rules and regulations. 
Some of the orders of everyday life are suggested by the 
word ordinary; but ordinariness cannot be imposed by order. 
There is something rather peculiar about instructing some- 
one how to be ordinary; 
2 
and it is one of the ironies of 
neurotic life that the attempt to achieve ordinariness must 
be self-defeating. 
When we speak of a household being in order we usually 
refer to this sort of ordinariness. We refer to the manner 
in which the household goes about its day to day business. 
This usually happens well enough without having to put 
into effect any overall administrative plan. The structure 
of the house is not so much imposed, as shaped, according 
to the concerns and priorities which its members have. 
Most households do not have 'formal rules', but they do 
certainly have a distinctive style or way, which is most 
1A11 
of us have experienced sudden composures, at times of profound 
distraction and disorganization; sudden sobriety, when intoxicated; 
and - especially as we grow older - sudden total recalls of our 
past or our childhood, recalls so complete as to be a re-being. All 
of these indicate that one's self, one's style, one's persona exists 
as such, in its infinitely complex and particular being; that it is 
not a question of this system or that, but of a total organization 
which must be described as a self. Style, in short, is the deepest 
thing in one's being. Sacks, 0. (1973) pp. 203-204. 
2The 
Stanislavski School provided instruction in the pretence or the 
enactment of being ordinary. 
142 
intricately 'rule governed'. The idea, however, of making 
all of these rules explicit' is as meaningless as is the 
assumption that there could be a household which was not 
ordered. When a mother plays the game with her child: 'This 
is the way we... ' she is not so much showing the child how 
to put on his shoes, brush his teeth, and so on, as showing 
him something about the w we show one another the way, 
which may not always be spelled out in words. 
It might be proposed that a healthy household or 
community, like a healthy eco-system, or a healthy life, 
contains within its integrity or wholeness its own disorders 
or disorderings. That is, such an entity is 'in order', 
or 'works' not when its disorders are removed but when 
they are included within an interplay of ordering-disordering. 
This ordering process is dependent upon its complementary 
disordering - as the mean is dependent upon the variations 
around it. Disordering (which in an eco-system will include 
decay) thereby comes to be seen as a generative source. We 
recall that the Greek 'chaos' contained the seeds from which 
all things come. A community, if it is to thrive, will not 
engage in the task of setting things in order, in the sense 
of removing chaos, but rather will engage in the living 
process of ordering-disordering whereby health may be 
maintained. 
1"A 
well-functioning ordinary family is likely to have a complicated 
and effective management system even though it would not be described 
in those terms and is often not noticed because it is implicit and 
stable over long periods. In institutions the same effect can only 
be achieved by making explicit the managerial functions and relation- 
ships. " Menzies, I. (1979) pp. 203-204. 
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The Programme 
A further example of 'administrative order' to which 
we may now turn is that of the house or community programme. 
The community structure defines certain 
limits which are considered necessary for 
the functioning of the group. Common limits 
are: adhere to the programme... 
Common elements in ensuring that the commu- 
nity exerts a positive effect are... 
explanation to the applicant of the commu- 
nity's goal and programme ... a programme 
which is planned to engage and retain the 
involvement of residents. 2 
The impact of the house programme is rein- 
forced by the community's culture, norms and 
values, which exert pressure on members to 
adhere to the programme, and to encourage 
others to do so. 3 
These programmes, which are 'designed to produce group 
cohesiveness' are 'oriented towards autonomy'4 and the 
'mobilization of initiative'. 
5 The assumption that human 
life may be organized by programmes, whose purpose is to 
'motivate patients in the directionof autonomy'6 may seem 
particularly paradoxical where it is applied in the case of 
persons whose capacity for autonomy, responsibility, and 
independence may be especially in question. In fact, 
responsibility comes to be seen simply as the living up to a 
system of expectations. 
As a general rule, however, it can be stated 
that opting out of the work programme is 
'Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 37. 
2Ibid. 
p. 33. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
p. 34. 
5Badaines, 
J. and Ginzburg, M. (1979) p. 74. 
6Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 22. 
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seen as an infantile avoidance of responsi- 
bility which people can and should exercise 
within the community. 
l 
The therapeutic community is designed to pro- 
duce group cohesion and a high level of 
interaction, with the aim of constructive 
behaviour in the anticipation of some resistance. 
The conflicts and obstructions which emerge are 
then recognizable as defences arising from 
individual and group needs, often of an in- 
fantile nature. 2 
The notion of responsibility as the living up to 
expectation is brought out in the following list of Expecta- 
tions of a community: 
1. Members are responsible for themselves. 
2. Time keeping is important. 
3. Medication is to be responsibly reduced. 
4. Maximum participation is expected in 
the community and in groups. 3 
Many people assume that disturbed people are parti- 
cularly in need of the sort of structures such as I have 
referred to; the more disturbed, the more robust these 
structures must be, and the more firmly set the limits of 
their tolerance. One feature of the community programme 
which is designed to provide just this sort of structure 
is the house timetable, which breaks the day down into its 
various programmed components. "One of the crucial issues 
that therapeutic communities have to deal with is the 
problem of structuring the day. "4 One way of coping with 
this problem is to break the day down into such a "daily 
round of organized activities" as the following: 
1Ibid. 
p. 36. 
2Ibid. 
p. 37. 
3Manning, N. and Blake, R. (1979) p. 148. 
4Grunberg, S. (1979) p. 249. 
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7.30 - 8.30 
8.30 - 9.45 
9.45 - 10.15 
10.15 - 11.15 
11.15 - 12.00 
12.00 - 12.30 
12.30 - 13.00 
13.00 - 16.00 
16.00 - 16.30 
16.30 - 18.30 
18.30 - 20.30 
20.30 - 21.00 
21.00 - 07.00 
Breakfast 
Community meetings 
Tea 
Doctors' groups 
Workshops 
Lunch 
Ward meeting 
Workshops or therapeutic interviews 
Tea 
Free time 
Unit social 
Prepare for bed 
Sleep. 1 
This list is commented upon as follows: 
Treatment potentialities are seen in every 
aspect of this pattern. In any particular 
kind of activity, be it doctor's therapeutic 
group, furniture repair shop, or evening 
social, all members of the unit are meant to 
be 'permissive', 'democratic', 'communal', 
and reality oriented. The participants 
ideally orient their activities in terms of 
these values, rather than predominantly in 
terms of other cross-cutting aims such as 
personal gratification... 2 
The "abstract permissiveness" allows patients to attend 
as they choose although an absolute requirement "indicating 
minimal positive orientation to the treatment as a whole" 
is that patients must attend the 8.30 a. m. meeting and "be 
in the ward in pyjamas at 9.00 p. m. ". 
The principle rationale for the pattern is 
that it includes a round of activities that 
is to some degree a replica of the social 
life of individuals living in the non-hospital 
community... Treatment is meant to be all- 
pervasive, and the rehabilitation effect of 
treatment is meant to be enhanced by creating 
a pattern of activities that is like that of 
the average person outside. 3 
1Rapoport, R. N. (1960) p. 80. 
2Ibid. 
pp. 80-81. 
3Ibid. 
p. 81. 
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What is 'free time' which is 'ideally oriented towards 
community values'. Other timetables refer to 'unstructured 
time' between '2.00 and 3.00 p. m. ' or 'relaxation and tea' 
between 5.00 and 5.30, and so on. What sort of times are 
these? 
In these therapeutic community timetables the day is 
apportioned into a number of sectors which are filled with 
therapeutic activities of one sort or another, including 
'free time' which is another sort of house activity. This 
apportioning of time extends to a resident's stay in the 
community; his time of residence is expected to have a 
specific duration of six months, a year, or two years, with 
review of progress at periodic intervals. During this 
time, he is expected to accomplish his work of change or 
growth. When he leaves, staff are expected to keep in 
touch with him to see how he is progressing: 
For those who do not seek to keep in touch, 
staff have a responsibility to make contact 
by correspondence after half a year and one 
year to establish how ex-residents are 
managing, as well as to demonstrate concern 
for the ongoing welfare of the residents 
concerned. 
1 
While most people in Western cultures are quite 
familiar with the presses and demands of timetables, 
appointments to be kept, and so on, and articulate their 
lives quite readily into the structures of conventional 
time, they do not ordinarily measure out their lives into 
hours and minutes allocated to their various activities. 
1Jansen, E. (1980) p. 48. 
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Nor do they usually experience their time in terms of these 
chronical units. If a person, for example, is asked how he 
spent his day, we might think it rather odd if he replied 
that he got up at 7.30, brushed his teeth and shaved at 7.35, 
had breakfast from 7.35 till 7.55, caught the bus at five 
past eight, and so on. He would be more likely to speak of 
the different times of his day rather than the hours and the 
minutes that these times occurred in. He might tell us that 
in the morning he was bored and time dragged, but in the 
afternoon he became engrossed in something and before he 
knew it, it was time to go home. The sort of day that a 
person has has much more to do with the nature of these times 
than the time that they took. 
Although I make use of timetables, keep appointments 
and so on, and thereby gear into the conventions of chrono- 
logical time, this is not 'my time', that is, the time that 
I live. I have an appointment to meet a friend tomorrow 
at 10.00 a. m. But I do not orient myself towards that 
meeting as a future event in a grid of time made up of so 
many equal hourly units. Rather, within the unitariness of 
my time, this meeting which I am looking forward to already 
awaits me, my friend has a presence for me now, at a 
distance which I can feel. I am not separated from that 
meeting by so many hours, so much as borne towards it by 
the projects to which I am committed, and which constitute 
my time and my life. 
Here we are indicating very approximately a distinction 
between what might variously be called objective time, 
chronological time, serial time, passing time - and lived 
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time or phenomenological time. Chronological time, for 
instance that which is measured by the clock, we usually 
regard as a seriality of 'vows'. The past consists of 
traces or records of 'vows' which are no longer, the future 
of anticipated 'nows' which are yet to come. We are in 
time, as a dimension which has a peculiar quality of being 
like a stream flowing at a constant rate, passing over us. 
We divide time into the equal units which tell us how much 
of it has passed between one now and another, or between 
one 'event' and another. We know how much time has passed 
between the event of our birth and the present time; an 
actuary will tell us of the probabilities of different 
periods of time which remain for us. 
We tend to characterize live time, on the other hand, 
by reference to its openings and closings, cycles and phases, 
flowerings and fruitions. The time 'to every purpose' can 
be 'right' or wrong, ready or not yet ready, premature or 
too late. Lived time is characterized first of all by its 
rhythms, its ebbings and flowings (the etymology brings 
together the words time and tide) its arisings and unfoldings, 
upwellings and advents. Where we might be said to be living, 
either temporarily or chronically, in a modality of 'chrono- 
logical time' we might typically be found 'watching the 
clock', 'clocking in and out', filling time, killing time. 
'Biding' our time is rather different; it is a staying with, 
rather than a mere enduring. Notions which we might- 
typically associate with lived time are those such as 
spontaneity, timeliness, readiness, and possibility. 
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We are sometimes inclined to think of 'lived time' as 
being simply the 'subjective experience' of real, or 
objective time. Careful reflection makes this a difficult 
position to justify. Many philosophers have pointed out 
the unsatisfactoriness of a 'pure time' which flows like a 
stream; indicating for example that this metaphor itself 
pre-supposes time. 
1 Perhaps the extraordinarily intimate 
'relation' between human being and time -. such that we might 
be said to be 'the upsurge of time' - shows itself nowhere 
more clearly than in the particular temporalities of people 
who are 'mentally' ill. Psychiatric disorders might well 
be said to be 'disorders of time', disorders which are in 
one way or another closures of time. The healing of these 
'takes' time, in the very particular sense, for example of 
the retrieval of time. Typical neurotic complaints are to 
do with the 'emptiness' of time, with the 'sameness' of it 
all, with past, present and future being closed off from one 
another in different ways, with always living in the past, 
or always living 'in the future', but never in the present; 
with inability to be spontaneous, and so on. There are 
'typical' disorders of lived time, such as are associated 
with the manic, the depressed, the obsessive, and so on. 
Freud of course, drew attention to the relationship between 
sexuality and time, to the timelessness of the unconscious - 
as well as inventing the 50-minute hour. 
How is a therapist - or a community - able to help 
someone remember time - remember his own future, awaken that 
1See, 
e. g., Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) pp. 410 ff. 
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time which is his own advent or upsurge into the world? 
How can a community help someone who is 'out of time', who 
has lost track of his time, whom time passes over, or 
whose time is the unending hell of eternal repetition? We 
might say that such a person 'needs' time (but not as the 
body needs salt! ) or that a community must 'have time for' 
its members, if time is to be opened up. 
This speaks of an entirely different time from that 
which is accounted for by the activities of the house time- 
table. Here, every moment of the day is structured as a 
'having time for' the patient. Not a single second is 
wasted. 
But by no means does having time for refer to chrono- 
logical time which is meted out. We can have a lot of time 
for someone whom we hardly ever see, and we can spend all 
day with someone for whom we have very little time. Having 
time for does not mean just putting in the hours and minutes. 
Rather than indicating that members of a community have time 
for one another, the timetable which I have illustrated 
suggests that here there is no time to have time for one 
another's own time. Such a structuring of time forecloses 
the possibility of authentic time, because all time is 
contained within the parameters of an overall directive 
or plan, all time is used as efficiently as could be, in 
the service of a pre-ordained project, expressly designed 
for the patient's good. Every moment of the day is accounted 
for. It is a very minor consideration that residents are 
not in fact compelled to take part in all these activities, 
since this freedom is itself contained within the directives 
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of the 'abstract permissiveness'. 
The day has been divided into little units, and into 
activities accorded to each unit, and time is narrowed or 
constricted to a seriality of events. There is no temporal 
ground for time to take seed, since all time has been used 
up. These slicings of the day into purposive activities 
cut across or disarticulate what might be the 'temporal 
wholeness' of a community, and ensure that the potency of 
its time, its power or capacity to open time's backwaters, 
remember time, will not be realized. A wholeness is not a 
uniformity. People may need time to remember; but different 
times may have different fecundities for different people. 
Some people may need nothing so much as the reassurance of 
the sureness of the ordinary, the comings and goings, 
openings and closings of the everyday. Some people may 
want to do everything at once, others may need to do nothing, 
or to 'lie fallow'. 
1 Some people may need time to 'give', 
others to take, some to 'work', some to 'refrain from 
working'; to everything there is indeed a season. Some 
people may wish to stay up all night and sleep all day; or 
stay up day and night, or sleep day and night. 
If a community can open itself to, and have the time 
for, all these times, and include them within its own 
rhythms of comings and goings, gatherings and dispersings 
as people go about their business, it might then find itself 
freed from the absurdities of 'structured versus unstructured 
time', and having found its way towards a living of that 
1See 'On Lying Fallow', Khan, M. M. R. (1983) pp. 183 ff. 
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time which is of the essence. 
Summary Conclusion 
The contemporary psychiatric therapeutic community 
consists of a method, family of methods, or 'context-method' 
for the treatment of ailments variously described as mental 
illness, psychological disturbance or disorder, problems of 
living. These communities have arisen within the last 
thirty years or so, largely in response to the realization 
that traditional forms of institutional care for the men- 
tally ill are, or may be, seriously faulted. 
But these 'alternative' forms of treatment are 
themselves seriously faulted. I shall very briefly re- 
capitulate some very general and far reaching faults, errors 
or sources of confusion, under three main headings. By no 
means, however, do all of the criticisms which apply to 
therapeutic communities fall neatly within these headings; 
nor do such critical points as I have raised apply to all 
therapeutic communities to the same degree, or in the same 
way. 
Firstly, therapeutic community epistemology is pre- 
dominantly medicalistic. The explicit movement of the 
therapeutic community approach to treatment is away from 
the traditional medical model, where professionally 
distanced doctors and nurses provide packaged treatments 
for passive patients. In fact, most therapeutic communities 
simply 'update' the medical model by allowing the patient 
more 'say' in his treatment and including a wider range of 
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therapeutic devices on the list of medicines. The concept 
of medical treatment is expanded until the community 
itself becomes the doctor. 
Secondly, insofar as there is a shift from a medical 
to a non-medical 'frame of reference', it takes the form, 
for the most part, of a slide into psychologism. Psychologism, 
in this context, illustrates the principle of being 'too 
clever by half'. Psychologism reduces the person and his 
social, cultural, and interpersonal world to psychological 
processes, forces, vectors and dynamics - and ends up with 
a world inhabited by no-one. Therapeutic communities fre- 
quently commit a double psychologistic error. They first 
reduce the lived world to a ghostly world of psychologistic 
abstraction, and then proceed to construct models out of 
these abstract elements which are then applied or put into 
practice in the running of the community. 
Finally, therapeutic community thinking and practice is 
predominantly technological. It reduces psychotherapeutic 
practice to technique, being to process, and 'community' 
to 'organization', whose resources may be utilized or 
exploited towards therapeutic goals which are not themselves 
subjected to any critical examination. We are left, there- 
fore with a politics of community which, in the absence of 
telos other than that of individual growth or social 
adjustment, reduces to the dynamics of control and toleration. 
These fundamental errors are deep errors of appraisal, 
or epistemology; they are not errors of method. That is, 
given the assumptions from which therapeutic communities 
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start, the procedures which ensue are often logical and 
consistent. These errors cannot therefore be remedied by 
tinkering with the methods, introducing finer and finer 
tunings and adjustments, or devising alternatives to the 
alternative. They call instead for a fresh appraisal of 
the phenomena, which must first of all be brought into view. 
At this point a way may show itself, which is a radical 
departure from any structure of treatment alternatives. 
These critical remarks notwithstanding, it would be 
churlish indeed to deny that many therapeutic communities 
obtain results; and results whose value is beyond equi- 
vocation. There can be little doubt that many people who 
live, or have lived in therapeutic communities of the sort 
that I have described would describe themselves as con- 
siderably enriched by the experience. However, it cannot 
by any means be assumed that the results obtained by applying 
therapeutic community methods follow as a logical conse- 
quence of the particular methods employed. I have pointed 
out that this insight - the logical independence of thera- 
peutic method and result - proved to be a crucial factor 
in the evolution of 'social psychiatry' and the therapeutic 
community. It was discovered that the relationship was 
more important than the medicine. Now the relationship 
comes with the medicine, and finally comes to be the medicine. 
We come full circle. 
How large a part, in the recovery of mentally ill 
people through therapeutic community methods of treatment, 
may be played by the emergence or survival of little pockets 
of simple, unmotivated companionship? If members of 
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therapeutic communities do indeed come to enjoy themselves 
a bit more, could it not be possible that this happens as 
much despite as because of treatment; and is in part at 
least, a moving testament to the indefatigability of the 
human spirit? 
This much, however, is clear. A therapeutic community 
which puts itself forward as offering an alternative 
treatment for mental illness is for that 'very reason 
obliged to close its doors to other possibilities, which, 
too, have a claim to be considered therapeutic. It is with 
these other possibilities that I am concerned in this study. 
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PART TWO 
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Introduction to Part Two 
When today we oppose 'practice' to 'theory', 
we usually have in mind lived life as opposed 
to abstract ideas, or else man's acting as 
opposed to his 'mere' thinking and reflecting. 
Almost nothing in this distinction which today 
is found in all European languages, reminds 
us of the fact that it is a last relic of 
several categories in terms of which the Greeks 
tried to tackle a question highly character- 
istic of their culture, namely, which is the 
best and most desirable of lives. For when the 
Greeks opposed to each other theoria and 
praxis, they did not have in mind abstract 
doctrines in contrast to their concrete appli- 
cation; nor did they, without further ado, 
think of the two most obvious facets of man's 
conscious life, his thinking and his acting. 
Rather, what they had in mind was a distinction 
between various kinds or walks of life -a 
distinction which permitted them to tackle the 
kind of questions which it was customary to 
ask at the Delphic oracles: Who is the most 
pious, the most happy, the wisest, the best of 
men? l 
This is a 'theoretical' work on therapeutic community. 
In the previous pages I have examined some of the ways in 
which therapeutic communities tend to be thought about, 
discussed, and justified. And in this sense, I have limited 
my attention to therapeutic community 'theory'. I have made 
no empirical study of therapeutic communities to see what 
their members in fact do, or to see whether what they do 
differs from what they say they do. I have so far not 
entered into any therapeutic community. Yet perhaps it 
would be premature to claim that I have been concerned 
with theory as against practice, for after all thinking, 
discussing and justifying are activities; and explaining 
the ways of one's community is a very important activity 
1Lobkowicz, N. (1967) p. 3. 
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indeed. 1 The distinction between 'theory' and 'practice' - 
between thinking and acting - quite clearly becomes an 
intricate one when we suggest that the purpose of thera- 
peutic community theory is to awaken thoughtful action. 
If the first part of this thesis is taken up with a 
'critique' of prevailing theory, then the direction which 
it now takes is towards an elaboration of the 'ground' of 
this critique. Thus, whilst the movement of my theorizing 
is, in a certain sense 'destructive-constructive', it is 
important not to make the mistake of seeing part two as 
attempting the positive task of theory building; of con- 
structing a better theory, or theoretical model of the 
therapeutic community than those which have preceded it. 
In order to make this more clear, at this point in our 
theorizing we may take the opportunity to make some comments 
on the nature of 'theory'. 
The notion of 'theory', as a substantive, may itself 
be misleading. A modern 'theory' has become something 
which we have or possess, the correctness of which is 
debated or demonstrated by its power to control. We build 
theories, which enable us to build better theories; or 
we use theories as'buildings' scaffolding, as when we talk 
about theoretical 'frameworks'. Or we use theories as 
'models', enabling us better to 'understand' the world. 
These theories and models become shared as common property 
or common knowledge: everyone knows now that E equals mc2. 
1"Words 
are also deeds. " Wittgenstein, L. (1972) p. 546. 
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The modern theory is a tool of construction, 
by means of which we gather experiences to- 
gether in a unified way and make it possible 
to dominate them. We are said to 'construct' 
a theory. This already implies that one theory 
succeeds another, and each commands, from the 
outset, only conditional validity, namely in- 
sofar as further experience does not make us 
change our mind.... What modern science calls 
theory has, it would seem, scarcely anything 
to do with that attitude of seeing and knowing 
in which the Greek accepted the order of the 
world.... Ancient theoria is not a means in the 
same sense, but the end itself, the highest 
manner of being human. 1 
Why attempt to recall the Greek theoria? Let us 
merely propose that the powerfulness of theorizing may 
have become forgotten, paradoxically, when its correctness 
comes to be confirmed by the demonstration of its power. 
The nature of theory, as a telling showing, has become 
forgotten when the truth of a theory (e. g. a 'scientific' 
theory) is demonstrated by the push of a button. The notion 
of 'theory' reaches absurdity, for example, when the 'truth' 
of medical theories of madness is demonstrated by the power 
of psychopharmacology to render individuals unconscious. 
Let us propose, further, that even such as we are able to 
glimpse of Greek 'theoria' may serve to expand our vision 
of theory and our expectations of 'theorists', and awaken 
our sense of the powers to which theory is subject. 
Theoria, which is usually translated as 'contempla- 
tion', is generally understood as referring to a way of 
life - the contemplative, 'theoretic' or philosophic life. 
Contemplation of the true, the eternal, the unchanging, 
the Good, fulfills that which is highest in man; and indeed 
I 
Gadamer, H. G. (1981) p. 412. 
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insofar as man contemplates the divine order and takes 
part in its eternity, he succeeds in transcending what 
the Greeks experienced as man's most distinctive character, 
his 'mortality'. But if the contemplative life is the 
'best' life for man, this is not to say that it somehow 
competes for this prize with the practical life, or life 
of action. The contemplative life is not 'other-worldly'; 
and the theoretical man may contemplate his friendships as 
much as the starry heavens. 
1 
Contemplative and practical life closely and intricately 
implicate one another. They are related in some ways as 
dimensions of human life. 
2 Not everyone may contemplate, 
for a disordered life does not lend itself to this attitude. 
At the same time, a man may come to possess a practical 
understanding or wisdom only through some degree of con- 
templative understanding of what is Good. From this it 
follows that theoria is not simply spectating, speculating 
or 'looking on', for presumably everyone is able to do 
these things. 
The theoros originally was the envoy or representative 
(theoria being the group of such ambassadors) delegated by 
the city-state to consult an oracle, and to witness the 
sacred festivals of another city-state. 'Theoros' came to 
mean 'spectator' - but also the traveller who visits foreign 
countries to learn something of their ways. What is 
important to emphasise about the theoros is that he himself 
shares, or partakes of the total order of which he is now, 
1See, for example, Rorty, A. E. (1980) pp. 377 ff. 
2See, for example, Lobkowicz, N. (1967) p. 26. 
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in his witnessing, a part - he is chosen according to his 
capacity to be moved or changed in accordance with the 
sacred events which he beholds, and to make his 'seeing' 
manifest in his conduct. Clearly, one of the ways in which 
the 'seeing' of the theorist will be manifest, will be in 
his speech. 
Theories provide a bridge between language and 
experience. The two major parts of theory are 
concepts, a part of language, and variables, a 
summary of experience. A theory uses concepts 
and variables plus other various assorted parts 
to span the gap between what we know as ideas 
and what we perceive as experience... 
This quotation from "The Art of Theory: construction and 
use"1 illustrates a rather typical modern understanding of 
'theory'. It is clearly a far remove from the Greek experi- 
ence of 'theoria' to this contemporary sense of theory as 
construction. More important: what is most essential to 
theory may have become lost in this remove. 
I propose here that 'theorizing', rather than being 
thought of an an activity culminating in the production 
of 'a theory', a bridge between language and experience, 
may be thought of as the activity of awakening the experi- 
ence of language. Here, theorizing silences chatter by 
pointing to the silence which chatter covers up. In 
silence the world may show itself; for the world speaks 
silently. Far from being a bridge, theory is a pointer 
to the unbridgeable; not unbridgeable because the 'gap is 
too wide', but because the other side is too near. 
1Mullins, 
N. C. (1971) p. 7. 
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Theorizing is a speaking which is a telling, a saying which 
is a showing, a showing which points to...; but theory can 
never spell out that by which its speaking is authorized, 
that to which it is subject. 
Theorizing is a display of the theorist's 
commitment to some conception of the difference 
between his speech and that about which it 
speaks. Theorizing is then an argument for 
the rationality of the authority under whose 
auspices it speaks. As an exposure of its 
own commitment, theorizing displays its 
Reason for speaking in its very speaking... 
The great tradition in theorizing is the 
tradition that re-members the problem of 
Socrates... To remember the problem of Socrates 
is to remember the moral grounds of speaking 
as a saying and the imperativeness of con- 
stantly re-asserting these grounds even while 
employing them. To show the Good while orienting 
to showing itself as a faithful responsibility. 
To submit speech to this demand - to attempt to 
say what ought to be shown - is to show that 
towards which the saying aspires as that which 
is Good, it is to take the risk of faithful 
speaking. 2 
These orientating remarks on 'theory' must serve as an 
introduction to the way 'theory' is to be understood in 
these chapters; as orientation. The aim of the thesis is 
to orient the reader towards that which provokes its 
theorizing, and towards that which grants it authority to 
speak. Three themes about which this theorizing-orientating 
is organized may be mentioned. 
Firstly, theory itself. I point first of all to the 
sort of theorizing - and the sort of starting point for such 
theorizing - which the phenomena in question, to do with 
'therapeutic community' - call for. 
1Blum, 
A. (1974) p. 180. 
2Ibid. 
p. 38. 
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Secondly, I point to certain considerations which 
pertain to the way, and the waywardness of human being. 
I propose that the w of being human is dwelling. This 
is not to make an empirical-theoretical claim which meets 
the requirements of 'falsifiability'. It is not a claim 
which is proved incorrect by the existence of nomads or 
people who sail round the world in small yachts. Neither is 
it simply a rhetorical device designed to'remind the reader 
through some 'poetic' invocation of the importance of 'home 
comforts' in our lives. Rather, it is an endeavour, which 
makes no attempt to banish rhetoric from its understanding 
of reason, to speak of what it is for a human being 'to be', 
as distinct, for example, from being swallowed up in some 
process; or absorbed within a totality. 
Thirdly, I attempt to suggest how this inquiry into 
human being itself prepares us to receive a notion of 
'concern' which is quite other than that concern which 
leaps in, smothered in its own good-intentionedness, to show 
other people how to live. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FIRST PRINCIPLES 
Practical and Theoretical Science 
I hope to have shown in part one that the theorizing 
associated with psychiatric therapeutic communities is 
seriously flawed, and fails to bring into sufficiently 
clear view the nature of the concerns proper to such a field 
of practice. I have argued that the medicalistic and 
psychologistic prejudices which prevail throughout this 
literature stand in the way of any adequate recognition of 
a range of phenomena which are crucial to an understanding 
of the nature of community, and of the circumstances under 
which a community might be able to foster the well-being of 
its members. Phenomena which I have particularly in mind 
include those which seem to be overlooked precisely because 
of their ordinariness; conviviality and companionship seem 
to be obvious examples. 
The question therefore remains: if neither the sciences 
of medicine, nor psychology, provide a ground whereupon 
considerations of this sort come readily into view, and 
if they fail, furthermore, to furnish principles upon which, 
from which, or guided by which a therapeutic community may 
be built, where then do we turn in order to arrive at such 
first principles? And what might such first principles be? 
It is important, at the outset, to recognize that the 
nature of those first principles appropriate to one field 
of endeavour may be quite different from those appropriate 
to another. Therefore, not only must we question the 
assumption that medicine or psychology might furnish the 
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founding principles of a therapeutic community. We must 
first of all inquire as to what sort of 'first principles' 
might be more appropriate to a discipline of this nature. 
Here it may be useful to recall a distinction which is 
discussed on a number of occasions by Aristotle, between 
the theoretical and the practical sciences. 
The theoretical, demonstrable, or exact sciences 
(episteme) were directed to an apprehension of the truth 
of being, for its own sake; it is roughly akin to what we 
speak of as 'pure science'. The object of the theoretical 
sciences was the analysis of the real or actual, and the 
movement of inquiry proceeds from necessary, certain or 
self-evident principles towards demonstrable conclusions. 
There were according to Aristotle three branches of demon- 
strative science. Metaphysics, which investigated reality 
as a whole, primary causes and essential attributes of all 
reality; mathematics, concerned with n mber, point and line, 
axiom and derivative theorem, postulate and corollary; and 
physics, concerned with reality studied through its aspects 
of matter and body qua changeable, with form and potency. 
The practical episteme were, according to Aristotle, 
concerned with human affairs ( rp akta) and human conduct 
(praxis). They were the episteme of conduct, whose concern 
was the art of living. They were divided into the three 
domains of politics, concerned with life in the polis, 
economics, with the family and household, and ethics, 
concerned with excellence of character (ethikai aretai) 
and practical wisdom (phronesis). These sciences were for 
Aristotle, as they were for Plato, quite inseparable. In 
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a number of important senses Aristotle's Ethics and Politics 
complement one another. 
Practical epist; m; (I shall restrict my comments to 
Aristotle's Ethics) was concerned to indicate that life 
which is the best for man, according to his powers and 
circumstances. It was directly addressed to the cultivation 
of those capacities whereby this 'best life' may be recog- 
nized, preferred and chosen. 
Of the distinction between the two sciences, Averroes, 
the fourteenth century Aristotle scholar and commentator, 
writes: 
We say: this science, known as practical 
science, differs essentially from the theo- 
retical sciences. Now this is clear inasmuch 
as its subject differs from the subject of 
each and every one of the theoretical sciences 
and its principles differ from their principles. 
This is because the subject of this science is 
volitional things, the doing of which is within 
our power, and the principle of these things is 
will and choice; just as the principle of 
natural science is nature and its subject the 
natural things, and the principle of the divine 
science is God (may He be exalted) and its sub- 
ject matter the divine things. Furthermore, 
this science differs from the theoretical sciences 
in that their end is knowledge alone; if there 
is anything of action in them it is by accident, 
as happens in many of the matters that the 
mathematicians study. Now the end of this 
science is action alone .1 
We may notice three important distinctions between 
theoretical and practical episteme. 
First of all, practical science, unlike, for example, 
mathematics or physics, is not proposed as an exact science. 
. 1Averroes (1974) p. 3. 
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As a discipline, we rather speak of it as exacting. (Exact 
derives from the Latin, 'exactus', precisely weighed or 
determined, precise, from exigere, to weigh, to achieve, but 
also to drive out, hence to cause to come out, whence to 
exact. ) It is concerned with knowing what modes of conduct, 
or responses, are appropriate to particular concrete 
situations and circumstances. It does not aim to arrive at 
general, universal and demonstrable truths, which are always 
or necessarily so. it will achieve "such clarity as the 
subject matter allows, for the same degree of precision is 
not to be expected in all discussions". 
' 
The subject matter 
of the practical sciences, namely the vicissitudes of human 
conduct and fortune, place an inherent limitation upon the 
nature and the exactness of its conclusions; if the practical 
sciences do yield generalizations about human conduct or 
argue from such generalizations, then they must be content 
to arrive at conclusions which are "for the most part true". 
Now questions of conduct and expedience have 
as little fixity about them as questions of 
what is healthful; and if this is true of the 
general rule, it is still more true that its 
applications to particular problems admits of 
no precision. For they do not fall under any 
art or professional tradition, but the agents 
are compelled at every step to think out 5or 
themselves what the circumstances demand. 
Secondly, as the above quotation suggests, the practical 
sciences are situational; they are concerned with the down 
to earth concrete realities of resourcefulness, as it is 
demanded by occasion, with the ability to appraise situations., 
1Aristotle (1976) pp. 64-65. Nichomachean Ethics, I, (iii) 1094b 12. 
2Aristotle (1976) p. 65. Nichomachean Ethics, I, (iii) 1094b 20. 
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to assess what is according, fitting, right, appropriate to 
the demands of particular situations and circumstances. 
They are concerned not only with intellectual understanding 
of what is the case (nous) but with phronesis, practical 
intelligence or wisdom - the perfected excellence of 
practical nous. We might say in colloquial terms that the 
emphasis of the practical sciences is upon 'home truths' 
rather than universal truth, although this claim would 
require qualification. For the man of phronesis is not 
merely the possessor of the savvy or knowhow which is 
street-wisdom; his conduct is guided by some degree of 
knowledge of that which is the best life for a man - and 
thus we may still speak of the sphere of the practical 
as an episteme. 
Practical sciences, whilst they are not reducable to, 
or derivable from the theoretical, are by no means situated 
outside the domain of lawfulness. 
Human civilization differs essentially from 
nature in that is is not simply a place in 
which capacities and powers work themselves 
out, but man becomes what he is through what 
he does and how he behaves, i. e., he behaves 
in a certain way because of what he has 
become. Thus Aristotle sees ethos as 
differing from physis in that it is a sphere 
in which the laws of nature do not operate, 
yet it is not a sphere of lawlessness, but 
of human institutions and human attitudes that 
can be changed and have the quality of rules 
only to a limited degree. ' 
Aristotle's Ethics are addressed to the furtherance of 
those capacities whereby an agent will acquire those tastes 
1Gadamer, 
H. G. (1981) p. 249. 
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of judgement, and prefer those actions which are appropriate 
to the time, place and 'politics' of situation, determined 
not simply by intellectual understanding but by the 
enlightened self-interest of phronesis, practical intelli- 
gence. It is important, finally, to note therefore that 
the action or conduct with which the practical sciences are 
concerned is praxis: it cannot be separated from the acting 
subject. Aristotle considers, for example, that his 
teachings on fitting conduct are accessible only to a subject 
who is already disposed in some ways to receive them. His 
teachings are concerned not primarily to lay down general 
rules or even guidelines of conduct, but to engender in the 
agent, or refine, fixed dispositions of a 'second nature', 
oriented towards the fulfillment of well-being or flourishing 
(eudaimonia - usually and not altogether misleadingly trans- 
lated as 'happiness') which discipline itself presupposes 
a certain disposition of character, an already according 
ethos. 
Embodied knowledge of fitting conduct, therefore, is 
quite distinct from learning the skills of social behaviour; 
practical science is not a productive science, as may be 
cultivated by the artist or craftsman, it is not simply a 
'know-how'. Ethical knowledge is not a knowledge that we 
'possess' in such a way as to apply it, or so as we are able 
to bring it to bear upon specific situations. Unlike 
technical or productive knowledge, which is particular, 
and serves particular ends, practical knowledge is concerned 
with right living in general, and at all times. Ethics 
proceeds on all fronts. It is, furthermore, a reflective 
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knowledge, in the sense that it directly implicates the 
agent's relation with himself. 
The healthy soul, on the other hand, is 
not simply in the hands of some 'nature' 
which takes care of it; it does not possess 
a natural good constitution which could be 
said to govern it. The soul is always 
aware of the danger of disharmony because 
it must knowingly aim at being at unison 
with itself. It must pay constant attention 
to ensure that it maintains its accord with 
itself; or, put another way, its self-accord 
is endangered at every moment. In preserving 
phronesis, in existing as knowing, Dasein 
attains to a lasting governance of itself. 
Thus in the case of the soul it is not 
sufficient to have merely characterized its 
healthy state. The real concern is to prevent 
it from being led astray. 1 
Practical Science and Psychology 
The distinction between Aristotle's practical and theo- 
retical episteme, and the nature of these sciences as they 
were characterized by Aristotle do not, perhaps, readily 
coincide with their equivalents in contemporary thought. 
Needless to say, we do not find any exact correspondence 
between the theoretical sciences of Aristotle's day, and 
their modern day versions. Notwithstanding our different 
conceptions of science, however, the distinction still 
holds good, although nowadays only one pole of the distinction 
would be graced by the appelation of 'science'. 
It is not difficult to allocate to contemporary psycho- 
logy an approximate position within the range of that which 
Aristotle calls 'theoretical science'. Psychology, for 
1Gadamer, H. G. (1980) p. 88. 
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example, aims at exact truth (this claim is not lessened 
by the degree of psychology's reliance upon parametric 
statistics), at the quantifiable, measurable, repicable; it 
is far from being content with those rough and ready, often 
contradictory truths of 'human nature' which are etched in 
history, literature, folklore, common sense. It is, further- 
more, concerned to arrive at theories pertaining to the 
general rather than the particular; with laws, that is, 
which illuminate the ways in which 'people' behave - laws 
which are arrived at in accordance with prevailing scientific 
method, and which meet generally agreed requirements of 
falsifiability, communicability and so on. 
And this entails issues which are quite different from 
those with which a therapeutic community will be most 
intimately and immediately concerned, which seem, on the 
face of it, to be precisely those with which practical science 
grapples. For the fact that the subject of ethical disci- 
pline resembles the scientist in the fact of his pursuit 
of truth should not force us to assume that it is the truth 
of fact which he pursues. Belonging to the ethical sphere 
is the truth of situation - the truth which outs. The 
distinction which Aristotle brings to our attention, there- 
fore, does suggest that a different order of theoretical 
discussion from those which prevail may be of the utmost 
relevance to our present area of inquiry. 
A psychologist approaches his field of concern with 
some (albeit provisional) theory in mind, with which he 
compares the nature of that which confronts him. His seeing 
is framed through some set of formal constructs, or through 
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some 'theoretical model' which defines or characterizes that 
domain of human reality which is his particular interest or 
field of expertise. He will furthermore, qua psychologist, 
and depending on his 'theoretical orientation', found his 
practice (whatever it is, whether it be designing intelligence 
tests or personality inventories, producing better experi- 
ments and better theories, or treating abnormalities) upon 
a particular set of generalizations or principles, according 
to his own particular formalization of human nature. If he 
is of the behaviourist school, he will probably start from 
a- more or less sophisticated - stimulus-response model of 
man. If his inclinations are towards the humanistic school, 
he will probably start from a set of assumptions as to man's 
innate capacity for growth and self-actualization. If he 
is a construct theorist, his assumptions will be to do with 
the personal construct system which determine a person's 
perception of the world. Again, if he is a psychologist of 
psychoanalytic orientation, he will be likely to attribute 
to the mind a rather different structure, according to its 
instincts, dynamics, and internal economics. 
Let us suppose that he is engaged in a clinical field 
of practice. According to his theoretical orientation he 
will proceed on the basis of a number of assumptions as to 
the nature and causes of the abnormal manifestations con- 
fronting him. For example, his patients or clients will be 
suffering from maladjusted conditioned responses, from 
environmental factors which block the instinct towards 
self-fulfilment, from invalidated core constructs, or 
failure of the ego to adjust to reality. 
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It is not necessary here to enter into discussion of 
whether or not each of these schools exemplifies what we 
may call 'good' science. What we do note is that this aim, 
of natural scientific respectability, is one to which each 
of these schools aspires. And this is as true for Maslow, 
founder of the humanistic 'third force' of American psychology, 
discoverer of 'self-actualization', as it is for B. F. Skinner. 
For it is Maslow who writes that 
only science can overcome characterological 
differences in seeing and believing. Only 
science can progress. Science is the only 
way we have of shoving truth down the 
reluctant throat. 1 
Our quarrel here is not with those who dream of the goal 
of a scientific psychology, or of regional psychologies, 
but with those who assume that such a theoretical scientific 
programme will furnish the appropriate guidelines to effec- 
tive action on the part of those who are members - or 
'staff' - of a therapeutic community. 
For the knowledge required of a person who aspires to 
play an inspirational role, or lays claim to offer guidance 
through the difficulties of living t6gether in a community, 
is of a different order from that knowledge possessed by a 
person trained in a theoretical science, for example, in 
one or other of the prevailing schools of psychology. He 
resembles more the veteran soldier than the analyst of 
military theory. He will not be required to bring to bear 
upon that field of interaction and relationship, of which 
1 Maslow, A. (1962) p. (v). 
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he is a part, his intellectual grasp of psychological theory 
pertaining to the workings of the human mind or human 
relationship. That this sort of knowledge plays a rather 
minimal part in a field of this nature is suggested or con- 
firmed by the evidence indicating that people are probably 
no better at living together harmoniously than they were 
two thousand or more years ago, although there are of course 
libraries full of empirical psychological findings. Where 
a person finds it appropriate to employ the imagery or 
rhetoric or findings of some or other school of psychology, 
in order to make a point or provide an illustration it will 
be his judgement and his taste which tells him so. Tact 
and taste provide good illustrations of notions which are 
central to practical science - and the distinction that I 
am here emphasizing distinguishes between the way we move 
in accordance with tact and taste - and the way in which we 
might proceed armed with some or other 'model of man'. 
We can certainly now assert that at least 
a reasonable, theoretical and empirical case 
has been made for the presence within the 
human being of a tendency toward, or need 
for growing in a direction that can be 
summarized in general as self-actualization, 
or psychological health, and specifically 
as growth toward each and all of the sub- 
aspects of self-actualization, i. e., he has 
within him a pressure towards unity of 
personality, towards spontaneous expressive- 
ness, towards full individuality and identity, 
towards seeing the truth rather than being 
blind, towards being creative, towards being 
good, and a lot else. That is, the human 
being is so constructed that he presses toward 
fuller and fuller being and this means pressing 
toward what most people would call good values, 
toward serenity, kindness, courage honesty, 
love, unselfishness, and goodness. 
i 
1 Ibid. p. 147. 
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This is typical of statements which are to be found 
within the therapeutic community literature. Sometimes they 
are couched more in the psychoanalytic idiom, sometimes more 
in that of behaviourism. In either case they resemble 
scientific statements in that they make claims as to the 
nature of some or other sector of reality - in this case 
'people'. They are conspicuously unscientific, however, in 
that they are the expression of complex value judgements, or 
are at least saturated with value judgements or evaluative 
terms, which are not amenable to scientific demonstration. 
They are statements of a personal belief or credo, supported, 
we assume, by the holder's considered experience. They 
are, for that reason, not necessarily to be dismissed out 
of court; rather, they invite discussion. When it is 
assumed, however, that they have achieved the status of 
scientific correctness, and when furthermore they spawn 
procedures to correct wayward lives, they can only lead - 
at best - to further confusion. 
Once we 'come clean' and concede that our field is 
ethics, a domain which stands its own ground and does not 
require the assertions of science in order to justify its 
claims, we are free to incline towards whatever views 
of human nature happen to accord with us, without having 
to assume, or insist, that they must be correct. Freud, 
it is well known, felt that worthwhile human beings were 
rather the exception to the rule - but there is no reason 
to believe that his particularly dark irony made him any 
less good a therapist than someone else who, like Maslow, 
feels that people have a pressure within them towards 
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'goodness'. 
Starting Point 
Having noted the relevance of Aristotle's distinction 
between theoretical and practical sciences, we may now turn 
to the consequences of this distinction insofar as they 
bear upon our original question concerning the nature of 
first principles. I have already suggested - following 
Aristotle -. that different sciences call for different 
'starting points', or first principles. The point that we 
must now consider is that different orientations towards 
first principles must be taken into account. 
We must not overlook the difference that it 
makes whether we argue from or to first prin- 
ciples. Plato used very properly to raise 
this question, arguing whether the procedure 
was from or to first principles... We must 
start from what is known. But things are 
known in two senses: known to us, and known 
absolutely. Presumably we must start from 
what is known to us... l 
The question, in Aristotle, of where inquiry starts - 
with what we may all agree upon, or what is the cause of 
disagreement (where what 'we say' stands opposed to what 
'they say') - is an extremely intricate one. To simplify 
rather drastically, we may assume that in Aristotle's 
remarks here upon the starting point for ethics, 'what is 
known absolutely' refers to the demonstrable axioms and 
theorems of 'exact science', as well as the definitions 
A 
1Aristotle (1976) p. 67. N. E. I, (iv) 1095a 30-1095b 3. 
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and logical principles of demonstration itself. 'What is 
known to us' seems to refer more to what we know by 
tradition, by being a member of a culture and a civilization, 
and in that sense, already knowing our way about. We do 
not have to start from scratch because we are already on our 
wem. But if, as I understand, Aristotle means by 'what is 
known to us', some degree of common acknowledgement, e. g., 
of the moral conventions of our society, then this common 
acknowledgement includes, too, some degree of common sense; 
for ethics requires a subject who will not have to be shown 
everything, for whom some things already are sufficiently 
plain. 
From this starting place - from the everyday, the 
familiar, the commonplace - ethical inquiry will proceed. 
It does not start with the 'first principles' of units, 
definitions, logical procedures and so on, which have 
already been established, but with 'where we are'. From 
there, its movement is towards the 'first' or central 
principles or reasons, which discloses the essentials of 
'where we are'. 
Ethics reasons not from but to first principles; 
it starts not with the intelligible in itself 
but what is familiar to us, i. e., with the bare 
facts, and works back from them to the underlying 
reasons; and to give the necessary knowledge of 
the facts a good upbringing is necessary. Mathe- 
matics deals with a subject matter the first 
principles of which are acquired by an easy 
abstraction from sense-data; the substance of 
mathematics is the deduction of conclusions from 
these first principles. The first principles of 
ethics are too deeply immersed in the detail of 
conduct to be thus easily picked out and the 
substance of ethics consists in picking them out. 
1Ross, 
Sir David (1977) p. 189. 
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Without doubt, Aristotle's argument will read rather 
differently to his contemporaries, for whom mathematics 
proves to be the paradigm for all demonstrative sciences, 
than to the twentieth century scientist or philosopher of 
science. In all of the theoretical sciences, Aristotle 
argued, we move from necessary first principles which we 
grasp directly by means of intellectual insight or nous, 
to conclusions which are demonstrable and also certain, but 
less authoritative than those premises on whose self- 
evidence they depend. And this seems to be quite unlike 
the sort of movement which is followed, for example, in 
modern particle physics or molecular biology, which returns 
again and again to observation and experiment, and is, we 
might say, a 'two way' between theory and observation. 
Here, a number of arguments may be brought forward 
which suggest that Aristotle's understanding of science is 
not in fact so out of date. Consider, for example, the 
following: 
The notion that scientists occupy themselves in 
expounding demonstrative syllogisms based on 
definitions is indeed laughable. A glance at 
Aristotle's own scientific treatises suffices to 
show that his own scientific work certainly does 
not have such a form. The notion may have been 
swallowed by some of his followers, but if we 
turn to Aristotle himself we find that the 
absurdity dissolves. For his theory of demon- 
stration is not offered as an account or theory 
of how scientists actually proceed when at work, 
but rather as an outline of an ideal of complete 
knowledge at which they are aiming. No doubt 
the structure of proof which he suggests is too 
limiting. But the idea that a science aims at 
achieving a theory, as simple as possible, from 
which will be deducible as many consequences as 
possible, is a valuable one; and for embodying 
this view of the nature of a finished science 
Aristotle's account of demonstration deserves 
respect. Ironically enough, this ideal of 
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deducibility is closer to the rigorously 
mathematical theories Aristotle did not know 
than to the more homely and less quantified 
theories that were available at his time... 
Although his examples are archaic, some of 
his ideas will be found remarkable up to date... 
Aristotle's formulation of an ideal for the 
final structure of a science can after all be 
seen as a brilliant anticipation rather than 
as an anarchaism. 1 
We may take note of the distinction - and of the 
significance of the distinction - between orientation to- 
wards, and orientation from 'first principles' - without 
concluding or having to assume that a theoretical science 
proceeds in any simple fashion from 'necessary' first 
principles to conclusions, or that the practical science of 
ethics simply proceeds from 'what is known to us' to the 
'first principles' of moral conduct. For here, generaliza- 
tion, demonstration, and psychological theory may well have 
a part to play. Aristotle, indeed, makes this quite clear 
when he proposes that 
Some aspects of psychology are adequately 
treated in discourses elsewhere, and we should 
make use of the results: e. g. that the soul is 
part rational and part irrational (whether 
these are separate like parts of the body or 
anything else that is physically divisible, or 
whether like the convex and concave aspects of 
the circumference of a circle they are distin- 
guishable as two only in definition and thought 
and are by nature inseparable, makes no difference 
for our present purpose). 2 
For the present purposes, my aim is to establish the 
relevance of this distinction to the practice of a thera- 
peutic community. And we see that an empirically, 
lAckrill, J. L. (1981) p. 98. 
2Aristotle (1976) p. 88. N. E. I, (xiii) 1102a 25-32. 
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psychologically grounded therapeutic community - the 
community which harnesses psychological processes - will 
proceed in at least two important senses from 'first prin- 
ciples'. It will, first of all assume first principles of 
scientific method, such as are entailed in notions of 
empiricism, objectivity, measurement, unit, and so on, as 
these are held to apply within empirical psychology. And 
it will, furthermore, as an applicative system be proceeding 
from the general principle, the 'theory', to the particular 
instance. 
My aim, secondly, is to show that this movement con- 
trasts with that of an ethical science, which indeed does 
proceed towards first principles in at least two important 
senses: and to show, furthermore, why this movement is 
appropriate to the sort of discipline which is called for 
by the requirements of a therapeutic community. 
Orientation and Firstness 
Practical science, according to Aristotle, starts with 
what is 'familiar', with what is known 'to us'. It cannot 
presuppose an existing system of formalized and coherent 
constructs and principles, there are no institutional 
structures of practical wisdom akin to the institutions of 
science with formal conventions, technical procedures which 
specify regulations governing objective criteria, unit, 
measurement, and so on. There is no Academy of Ethics. 
The language of practical science is for the most part 
'ordinary language'; insofar as it does employ technical 
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terms, it is not a case of aspiring to the scientific 
ideal of a pure sign language whose terms are unequivocally 
designated, but rather aiming towards a progressive 
refinement and careful articulation of what is implicit 
in 'common sense'. I do not, for example, employ the 
'technical term' - phronesis - here, in the same fashion as 
the behaviourist invokes 'retroactive inhibition' or the 
psychoanalyst (usually) talks of 'superego'. The word 
phronesis approximates rather closely to the word 'conscious- 
ness', used in the rather special sense where it refers to 
a person's knowing what he is doing (as distinct, for 
example, from proceeding on the basis of assuming that he 
knows what he is doing). But this is not the end of the 
matter, rather the beginning; for the word phronesis needs 
to be talked about. And indeed, talking about the words 
that we use is a very important part of opening up our 
moral vocabulary, and provides a good illustration of that 
movement which starts from or with what is familiar. In 
the course of some conversation about the words which we 
use to justify and explain our actions (words which are 
familiar and which we seem to understand) we may arrive at 
a more essential - first - understanding of these same 
words. We may end up with a fuller and more embodied 
understanding of what, for example, justice, or truth, or 
good, mean; but this is entirely different from seeking a 
general or standard definition. Where ethical enquiry 
may culminate in understanding a word, scientific inquiry 
may only begin when there is agreement over its use. 
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Whatever first principles there may be to practical 
wisdom are too deeply embedded in the ambiguities of con- 
duct to be easily picked out and demonstrated, or universally 
applied. What, for example, are the 'units' of conduct? 
They are clearly not the units of behaviour, since action 
is contextualized within a culture which has its own con- 
ventions, rules, beliefs and language. And furthermore, 
inactivity may be a highly telling form of action. 
Do rules of conduct provide us with the principles 
which we may seek? Aristotle, certainly, does not incline 
to the view that moral rules can be demonstrated and applied 
to the business of living well. 
There are for Aristotle no general rules, no 
universal moral laws, no 'principles' in ethics, 
save the one and single arche; always to act 
in any situation so as to realize eudaimonia. 
The function of the intelligent or purdent man, 
ho phronimos, and hence of the good or the 
moral man, is never to create the havoc that 
comes from acting on universal moral or political 
'principles', never to be so stupid as to 'follow 
the right', ruat caelum, but rather to make the 
best he can out of every situation. 
i 
And in any case, 'moral rules' cannot provide the first 
principles' of an ethical science, since they presuppose 
constitutive rules', that is, 'rules which constitute the 
society in which the regulative rules apply and which make 
them meaningful. '2 
What I am calling - somewhat old-fashionedly - the 
ethical sciences are concerned with the vicissitudes of 
1Randall, J. H. (1960) p. 268. 
2Heaton, J. M. (1979) p. 189. 
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human life and conduct, with questions of practical living. 
They attempt to bring into view that way which is most 
fitting, proper or right for a person to live, that which 
is his best way of life, and to engage the subject in a 
movement of inquiry or critical reflection which is an 
awakening of awareness of 'best interest'. Now this sort 
of inquiry certainly cannot start off with some already 
worked out blueprint for the 'best life' which may be 
passed on to the subject like a recipe. Yet surely, he 
needs to know how to live better; for the subject is going 
to be drawn towards ethical discipline only insofar as he 
finds his life, in aspect or in whole, either more or less 
severely, problematic. Only someone who suspects or 
believes or imagines - or realizes - that he does not know 
the best way for him to live, is going to engage in the 
inquiry which is the examined life. And he must start 
from his own experience of how he in fact does live, from 
his present position embodying his most up-to-date under- 
standing of his 'best interest'; and by an ironic and 
regressive movement arrive at his own, more far-reaching 
grasp or realization of 'best interest', or the first 
principles thereof. 
The first sentence of the Nichomachean Ethics reads: 
"Every act and every inquiry, every action and choice seems 
to aim at some good". 
' This introduces a second or further 
sense in which a practical science is directed towards 
first principles; what is the final good to which human life 
1Aristotle (1976) p. 63. N. E. I, (i) 1094a 1-3. 
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is directed, what, as Aristotle asks, is the target at 
which the good man aims? Here we arrive at the 'first 
principle' as a final cause, or telos of human life. "In 
the practical science of conduct or praxis, the arch; is 
the good at which conduct aims. " This good is the last 
step in the chain of '... for the sake of'; it is the Good, 
which "has been rightly defined as that at which all things 
aim. "1 
If, then, our activities have some end which 
we want for its own sake, and for the sake of 
which we want all other ends - if we do not 
choose everything for the sake of something 
else (for this will involve an infinite pro- 
gression, so that our aim will be pointless 
and ineffectual) - it is clear that this must 
be the Good, that is, the supreme good. Does 
it not follow then, that a knowledge of the 
Good is of great importance to us for the con- 
duct of our lives? Are we not likely to 
achieve our aim if we have a target? If this 
is so, we must try to describe at least in 
outline what the Good really is, and by which 
of the sciences or faculties it is studied. 2 
The supreme good for man is eudaimonia - happiness, 
well-being, flourishing, blessedness. Upon this, says 
Aristotle everyone is agreed; it is "when it comes to saying 
in what happiness consists, opinions differ, and the account 
given by the generality of mankind is not at all like that 
of the wise". 
3 Nevertheless, human flourishing remains as 
the arche or first principle of ethical science, towards 
which, from the beginning, this science is directed or 
oriented. To enter into the intricacies and complexities 
1Aristotle (1976) p. 63. N. E. I, (i) 1094a 3. 
2Aristotle (1976) pp. 63-64. N. E. I, (i) 1094a 16-26. 
3Aristotle (1976) p. 66. N. E. I, (iv) 1095a 18-22. 
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of Aristotle's argument as to the nature of well-being 
would take us far beyond the compass of the present study. 
We may note, however, the importance of the part which 
contemplation or theoria plays in the fulfilled life, 
without forgetting the importance of other potentialities 
of the soul, actualized for their own sakes "because 
actualizing them just is living the life of a human being, 
and not merely because they also promote and assure the sort 
of life that gives contemplation its widest play". 
' 
We may 
also note - in anticipation of further discussion - the 
importance to wellbeing of the phenomenon of, and contem- 
plation of, friendship. 
I have suggested that a 'therapeutic community' would 
seem, on the face of it, to call for, or entail a discipline 
which accords with what Aristotle calls a practical science. 
Indeed, it would be hard to find better illustrations of 
'inexactness', of 'difference and variety', of things which 
must be true only 'for the most part' than those which are 
offered by a community of people living together; and 
particularly so in the case of a community whose members 
are drawn together specifically because of their own diffi- 
culties in living together with others. Innumerable examples 
drawn from therapeutic communities would seem to confirm 
that the field is indeed that of ethics, and that the 
appropriate theorizing will be ethical, and not medical- 
psychological. Indeed, it is a common 'symptom' of people 
who enter therapeutic communities or for that matter 
psychotherapy, that they do not expect to be treated as 
1Rorty, A. E. (1980) p. 377. 
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ethical subjects; they assume that some technique has been 
worked out, and through following this they will lead 
better and happier lives; or they assume that such instruction 
can be put into words. 
Whatever it is that is 'right' or fitting for one person 
under particular circumstances (and whatever it is about the 
'right' that makes it right) may not be at all right for 
another person under different circumstances. To refer 
back to the list of therapeutic goals provided by Schwarz, 
which I cited earlier, it is very far from clear that the 
desiderata of enjoying reduced anxiety or 'increased com- 
fort' hold true of all people under all circumstances. Can 
we not agree surely, that some people, under some circum- 
stances, need precisely to undergo increased discomfort, 
suffer greater anxieties? But what is the right amount? 
To what science do we turn to discover when enough is 
enough? And what are its first principles? 
Can we trust the person himself to know what is right? 
It is a commonplace truth that people will pursue courses 
of action by their own choice which, far from being right 
or fitting, are to their utmost disadvantage. To show 
someone who is blind to his own interest, what may be good 
for him, or how he may come to realize what is good for him, 
may be no simple matter - even when it is quite clear to 
everyone else. And such a showing will be of a different 
order entirely from scientific demonstration, employing 
for example inductive or statistical methods. We may well 
succeed in 'demonstrating' that a person's conduct leads 
them into endless misery, and it not make a whit of 
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difference. 
We may conclude our preliminary inquiry into thera- 
peutic community 'first principles'; and we are lead to the 
conclusion that the disclosure of first principles is not 
after all some preliminary - but is that to which the whole 
therapeutic community project tends. We conclude, too, that 
whatever 'theoretical knowledge' is required by people who 
would find guidance within a therapeutic community can assume 
no more solid, fixed, or substantial starting point than 
'where we are' in all its complexity. We arrive at the most 
provisional conclusion as to how such a practice might pro- 
ceed in saying that such a community is aw which must in 
some way show its way - that the direction or orientation 
of this way is toward what is first, towards orginary 
disclosure. 
Thus we are left with a direction but no ground; with 
a reminder that the inquiry entails a critical attentiveness 
to ordinary things, that it concerns practical episteme - 
but no indication of a 'where' from which we might start. 
Episteme which we might roughly translate as 'knowledge' is 
(221, upon, histemi, I place) a 'placing of oneself in the 
position required for'. In this, the word somewhat resembles 
'understanding'. Where is it that we are required to 'place 
ourselves' in order to 'understand', or in order that our 
inquiry might proceed? 
188 
Place 
It is more usual to speak of 'grounding' an inquiry 
or a subject matter than it is to speak of 'placing' it. 
Yet it might be quite appropriate to approach questions of 
ground, or 'groundproblems' through place. Plato, indeed, 
suggests precisely this. For the places and settings which, 
in the dialogues, he so carefully brings into view are not 
merely theatrical adornments, but rather prepare and expose 
the ground of the subsequent dialogical inquiry. Whilst 
wishing to avoid any implication that problems of ground or 
foundation are finally to be thought of spatially, that 
ontology is topology, I propose that a consideration of 
'place' may serve as an appropriate point of departure for 
a 'laying out' of ground, adequate at least to our present, 
particular purposes. 
In Indo-European languages the basic idea suggested 
by 'place' is flatness, openness, spreadoutness, whence 
easy to see or determine, easy to build on. This openness, 
laidoutness of place is indicated, for example, by plane, 
plain, (explain, to spread out, literally or before the 
mind), platform, plateau; see also Platon (Plato), the 
'broadminded'. 
It is this sense of opening, laying out or horizontally 
which distinguishes place from what I shall call location. 
There seems to be some important sense of self-shownness 
essential to place, which contrast with the appointment 
of location. Thus a location is more akin to a point 
or position. For example, Cartesian co-ordinate geometry 
provide the coordinates of point or position, location, 
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not of place. Something of this distinction may perhaps 
be illustrated by the particular constructions which belong 
with either place or location; we might consider the case 
of a mountain cairn and a triangulation point. 
A mountain cairn powerfully 'gathers' the place, for 
example in its unique horizontality of earth and sky, near- 
ness and farness. It celebrates the place. A triangulation 
point, by contrast, uses the place, as an object. It is 
embedded in a network or structure of other locations, and 
the 'places' where these structures are erected are in a 
sense incidental, or employed merely for their convenience 
to the surveyor, for their properties of visibility and so 
on. Film crews usually speak of . 
'locations'; again they 
are referring to a place as an 'object' which is chosen for 
its properties. Places usually have names. 
Just as architectural constructions may open up and 
speak of quite different 'places', so these different places 
may open up or upon entirely different possibilities of 
space. 
The background of the physical plant and the 
foreground of human activity are profoundly and 
intimately dependent on one another. Laymen do 
not realize how deep and subtle this connection 
is. Let us immediately give a strong archi- 
tectural example to illustrate it. In Christian 
history, there is a relation between the theology 
and the architecture of churches. The dimly-lit 
vast auditorium of a Gothic Catholic cathedral, 
bathed in colors and symbols, faces a bright 
candle-lit stage and its richly-costumed celebrant: 
this is the necessary background for the mysterious 
sacrament of the mass for the newly growing Medieval 
town and its representative actor. But the daylit, 
small, and unadorned meeting hall of the Congre- 
gationalist, facing its central pulpit, fits the 
belief that the chief mystery is preaching the 
Word to a group that religiously governs itself. 
And the little square seating arrangement of the 
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Quakers confronting one another is an environ- 
ment where it is hoped that, when people are 
gathered in meditation, the Spirit itself will 
descend anew. 1 
It is worth stressing the particularly intimate 
relation between place, and human being. We can place a 
thing or a body, but we cannot place a person (except in 
the sense of 'allocating', e. g., to a job or 'position' or 
'placement'). Interestingly, we talk of 'placing' someone 
as recalling or remembering them. But we cannot place a 
person insofar as he has already made place, is placed; and 
in a sense, is place. The etymology suggests that 'here' 
is where 'he' is; 'there' is where 'they' are. We may 
recall Heidegger: Dasein is the 'there' of being. 
Place and stance imply one another as horizontal and 
vertical dimensions of being. 
2 Stance, standing, standing 
out, understanding - the vertical - open out or extend our 
horizon. Lying down, as in sleep, is a surrendering to the 
world, a merging with the horizontal, an abandonment to 
place, in whose protective closeness we let go all but our 
oneiric ties to the world. 
A place is not an indifferent 'somewhere', but 
a base, a condition. Of course we ordinarily 
understand our localization as that of a body 
situated just anywhere. That is because the 
positive relationship with a place which we 
maintain in sleep is masked by our relations 
with things. Then only the concrete 
1Goodwin, P. and Goodwin, P. (1960) pp. 3-4. 
2It 
is interesting to note that the root of the word 'vertical suggests 
a turning, whence, for example, 'vertigo'. Thus place and stance 
together suggest a bounding or limiting (the horizontal) and a 
rotating, or turning (the vertical). To this 'movement', a 
simultaneity of staying and not staying, (beautifully illustrated 
in the silent turnings of dervishes) we shall subsequently return. 
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determinations of the surroundings, of the 
setting, of the ties of habit and of history 
give an individual character to a place, 
which has become our home, our home town, our 
homeland, the world. When detached from its 
atmosphere, localization is generally taken to 
be presence in an abstract extension, like 
that of a star in the infinity of space. Sleep 
re-establishes a relationship with a place qua 
base. In lying down, in curling up in a corner 
to sleep, we abandon ourselves to a place; qua 
base it becomes our refuge. ' 
If place is fundamental, is there than a fundamental place? 
Is there a place which comes first? I shall consider the 
place where we live. I shall argue that this place does 
indeed have an ontological significance and priority; that 
it is not simply an empirically convenient place. I shall 
first of all suggest the specific relevance of this place 
to the matters under consideration in this present inquiry. 
1Levinas, 
E. (1968) p. 69. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HOMELESSNESS 
Alienation 
Talk of alienation has become tired. How many books 
do we open to find descriptions of 'man's present condition' 
such as the following: 
There is also plenty of evidence that the sense 
of isolation, the alienation of one's self from 
the world, is suffered not only by people in 
pathological conditions but by countless 'normal' 
persons as well in our day. Riesman presents a 
good deal of sociopsychological data in his study 
The Lonely Crowd to demonstrate that the isolated, 
lonely, alienated character type is characteristic 
not only of neurotic patients but of people as a 
whole in our society and that the trends in that 
direction have been increasing over the past couple 
of decades. He makes the significant point that 
these people have only a technical communication 
with their world; his 'outer-directed' persons 
(the type characteristic of our day) relate to 
everything from its technical, external side.... 
Other portrayals of this condition of personal 
isolation and alienation in our society are given 
by Fromm in Escape from Freedom, particularly with 
respect to sociopolitical considerations; by Karl 
Marx, particularly in relation to the dehumaniza- 
tion arising out of the tendency in modern 
capitalism to value everything in the external, 
object-centered terms of money; and by Tillich 
from the spiritual viewpoint. Camus' The Stranger 
and Kafka's The Castle, finally, are surprisingly 
similar illustrations of our point; each gives a 
vivid and gripping picture of a man who is a 
stranger in his world, a stranger to other people 
whom he seeks or pretends to love; he moves about 
in a state of homelessness, vagueness and haze as 
though he had no direct sense connection with 
his world but were in a foreign country where he 
does not know the language and has no hope of 
learning it but is always doomed to wander in 
quiet despair, incommunicado, homeless, and a 
stranger. 
Nor is the problem of this loss of world simply 
one of lack of communication with one's fellows. 
Its roots reach below the social levels to an 
alienation from the natural world as well. It is 
a particular experience of isolation which has 
been called 'epistemological loneliness'. Under- 
lying the economic, sociological, and psychological 
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aspects of alienation can be found a profound 
common denominator, namely, the alienation 
which is the ultimate consequence of four cen- 
turies of the outworking of the separation of 
man as subject from the objective world. This 
alienation has expressed itself for several 
centuries in Western man's passion to gain power 
over nature, but now shows itself in an estrange- 
ment from nature, and a vague, unarticulated, 
and half-suppressed sense of despair of gaining 
any real relationship with the natural world, 
including one's own body. 1 
'Alienation' here is used variously to allude to un- 
rootedness, set-apartness from the objective world, and 
from nature, technical outer-directedness, and loneliness; 
we are left less with a concept that has been clarified 
than with a feeling that alienation is a 'bad thing', and 
the disease of our age. Alienated man moves around home- 
less, he does not know 'the language', he is obsessed with 
the control of nature. But far from being problems peculiar 
to our age, these have been discussed by philosophers and 
religious teachers for millennia; and it was after all in 
the first chapter of Genesis that man was instructed to 
subdue nature. Perhaps alienation is in some way intrinsic 
to human nature; if this suggests the rather odd conclusion 
that the more man fulfills his nature the more alienated 
he becomes, it may at the same time suggest senses in 
which alienation may be a 'positive' phenomenon. 
"Our alienation goes to the roots", writes R. D. Laing. 
"The realization of this is the essential springboard for 
any serious reflection on any aspect of present inter-human 
life. Viewed from different perspectives, construed in 
1May, R. (1958) pp. 56-57. 
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different ways and expressed in different idioms, this 
realization unites men as diverse as Marx, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Tillich and Sartre". 
1 
This 
claim warrants serious attention. It is, however, quite 
beyond-the scope of the present study to attempt to trace 
the 'history' of alienation, or to spell out the rather 
different senses in which the term is employed, for example, 
by Hegel, Marx and Heidegger, or to indicate how it has 
come to be used much less carefully by commentators such 
as Erich Fromm, and the humanistic psychologists. Nor is 
it possible here to consider the manner in which 'alienation' 
is discussed within the psychoanalytic literature. However, 
I do not mention 'alienation' here merely to pay homage to 
an historically important concept, but rather to draw 
attention to a difficulty or problem that seems to exhibit 
itself with great consistency within the therapeutic 
community literature; a difficulty that it not so much to 
do with discussing 'alienation', as doing so in a fashion 
that is not itself 'alienated'. 
To 'alienate' is to make alien, strange, or foreign; 
also to disown. Alienation, however, is usually used to 
refer to that state of being alienated or estranged - from 
something, someone, or oneself. Alienation is not, as May 
suggests, more or less the same as 'isolation' or 'being 
apart', since neither of these words brings out what is 
perhaps most 'central', to alienation: strangeness. Thus 
we might contrast the state or experience of being alienated 
1 
Laing, R. D. (1965) p. 41. 
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with that of 'at-homeness', familiarity, or intimacy, 
rather than 'being together with'. But this immediately 
requires qualification, since what is most familiar may 
(as Hegel shows) precisely because of its familiarity, 
most stubbornly remain 'alien' and unknown. We hear 
stories of it dawning upon people who have lived together 
for years - that they are strangers to one another. To 
see the familiar may require, in Plessner's words, a seeing 
'with different eyes', and, in that sense, an estrangement. 
If philosophy begins with wonder, wonder arises when we 
see in the familiar, for the first time, a strangeness. 
The world of the familiar and conventional is 
the self-evident, but this kind of understanding 
is a meaningful experience only when it is 
fought for and won. Only when it is won can 
it be called one's own. But for this new under- 
standing to be won, the first familiarity has to 
have been lost, and life does not always do us 
the painful service of removing us from our 
familiar milieu. That is why the estranged vision 
of the artist fulfils an indispensable condition 
for all genuine understanding. It lifts what is 
invisible in human relations, because it is 
familiar, into visibility; in this new encounter 
understanding is brought into play; so that what 
is in fact familiar becomes accessible by virtue 
of being estranged. Without this estrangement 
there is no understanding; it constitutes a 
roundabout approach to the familiar, the counter- 
foil which puts the familiar into perspective as 
foreground and background and makes it compre- 
hensible. 1 
'Alienation' remains an irreducible phenomenon to which 
psychiatrists (who used in the nineteenth century to be 
called 'alienists') are called upon to address themselves. 
2 
1Plessner, H. (1978) p. 31. 
2In 
the 1971 Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, the meaning of 
alienist is given as: One who treats mental diseases; a mental 
pathologist; a 'mad-doctor'. 
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Psychiatry - in one way or another is concerned with 
persons whose reason and experience are alienated, or who 
are out of tune with their desires; with alienated relation- 
ships and alienated modes of conduct between one person and 
another; with forms of alienation which characterize at 
the same time a person's relationship with himself - for 
example repressions, denials, flights, disownments of one 
sort or another. According to prevailing 'therapeutic 
community' approaches these various 'alienations', now 
'symptoms', provide the material to be 'worked on' by the 
resources of the community; and insofar as therapeutic 
communities practice their methods and techniques according 
to, and consistent with such 'theoretical frameworks' as I 
have described in part one, they evidence that 'double 
alienation' which characterizes psychiatry as a whole, 
concerned as it is, in the name of reason, with the confine- 
ment of madness to the metaphor of mental illness, and 
thereby with the alienation of the alienated. So long as 
therapeutic communities take as their area of concern the 
treatment of mental illness - or what amounts to the same 
thing, psychological disorder - the estranged person remains 
alien, an other whose sufferings no longer belong within the 
order of the merely human but are of a 'special nature', 
requiring confinement to a place of treatment, and the 
ministrations of medical and psychological expertise. 
Insanity now becomes unsanitariness. 
We have seen that therapeutic communities place an 
unrelenting emphasis upon insight, self-knowledge, and 
self-understanding, seen predominantly in terms of the 
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'psychological'. This knowledge is conveyed by 'communi- 
cation', 'sharing of feelings', 'feedback through reality 
confrontation', and so on; its possibility is maintained by 
the formal structures of an especially designed human context, 
which is both a 'culture' or a network of 'ongoing relation- 
ships', and at the same time the locus of treatment for the 
alienated, and a regime for the induction of 'appropriate' 
change. 
But we must ask: how far do therapeutic communities 
succeed in evoking or calling forth a world in which a person 
might come to 'understand' or recognize himself as other than 
alien. How far do they succeed in evoking or recalling an 
ordinary or familiar world, or a world of intimacy, within 
which alienation might come to recognize its own strange- 
ness? A person who moves toward a therapeutic community 
typically does not feel 'ordinary' - he has lost his way. 
This is his alienation - but it is an alienation which, we 
might say, is essentially human, since it is by straying 
that we find our way. Must we not say, however, that a 
community has lost its way when the most ordinary or common- 
place things have become forgotten - ordinariness which is, 
so to speak, the very stuff of our finding our way in the 
world. If a person turns from the loneliness and despair 
of his alienation towards a community of fellow beings; 
turns in his estrangement towards the possibility of some 
re-articulation into 'the normal interactions of healthy 
community life', and thereby the open world - does this 
turning not suggest the notion of a homecoming rather than 
that of a treatment process aimed at some cure? In what 
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sense may we consider its occasion to be a homelessness? 
Homelessness 
The suggestion that that which draws people to thera- 
peutic communities is 'homelessness' seems immediately to 
call for some considerable amplification. More than that, 
it seems on the face of it to be quite incorrect, since 
many 'mentally ill' people are perfectly well housed. 
Furthermore, it seems to be rather at odds with our earlier 
statements to the-effect that therapeutic communities are 
engaged what we are broadly calling an ethical rather than a 
scientific or medical practice. For our 'ethical conduct' 
does not seem to be directly contingent upon our 'housing 
conditions'. 
I do not introduce the notion of 'homelessness' here 
to indicate some condition that we suffer from, but to 
suggest a position in the world which we may arrive at. 
I wish to suggest by 'homelessness' not the position of being 
without a roof over one's head but of having lost one's way; 
or not knowing one's way about. I wish to suggest, further, 
a sense of having lost one's way, where it is not simply a 
matter of following some directions back - for one may have 
lost one's desire, too. There are numerous different 
inflections to this 'having lost one's way', such as being 
out of touch, beside oneself, not knowing where to turn, 
going round in circles, up the wall, and so on. Many of 
these popular idioms are strikingly spatial; homelessness, 
we might say, is being 'spaced out' as distinct from 'homed 
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in'. Indeed, it is partially this very spatiality of our 
being which invites the metaphor of homelessness; for home- 
lessness is, above all, disorientation. How does it feel, 
screams Bob Dylan in that anthem of the sixties, to be with 
no direction home? 
Other nuances of 'homelessness' are suggested by the 
notions of being 'untogether', and being 'ontologically 
insecure', or lacking that surefootedness in being which is 
ontological security. These I shall briefly discuss in the 
following sections. Here I shall-suggest why these various 
states of being invite the metaphor of homelessness; and why 
we may consider the notion of 'being at home' to be asso- 
ciated with so great an integrative power. 
It is rather striking that 'homelessness', in whatever 
sense it is understood, receives so very little attention 
within the therapeutic community literature. Institutional 
psychiatry, whilst paying occasional nodding attention to the 
correlation between homelessness and madness, fails to imagine 
anything other than the most concrete of relationships. 
Studies note the high incident of mental illness among the 
homeless, for example: "The admissions rate in the region 
of patients with no fixed abode admitted to the mental 
hospital has risen alarmingly during the last ten years". 
' 
Homelessness may be seen as a factor in mental illness; in 
one study showing 22 percent of men living in a reception 
centre to be mentally abnormal, the authors conclude that 
the 'basic factors' such as homelessness and social isolation 
1Berry 
and Orwin (1966) pp. 1019-1055. 
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must be tackled rather than their "expression in... alcohol- 
ism, schizophrenia, or persistent failure to maintain him- 
self". 
' Sometimes the relation is reversed; homelessness 
is seen as the result of personal inadquacy, rather than 
its occasion: "The possesion of a home carries with it the 
fulfilment of a number of roles... We might postulate that 
the homeless man is one who is incapable of fulfilling 
these roles and seeks to evade-them and further that this 
inadequacy might be the consequence of various childhood 
traumata". 2 
In these examples, two discrete phenomena are posited 
or assumed, between which empirical connection may or may 
not be established. Here, I wish to suggest that a more 
immediate and essential relation holds between the 'unsound 
mind' and the 'homeless mind'. To see this we must inquire 
further into homelessness. 
'Homelessness' commonly refers to the state of having 
'no fixed abode', e. g., a tramp or a 'down and out' may be 
described as 'homeless'. Yet our ordinary language suggests 
that the domain of 'home' extends far beyond the roof which 
shelters us. We may talk, first of all, of being at home 
in the world. We refer, furthermore, to a person's 'being 
at home' in what he is doing, to being at home in language, 
to people being at home with one another, and so on. 
1Lodge-Patch (1970) pp. 437 ff. 
2Whiteley, S. In Lodge-Patch (1970). 
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When we speak of being 'at home' we suggest a domain 
where we belong, and which is in some way 'our own'. When 
I make myself at home somewhere, I do not simply 'put' my- 
self there, or 'stay put' amidst my surroundings. One 'puts' 
objects; and when one speaks of 'putting oneself' it usually 
has a rather awkward or 'wrong-footed' sense to it - such as 
putting oneself on the spot, or 'in it'. Being at home is 
much more a matter of finding oneself amidst one's surround- 
ings in a certain way; a way which is opened up by the notion 
of inhabiting. Inhabitation is crucial to any understanding 
of our inherence in the world, and our sense of the world 
'mattering'. The world is not, as is supposed by empirical 
thinking, an object of knowledge; objective knowledge is 
possibly only because we already know and are 'of' the world; 
because we are the 'flesh of the world' (Merleau-Ponty). 
Inhabitation very much implies this 'enwovenness' within 
the fabric of things. The obsolete verb 'habit' meant to 
wear and to dwell; and the first huts were made of skin, or 
hides. To inhabit is to have and to hold; and to be-have 
and to be held. Inhabitation, like belonging, speaks of a 
primary holding. It is ironic that behaviourism is so blind 
to this primary structure of behaviour, and thereby reduces 
a pre-given sense to nonsense. 
There are many different ways in which we might open 
out what we mean by being at home, and inhabiting. We 
might, for example, think of the temporality of being at 
home; and what it is to 'have' one's own time, to find and 
lose one's time, to 'have the time of one's life'. It 
might be equally instructive to consider different ways in 
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which we move, and are moved to move, according to whether 
or not, and in what fashion, we feel 'at home', according 
to different ways of inhabiting. Being 'at home' carries 
with it some of the connotations of being 'in our element'; 
here we wish to touch upon the spatiality of our element. 
According to the degree and manner in which I am 'at 
' home' where I find myself, in what I am doing, my mode of 
inhabitation of space will vary enormously. Space is not 
some ether which surrounds and envelops us, but a field of 
openings and depths held or subtended by vectors of 
intentionality. The distinction between lived or pheno- 
menological space, and space known as an 'ideal object', 
the space of mathematical convention which is everywhere 
'the same' is well illustrated by Merleau-Ponty's example 
of the footballer: 
For the player in action the football field is 
not an 'object', that is, the ideal term which 
can give rise to an indefinite multiplicity of 
perspectival views and remain equivalent under 
its apparent transformations. It is pervaded 
with lines of force (the 'yard lines'; those 
which demarcate the 'penalty area') and arti- 
culated in sectors (for example, the 'openings' 
between the adversaries) which call for a cer- 
tain mode of action and which initiate and 
guide the action as if the player were unaware 
of it. The field itself is not given to him, 
but present as the imminent term of his practical 
intentions; the player becomes one with it and 
feels the direction of the 'goal', for example, 
just as immediately as the vertical and horizontal 
planes of his own body. It would not be suffi- 
cient to say that consciousness inhabits this 
milieu. At this moment consciousness is nothing 
other than this dialectic of milieu and action. 
Each maneuver undertaken by the player modifies 
the character of the field and establishes in it 
new lines of force in which the action in turn 
unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the 
phenomenal field. 
1 
1Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963) pp. 168-169. 
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This example of the footballer illustrates rather well 
that freedom of movement which belongs with 'being at home'. 
The way in which, like this footballer, we may 'be at home' 
and move in the world of our desire; where we are able 
equally to move and speak in sureness of our ground, and 
where we stand with one another, contrasts with the way in 
which we tend to move when we are not sure of our ground, 
when we do not know where we stand with others, where we 
do not 'feel at home'. 
Some situations quite clearly do not lend themselves to 
a free inhabitation which is symbolized in Merleau-Ponty's 
'field of play'. Space now becomes 'occupied' instead of 
'lived', taken up instead of opened up. Institutional spaces 
of one sort or another provide examples of inhabited spaces 
which do not invite people to 'come out of themselves'. Yet 
anyone familiar with total institutions will know of examples 
of fine nuances of inhabitation, with spaces within which 
and upon which one still has some hold, as distinct from 
merely 'occupying'. This sort of phenomenon is well illus- 
trated by the little pockets of 'free space' which some 
patients are able to shape out for themselves within mental 
hospitals. 
Patients who had been on a given ward for 
several months tended to develop personal terri- 
tories in the day room, at least to the degree 
that some inmates developed favourite sitting 
or standing places and would make some effort 
to dislodge anybody who usurped them. Thus on 
one continued treatment ward, one elderly 
patient in contact was by mutual consent 
accorded a free-standing radiator; by spreading 
paper on top, he managed to be able to sit on 
it, and sit on it he usually did. Behind the 
radiator he kept some of his personal effects, 
which further marked off the area as his place. 
204 
A few feet from him, in a corner of the room, 
a working patient had what amounted to his 
'office', this being the place where staff 
knew they could find him when they wanted him. 
He had sat so long in this corner that there 
was a soiled dent in the plastIr wall where 
his head usually came to rest. 
Inhabitation refers to our hold on the world and its 
spaces; and according to how we inhabit or 'have' space, 
quite different spaces will open up. Consider, for example, 
the spaces of dance, of play, of work; spaces in which we 
are bored or entranced - and the various gestures which 
invoke or invite these various spaces. 
Our gestures are of course spatial; we reach towards, 
point, beckon, invite, repel. Our embodiment very precisely 
gestures openings and closings, closeness and distance. Our 
speech is gestural; language is exquisitely spatial. This 
is not merely to say that we employ convenient spatial 
metaphors, for our words themselves sound depths. Words 
beckon us and may instruct us; we reach for the right word 
somewhere where it awaits us. Sometimes - despite our- 
selves - the wrong word utters itself; in parapraxes we 
show ourselves to be not quite 'in' or 'at one with' what 
we say, since our saying is vacillatory. Words, of course, 
may spellbind us and lead us astray. 
The 'proposition' provides a good example of what I 
am calling the spatiality of language; and particularly, 
too, 'double propositions', such as when people are 'on 
about', or 'up against' something or other. We cannot 
help but notice, too, how spatial are the terms whereby 
1Goffman, 
E. (1961) pp. 217-218. 
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we characterize ourselves and one another, or states of 
mind and dispositions. We talk of feeling 'up' and 'down', 
'high' and 'low'; we refer to others as being 'straight' 
or 'bent', 'uptight' or 'downcast', 'open' or 'closed off'. 
We refer to someone whose world is rigidly structured as 
'square'. We talk of being 'in it' or 'with it' or being 
'out of it' or 'spaced out'; we find ourselves 'beside 
ourselves' or 'on top of' things, at odds with, 'all over 
the place', sinking to great depths, or rising to the 
occasion. We fall in love, then have a 'falling out'; we 
become de-pressed, strung out, find ourselves 'down', or 
even down and out. And so on - the list is endless. 
Space is co-existensive with existence; our existence 
is spatial. I have suggested that language (which we are 
'in') provides a rich illustration of this. The word 
'existence', which belongs to that enormously large con- 
stellation of words whose root is in 'stand', itself is 
informative. Consciousness, as embodiment, faces the world, 
it is an opening of the world; it is postural, attitudinal. 
Our consciousness is our stance; and according to this 
stance or position, and the openings which it subtends, a 
lived space arises which is my possession of the world, 
my gearing into the world, or my inhabitation. This lived 
space is a more primordially given phenomenon than the 
abstract space of extension or the further abstraction 
of analytic algebraic relations. 
The space provided for in this mathematical 
manner may be called 'space', the 'one' space 
as such. But in this sense 'the' space, 
space contains no space and no places... 
Spatium and extensio afford at any time the 
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possibility of measuring things and what they 
make room for, according to distances, spans 
and directions, and of computing these magni- 
tudes. But the fact that they are universally 
applicable to everything that has extension can 
in no case make numerical magnitudes the ground 
of the nature of spaces and locations teat are 
measurable with the aid of mathematics. 
What I am calling not 'being at home' expresses itself 
spatially, that is, in terms of disarticulations of lived 
space of which 'conditions' like agorophobia and claustro- 
phobia are obvious and extreme examples. What, then, are 
the implications of this for the therapeutic community? 
if a therapeutic community is to be able to enable 
its members to arrive at some sense of being at home in the 
world, then it must generate conditions conducive to their 
finding their own way; since the way that a person makes 
himself at home can only be his own way. It must enable 
those who live there to open up their 'own space', find 
their own place, in their own time, in their own way. One 
important addition must be made to this statement: that the 
opening or tending of this 'potential space' within which 
people might find their own way is a concern common to 
everyone within the community. This simultaneous structure, 
of finding one's own way, upon a common ground, is suggested 
by the notion of belonging. 
No experiences may be offered or provided whereby one 
might find his way. A community which is structured around 
the provision of these experiences of what is therapeutic 
leaves its members 'short-circuiting' the world; for finally 
the only world which we are able to gesture and to open is 
'Heidegger, 
M. (1971) pp. 155-156. 
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the world we inhabit. And it is 'inhabitation' which is 
so conspicuously left out within the literature. 
Being 'untogether' 
A further nuance to that which I am broadly referring 
to as 'being at home' is that of being 'together'. The 
footballer who is fluent and 'at home' on-the field of play 
may also be described as being 'together' in his play. His 
actions and gestures speak of a certain surefootedness, or 
sureness of movement which usually is quite discernible. 
Other examples of being 'together' in this sort of way, of 
moving in an element within which one is at home, might be 
a musician, a craftsman, a fisherman at a river, or a thinker. 
But being 'together' brings out particularly important 
sense of being 'at home', namely being at home or at one 
with oneself. A graphic illustration of not being 'to- 
gether' is offered by Freud's metaphor of a tunnel which is 
driven through a hill from both ends - but failing to meet 
in the middle. Freud is referring to the sexual life of the 
mature adult arising as the convergence of its various com- 
ponents, in particular what he refers to as the affectionate 
current and the sensual one. A mature sexuality is not at 
odds with the polymorphous perversity of childhood; and in 
general the relation between a person and his childhood may 
offer a good illustration of being together, or otherwise. 
Part of what is suggested by the notion of being 'together' 
is the relation between the person, and his time. Thus we 
might say that a person is untogether where he is 'out of' 
208 
time in some fashion or another, or, for that matter, 
where he never 'has' any time. Equally, we might think of 
an 'untogether' person as being stuck in the past, or never 
'present'. 
When we speak of a person being 'together' or 'unto- 
gether' we do not refer simply to some 'inner state', nor 
are we indicating the degree of 'organization' which he has 
succeeded in bringing to his affairs. It has very clear 
connotations, first of all, of being 'there'. Examples of 
everyday disorientation illustrate this. For example, I 
come out of a familiar underground station, by an unfamiliar 
exit; for a moment I have no bearings, I am in a sense no- 
where, oriented only in terms of my eventual goal, the path 
towards which presents no immediate openings to me. I may 
savour this unexpected strangeness until suddenly I can 
place where I am, and my world comes together. A person who 
'wobbles' in certain ways, who finds himself 'on the spot' 
or 'unhinged' or perhaps embarrassed or self-conscious, or 
loses the thread of what he was saying, may seem in these 
moments to be 'untogether' and may well feel untogether. 
Such experiences may merely dissipate in some way or may be 
transcended as a certain 'gathering oneself together'. One 
may even 'pull oneself together', although gathering oneself 
is not ordinarily a simple act of will or determination. A 
person typically has a distinctive and rather paradoxical 
sense of 'agency' in gathering himself, according to whether 
he is gathering himself to speak, gathering his thoughts, 
gathering himself to action (e. g. diving into water) or 
gathering himself to an occasion, such as a concert, play 
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or lecture. One gathers oneself quite differently in the 
invocation of sleep from the manner in which one gathers 
oneself in awakening. Remembering or recalling is a kind 
of gathering, not only remembering the past, but remembering 
'where one is', remembering oneself, remembering one's 
friend. 
To the extent that a person is 'untogether' this will 
show in his language. This is illustrated, for example, in 
the 'slip of the tongue', where a person's thoughts are aimed 
at more than one target or possibly are not sincere. A 
person who makes a slip of the tongue is in a sense not 'in' 
what he says, what he says is not 'at one' with what he 
means. Similarly, when a person makes some unnecessary 
bungle, or leaves something behind that he meant to take 
with him, we may recognize a sense in which he is 'not in' 
his actions; the author of a parapraxis is in a sense not 
fully present. 
We may describe a person's whole being in the world as 
'untogether'. Here we are referring to his effective stand 
or place in the interpersonal world, a gestalt, articulated 
into time, an enduring style of living possessing a certain 
existential weight or momentum. We are not referring to 
'parts' of the self, or functions of the mind or psycho- 
somatic systems which are not working properly, or are 
imperfectly ordered, nor are we referring to some sort of 
mis-match between objective reality and the sensory- 
cognitive-affective apparatus. We are alluding most 
fundamentally to disarticulations of being, to fragmentations 
of wholeness, to a privation or deficient realization of 
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being in the world as a whole or of the unitariness of 
being; a unity of thought and deed, of self and world. 
This idiom, wherein we speak of people as being 'un- 
together' or otherwise, is of some interest in the context 
of our present task, namely inquiring into how therapeutic 
communities should be thought. For these communities are 
specifically concerned with offering help to people who are 
'untogether'. Furthermore, a community is itself a kind of 
gathering, and it makes excellent sense to ask about the 
nature of this gathering in terms of the manner of the 
community's coming together, and its being together. We 
might suspect that its capacity to be therapeutic might be 
very closely related with the manner and extent that it is 
'together'. What does it mean, therefore, for a therapeutic 
community to be 'together'? 
Here, needless to say, being 'together' cannot be any 
simple matter of being 'well organised' or efficiently 
administered. We might - possibly - talk of a highly 
efficient bureaucracy as being together if it does what 
it is supposed to do expediently or well, whatever the cost 
might be to others. A therapeutic community, however, 
must have as a central concern the well-being of its members, 
who are, furthermore articulated within the broader society, 
and its concerns. Yet what it is supposed to do in order 
to realize that well-being is not yet clear; and possibly 
no simple matter. We might propose, as a start, that it 
will allow the coming into view of whatever stands in the 
way of those who live there - being happy. But we recall 
our earlier discussion of Aristotle: happiness is not some 
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goal which may be posited so that methods may now be 
devised to bring this about. It is rather a possible 
fruition of an ethical discipline which starts with 'where 
we are', in all its complexity. We might add: an ironic 
discipline, for the 'where we are' may well resist 
acknowledgement. And at once we question 'efficiency' as 
to its belongness within this sort of inquiry; rather we 
think of terms such as commitment, resolve, desire, which 
may have very little to do with any sort of expediency or 
doing. 
Furthermore, I have already suggested that the help 
which a therapeutic community offers might be to do with 
enabling or encouraging people to-find their own way of 
being together, or of living together. If we agree that 
people's ways will be different, and sometimes very diffe- 
rent, then we might come to the conclusion, or the tentative 
conclusion, that the community will be together to the 
extent that it embraces difference, or indeed has the 
capacity to allow people to be 'untogether'. Any obviously 
apparent orderliness therefore might be quite deceptive as 
to how 'together' the community is. Where a community seems, 
on the face of it, to be a complete shambles, claims as to 
the deceptiveness of this appearance might be supported by 
considering the sense that it may make for its members to 
live in the way that they do, in the belief that there is 
sense to its nonsense, that its manifest inconveniences. are 
worthwhile. 
Finally, then, the senses in which a community is or 
is not 'together' will be indicated or revealed - inter 
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alia - by the ways in which the community characterizes and 
understands itself. If a community is 'together' it will 
accord with its self-understanding; its 'theory' will be 
appropriate to, or consistent with its 'practice'; its 
illumination the self-shownness - not the ideology - of what 
is good. 
Homelessness and Ontological Insecurity 
So far, I have suggested that the various positions in 
which people find themselves, and which occasion their 
seeking therapeutic help in the form of a supportive commu- 
nity, may be embraced within the notion of 'homelessness'. 
This notion may in turn be articulated in such terms as 
being 'untogether', being 'spaced out', out of touch (with 
oneself, with others, with one's desires), profoundly unsure 
of the way; in each case privative modes of being, or 
belonging, in the world. Seen in this way, 'homelessness' 
extends far beyond being dispossessed of one's house: it 
finally approximates to what has been referred to as 
ontological insecurity. 
The individual, then, may experience his own 
being as real, alive, whole; as differentiated 
from the rest of the world in ordinary circum- 
stances so clearly that his identity and autonomy 
are never in question; as a continuum in time, 
as having an inner consistency, substantiality, 
genuineness and worth; as spatially co-extensive 
with the body; and usually as having begun in or 
around birth and liable to extinction with death. 
He thus has a firm core of ontological security. 
This, however, may not be the case. The 
individual in the ordinary circumstances of 
living may feel more unreal than real, in a 
literal sense more dead than alive, precariously 
differentiated from the rest of the world, so 
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that his identity and autonomy are always in 
question. He may lack the experience of his 
own temporal continuity. He may not possess 
an overriding sense of personal consistency 
or cohesiveness. He may feel more insubstantial- 
than substantial, and unable to assume that 
the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, 
valuable. And he may feel his self as partially 
divorced from his body. 
It is, of course, inevitable that an indi- 
vidual whose experience of himself is of this 
order can no more live in a 'secure' world than 
he can be 'secure' in himself. ' 
In order to support the claim that homelessness is an 
ontological phenomenon, we may first of all raise the 
question: what is it, to dwell? 
1Laing, R. D. (1965) p. 41. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DWELLING 
The Plight of Dwelling 
By way of introduction to the question 'What is 
dwelling' let us consider the following remarks of Heidegger. 
Heidegger concludes his essay, 'Building Dwelling Thinking', 
thus: 
We are attempting to trace in thought the 
nature of dwelling. The next step on this path 
would be the question: what is the state of 
dwelling in our precarious age? On all sides 
we hear talk about the housing shortage, and 
with good reason. Nor is there just talk; 
there is action too. We try to fill the need 
by providing houses, by promoting the building 
of houses, planning the whole architectural 
enterprise. However hard and bitter, however 
hampering and threatening the lack of houses 
remains, the real plight of dwelling does not 
merely lie in lack of houses. The real plight 
of dwelling lies in this, that mortals ever 
search anew for the nature of dwelling, that 
they must ever learn to dwell. What if man's 
homelessness consists in this, that man does 
still not think of the real plight of dwelling 
as the plight. 
We may note first of all that for Heidegger, homeless- 
ness extends to 'thinking': our very thinking is 'homeless'. 
The fact, and the seriousness of this homelessness may be 
obscured by the intricacy and cleverness of our thinking, 
and by the ingeniousness of its products. But the thinking 
which is ingenious, and which produces 'results' need not 
be at all a thinking which 'dwells'; on the contrary it is 
precisely this thinking which becomes bewitched with its 
own successes and rushes on. In this rushing, what it is 
1Heidegger, M. (1971) p. 161. 
215 
'to think' is considered no more worthy of thought than 
what it is 'to dwell', since everywhere we see the evidence 
which assures us that we already know. Heidegger invites 
us to ponder over the possibility that we may not know; and 
inevitably, therefore, his thinking of dwelling proceeds in 
a fashion which may not be 'familiar'. 
Heidegger refers to the 'plight of dwelling'. Yet he 
makes it clear that this plight is not the same as the 
'housing shortage'; and that the construction of houses, 
however essential and indeed praiseworthy a work this may 
be, carries with it no assurance that this 'plight of 
dwelling' will be anyway lessened. 
In today's housing shortage even this much 
is reassuring and to the good; residential 
buildings do indeed provide shelter; today's 
houses may even be well-planned, easy to 
keep, attractively cheap, open to air, light 
and sun, but - do the houses in themselves 
hold any guarantee that dwelling occurs in 
them? l 
Heidegger suggests that we may in some sense not 
understand what it means 'to dwell', since the provision of 
all the seeming requirements of dwelling, adequate housing, 
etc., is not sufficient to ensure that 'dwelling' occurs 
or takes place. Thus it is that man's plight - man's 
plight of dwelling - consists in his ever having 'to search 
anew' for the nature of dwelling. Perhaps, therefore, man 
has never known what dwelling is; it remains some ideal goal 
that he has vaguely glimpsed in his farthest vision. But 
this is not what Heidegger says. Rather, he says that 
1Ibid. 
p. 146. 
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the 'plight of mortals' is that they ever search anew for 
the nature of dwelling. He does not search afresh. Ever 
searching anew is a restlessness. It is not content with 
what it has hitherto found, or perhaps what is found is 
simultaneously lost. If man is always searching anew for 
his dwelling, he has forgotten, or perhaps, precisely by 
virtue of having the nature of a being who dwells, forgets 
what it means to dwell. The plight of dwelling, therefore, 
is a form of forgetfulness. Man dwells forgetfully. 
Accordingly, learning to dwell may not consist at all in 
acquiring further skills or competence, but rather will 
take the form of recollection. 
Dwelling and Building 
If we are to think of the essential nature of dwelling, 
according to Heidegger, then we must be prepared to give up 
the 'customary notion', according to which dwelling is merely 
one human activity amongst many others. Thus we work in 
our offices, factories and fields, drive on the roads and 
motorways, vacation beside the sea - and dwell in our homes. 
"Dwelling so understood is always merely the occupying of 
a lodging. "' 
One line of Heidegger's argument that dwelling is not 
the 'occupying of a lodging', or something that we do, such 
that 'learning to dwell' might entail doing better, opens 
up through a discussion of dwelling in its relation to 
1Ibid. 
p. 215. 
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building. We are accustomed, perhaps, to think of dwelling 
as an end which is served by the activities of building; 
building a house, therefore, stands in the same relation 
to dwelling as constructing a car does to driving. The two 
are related as end and means, and "thus dwelling would... 
be the end that presides over all building". 
' Heidegger 
argues, however, that dwelling and building belong together 
more essentially. His way of showing this takes the form, 
in the first place, of an appeal to language. The idea 
that dwelling and building are two separate activities, 
related as means and end 'has something correct in it'. 
Yet at the same time by the means end schema 
we block our view of the essential relations. 
For building is not merely a means and a way 
towards dwelling - to build is in itself 
already to dwell. Who tells us this? Who 
gives us the standard at all by which we can 
take the measure of the nature of dwelling and 
building? 
It is language that tells us about the 
nature of a thing, provided that we respect 
language's own nature... Among all the appeals 
that we human beings, on our part, can help to 
be voiced, language is the highest and every- 
where the first. 2 
It is important to realize that while Heidegger refers 
here to language as the 'standard' by which we 'take 
measure' he is not proposing that philosophical or hermen- 
eutic difficulties may be 'resolved', or that originary 
thinking proceed, simply by prising out the meaning of words 
according to the dictionary, whether it be one of usage or 
of origins. His arguments for language being the 'standard' 
1Ibid. 
p. 146. 
2Ibid. 
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pervade his entire writings, and is discussed with particular 
reference to 'dwelling' in the essay 'Poetically man dwells'. 
Heidegger is, however, fond of discussing the words he uses, 
and typically opens his meditation by way of discussing a 
word. The possibility that inquiry into language belongs 
especially with a discussion of dwelling is suggested by the 
notion of man's dwelling within language; we recall Heidegger's 
earlier and much quoted phrase 'Language is the House of 
Being'. 1 
How, then, is building related to dwelling. Heidegger 
notes that the Old English and High German word 'bauen' 
first of all suggests a sameness; it is to build and to 
dwell. A number of variants of this word survive in modern 
English; for example in neighbour, a near-dweller, in bower 
and byre. But does this tell us anything that is not 
already obvious? How could it be otherwise, than that the 
word meaning dwell overlaps into the artifact with which we 
dwell, and furthermore, the activity whereby we construct 
this artifact? Are we any clearer as to what building and 
dwelling in essence mean? 
The word bauen - to build and to dwell - means at the 
same time to cultivate. By cultivation, two modes or 
senses of building are suggested; a building as tending or 
cultivating, and a building as erecting, laying-out (e. g. 
as a road) or construction. Amongst its other meanings, 
therefore, 
1Heidegger, M. (1978) p. 193. 
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this word bauen also means at the same time to 
cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, 
specifically, to till the soil, to cultivate the 
vine. Such building only takes care - it tends 
the growth that ripens into its fruit of its 
own accord. Building in the sense of preserving 
and nurturing is not making anything. Shipbuilding 
and temple building, on the other hand, do in a 
certain way make their own works. Here building, 
in contrast with cultivation, is a constructing. 
Both modes of building - building as cultivating, 
Latin colere, cultura and building as the raising 
up of edifices, aedificare - are comprised within 
genuine building, that is, dwelling. l 
We may now, perhaps, move closer to seeing what is 
essential to dwelling by noticing how building as culti- 
vating and as constructing each 'take place'. Place, we 
recall, is a ground which is levelled or laid out, a 
horizontality which is 'easy to see or determine' and hence 
'easy to build upon'. A place which is laid out either for 
building or for gardening is a 'plot' which also suggests 
the 'plans' that we have for it. What, according to 
Heidegger, both forms of building - construction and 
cultivation - have in common is a freeing and preserving 
of place. 
An example which Heidegger discusses at some length 
is that of the bridge over a river. Whether we think of 
a wooden footbridge over a burn, an arched stone bridge 
over a river, or a modern suspension bridge over an estuary, 
the 'thingness' of the bridge is its gathering. Things - 
quite distinct from objects - 'thing' by gathering. The 
bridge gathers the waters and the banks (by letting the 
waters run their course, by letting the banks be banks) 
-Heidegger, M. (1971) p. 147. 
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and the to-ing and fro-ing of mortals who may now pass 
from shore to shore, and, as they do, give thanks (whether 
or not this thanking is 'pushed wholly aside'). Heidegger 
speaks of this gathering whereby things 'thing' poetically, 
as the 'fourfold' of earth and sky, divinities and mortals, 
which the bridge 'gathers to itself in its own way'. 
1 
But a bridge is not only a thing; it is a particular 
kind of thing which is at the same time a building. What 
is particular about buildings is the sense in which they 
'make place', which in turn makes for 'space'. Buildings 
gather, according to Heidegger, in such a way as to be a 
location. The thing which gathers as 'location' in turn 
'allows for' spaces. 
To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own 
kind, for it gathers... in such a way that it 
allows a site for... But only something that is 
itself a location can make space for a site. 
The location is not already there before the 
bridge is. Before the bridge stands, there are 
of course many spots along the stream that can 
be occupied by something. One of them proves 
to be a location, and does so because of the 
bridge. Thus the bridge does not first come to 
a location to stand in it; rather a location 
comes into existence only by virtue of the 
bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers... 
but in such a way that it allows a site for... 
only things that are locations in this manner 
allow for spaces... Space is in essence that 
for which room has been made, that which is 
let into its bounds. That for which room is 
made is always granted and hence is joined, 
that is, gathered, by virtue of a location, 
that is, by a thing such as a bridge. Accord- 
ingly, spaces receive their being from locations 
and not from 'space'... Things which, as loca- 
tions. allow a site we now call buildings. 2 
1lbid. 
p. 153. 
2Ibid. 
p. 154. 
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Buildings "are locations that allow a site for the 
fourfold, a site that in each case provides for a space. "1 
Heidegger speaks of this allowing as a keeping, a securing, 
a 'letting into its bounds' and a 'freeing and preserving'. 
Whilst remaining, so far, less than sure what exactly 
Heidegger means, we may sense that he suggests a prima facie 
case that may be made out for some buildings. Is it not 
indeed possible that some buildings (constructions and 
cultivations) 'free' and 'preserve' in some way which is 
in keeping with Heidegger. We may think of the geometrics 
of the Gothic cathedral, or perhaps of a gardened cottage 
nestling in the valley; and we may even speak of such 
buildings 'making' a place. But how we might ask, could 
such considerations hold of certain modern technological 
constructions and cultivations, whose seeming not 'freeing 
and preserving' would not simply be based on aesthetic 
considerations, but on considerations of their manifest 
destructiveness. Far from 'freeing and preserving', does 
not a nuclear power station cast a shadow upon its entire 
surrounding landscape? And again, if building as culti- 
vation is likewise in essence a freeing and preserving, 
does this hold of modern agriculture as it did the tending 
of the peasant; does it hold of the farming industry which 
puts aside all interests (such as the health of the land 
and the well-being of the 'consumer') save that of 'maximum 
yield'. Are all buildings subsumed to the interests of 
technological production, and which in certain ways seem 
IIbid. 
p. 154. 
222 
seriously to threaten and harm man and nature, also com- 
prised within 'genuine building' that is, dwelling; and 
which is, as such a freeing?. 
In order to see what truth there may be to the claim 
that all building is a sparing and preserving, we must 
first of all give thought to the manner in which different 
buildings 'preserve'; and to that which is preserved or 
saved, in this manner. The bridge, we recall, gathers, 
in its own way. The way in which the buildings I now 
mention gather, and in gathering, make location, is in 
keeping with the way of being of modern technology. Whilst 
a discussion of technology, and of Heidegger's writings on 
technology, is quite beyond the scope of this study, we 
may make several comments. 
Heidegger sees the essence of technology not in any 
thing technological, such as gadgetry, but as a showing, 
revealing, disclosing. Techne, which is the bringing forth, 
disclosing by man, like physis which is the budding, 
flowering, ripening whereby nature brings forth by itself, 
belongs within poiesis, bringing forth, whereby something 
not yet present attains presence. The technological mode 
of showing, by which our present age is ruled, shows as 
'stock', as resource, as standing reserve; that is, for 
example, it shows 'nature' (including our own 'nature') as 
'orderable', and on call, available for further ordering. 
The world shows itself as a vast repository of resources 
'in order to'... Insofar as being becomes subsumed within 
the categories of 'usefulness' Heidegger writes that 
technological showing is a mode of showing which conceals 
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its essence as showing, it "not only conceals a former way 
of revealing, bringing forth, but it conceals revealing 
itself". ' Yet whilst technological showing, in a character- 
istic way, blocks poiesis or bringing forth (which too is 
a showing) it is not simply another way of showing, along- 
side poiesis, but has its 'origin' in showing forth or 
bringing forth. And this origin - the last thing to be 
seen - nevertheless is shown in the concealing-disclosing 
mode characteristic of technological showing; and thus it 
arises that technology itself 'makes the demand on us' to 
think its essence, that is, to see its manner of showing, 
and that which, in this showing, most primordially is 
revealed. Thus it is that Heidegger talks of the 'saving 
power' of technology. 
According to Heidegger, the fundamental character of 
dwelling is sparing and preserving, and it is in this sense 
of sparing and preserving that building, as construction or 
cultivation, is already dwelling. How does this sparing 
and preserving happen? In staying with. "Dwelling itself 
is always a staying with things". 
2 We now turn to consider 
the question of how dwelling 'stays with'. 
Being and Dwelling 
Staying with is not a matter of being 'around' things, 
any more than dwelling is the topological relation of 
being 'within' a habitation. We have seen that 'building', 
'Heidegger, M. (1978) p. 309. 
-Heidegger, M. (1971) p. 151. 
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which belongs to dwelling, brings into being location, 
which 'allows for' space, or 'provides for' space. The 
'freeing of space' which is building as dwelling is not 
the 'taking' of a space which is already there and 
appropriating it to the ends of inhabitation. Neither, 
it should be emphasised, is space a 'subjective' phenomenon, 
a creation of human consciousness. 
Spaces, and with them space as such - space - 
are always provided for already within the 
stay of mortals. Spaces open up by the fact 
that they are let into the dwelling of man. 
To say that mortals are is to say that in 
dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue 
of their stay among things and locations.... 
Man's relation to locations, and through 
locations to spaces, inheres in his dwelling. 
The relationship between man and space is none 
other than dwelling, strictly thought and 
spoken. ' 
The nature of building is letting dwell. 
Building accomplishes its nature in the raising 
of locations by the joining of their spaces. 
Only if we ar5 capable of dwelling, only then 
can we build. 
The 'staying with' of dwelling is not, I have stressed, 
something which we 'do', that is, an activity. It is 
rather because man's dwelling is a staying with that he 
is 'free' to come and go, stay or leave, do this or that. 
Staying or leaving will in either case be including within 
the 'stay' of dwelling. If dwelling were something that 
we do, then perhaps the situation might not arise where 
dwelling, despite everything, remains in such a plight, 
continues to be associated with such 'restlessness'; -for 
could not procedures be worked out especially with all the 
1Ibid. 
p. 157. 
2 
1bid. p. 160. 
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resources and information available to us, such that man 
might finally be able to dwell 'better'. Building and 
dwelling are the 'same'; but this very identity, instead of 
lulling us with assurances of what building achieves for 
dwelling, requires us to ask what building shows of dwelling. 
Building is within the domain of dwelling. How far 
does this domain extend? Again we return to Heidegger's 
discussion of the word. 
Where the word bauen still speaks in its original 
sense it also says how far the nature of dwelling 
reaches. That is, bauen, buan, bhu, beo are our 
word bin in the versions ich bin, I am, du bist, 
you are, the imperative form, bis, be. What then 
does ich bin mean? The old word, bauen, to which 
the bin belongs, answers: ich bin, du bist mean; 
I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and 
I am, the manner in which we humans are on the 
earth, is buan, dwelling. To be a human being 
means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means 
to dwell), 2 
Heidegger's claim that to be a human being is to dwell 
is to be understood quite radically; it is not a claim that 
in dwelling man 'finds meaning', or that in dwelling he 
defines himself as homo oeconomicus. Dwelling is not 
inhabitation. Heidegger proposes that to be is to dwell; 
that man's being is'dwelling. Dasein, that being whose 
essential being resides in its compartment towards being 
IIbid. 
p. 147. 
2It is suggestive to compare this with the English 'be', as, for 
example, in such constructions as 'I have been'. Furthermore, in 
the context of Heidegger's discussion, it is interesting to note 
the etymology of 'was' from O. E. 'wesen', to be. 
"O. E. wesan is akin to O. Fris wesa... M. H. G. wesen (whence the German 
noun Wesen, being, existence... D. wezen to be; c. f. also with v for 
w: Skt vasati, he remains or dwells (lit. continues to be) and M. L. 
vesta the ancient Italian godess of dwellings... The I. E. root is 
probably wes-, to dwell for among the Germanic languages, not only 
in English does this verb serve as the pt or impf of 'to be'. " 
See Partridge, E. (1966) p. 797. 
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and towards the question of what it is, to be, is now, 
in later Heidegger, characterised as being a being who 
dwells; whose way of being is a dwelling of being. And 
we may now return to the question which was raised earlier, 
which Heidegger refers to as the 'plight' of dwelling, 
a plight which reflects man's restlessness, his ever having 
to learn to dwell. Now it seems that he must learn 'to be', 
or learn what it is 'to be' - whilst all the time he already 
'is'.. It is indeed a 'plight', because not amenable to 
solution by any course of action, because of the 'already'. 
If we already dwell, and yet are required to learn in 
some fashion about the nature of dwelling, then-we must 
turn, perhaps, to what we already know, and to what is 
closest. I have suggested that this learning will take the 
form of recollection, that insofar as man who dwells is 
at the same time homeless, unrecalled into dwelling, 
ungathered or untogether, his dwelling is wandered. This 
recollection will concern itself with what is closest. 
What is most close, and therefore at greatest risk of 
being most 'closed', is the ordinary, the everyday, the 
commonplace. Here, in the commonplace where we indeed 
are, we may find ourselves on the way to a reply to the 
question which guides these chapters, the question of 
beginnings. The movement of inquiry, which takes us from 
'ethics' to 'abode' is suggested in the following passage 
taken from Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism'. 
Along with 'logic' and 'physics', 'ethics' 
appeared for the first time in the school of 
Plato. These disciplines arose at a time when 
thinking was becoming 'philosophy', philosophy, 
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episteme (science) and science itself a matter 
for schools and academic pursuits. In the course 
of a philosophy so understood, science waxed and 
thinking waned. Thinkers prior to this period 
knew neither a 'logic' nor an 'ethics' nor 
'physics'. Yet their thinking was neither 
illogical nor immoral. But they did think physis 
in a depth and breadth that no subsequent 'physics' 
was ever again able to attain. The tragedies of 
Sophocles - provided that such a comparison is at 
all permissible - preserve the ethos in their sagas 
more primordially than Aristotle's lectures on 
'ethics'. A saying of Heraclitus which consists 
of only three words says something so simply that 
from it the essence of the ethos immediately comes 
to light. 
The saying of Heraclitus (Frag. 119) goes: 
ethos anthropoi daimon. This is usually translated, 
'A man's character is his daimon'. This translation 
thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. Ethos 
means abode, dwelling place. The word names the 
open region in which man dwells. The open region 
of his abode allows what pertains to man's essence, 
and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to 
him, to appear, The abode of man contains and 
preserves the advent of what belongs to man in his 
essence. According to Heraclitus' phrase this is 
daimon, the god. The fragment says: Man dwells, 
insofar as he is man, in the nearness of god. A 
story that Aristotle reports (De parte animalium, 
I, 5,645a, 17) agrees with this fragment of Heraclitus. 
The story is told of something Heraclitus said to 
some strangers who wanted to come visit him. 
Having arrived, they saw him warming himself at 
a stove. Surprised, they stood there in conster- 
nation - above all because he encouraged them, the 
astounded ones, and called for them to come in with 
the words, "For here too the gods are present. "1 
The significance of ethos as 'abode' is discussed in Fell's 
chapter on the 'Letter on Humanism': 
If the distinction between ethics, logic and 
physics has a particular historical starting 
point in the schools of Plato and Aristotle, a 
starting point that many have no absolute or 
self-evident warrant, it may be important to 
'remember' back to a more primordial under- 
standing - for example in Heracitus. Construing 
ethos as 'abode', Heidegger translates fragment 
DK 119 of Heraclitus (ethos anthropo daimon) 
1Heidegger, M. (1978) p. 232. 
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as 'Man, insofar as he is man, dwells in the 
precinct of God'. Heidegger thus locates the 
primal ground not only of ethics but at the 
same time of theology in an understanding of 
physic (which is prior to 'physics') as 'abode'. 
Heraclitus greeted visitors, disappointed at 
the humbleness and ordinariness of his 'abode' 
and way of life, with the admonition 'the gods 
present themselves even here'. This means that 
neither gods nor ethics are to be sought in a 
meta-physical topos, a separate region, but 
rather 'at this common place (an diesem 
gewöhnlichen Ort). Here the notion of 'owning up' 
to 'everydayness' in Being and Time comes into 
its own. Heidegger's term gewöhnlich is to be 
associated with wohnen (to dwell) and Wohnung 
(dwelling, home). Man's own true dwelling as 
mortal is a 'common place' where he finds a pre- 
cedent community of nature. The common, the 
accustomed, the customary - in short, the 'every- 
day' - is the proper (eigentlich) home of man. 
In modern times it has decayed into the 'merely' 
ordinary, from which man seeks meta-physical 
escape precisely because metaphysics has displaced 
or split off the spiritual, the theological, the 
ethical and the aesthetic from the everyday, 
leaving the everyday impoverished as 'the (merely) 
commonplace'. 1 
Fell's remarks recall Aristotle's 'what is known 
to us'. What is known to us - goes without saying. It is 
known to us as 'commonplace'. In being led to the common- 
place we arrive at what is most familiar. 
The coursing can lead us into what belongs to us, 
into the domain where we already dwell. Then 
why, one may ask, must we first travel a course 
toward it? Answer: because we are there, where 
we already are in such a way that we are at the 
same time not there, insofar as we still not 
properly appropriated what belongs to our 
essence... We still do not sufficiently dell 
where we really (eigentlich) already are. 
1Fell, J. P. (1979) p. 179. 
2Heidegger, M., Identity and Difference. Quoted by Fell, J. P. (1979) 
p. 258. 
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Lingering and Wandering 
Dwelling is a staying. It is fully in accordance, 
therefore, with the directives of 'dwelling' that we stay 
with the word a moment longer. 
The word 'dwell' comes from the Old English 'dwellan', ' 
meaning to linger, to wander. It provides a good example 
of the antithetical senses of a primal word. Dwellan is 
akin to "OE dwalian, OFris dwalia to wander, to be in error, 
OE dwalia, error, OFris dwalinge, OE dwolung, doubt, ON 
dvelja, to linger, delay, tarry, retard... "1 
The Oxford English Dictionary traces dwell to dwellan, 
to lead astray, hinder, delay; also intransitive, to go 
astray, err, be delayed, tarry. It lists seven principal 
meanings of the word. 
1. Lead into error. (obsolete) 
2. Hinder, delay. 
3. To tarry, delay. 
4. To abide or continue for a time, in a place, 
state or condition. 
5. To spend time upon, linger over. 
6. To continue in existence, to last, to persist, 
to remain. 
7. To have one's abode, to reside, 'live'. 
We may conveniently approach discussion of this word 
'dwelling' under the two main headings of 'lingering' and 
'wandering'. 
1Partridge, 
E. (1966) p. 172. 
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To Linger 
This word has the same root as 'long', 'stretch out', 
'prolong'; also longing, belonging. To linger is 
to stretch out 
to stay 
to stay with 
to abide, abide with (abode) 
to tarry, remain ... to put off, to stretch out... 
Dwelling is in the first instance a staying, and a 
staying with. We recall Heidegger: dwelling itself is 
always a staying with things. We may think of where we 
stay, amongst other things, as where we stand; for the 
attitudinal and ethical connotations of stance are fairly 
clear. The human posture is upright, yet man is 'fallen'. 
Stance speaks, too, of both our 'rootedness' and of the 
sense in which the notion of rootedness does not quite 
'apply' to humans. We stand on the earth, which sustains 
us and provides us with our daily bread. But at the same 
time, we stand out, or apart from the world; we ex-ist. 
We exist 'understandingly', stand in the world. 
1 
1Language 
expresses well the psychological meaning of standing, with all 
its facets. The coupling of the transitive and the intransitive 'to 
stand' and to 'stand something' characterize them as resisting and, 
therefore, enduring against threat, danger, attack. The etymological 
root of standing -sta- is one of the most prolific elements not only in 
English but also in Greek, Latin, French and German. It may suffice to 
mention only a few derivatives of an almost inexhaustible store. Beside 
such combinations as 'standing for', 'standing by' and 'making a stand', 
there are many words where the root has undergone slight changes but is 
still recognizable: e. g. 'state', 'status', 'estate', 'statement', 
'standard', 'statue', 'institution', 'constitution', 'substance', 
'establish', 'understand', 'assist', 'distant'. This entire family of 
words is kept together by one and the same principal meaning. They refer 
to something that is instituted, erected, constructed and, in its danger- 
ous equilibrium, threatened by fall and collapse. Straus, E. W. (1966) 
p. 143. 
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Thinking of dwelling as a staying, a tarrying, a biding 
(for the 'temporality of 'stance' cf. It. 'stanza', a pause 
hence a verse) brings to mind Heidegger's repeated utterance 
that it is mortals who dwell. His poetic discussions of 
dwelling are resonant with the echoes of earlier discussions 
of Dasein and temporality, being-toward-death, time and 
authenticity, in, for example, Being and Time. We have 
touched upon some consideration of notions to do with 
dwelling and space; yet it is the emphasis upon the tempo- 
rality of dwelling that is likely, first of all, to strike 
Heidegger's reader: 
Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own 
nature - their being capable of death as death - 
into the use and practice of this capacity, so 
that they may have a good death. To initiate 
mortals into the nature of death in no way means 
to make death, as empty Nothing, the goal. Nor 
does it mean to darken dwelling by blindly 
staring toward the end. ' 
They (human beings) are called mortals because 
they can die. To die means to be capable of 
death as death. Only man dies, and indeed con- 
tinually, so long as he remains on earth. 2 
"All people that on earth do dwell" - so goes the hymn. 
Dwelling-lingering suggests that our life is a sojourn, a 
passage. We may choose an image from the Iclandic sagas of 
the momentary flight of a bird through the flickering lights 
of a banqueting hall; a moment of appearance bounded by the 
darkness of the whence and the whether. We all know that we 
will die; dwelling-lingering may remind us that our death is 
always with us; that the darkness does not simply enter the 
picture by framing it but is always there with the very 
1Heidegger, M. (1971) p. 151. 
2Ibid. 
p. 150. 
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essence of the light. 
' 
The presently occurring does not lie like a 
cut off piece between the absent. When the 
presently occurring once stands in view, 
everything occurs together, one brings the 
other along 2with 
itself, one lets the other 
go its way. 
To say that mortals are 'towards death', or are 
capable of death 'as death' is to speak of that 'relation' 
with time whereby humans may be said to 'have time'. Only 
because man's life is a staying and a passing, because man 
is as a mortal, can he linger, and have time for. His 
dwelling is the mattering of time. Man's dwelling does not 
occur 'in' time, but is an advent of time. Having time for 
is not grounded in objective time, and it is not some allo- 
cation of time's segments, but is a freeing and preserving 
or opening up of time's fullness, a possibility which is 
granted to man and which is expressed in his standing so 
close to time that the nature of his being is - dwelling. 
Precisely because man dwells, is mortal, his staying 
is at the same time a leaving. It is a leaving because 
dwelling is only a stay, and because in time everything 
occurs together. Leaving is an allowing, a 'letting the 
other go its way'. But letting also is hindering. It is 
by letting as hindering that our stay becomes prolonged. 
The prolonging of staying, whereby staying tends to become 
1Discussion 
of the presence of that which is absent occupies a central 
position in many phenomenological writings. See, for example, not 
only Heidegger but also Merleau Ponty, especially The Visible and 
the Invisible. Merleau Ponty, M. (1968). 
2Heidegger, M. Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik. Quoted in Fell, J. P. 
(1979) p. 234. 
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staid, is a forgetting of the time; and a forgetting of 
the time of our staying, which is dwelling. But this 
prolonging or putting off is also in keeping with dwelling. 
To stay is at the same time to stray; lingering leads into 
error. 
To wander 
To wander comes from the same root as 'wind'. To 
wander is 
to take a winding course 
to turn, to turn about 
to change, to bend 
to err, to be in error 
to wend (p. p. 'wended', went) 
Wandering is a 'going on one's way' which is a wending; a 
going on one's way which is a way of indirection. The move- 
ment of wandering includes that of a turning or winding, and 
a turning upon oneself. The flexibility and suppleness 
suggested by the word is brought out in the noun 'wand', 
a slender, pliant stick used for example in basket making, 
wattled buildings, and weaving. The verb 'wand' (Sc. and 
dial. ) means to wattle, interweave, plait. Wanding is 
weaving. At the same time the 'pointedness' of 'wand' is 
is brought out in its meaning as a 'straight, slender stick', 
a light walking-stick, a stick used as a pointer. A wand 
was also a rod or staff borne as a sign of office; a 
sceptre. All of these various inflections of meaning, 
and at the same time the magical properties of the wand, 
are very nicely brought together in the image of the Hermetic 
staff, or caduceus. 
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The movement of wandering may be exquisitely para- 
doxical in the fashion in which it is both aimless and 
pointed, free and unfree. The wanderer turns upon his 
vertiginous spirallings and re-turns. It is a theme 
within countless mythologies that the treasure is arrived 
at only in the course of extended wanderings. 
What is perhaps the best known poem in the English 
language begins with the words 'I wandered... '. To put 
this down to poetic licence (it is well known that in fact 
Wordsworth was out for a walk with his sister) is to beg 
the question: why does this 'showing', this 'wealth' of 
which the poet speaks belong with wandering? Wordsworth's 
'recollection in tranquility', in 'vacant or in pensive 
mood' is itself a wandering, a wondering. Reverie is a 
wandering. 
The importance of wandering is very well brought out 
in Freud's discussion of free association. One of Freud's 
most important and far reaching 'discoveries', it was from 
the beginning referred to as the 'technique' of free 
association. A technique suggests an instrument applied 
by the analyst. This notion of free association as an 
instrument for investigating the mind has been criticized 
by Heaton. 
Let us turn back to Freud's practice and see 
if he actually used free association in the 
way he thought he did when he was writing his 
theoretical works. In the famous 'Aliquis' 
case at the beginning of his 'Psychopathology 
of Everyday Life', he tells his friends, 'I 
must ask you to tell me, candidly and 
uncritically, whatever comes into your mind 
if you direct your attention to the forgotten 
word without any definite aim'. To be asked 
235 
to be candid and uncritical is not to be asked 
to undergo a technical process but to take 
some moral stance towards what one says. 
Similarly to do something with no definite aim 
is hardly a technical matter - it is nearer 
play. 
Furthermore, Freud makes comments, well 
aimed questions and shrewd observations to the 
person free associating: again this is not the 
innocent application of a blind technique 
which produces knowledge but requires insight 
and knowledge of people on Freud's part. Also 
Freud reported many cases of people who forgot 
names, who made slips of the tongue and them- 
selves free associated wit out having heard of 
this particular technique. 
Freud's decision to abandon hypnosis as a means of 
'access' to the patient was largely a consequence of his 
patients' insistence upon following their own way, letting 
their speaking take its own course. 
His account of how he adopted the technique 
of free association, for example, is touching 
in its simplicity. A patient appears to have 
stoutly resisted Freud's interfering with the 
flow of the clinical material. 'I now saw 
that I had gained nothing from this interrup- 
tion and that I cannot evade listening to her 
stories in every detail to the very end. ' At 
another point the same patient'said in a 
definitely grumbling tone that I was not to 
keep on asking her where this or that came 
from, but to let her tell me what she had to 
say'. As Freud quietly put it, 'I fell in with 
this... ' Freud found that he had to be more 
patient in his therapy, and instead of starting 
out from the pressing symptoms and aiming to 
clear them up he left it to the patient to 
choose the subject of the day's work. The 
couch was a useful remnant from Freud's use of 
hypnosis, however, since it permitted both 
analyst and patient to relax and free associate... 
2 
Freud writes that his earlier methods of 'pressing 
and encouraging' 
1Heaton, J. M. (1982) p. 134. 
2Roazen, P. (1976) p. 99. 
236 
gave place to another method which was in one 
sense its opposite. Instead of urging the 
patient to say something upon some particular 
subject, I now asked him to abandon himself to 
a process of free association i. e. to say what- 
ever came into his head, while ceasing ty give 
any conscious direction to his thoughts. 
Freud now encourages his patients to let their thoughts 
wander, and he proposes in effect to accompany his patients 
in their wanderings. The particular wanderings to which he 
addressed himself were strayings and errings; for his work 
was with people who had lost their way. But Freud did not 
propose to his patients that they 'abandon' their wandering, 
in favour of some 'better way of life'. On the contrary, 
he proposed that they stay with their wandering, linger 
upon it and follow its movement, in that very situation 
of their being together. Freud writes that "we must bear 
in mind that free association is not really free". 
The patient remains under the influence of the 
analytic situation even though he is not 
directing his mental activities on to a parti- 
cular subject. We shall be justified in 
assuming that nothing will occur to him that 
has not some reference to that situation. ' 
What is 'binding' about that situation is for example the 
commitment to say everything which comes to mind (Freud 
would put it differently: "to report everything that 
occurred to his self-perception"). But the patient's 
being 'bound' in meeting the requirements of the situation 
is precisely a staying. This staying does not place limits 
upon freedom, but as staying, grants leave to wander. 
1Freud, S. (1936) pp. 71-72. 
2Ibid. 
pp. 72-73. 
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I have referred to Heidegger in making the claim that 
to be is to dwell - and have opened up something of the 
meaning of what it is to dwell by referring to the etymology 
of the word, which speaks of dwelling as a lingering and a 
wandering. What is important is the manner in which these 
two belong together. 
Lingering, or staying, is an opening, or holding open. 
I have already suggested that staying is a spatio-temporal 
opening, clearing or keeping. Staying is a freeing and 
preserving, a gathering together of what is already belonging, 
or perhaps fitting. We 'understand' the world in staying; 
we stay, for example, in language, which tells us, 
according to the manner of our staying, of the nature of 
things. 
The process of naming whereby Things come to 
be Things is essentially the process in which 
a finite being, understanding himself as 
finite, dwells with Things in a particular 
historical way (wondering about them, using 
them, looking at them, etc. ). This particular 
way either recognizes or neglects the fact 
that they come to be Things for him only 
because he dwells, in language, in an arti- 
culated region (time-play-space) that is a 
'between' (zwischen) whose 'limits', context, 
and source are marked by the mortal, the 
immortal or divine, the inexhaystible earth, 
and the rhythm of the heavens. 
Wandering, too, opens and holds open. Wandering extends 
the stay, leads it out, outstays and stays out, over-reaches, 
takes leave, takes liberties. Wandering takes funny turns, 
arrives with, or at the unexpected, and the unspeakable. 
Wandering finally brings it all back home. 
1Fell, J. P. (1979) p. 264. 
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Dwelling is both lingering and wandering: lingering 
and wandering belong in the unitariness of dwelling. 
Staying stays, wandering changes - in each case, the same. 
Lingering has time for wandering, staying safeguards 
wandering's extravagencies. Lingering protects wandering, 
wandering nourishes lingering. Lingering stays with the 
wandering, wandering prolongs the lingering, as Scheherazade, 
in One Thousand Nights prolongs her life each night, for 
yet one more day, by telling her story. 
1 Wandering spins 
a yarn which staying remains to hear, to gather the threads. 
It is in our nature to stay, to stand, to stand out, 
to remain where we are, to take a place, to hold our ground, 
to inhere, rest and shelter. It is in our nature at the 
same time to fall, and fall out, to wander and stumble, 
to lose the thread, become distracted, to surrender, let 
go, to turn and return. Dwelling is the playing of lingering 
with wandering, turning and returning, gathering and 
dispersing, coming and going, loving and leaving; that 
dance, as between man and woman, from which the world is 
born. 
Poetically Man Dwells 
We may now anticipate the criticism that this dis- 
cussion of 'dwelling' is in danger of becoming altogether 
too 'poetic', if only in its preparedness to linger with 
"'I lived in anxiety at not knowing if the Master of my destiny, less 
indulgent than the sultan Sheriar, would be willing, when morning 
interrupted my tale, to postpone my death sentence and allow me to 
continue on the following evening. " 
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words in an attempt to disclose something of their fullness 
of meaning, rather than (as might seem more to befit a 
theoretical work) defining the strict senses in which they 
are to be used. For one possible reply to this criticism, 
at least as it might be seen to apply to Heidegger, we 
again turn to our reading of this author, whose discussion 
of the 'poetic' in its relation to dwelling is quite 
explicit - if poetic. 
Heidegger's essay 'Poetically man dwells" takes its 
title from the Holderlin poem which includes the lines: 
Full of merit, yet poetically, man 
Dwells on this earth. 
Heidegger's short essay is both complicated and rich. It 
is all too easy to paraphrase it in some fashion which be- 
tokens an altogether premature understanding, and which 
merely confirms our suspicion of the importance of the 
aesthetic dimension of life. But Heidegger is not speaking 
of the poet as one who belongs to this or that literary 
tradition, but as the one who 'takes the measure'. The 
various resonances of 'logos' may be heard in this 'measure'. 
The notion of the 'measure' follows the earlier discussion 
of dwelling and building, and of building as a kind of 
'keeping'; for 'taking the measure' is a kind of building, 
too. "Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of 
building". 2 This 'poetic' building thus belongs with, 
and in a sense contrasts with the more prosaic building 
In Heidegger, M. (1971) pp. 211-229. 
2Ibid. 
p. 215. 
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which occurs through the work of man's hands - construction 
and cultivation. It is in these two senses of the 'building' 
of dwelling which Heidegger reads in the lines 'full of 
merit, yet poetically... '. The poetic measuring is, despite 
differences, more or less at one with what Heidegger else- 
where calls 'thinking'. A 'poetic' dwelling, in this sense, 
then, is a dwelling which gives thought - and thanks - to 
that which grants dwelling. It is dwelling thoughtfully. 
Without this thoughtfulness or grace, the various achieve- 
ments of dwelling amount to nothing. 
The poet is one who 'listens in the neighbourhood of 
being'; and who, in this listening, takes the measure - 
that "with which man measure out his dwelling, his stay on 
the earth beneath the sky. Only insofar as man takes the 
measure of his dwelling in this way is he able to be 
commensurately with his nature". 
Man's taking measure in the dimension dealt out 
to him brings dwelling into its ground plan. 
Taking the measure of the dimension is the 
element within which human dwelling has its 
security, by which it securely endures. The 
taking of measure is what is poetic in dwelling. 
Poetry is a measuring. 
1 
This is a measuring which differs from the 'ordinary' or 
the scientific, which does not use instruments of measure- 
ment, but which is 
in truth simpler to handle than they, provided 
our hands do not abruptly grasp but are guided - 
by gestures befitting the measure here to be 
taken. This is done by a taking which at no 
1Heidegger, M. (1971) p. 221. 
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time clutches at the standard but rather takes 
it in a concentrated perception, a gathered 
taking-in, that remains a listening. 
Heidegger speaks of the 'dimension' of dwelling, which 
poetry gauges, and thereby imparts 'the measure for all 
measuring', as a 'between'. He speaks the words of Holderlin 
in pointing to a 'between' the heavens and the earth. "We 
leave the nature of the dimension without a name. ,2 Its 
remaining nameless is fitting, since Heidegger is emphasis- 
ing that the dimension of which poetic dwelling is a measuring 
is beyond the domain of human will and mastery. Human 
dwelling, insofar as it is not forgetful, or guilty of 
hubris, remains in awe of the powers and fates to which it 
is subject. Mortal dwelling knows its place. "It is not 
grounded within itself., 
3 
Poetry, then 
builds up the very nature of dwelling. Poetry 
and dwelling not only do not exclude each other; 
on the contrary, poetry and dwelling belong 
together, each calling for the other. 'Poetically 
man dwells'. Do we dwell poetically? Presumably 
we dwell altogether unpoetically. If that is 
so, does it give the lie to the poet's words; are 
they untrue? No. The truth of his utterance is 
confirmed in the most unearthly way. For dwelling 
can be unpoetic only because it is in essence 
poetic. For a man to be blind, he must remain 
a being by nature endowed with sight. A piece of 
wood can never go blind. But when man goes blind, 
there always remains the question whether his 
blindness derives from some defect and loss, or 
lies in an abundance and excess. In the same 
poem that meditates on the measure for all 
measuring, Holderlin says: 'King Oedipus has 
perhaps one eye too many'. Thus it might be that 
our unpoetic dwelling, its incapacity to take the 
measure, derives from a curious excess of frantic 
1Ibid. 
p. 223. 
2Ibid. 
p. 220. 
3Heidegger, M. (1968) p. 193. 
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measuring and calculating. 
' 
In reading these words, one may be reminded of those 
approaches to living, where dwelling is indeed forgotten 
in a constant 'measuring up to', a calculating 'what is 
good for'. These measurings are without doubt carried out 
with the best intentions. But - according to Heidegger - 
it is not simply 'goodwill' or good intentions that ensure 
that kindness endures within the dwelling, but "the claim 
and appeal of the measure to the heart in such a way that 
2 
the heart turns to give heed to the measure". 
Perhaps the most important conclusion - in the context 
of the concerns of this thesis - to which Heidegger's 
writings on 'dwelling' lead us is this: that dwelling cannot 
be thought of adequately in terms which already presuppose 
its understanding. It therefore resists any assimilation 
to any 'framework' of thought, to any of the current 'isms' 
which offer an already prepared course for our thinking to 
follow. What Heidegger maintains is most essential to 
dwelling cannot, therefore be grasped by a 'humanism' or an 
'existentialism', any more than it can by utilitarian 
pragmatism, materialism or positivism. Dwelling demands 
to be thought - in the most original, oriental, sense of 
the word, originally. 
The term which Heidegger uses for that thinking which 
is most in keeping with the essence of dwelling is poetic. 
1Ibid. 
pp. 227-228. 
2 
1bid. p. 229. 
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That this is so follows from the essentially 'poetic' 
nature of dwelling. The poetizing of dwelling is not 
primarily, or necessarily an 'artistic', aesthetic or 
literary poetizing. To make this clear I have stressed the 
closeness of poetry with 'thinking', such that Holderlin's 
line might be paraphrased: 'Thoughtfully man dwells'. Man's 
dwelling is a staying with that which calls him to think; 
which gives him cause to think, and to thank. 
Intimate Space 
I would like to conclude this chapter on 'dwelling' by 
turning to a very different thinker, but one who in the 
course of a quite different style of meditation from that 
of Heidegger nonetheless has a great deal to say about 
'poetic dwelling'. Here, however, poetic dwelling is 
approached through the intimate spaces of dwelling; dwelling 
spaces which hold us and take hold in us, spaces which free 
us to wander; spaces which invite us to come out of our- 
selves. 
The intimate, hospitable spaces of the home, spaces 
which attract us, spaces that we love, are discussed and 
beautifully evoked, particularly in 'The Poetics of Space', 
by the philosopher of science and phenomenologist Gaston 
Bachelard. 1 His approach to these 'intimate spaces' is 
made through reverie, which regretably unsimple notion we 
shall briefly discuss. Those intimate spaces within which 
1Bachelard, 
G. (1958). All of the following extracts are taken from 
this work, except where otherwise indicated. 
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and upon which Bachelard meditates have a singular power 
to shelter and protect, awaken and give birth to 'reverie', 
and it is in this that their privilege and importance 
largely resides. For it is through reverie that our deepest 
being may be approached. "The values that belong to daydream- 
ing mark humanity in its depths". 
What does Bachelard mean by 'reverie', or by the term 
with which it seems to be used interchangeably - daydreaming? 
His discussion of these phenomena crystallizes around the 
notion of the poetic image. Reverie grasps, opens, 
inaugurates, awakens, discloses - culminates in - the poetic 
image. It is clearly distinguishable, therefore, from the 
dream - or even from that species of daydream which culmi- 
nates in sleep. The 'reverie-daydream' of which Bachelard 
speaks, awakens; since poetry has put it on the right track, 
'the track of expanding consciousness'. It is, says 
Bachelard, a poor reverie which 'invites a nap'. 
But when it is a question of poetic reverie, of 
reverie which derives pleasure not only from 
itself but also prepares poetic pleasure for 
other souls, one realizes that one is no longer 
drifting into somnolence. The mind is able to 
relax, but in poetic reverie the soul keeps 
watch, with no tension, calmed and active. 
Reverie - one of the feminine states of the soul - 'is the 
very force (puissance) of the being at rest'. 
' 
It is ironic that the one discrete, personal reverie 
of the author which is discussed at length should be one 
which is expressly entered precisely as an invocation of 
1Bachelard, G. (1969) p. 18. 
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sleep. I shall quote this in its entirety: 
Just here the philosopher who believes in the 
salutary nature of vast daydreams is faced with 
a problem: how can one help confer greater 
cosmicity upon the city space that is exterior 
to one's room? As an example, here is one 
dreamer's solution to the problem of noise in 
Paris: 
When insomnia, which is the philosopher's 
ailment, is increased through irritation caused 
by city noises; or when late at night, the hum of 
automobiles and trucks rumbling through the Place 
Maubert causes me to curse my city-dwellers fate, 
I can recover my calm by living the metaphors of 
the ocean. We all know that the big city is a 
clamorous sea, and it has been said countless of 
times that, in the heart of night in Paris, one 
hears the ceaseless murmer of flood and tide. So 
I make a sincere image out of these hackneyed ones, 
an image that is as much my own as though I myself 
had invented it, in line with my gentle mania for 
always believing that I am the subject of what I 
am thinking. If the hum of cars becomes more 
painful, I do my best to discover in it the roll 
of thunder, of a thunder that speaks to me and 
scolds me. And I feel sorry for myself. So there 
you are, unhappy philosopher, caught up again by 
the storm, by the storms of life! I dream an 
abstract-concrete daydream. My bed is a small 
boat lost at sea; that sudden whistling is the 
wind in the sails. On every side the air is 
filled with the sound of furious klaxoning. I 
talk to myself to give myself cheer: there now, 
your skiff is holdings its own, you are safe in 
your stone boat. Sleep, in spite of the storm. 
Sleep in your own courage, happy to be a man who 
is assailed by wind and wave. And I fall asleep, 
lulled by the noise of Paris. 
Bachelard adds that "in fact everything corroborates my 
view that the image of the city's ocean roar is in the 
very 'nature of things', and that it is a true image". 
I shall provide one further example of a house fur- 
nishing its daydreamer with strong images, which this time, 
against a different storm, are counsels of resistance. 
And so, faced with the bestial hostility of the 
storm and the hurricane, the house's virtues of 
protection and resistance are transposed into 
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human virtues. The house acquires the physical 
and moral energy of a human body. It braces 
itself to receive the downpour, it girds its 
loins. When forced to do so, it bends with the 
blast, confident that it will right itself again 
in time, while continuing to deny any temporary 
defeats. Such a house as this invites mankind 
to heroism of cosmic proportions. It is an 
instrument with which to confront the cosmos. 
And the metaphysical systems according to which 
man is 'cast into the world' might meditate 
concretely upon the house that is cast into the 
hurricane, defying the anger of heaven itself. 
Come what may, the house helps us to say: I 
will be an inhabitant of the world, in spite of 
the world. 
Something must now be said about the 'poetic image'. 
So far as it is the culmination of a reverie, some sort of 
evolutionary movement may be described "from the original 
state of the reverie to that of execution". Yet the first 
thing to note about the completed image, and one in which 
Bachelard sees an important ontological significance, is 
its reverberatory power, its trans-subjectivity, its 
communicability; its resonance, its sonority, which 'rings 
true'. The image shows precisely in its quality of inter- 
subjectivity, an 'autonomy'. The image which poetic reverie 
produces is not a product of the poet's past. The image 
appears 'above' customary language and it speaks in a 
language so new that 'correlations between past and present 
can no longer be usefully considered'. The image resists 
any attempt to subordinate it within any structure of 'ante- 
cedents'; it "is not subject to an inner thrust". 
When I receive a new poetic image, I experience 
its quality of inter-subjectivity. I know that 
I am going to repeat it in order to communicate 
my enthusiasm. When considered in transmission 
from one soul to another, it becomes evident that 
a poetic image eludes causality. Doctrines that 
are timidly causal, such as psychology, or 
strongly causal, such as psychoanalysis, can 
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hardly determine the ontology of what is 
poetic. For nothing prepares a poetic image, 
especially not culture, in the literary sense, 
and especially not perception, in the psycho- 
logical sense. 
I always come then to the same conclusion: 
the essential newness of the poetic image poses 
the problem of the speaking being's creative- 
ness. Through this creativeness the imagining 
consciousness proves to be, very simply but 
very purely, an origin. 
The question of 'origins' is central to Bachelard's 
thought; the image is in the deepest sense - original. So 
much so that the 'true' (not merely, a 'good') image in a 
sense might be said to 'originate' its reader. 
It takes root in us... It becomes a new being 
in our language, expressing us by making us 
what it expresses; in other words, it is at 
once a becoming of expression, and a becoming 
of our being. Here expression creates being. 
Bachelard's thinking is nothing if not radical; and so it 
is that the poetic imagination which it thinks requires us 
to forget all learning, and 'break with all habits of 
philosophical research'. "'Upstream from myself', says the 
poet; 'Upstream from upstream', says the reverie which looks 
to go back to the springs of the being. " 
My interest here is with certain privileged images 
which capture Bachelard's attention - which he calls images 
of 'felicitous space', of 'space that has been seized upon 
by the imagination', of 'intimate space' which suggests to 
Bachelard the notion of 'topophilia'. My interest in these 
spaces is not 'literary' in the sense of showing how 
various poets have praised them, but is with showing what 
it is about these spaces that makes them so eminently 
'praiseworthy'. 
248 
One word of warning must apply to Bachelard's state- 
ment quoted above, that the imagining consciousness is an 
origin. It is, I believe, far from being some idealist 
statement, to the effect that the imagination grants to 
consciousness the power to inscribe or etch value and 
meaning upon some tabula rasa that is the world. By 'origin' 
Bachelard refers more to that source where consciousness 
and the world most primordially touch one another, a source 
to which the one who listens may, in speaking of his reverie, 
return us. "Reverie unites us to the world. " In. this sense, 
the images of poetic imagination of which Bachelard speaks 
are at the same time the 'images of matter'. "Things speak 
to us", says Bachelard, "and as a result of this fact, if 
we give this language its full value, we have a contact 
with things. " The things which here speak to us are those 
spaces - nooks and cranniesl - which shelter our most 
intimate day-dreaming, and which speak of the wealth of 
imagined being in images 'which are in us as much as we 
are in them'. These are spaces which repose has found to 
be 'especially conducive situations', rooms which have 
become abodes for an 'unforgettable past'; spaces which 
open out a poetics of the house. 
"On whatever theoretical horizon we examine it, the 
house image appears to have become the topography of our 
intimate being. " It is a privileged entity about which 
images concentrate. The house, as a shelter of daydreams 
"'Indeed in our houses we have nooks and corners in which we like to 
curl up comfortably. To curl up belongs to the phenomenology of the 
verb to inhabit, and only those who have learned to do so can inhabit 
with intensity. " 
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is one of the greatest powers of integration 
for the thoughts, memories and dreams of mankind. 
The binding principle in this integration is the 
daydream. Past, present and future give the 
house different dynamisms, which often interfere, 
at times opposing, at others, stimulating one 
another. In the life of man, the house thrusts 
aside contingencies, its councils of continuity 
are unceasing. Without it, man would be a dis- 
persed being. It maintains him through the 
storms of the heavens and through those of life. 
It is body and soul. It is the human being's 
first world. Before he is 'cast into the world', 
as claimed by certain hasty metaphysics, man 
is laid in the cradle of the house. And always, 
in our daydreams, the house is a large cradle. 
The task of the phenomenologist of the 'home' is to 
seek out the 'germ of the essential, sure, immediate well- 
being it encloses'. "In every dwelling, even the richest, 
the first task of the phenomenologist is to find the 
original shell". It is in this shell that the images of 
our daydreams or reverie are concentrated, condensed; in 
this 'corner of the world' that our past, present and 
future are gathered together, and at the same time, dis- 
persed. 
But our adult life is so dispossessed of the 
essential benefits, its anthropocosmic ties 
have become so slack, that we do not feel 
their first attachment in the universe of the 
house. There is no dearth of abstract 'world 
conscious' philosophers who discover a universe 
by means of the dialectical game of the I and 
the non-I. In fact they know the universe 
before they know the house, the far horizon 
before the resting place; whereas the real 
beginnings of images, if we study them pheno- 
menologically, will give concrete evidence of 
the values of inhabited space, of the non-I 
that protects the I. 
The task of a phenomenology of dwelling, then, is to 
remind us of those values of inhabited space, to say "how 
we inhabit our vital space... how we take root, day after 
day, in 'a corner of the world"' and thereby to determine 
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"the profound reality of all the subtle shadings of our 
attachment for a chosen spot". Here my task is much more 
modest: to express the claim that the house is a first or 
original place, and therefore the house of original things. 
Our house is 'our corner of the world'; and from this 
corner from which we move out "all really inhabited space 
bears the essence of the notion of home". The oneiric house 
is characterized by its vectors of verticality and centrality. 
The vertical: the cellar and the attic; the roof and the 
eaves and the basement, the 'dark entity of the house, the 
one that partakes of subterranean forces'. See Jung's 
illustration of the man who "hearing a suspicious noise in 
the cellar, hurries to the attic and, finding no burglars 
there decides, consequently, that the noise was pure 
imagination. In reality, this prudent man did not dare 
venture into the cellar. "' The 'centrality' of the house 
is expressed by its 'centres of simplicity'; and as an 
enduring image of this gathered simplicity Bachelard speaks 
of the hut as the 'tap root of the function of inhabiting'. 
It is the simplest of human plants, the one 
that needs no ramifications in order to exist. 
Indeed it is so simple that it no longer 
belongs to our memories - which at times are 
to full of imagery - but to legend; it is a 
centre of legend. 
Bachelard pursues this image of the hut into 'centres of 
concentrated solitude', of which the hermit's hut is a 
particularly deep engraving by the imagination upon the 
memory. It gives us access to 'absolute refuge', which 
1Jung, 
C. Modern Man in Search for Soul. Quoted in Bachelard (1958) 
p. 19. 
251 
beckons as a distant glimmer of light. There are however, 
countless other primitive lights: 
In line with the distant light in the hermit's 
hut, symbolic of the man who keeps vigil, a 
large dossier of literary documentation on the 
poetry of houses could be studied from the 
single angle of the lamp that glows in the 
window. This image would have to be placed 
under one of the greatest of all theorems of 
the imagination of the world of light: Tout ce 
qui brille voit (all that glows sees) ... The 
lamp keeps vigil, therefore it is vigilant. 
And the narrower the ray of light, the more 
penetrating its vigilance. 
If the house is, as Bachelard suggests, "a tool for 
the analysis of the human soul", it is at the same time, he 
concedes, one whose use presents singular difficulties. 
In short, discussion of our thesis takes place 
on ground that is unfavourable to us. For, in 
point of fact, a house is first and foremost a 
geometrical object, one which we are tempted to 
analyse rationally. Its prime reality is 
visible and tangible, made of well hewn solids 
and well fitted framework. It is dominated by 
straight lines, the plumb-line having marked it 
with its discipline and balance. A geometrical 
object of this kind ought to resist metaphors 
that welcome the human body and the human soul. 
But transposition to the human plane takes place 
immediately whenever a house is considered as a 
space for cheer and intimacy, space that is 
supposed to condense and defend intimacy... We 
shall have to apply ourselves increasingly to 
studying how, by means of the house, the warm 
substance of intimacy resumes its form, the form 
that it had when it enclosed original warmth. 
The house encloses 'original warmth'; and it is here 
that the maternal features of the house come to the fore- 
front . 
Within the being, in the being of within, an 
enveloping warmth welcomes being. Being reigns 
in a sort of earthly paradise of matter, dissolved 
in the comforts of an adequate matter. It is 
as though in this material paradise, the human 
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being were bathed in nourishment, as though he 
were gratified with all the essential benefits. 
When we dream of the house we were born in, 
in the utmost depths of reverie, we participate 
in this original warmth, in this well-tempered 
matter of the material paradise. This is the 
environment in which the protective beings live. 
But is there not now a clear danger of our 'dreaming of the 
house that we were born in' becoming an unbridled wallowing 
in vulgar nostalgia? Bachelard distinguishes between a 
coarse nostalgia for youth, and a nostalgia for the 
expressions of youth - 
images as we should have imagined them 
during the original 'impulse of youth'. 
And so, beyond all the positive values of 
protection, the house we were born in 
becomes imbued with dream values which 
remain after the house is gone. Centres of 
boredom, centres of solitude, centres of 
daydream group together to constitute the 
oneiric house which is more lasting than 
the scattered memories of our birthplace. 
Long phenomenological research would be 
needed to determine all these dream values, 
to plumb the depth of this dream ground in 
which our memories are rooted. 
And we should not forget that these 
dream values communicate poetically from 
soul to soul... well determined centres of 
reverie communicate between men who dream 
as surely as well-defined concepts are means 
of communication between men who think. 
The house that we were born in overflows into the 
oneiric house, and it is here, in the depths of our 
reverie, and in the depths of our being, that we are always 
at an origin. "Through dreams, the various dwelling places 
in our lives co-penetrate and retain the treasures of 
former days... 'we always bring our lares with us'. " Thus 
it is that the house shelters the dreamer who dreams the 
house which shelters him. 
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The word habit is too worn a word to express this 
passionate liason... with an unforgettable house... 
Not only our memories, but the things we have 
forgotten are 'housed'. Our soul is an abode. 
And by remembering 'houses' and 'rooms' we learn 
to 'abide' within ourselves. Now everything becomes 
clear, the house image moves in both directions; 
they are in us as much as we are in them... 
"The unconscious abides" writes Bachelard. Memories, 
like childhood, are motionless. "The unconscious is housed. 
It is well and happily housed in the space of its happiness. " 
"In its countless aveoli space contains compressed time. 
That is what space is for. " The oneiric house becomes a 
vehicle for the perpetual childhood within us still to dream - 
and in its reverie ensure that we remain free beings. 
The house we were born in is more than an embodi- 
ment of home, it is also an embodiment of dreams. 
Each one of its nooks and corners was a resting- 
place for daydreaming. And often the resting- 
place particularized the daydream. Our habits 
of a particular daydream were acquired there. 
The house, the bedroom, the garret in which we 
were alone, furnished the framework of an 
interminable dream, one that poetry alone, 
through the creation of a poetic work, could 
succeed in creating completely. If we give their 
function of shelter for dreams to all these places 
of retreat, we may say, as I pointed out in an 
earlier work, that there exists for each one of 
us an oneiric house, a house of dream-memory, 
that is lost in the shadow of a beyond of the 
real past. I called this oneiric house the crypt 
of the house that we were born in. Here we find 
ourselves at a pivotal point around which recipro- 
cal interpretations of dreams through thought, 
and thought about dreams, keep turning. But the 
word interpretation hardens this about face unduly. 
In point of fact, we are in the unity of image 
and memory, in the functional composition of 
imagination and memory. The positivity of psycho- 
logical history and geography cannot serve as a 
touchstone for determining the real being of our 
childhood, for childhood is certainly greater 
than reality. In order to sense, across the 
years, our attachment for the house that we were 
born in, dream is more powerful than thought... 
It is on the plane of the daydream and not of 
that of facts that childhood remains alive and 
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poetically useful within us. Through this permanent 
childhood, we maintain the poetry of the past. To 
inhabit oneirically the house we were born in means 
more than to inhabit it in memory; it means living 
in this house that is gone, the way we used to dream 
in it. 
The unconscious is timeless; the unconscious abides. 
Something of what Bachelard means may be suggested by 
the rather compelling play on words which his translation 
offers - childhood is the well of being. 
l 
The well 
sheltered dreamer, however, does not draw memories and 
fragments of memories from a personal past located in this 
or that inhabitation - although he may do this too. Bachelard 
is most emphatic in his distinction between memories of 
childhood, and those images of reverie which first opened 
up the world for us. "Childhood is at the origin of the 
greatest landscapes. Our childhood solicitudes have given 
us the primitive immensities. By dreaming of childhood 
we return to the lair of our reveries. " The lair of 
reveries, or the oneiric house, is a motionless zone, for 
the being of reverie "crosses all the ages of man from 
childhood to old age without growing old". As our reverie 
toward childhood deepens so "we root the tree of our 
destiny more deeply". 
2 The memories of the dreamer-toward- 
childhood, that is, the well-housed dreamer, are not 
vestiges, traces or those fragments of recollection which 
Bachelard calls 'frozen shapes'; "they are reborn as rays 
of being". 
3 
1Bachelard, 
G. (1969) p. 114. 
2Ibid. 
p. 135. 
3 
1bid. p. 135. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCERN AND ITS GROUNDS 
Ethics and Dwelling 
In these chapters which comprise part two of this 
thesis, I am concerned to show a theorizing whose 'form' 
and 'content' might serve to inform the practice or 
discipline of living in a therapeutic community. Such 
theorizing, it is to be hoped, will help engender a more 
informed, and a more thoughtful practising. In the course 
of theorizing that I have pursued, I have acknowledged in 
particular two informing sources - Aristotle's ethical 
writings, and Heidegger's writings on 'dwelling'. 
The importance of Aristotle to our topic, I believe, 
is this: that in his ethical writings is opened up a 
discussion, which remains extraordinarily alive and fresh 
after nearly two and a half thousand years, of what it is 
to live 'well'. His discussion is of those conditions and 
considerations which pertain to a life which is 'fitting' 
and a life which flourishes; a life which is thoughtful to 
what is fitting, and attentive to the powers which govern 
us. If Aristotle is indeed able to show us some of these 
considerations, or show us what is entailed in finding 
them for ourselves, is this not to be welcomed? And 
doubly so in our present circumstances - for we are con- 
cerned with the problematics of living well within a 
therapeutic community, to which people make their way 
precisely because they are not managing to live well. 
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In this context, two features of Aristotle's Ethics 
in particular interest me. Firstly, that movement of 
inquiry which starts where we are, with what we know, 
what we can assume - and proceeds towards first things. 
Aristotle's Ethics starts from and assumes 'common sense' 
and common sensibility, but soon makes it clear that common 
sense is not enough - for living well seems to require a 
wisdom that is rather uncommon. Secondly, then, Aristotle 
introduces us to the idea of phronesis, or 'practical 
wisdom'. Phronesis is an intricate and most interesting 
notion; it conveys connotations of 'savvy', of being 'on 
the ball', having one's wits about one, and so on, but at 
the same time it is quite clear that the phronismos is not 
simply some shrewd opportunist, for phronesis crucially 
entails a knowledge of what is right and good. But if 
phronesis is a knowledge, it is not an 'abstract' knowledge 
- such as nowadays we might call 'theoretical'. On the 
contrary, it is a knowledge of what the situation we find 
ourselves in demands of us; it is a knowledge which expresses 
itself in the right reply, in right action. 
A second 'informing source' has been mentioned - 
Heidegger writings on 'dwelling'. We may readily discern 
a number of links which lead us from Aristotle's Ethics to 
Heidegger; Heidegger is in many ways deeply 'Aristotelian'. 
The Nichomachean Ethics seems to have maintained a compelling 
attraction for Heidegger, and it seems clear that the 
discussion of phronesis in Book VI of the Ethics consider- 
ably influences Heidegger's thinking of Dasein in Being 
and Time. It is through this book that the reader is 
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likely to have made his way to later works which speak of 
dwelling and 'poetic dwelling'; but my comments in these 
pages have been restricted to the two essays on dwelling 
which appear in these later works. 
And again, the importance of this notion of dwelling 
may be quite simply expressed. Our dwelling is where we 
are, and where we must begin - it is our starting point. 
It is a starting point where we always already are - for 
our being is 'dwelling'. If phronesis is an understanding 
of 'situation' then our most original situation is where - 
and how - we make ourselves, and find ourselves, 'at home'; 
where and how we abide; where we stay - and keep coming 
back to. Heidegger understands such 'situation' as arising 
only for beings who speak, and disclose Being, whose being 
within Being is privileged, is a standing in an opening - 
whose way of being (open to Being) is a staying with, or 
dwelling. 
My emphasis upon the 'discipline' of the therapeutic 
community as being 'ethical' rather than 'psychological', 
and upon the foremost place of this ethical practice as 
being the home or the dwelling rather than the residential 
treatment centre or unit, serves the purpose of alerting 
the reader to a consideration of those concerns - or the 
sort of concern - most befitting a therapeutic community. 
It would surely be a poor therapeutic community that did 
not, in some sense or other, 'show concern'. But rather 
than take this very important fact simply for granted, 
it is worthwhile asking what it is, to show concern; or 
perhaps, what it is that concern shows. 
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De-based Concern 
Any 'therapy' or 'therapeutic treatment' - whether it be 
brain surgery, electro-convulsive therapy, drug treatment, or 
'psychotherapy' of one form or another - is predicated upon 
'care', 'concern', or 'regard'. This is logically entailed 
in our understanding of professional conduct; it makes no 
sense at all for a person engaged in the profession of 
healing not to take as his final warrant of authority to 
practice, his considered estimation of what is to the ulti- 
mate good of, or in the best interest of, his patient. 
Now this concern for the wellbeing of the patient, 
which must underly any therapy or treatment, carries with it 
certain implications for the wellbeing of the practitioner. 
That is, a therapist, who must do what is right, in his con- 
sidered estimation, for his patient must at the same time be 
doing what is right for himself. He cannot be treating his 
patient well, in such a manner as to further their well- 
being, and at the same time, and in the same actions, 
treating himself harmfully, or in such a manner as to stand 
in the way of his own well-being. If this were so, he 
would be implicated with his patient, in a structure of 
injuriousness. His conduct towards his patient, and towards 
himself are in an important sense, reciprocal: his own good 
and the good of his patient belong to a unitary structure. 
His warrant to practice must reside therefore, not only in 
his knowingly doing what is right for his patient, but also, 
and at the same time, knowingly doing what is right for 
himself. The doctor must take his own medicine. 
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Questions regarding 'right conduct' - which are 
implicated in all of medicine but which take up a central 
position in the field of psychiatry, whose object is inter- 
personal conduct, how people treat one another - are as we 
have seen not simply 'theoretical' questions but practical 
or ethical questions. As such, they directly implicate the 
being of the person concerned, and not merely his 'theo- 
retical understanding' of what is right and wrong. This 
existential reference of ethics is brough out in the Greek 
ethos, meaning character or spirit, in the sense in which 
we talk about the 'spirit' of an age, or perhaps the spirit 
in which a person acts. Ethos, furthermore, means 'habit'; 
and it is interesting that the word 'habit' has retained 
its meaning as vestment in the context of persons whose 
life is lived explicitly as an ethical stance. 
The nature of concern, and of the various forms which 
concern might take lead us, in the first instance, back to 
ethics. Concern is first of all our own concern. Matters 
which concern us, inescapably, and such as I have therefore 
characterized as 'ethical' include questions as to how we 
conduct ourselves towards one another, how we treat one 
another - effectively, what we mean to one another. I 
have suggested that this ethical ground appears ambiguously 
within the therapeutic community literature. On the one 
hand, it is not only clearly supposed, but in some cases 
explicitly thematized. On the other hand, originary 
concern, simultaneously with its appearing undergoes 
mutation into the predominant forms which I have referred 
to as the medicalization and psychologization of concern. 
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Concern may then be said to have wandered from its 
home ground. Institutional or psychiatric concern may 
provide plentiful examples of such errance. The agents 
of psychiatric practice - except insofar as they may be 
wholly cynical or ruthless - are of course concerned; they 
are well-intentioned and carry out their work in good 
faith. Psychiatric concern is however, for the most part, 
a privative concern, in the sense that the psychiatrist is 
ethically apart from his patient. The psychiatrist is not 
primarily concerned to gesture to his patient a common 
ground whereupon they might meet, that is, 'simply', as 
person to person. Nor is he, usually, prepared to consider 
the possibility that this might be, quite literally his 
responsibility. Thus those questions which ordinarily 
arise in the course of discussion of 'psychiatric ethics' 
(for example, whether brain surgery is ethical, under what 
circumstances should patients have the right to refuse E. C. T. 
and so on) are quite secondary to, and may simply smoke- 
screen the more immediate question of the stance which the 
psychiatrist embodies or takes up. The psychiatric attitude 
is predominantly a dis-stance, a disownment of ground; but 
this claim carries with it no recommendation that the 
psychiatrist should instead in some way try to 'get close 
to' his patient, which may be simply another form of 
violence. 
A psychiatrist's typical mode of conduct, predicated 
upon his considered estimation of what is to the good of 
the patient, does not, as a necessary and integral structure, 
entail that movement of radical reflection or reflexivity 
whereby a person may adopt, in face of the possibilities 
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before him, that course of action which is to his own good. 
In absence of a common ground, how may two persons arrive 
at a common good? The psychiatrist, typically, is not 
called upon to enter the inner arena, or agon, of 'what is 
right', at least in this sense: that what is right for the 
patient has already been worked out, for example, in pharmo- 
cological laboratories somewhere, in psychiatric textbooks. 
The task of the psychiatrist will therefore, to a very 
great extent, consist in the skilful diagnosis of formal 
conditions or entities, which diagnoses then directly 
determine the appropriate treatment - give or take room for 
the 'connoisseurship' of experienced judgement, the require- 
ments of 'special considerations', and so on. To this 
criticism, that his treatments, bar the details, always 
have already been worked out, the psychiatrist will probably 
have a ready reply. He will say that these objections 
quite miss the point; for his field precisely is not ethics, 
but science - and do not all scientists stand on the 
shoulders of their predecessors? But now, insofar as his 
case rests upon the evidence for the working concepts of 
psychiatry, such as the diagnostic entities which its 
textbooks teach, having been scientifically shown - it is a 
poor one. 
The nominal definition of disease puts the 
method of investigation over the subject 
matter, a sure sign of theoretical poverty and 
technical thinking. It delimits a category by 
attaching numerical value to questions found 
within the context of the investigation it- 
self. It thus sets out to investigate an 
object with an instrument which through its 
own construction decides in advance just what 
the object is -a simple case of circularity. 
With an arrogance born of ignorance, the 
objections of classical philosophy (Kant, 
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1781; Hegel, 1837) to the practice of defini- 
tion without the theoretical labour of producing 
the concept of the object are consigned to 
oblivion. What that philosophy banished as a 
remnant of scholasticism is still flourishing 
under the name of scientific psychiatry. 1 
A relatively simply and benign instance of a dis- 
possessed ethical ground - and of the medicalization of 
concern - is illustrated in the case of a person who, 
suffering grief at the loss of a loved one, and in the 
absence of anyone else to turn to, finds herself admitted 
as a psychiatric casualty. Following a psychiatric inter- 
view she is accepted for treatment for a 'grief reaction'; 
the treatment consists of 'sedation', and staff vigilance 
is recommended in view of the risk of suicide. The shift of 
ground, whereby suffering grief becomes 'displaying a grief 
reaction' is, perhaps, subtle; but its significance is 
considerable. Concern is no longer a matter of standing 
with this woman in what she may be going through, according 
to one's sensibilities and tact - which is in a sense doing 
nothing. Rather, concern now takes the form of treating 
her for what she is 'suffering from', a quasi-medical 
diagnostic entity. How many of these entities there now 
are, and how they change with fashion! Not only do medical- 
psychiatric interventions such as this, and interventions, 
too, of a much more serious nature - do violence to common 
sense and common decency alike; they are unceasingly 
perpetrated in arrogant dismissiveness of empirical studies 
1Heaton, 
J. M. (1982) p. 19. That literature which belongs within the 
critique of scientific psychiatry is much too extensive to discuss 
here. Two further references might be suggested as helpful points 
of departure: Laing, R. D. (1965) and Boss, M. (1979). 
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which radically question their 'cost-effectiveness'. In 
many cases it may well be that hospital staff, particularly 
those of the 'lower orders' have sufficient common sense 
to override this medical nonsense. 
I have already discussed at some length the 'psycho- 
logization of concern'. Psychologised concern takes as its 
object, the mind. It proceeds more or less on the assumption 
that people become mentally ill, suffer psychological break- 
down or go haywire largely insofar as the cogs of the mind 
start to slip, and insofar, furthermore, as their under- 
standing of its machinations remains obscure. The concern 
which belongs with psychologism takes the form, for the most 
part, of treating this deranged organ; again it proceeds as 
a revealing of what is really going on in our minds and 
their relational ramifications, whether through mirroring, 
dramatizing, confronting or explaining. Through reality 
confrontation we may discover where our perceptual apparatus 
is disordered, through interpretation we come to realize 
our lack of insight, and so on. Again, psychologized concern 
will take a number of different forms, according, as for 
example, as behaviour therapy differs from the techniques of 
the growth movement. Behaviour therapy and social skills 
training are merely the negative versions of psychologi- 
zation; the mind appears, so to speak, precisely in the 
mindlessness of its conditionability. The ethos of psycho- 
logized concern tends to be, at least within therapeutic 
communities, this or that form of a pragmatic humanism. 
Humanistic ethics are very well discussed in Heidegger's 
'Letter on Humanism', where the author speaks of the 
264 
'poverty' of the existence of 'homo humanus', symptomatic 
of a 'straying into subjectivity'. 
1 
Psychiatric units, psychological or behavioural clinics, 
'homes' of one sort or another (mental homes, geriatric 
homes, childrens' homes) are all in the business of concern. 
They make it their business to show concern where an 
original concern has either failed to hold, or perhaps never 
existed. It is not my present task to discuss these various 
institutions and their particular structures of concern, 
but rather to draw attention to the fact that concern may 
show itself in any of a number of different forms. We 
might say that these various forms of institutional concern 
represent so many different isomers of concern; and ask 
accordingly whether we are entitled to speak of more original 
forms of concern - and if so, where they might naturally 
occur. 
The Openings of Concern 
One way of approaching the question of 'concern' is 
by saying that it is 
provides the bedrock 
will be based. Thus 
will arise where one 
- to do this or that 
is a feeling that we 
for some things and 
a 'feeling' - and that this feeling 
upon which any appraisal of concern 
interventions of one sort or another 
person arouses this feeling of concern 
about the situation. Concern, then, 
have sometimes and not others, we have 
not others. Yet in some ways it is quite 
1Heidegger, 
M. (1978) pp. 189-243. 
265 
misleading to think of concern as a feeling. Although we 
may speak'of feeling concern at some times and not others, 
'feelings of concern' do not ordinarily descend on us, over- 
come or overwhelm us, like depression, anger, shame or joy. 
We may have an angry, guilty, depressed or joyful reaction 
to something, but we do not 'react' with concern; we speak 
of concern, rather, as a response. Furthermore, we do not 
speak of a person's susceptibility to feel concern, as we 
do, for example, of a person's susceptibility to moodiness, 
or even to 'their emotions'. We speak, instead, of a 
person's capacity for concern. 
1 
Concern is not a feeling state, or gestalt of various 
feelings. Thus, for example, a person going about his 
business, and attending to his concerns, does not in so 
doing experience particular 'feelings of concern' like 
twinges, pangs or pulsations. Concern is dispositional, 
and refers to that towards which, and the manner towards 
which, we are disposed or inclined. Concern is therefore 
in some ways like interest - where we are said to be 
interested in something, or something captures our interest 
we are not experiencing twinges and pangs of some sort, 
but tend to be taken out of ourselves. But concern is 
not the same as interest. We talk, for example, of having 
'consuming interests' or obsessional interests, yet insofar 
as we may feel that a person is obsessed or consumed by his 
'concern', we probably conclude that this concern is rather 
peculiar, if not in some way false. 
1See 
Scheler, M. (1973) esp. p. 328 ff. 
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If concern is not simply a feeling, nor even a feeling 
which prompts us to respond, concern nevertheless may be 
felt. I may feel the other's concern for me, or the concern 
that a group of people have for one another, just as surely 
as I can feel its absence. Accordingly, I am moved to act 
in this or that way. We may move towards the other, in 
concern or 'out of' concern, or be moved by the other's 
concern, and accordingly an area or a ground of concern opens 
up. Thus where concern refers to that which we feel, it 
refers at the same time to that domain towards which we 
feel drawn, which calls or invites us, which opens before 
us. This domain is neither a private world of inner 
feelings, nor an objective world to which we have attached 
certain valencies or attractions, but is first of all that 
which is opened up between one person and another. Insofar 
as we find ourselves in a world which matters to us, we 
have mattered to someone. Concern arises as an opening 
between, opening upon, out of which a world takes shape; 
and the 'showing' of concern itself takes the form of 
'opening'. But of course, not everything in our world 
matters equally; the range of our concern will be bounded 
and regioned in a number of ways. We say, for example, 
that something is outside our concern, or no longer a 
concern of ours, no longer of concern to us. These matters 
which are of our deepest and most abiding concern in a 
sense define who we are, and speak of what it is that we 
are 'on about'. 
The world of our concern is first of all the world 
where we make ourselves at home, where we dwell. The 
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concerns which are our world - our abiding concerns - arise 
within the always present horizons of birth and death, 
which may be approached or turned away in many ways. For 
example our birth may be reduced to a historical event in 
our past, or death to a demise which will befall us at some 
time in the future. Whatever way these horizons may be 
approached, they are by no means extrinsic to, or beyond 
the everyday concerns of dwelling, i. e. provisioning, 
nourishing, sheltering, enjoying and suffering - but per- 
meate dwelling in its entirety. 
At the same time it must be acknowledged that the 
everyday concerns of dwelling are in the first instance mun- 
dane and 'practical'. They are to do with 'real estate' 
or 'reality' - with a roof over one's head and under the 
sky, with walls which bound and shelter and protect. The 
concerns of dwelling, furthermore, are embedded in, for 
example, the furnishings of the house - this chair to be 
fixed, this wall to be painted, fences to repair. The 
household is of course articulated into a larger socio- 
economic whole. We keep our home in order, but also step 
outside it, leave it: no household is 'self-sufficient'. 
These mundane concerns are accomplished through dwelling's 
various rituals - rituals of work and play, of sacrament 
and nourishment, of gathering round the table and the fire, 
resting and awakening, washing and cleaning, and so on. 
According to the manner or spirit in which these rituals 
are performed, the language and context within which they 
assume meaning, and are recognized, that is, according to 
the ethos of the house, which begets its particular ambiance 
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and grace, we might speak of the house 'holding together' 
in some discernible fashion. This holding together is at 
the same time a 'holding open' of concern. 
A dwelling arises as a gathering -a dwelling comes 
together. A dwelling is also a clearing - that is, an 
opening-out and a holding open. A dwelling is shaped or 
takes shape; like a path it traces our intentions. It is 
shaped by our concerns - what we have time for - and our 
concern in turn takes shape within the dwelling. A dwelling 
cannot be organized any more than 'what we mean to one 
another' can be organized. Within the dwelling are shaped, 
or articulated, primary structures of concern, first matters 
which must carefully be brought into view (and in a manner 
mindful of all the dangers which surround the understanding 
of first things) prior to any asking whether and in what 
fashion any particular household or dwelling lives out a 
concern which is 'therapeutic', or attentive to the needs 
of people in states of deprivation. 
We have seen now therapeutic communities, for the most 
part, respond to the cry of homelessness - now interpreted 
as mental illness or psychological disturbance - by the 
provision of specialized services or consumer packages of 
one sort or another; and that these various specialized 
services are proposed as being able to assist or enable 
patients to master the art of living. These forms of 
therapeutic concern are examples (and remain more stubbornly 
so the more psychologically sophisticated and forward 
thinking they become) of de-based concern, to the extent 
that they wander from the commonplace, from a human sheltering 
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whose welcome is immediate and recognizable, from the 
sureness of home ground, from the familiarity of home- 
coming. By placing the emphasis of my study upon dwelling, 
and suggesting that the opening out, in actuality, of what 
it means to dwell, to be at home, emerges as the theoretical 
practice we are called upon to enter, rather than the 
designing of formal activities superimposed upon and pre- 
supposing dwelling, I propose no more than the putting of 
first things first. I argue for a reversal of that movement 
whereby we arrive at the ludicrousness of the tail wagging 
the dog. 
But what are first things? Dwelling? Dwelling comes 
first in the sense that the dwelling is an 'original' or 
first - central - place; a place or origins. Dwelling comes 
first, too, in the sense that our being is 'dwelling'; we 
dwell in the neighbourhood of being - and Being comes first. 
It is utterly in keeping with the argument of this thesis 
that it should align itself with those informing sources 
which speak for the priority of Being; which raise questions 
of Being and of our way of being, and being with one another, 
questions which the clamour of functioning is still unable 
to drown. But at this point I must introduce one further 
informing source - one which distinguishes radically between 
the truth which is the unconcealment of Being, and the 
truth which is justice. By way of attempting to paraphrase 
an argument which stubbornly resists paraphrase, I shall 
introduce the provocations of Emmanuel Levinas. In deference 
to some degree of continuity, I shall place Levinas' dis- 
cussion of 'dwelling' rather centrally; and yet to arrive 
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at this notion it is necessary to prepare the way. For now 
we are required to rethink our thinking of ground; not 
because it is incorrect, but because it forces thinking 
further. 
Economy and Exteriority 
'Dwelling' occupies as central a place in the philo- 
sophical writings of Emmanuel Levinas as it does for 
Heidegger. And one even finds in the writing of Levinas 
statements as to the nature of dwelling which might have 
'come straight from' Heidegger. For each of these thinkers, 
'to exist means to dwell'. From this, however, it would be 
quite wrong to conclude that there are not fundamental 
differences and points of disagreement between these two 
thinkers; differences which-are so far reaching as to pro- 
hibit any easy reconciliation by regarding their respective 
accounts of dwelling as being simply different perspectives 
upon the same phenomenon. It is Levinas' explicit claim 
that that which instigates his thinking cannot be brought 
into 'perspective'; the entire movement of his thought runs 
counter to the occular-centrism - the 'primacy of the 
panoramic' - which as, he insists, dominated the western 
metaphysical tradition. 
In my introduction to the notion of 'dwelling' as it is 
discussed by Levinas I shall limit myself to the line of 
thought which is developed in 'Totality and Infinity', 
1 
1Levinas, 
E. (1969). All of the following extracts are taken from this 
work, except where otherwise indicated. 
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subtitled, 'An Essay in exteriority'. It will first of all 
be necessary to indicate what Levinas means by 'exteriority' 
and 'interiority'; the fact of the latter term's being used 
synonymously with 'economy' already alerts us to the 
importance which is attached to the domain of the home. 
And yet the reader who first acquaintances himself with 
Levinas' writings is likely to find himself feeling less 
than 'at home' with the ideas he discovers there; he is, on 
the contrary likely to find himself singularly confused and 
disoriented. Levinas' work does indeed, as is suggested by 
Blum, present 'special difficulties' for the interpreter. 
"His style is evocative rather than expository and his 
thought does not develop through a series of carefully 
reasoned arguments but rather by semi-poetic, rhapsodic and 
grammatically elusive meditations around certain central 
intuitions or metaphors... "_. 
' Levinas, Blum reminds us, is 
French. 
Levinas' style, however, is not a simple matter of 
personal idiosyncracy, expressing the natural flamboyance of 
one given to gnomic utterance, which resists any concession 
to the reader's logical tastes. The difficulties of his 
style, and the radical otherness of the work, are intrinsic 
to the matter which he is thinking. The entirety of Totality 
and Infinity is addressed to a thinking of the Other. The 
term which Levinas gives to this Other, and which already 
suggests an other which cannot be seen from the side - one 
in a line of profiles - or crept up upon from behind, that 
1Blum, P. P. (1982). 
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is, observed and objectified, is the Face. The other who 
faces us, who addresses us, makes claim upon us in calling 
for reply - the other of whom the experience is given in 
the 'face to face' is the subject of Levinas' meditation, 
that which Levinas proposes to think. And it is precisely 
the face which resists thinking. 
Bernasconi has suggested that Levinas' thinking may 
correspond to what Hegel refers to as speculative thinking. 
I would suggest that we think of Levinas' 
thinking of the face, as a speculative thinking, 
and I would propose that speculative thinking 
maintains the face to face, is proper to it, 
much as poetry is proper to dwelling in 
Heidegger. In so doing I am drawing on a dis- 
tinction between speculative and dialectical 
thinking in Hegel, a distinction for which 
there is only slight authorization and whose 
justification is simply that we need it. l 
What is speculative thinking? Bernasconi suggests that a 
clue may be given in Hegel's criticism of those who complain 
that philosophy books must be read again and again, for here 
"he is making the point that if we are held by the propo- 
sition, so that we read it again and again, we stay with 
what is being spoken about". Thinking is disturbed. 
Because thinking is disturbed it does not pass 
on or become engaged in arguing; it stays with 
the content... The thinking subject finds itself 
held by what is being said. We know nothing more 
mobile than thinking, but in the speculative it 
is brought to a stand without its activity being 
diminished... Speculative thinking is without 
resolution or fulfilment. 
1Bernasconi, 
R. (1982). 
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The face to face, in Levinas, is not equivalent to 
what more usually is called the relationship between self 
and other, for it is precisely the otherness of the other 
which ensures that the face to face may not be reduced to 
a relationship. It is an 'ultimate situation', a 'relation 
without relation'. Thus, first of all, the same and other 
of the face to face is not reducible to an oppositional 
structure of complementary terms; such is the radical other- 
ness of the other that he and I do not form a system, we are 
not equals, we are not relations nor are we merely different 
as chalk and cheese. Rather, between us there is an absolute 
difference. It is not a dialectical relationship where 
self and other might mutually define one another; the 
existence of each is independent of the sphere of the other. 
Furthermore, this separation of face to face cannot be united 
by the gaze of a third person - it cannot be included within 
a totality. The pre-occupation of Western philosophy with 
totality - the view of the whole (and here Levinas includes 
Heideggerian 'Being') - destroys the alterity of the other. 
In Totality and Infinity - expressing the infinitizing 
rather than the totalizing - is articulated the breach of 
totality, the separation, the distance which makes it 
impossible to unite the face to face under a single gaze. 
The absolute distance which separates the same and other 
cannot be filled in. The 'inequality' does not appear to 
the third party who would count us; it cannot be recounted, 
since in telling it to another it is re-established. This 
inequality 
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precisely signifies the absence of a third 
party capable of taking in me and the other, 
such that the primordial multiplicity is 
observed within the very face to face that 
constitutes it. It is produced in multiple 
singularities and not in a being exterior to 
this number who could count the multiples. 
The inequality is in this impossibility of 
the exterior point of view, which alone could 
abolish it. 
And secondly, at the same time as the other's existence 
is radically independent of me, is unequal, irreducible to 
my comprehension or grasp, beyond the reduction of difference 
which is the totalizing process, the other who resists my 
powers of conceptualization exerts an absolute moral claim 
upon me. The face is the way in which the other presents 
himself 'which exceeds the idea of the other in me'; in its 
irreducibility to the same it reveals the impotence of 
totalization. But what Levinas calls the Epiphany of the 
Face is ethical, and reveals at the same time, or rather 
first of all, the injustice of totalization. Thus, of 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes: 
The establishing of this primacy of the ethical, 
that is, of the relationship of man to man - 
signification, teaching, and justice -a primacy 
of an irreducible structure upon which all other 
structures rest (and in particular all those 
which seem to put us primordially in contact with 
an impersonal sublimity, aesthetic or ontological), 
is one of the objectives of the present work. 
Levinas reverses the order whereby a 'metaphysics grounds 
an ethics; rather "The Other is the very locus of meta- 
physical truth". The face expresses this ethical priority, 
it makes a claim on me, summons me, calls me to my responsi- 
bilities. "The face opens the primordial discourse whose 
first word is obligation. " In speaking of the face not 
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as a (visual) disclosure but as a revelation in which truth 
is expressed, an epiphany and an injunction, Levinas refers 
to the 'Good which is beyond Being' of the Republic. To 
see the Good (to receive the other) is to reply. Unexpectedly, 
in view of his insistent non-perspectivism, non-occularism, 
Levinas expresses this in the form: Ethics is an optics. 
This 'optics' refers to an immediate or non-mediate 'seeing'; 
what in Aristotle's Ethics is a seein of-the situation 
becomes in Levinas a seeing of the other, a seeing which 
cannot help but reply. But the face that we see is no image. 
To hear the destitution of the other, 
which cries out for justice is not to present 
an image to oneself, but is to posit oneself 
as responsible, both as more and as less than 
the being which presents itself in the face. 
Less, for the face summons me to my obligations 
and judges me. More, for my position as I 
consists in being able to respond... 
Levinas writes that 
the differences between the Other and me do not 
depend on different properties that would be 
inherent in the 'I', on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, in the Other, nor on different 
psychological dispositions which their minds 
would take on from the encounter. They are due 
to the I-Other conjuncture, to the inevitable 
" orientation of being 'starting from oneself' 
toward 'the Other'. The priority of this 
orientation over the terms that are placed in it 
(and which cannot arise without this orienta- 
tion) summarizes the theses of the present work. 
We may now briefly consider this orientation starting with 
the 'starting from oneself', and noting particularly what 
bearing this orientation may have upon 'dwelling'. 
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Interiority 
We have seen that Levinas' thinking runs counter to 
those tendencies of 'totalization' whereby same and other 
may be included within the same panoramic perspective, in 
its uncompromising conception of the alterity of the other 
and of the 'absolute distance' which separates the other 
from the same. From the otherness of the other we now 
turn to the sameness of the same. 
The alterity, the radical heterogeneity of the 
other is possible only if the other is other 
with respect to a term whose essence is to 
remain at the point of departure, to serve as 
entry into the relation, to be the same not 
relatively but absolutely. A term can remain 
absolutely at the point of departure of 
relationship only as I. 
The way of the 'I', or the self is a way of 'making 
itself' which is 'identifying itself'. "The I... is the 
being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in 
recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it... " 
This mode of being constitutes the 'unrendable identity of 
the I and the self'. The 'I' identifies itself as the same 
not only in living the tautology 'I am I', but as a manner 
of being - at home with myself. "The way of the I against 
the 'other' of the world consists in soujourning, in 
identifying oneself by existing here at home with oneself. " 
The notion of self which Levinas invokes is strongly 
reminiscent of Kierkegaard. In his notion of 'beginning' 
(particularly in his earlier works) he stresses the self's 
relation with itself which it is compelled to maintain, 
as though we are on a trip "where one always has to look 
after one's baggage, baggage left behind or baggage one is 
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waiting for"; to be is to be "unable to turn back, it is 
to set sail and cut the moorings". 
There is a duality in existence, an essential 
lack of simplicity. The ego has a self, in 
which it is not only reflected, but with which 
it is involved like a companion or a partner; 
this relationship is what is called inwardness... 
Existence casts a shadow, which pursues it 
tirelessly. 
Existence is 'burdened with itself'. "Its movement of 
existence which might be pure and straightforward is bent 
and caught up in itself, showing the verb to be a reflexive 
verb: it is not just that one is, one is oneself (on s'est). " 
Ours is a perpetual birth. 
The identification of the same which is the way of the 
self - which starts from itself - is also a separation of 
the same. 
The separation of the same is produced in the 
form of an inner life, a psychism.... Separation 
is the very act of individuation, the possi- 
bility in general for an entity which is posited 
in being to be posited not by being defined by 
its references to a whole, by its place within 
a system, but starting from itself. The fact 
of starting from oneself is equivalent to 
separation. But the act of starting from one- 
self and separation can be produced in being 
only by opening the dimension of interiority. 
Psychism, interiority, articulates separation, a breach of 
totality -a breach of totality accomplished by an egoic 
self-identification and reduction of other to same which 
is the totalizing process par excellence. Interiority 
articulates separation; separation which is the ipseity 
of the self be-ing itself, a self whose way of being, as 
egoity, is to constitute itself as being, as a beginning. 
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The work of separation, that is the upsurge of the 
I which articulates itself as identification of the same, 
is accomplished as enjoyment. Enjoyment snuggles out a 
hollow for itself in the plentitude of being - from which 
it now no longer 'participates'. It hollows out interiority, 
the egoic shell of psychism, surrounds itself, and casts 
off... Enjoyment actualizes the separation of same for a 
being who is 'at one with' in finding itself at home with 
itself. "For the I to be means to enjoy something... In 
enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without 
reference to the Other, I am alone without solitude, 
innocently egoist and alone. " Enjoyment is the pulse, the 
'very eddy of the same'. To be an I is to enjoy what, 
in separation, is lived off. 
The movement to self in enjoyment and 
happiness marks the sufficiency of the I, 
although the image we have used of the 
spiral that coils over itself does not 
enable us to depict also the enrootedness 
of this sufficiency in the insufficiency 
of living from... The I is, to be sure, 
happiness, presence at home with itself. 
But, as sufficiency in its non-sufficiency, 
it remains in the non-I; it is enjoyment 
of 'something else', never of itself. 
Autochthonous, that is, enrooted in what 
it is not, it is nevertheless, within this 
enrootedness, independent and separated. 
The relationship of the I with the non-I 
produced as happiness which promotes the I 
consists neither in assuming nor refusing 
the non-I. Between the I and what it lives 
from there does not extend the absolute 
distance which separates the same from the 
other. The acceptance or refusal of what 
we live from implies a prior agreement 
(agrement), both given and received, the 
agreement of happiness. The primary agree- 
ment, to live, does not alienate the I but 
maintains it, constitutes its being at home 
with itself. 
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"In enjoyment throbs egoist being. Enjoyment separates 
by engaging in the content from which it lives. Separation 
comes to pass as the positive work of this engagement... to 
be separated is to be at home with oneself. " In enjoyment 
is opened up interiority, but not added as an attribute to 
a subject now endowed with conscious life. "The interiority 
of enjoyment is separation in itself, is the mode according 
to which such an event as separation can be produced in the 
economy of being. " 
The individuation of the same occurs from within. 
In the happiness of enjoyment is enacted the 
individuation, the autopersonification, the 
substantialization, and the independence of 
the self... Enjoyment is the very production 
of a being that is born, that breaks the 
tranquil eternity of its seminal or uterine 
existence to enclose itself in a person, who 
in living from the world lives at home with 
itself. 
The paradigm, perhaps, of what Levinas calls 'living 
from... ' is eating. Nourishment, to be sure, entails a 
transmutation of the other into the same, an incorporation 
of the other of the world. This transmutation of the other 
into the same is the essence of enjoyment, and "all enjoy- 
ment is in this sense alimental". However this does not 
so far capture the fuller meaning which Levinas attaches 
to 'living from... '. For not only are we nourished by the 
contents of what we eat; but this relish with which we eat, 
too, is a content which equally is nourishing. "Enjoyment 
is precisely this way the act nourishes itself with its own 
activity. " Our life is a consciousness of consciousness 
which is not a reflection or a self-consciousness, but 
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enjoyment. Life is a love of life. Even suffering loves 
the being to which it is riveted. One minute more, 
Mr Hangman! 
Eating is not mere replenishment, but a way of feeling 
re-invigorated, of enjoying one's own vitality. 
Nowhere in the phenomenal order does the object 
of an action refer to the concern for existing; 
it itself makes up our existence. We breathe 
for the sake of breathing, eat and drink for the 
sake of eating and drinking, we take shelter for 
the sake of taking shelter, we study to satisfy 
our curiosity, we take a walk for a walk. All 
that is not for the sake of living; it is living... 
It is in times of misery and privation that the 
shadow of an ulterior finality which darkens the 
world is cast behind the object of desire. When 
one has to eat, drink and warm oneself in order 
not to die, when nourishment becomes fuel, as in 
certain kinds of hard labour, the world also seems 
to be at an end, turned upside down and absurd 
needing to be renewed. Time becomes unhinged. 
i 
Not all modes of reducing alterity are equivalent. In 
need, the other is reduced to the same, and irrevocably 
altered by this reduction. Eating is the paradigm example. 
Eating is an 'innocent' action, or cohesion of enjoyment 
with exteriority, nevertheless, whereby the human being 
thrives on and is happy for his needs. Representation is 
a reduction of other to the same which leaves the other 
unaffected, in making intelligible. It is the surrendering 
of exteriority to thought, in which occurs the disappearance, 
within the same, "of the I as opposed to the non-I". 
One important image with which Levinas chooses to 
illustrate egoic interiority is that which occurs in The 
Republic, of Gyges' ring - whose wearer, being invisible, 
1Levinas, E. (1968) pp. 44-45. 
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is able to perform injustice with impunity. A rather more 
contemporary image of Gyges' situation is provided by the 
locked cubicle of the pornographic peep-show. There are 
many ways in which the situation of western man, who looks 
out onto the spectacle of the world for his enjoyment, is 
that of Gyges. From a position of invisibility and non- 
accountability he represents to himself a world which he 
in turn uses, manipulates and controls, accumulating power 
and exploiting resources to maintain his comforts. Separa- 
tion is a break with participation; it is "to see without 
being seen, like Gyges... The myth of Gyges is the very 
myth of the I and interiority, which exist non-recognized". 
Gyges is a being who no longer participates, who draws from 
itself its own existence - and a being for whom the world 
is a spectacle, and a spectre. "Gyges ring symbolizes 
separation. Gyges plays a double game, an presence to the 
others and an absence, speaking to 'others' and evading 
speech; Gyges is the very condition of man, the possibility 
of accepting the rules of the game, but cheating. " 
The security of a separated being, enjoying interiority, 
does not go unthreatened or unperturbed. Two sources of 
disturbance in particular present themselves, corresponding 
to two dimensions of lack, which may be designated by the 
domains of need and desire; of these, only need is capable 
of satisfaction. Desire desires beyond everything that 
could complete it. "The desired does not fulfil it, but 
deepens it. " 
In need, the alterity of the other of the world is 
surmounted -a world upon which need depends. The insecurity 
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of the world upon which need feeds is expressed by the 
elemental, whose darkness, formlessness resists possession 
and assimilation. The elemental is the backdrop from which 
things we enjoy come to us; it is the sea, the sky, the sun, 
the air, the night - against which the interiority of 
enjoyment offers shelter, and need finds satisfaction in 
the precipitation of objects of representation and things 
of enjoyment. The pursuit of labour and working over 
enables us to realize the security in which the 'other' 
of the elemental would be revealed as the same and need 
which is our dependence on the other, be satisfied. But 
our sheltering within the elemental remains troubled. 
"Enjoyment, as interiorization, runs up against the very 
strangeness of the earth. " "Faceless gods... mark the 
nothingness that bounds the egoism of enjoyment in the 
midst of its familiarity with the element. " The elemental 
comes from 'nowhere', its source is radically foreign, and 
flows from the anonymous nocturnal dimension of the il ya 
or the there is, from the horror of which the contentment 
of enjoyment, and indeed the occularism of light, per- 
spective, vision, comprehension and the panoramaism of 
totalization attempts to deliver us. 
The il ya is the unsee-able which announces itself 
as 'the anonymous rustling of existence', from whose 
watching in insomnia we are unable to withdraw by taking 
refuge in ourselves; from which even the drastic egoism - 
and enjoyment - of sleep finally is unable to lull us. 
The frontier of the anonymous night which watches repre- 
sents the pagan, facelessness of separation. 
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And yet it is precisely separation, and the finality 
of separation whereby the self casts off its moorings in 
being, by identifying itself as same, which makes possible 
the awakening of the Other in desire, that is, transcendence. 
Desire, unlike need, which is a 'sinking of one's teeth into 
the real', a satisfaction in assimilating the other, admits 
of no satisfaction, but offers 'an uncharted future before 
me'. Desire, which is the mode in which we experience the 
other, thus opens time - indeed reminds us that need's time 
is borrowed. "Human need rests on desire. " We arrive at 
the especial peculiarity of separated being. Precisely in 
the movement of separation, whose interiorizing produces a 
being absolutely - not relatively - closed over upon itself, 
"within the very interiority hollowed out by enjoyment there 
must be produced a heteronomy that incites to another 
destiny than this animal complacency in oneself... Interiority 
must be at the same time closed and open". "In the separated 
being the door to the outside must be at the same time open 
and closed. " 
Exteriority 
The self, for Levinas, is beginning; and his thinking 
begins with the self. The entirety of its argument, however, 
is concerned to show that philosophy does not end with the 
self. The very nature of the self which identifies itself 
as the same requires a response to that which is exterior, 
utterly beyond it - the 'absolutely other' who is the Other. 
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The movement of separation - notwithstanding the 
seriousness of its radical closedness (denoted in Levinas 
by 'atheism') establishes a starting point for 'another 
destiny'. The egoic shell which enjoyment hollows out - 
that is, interiority - makes possible a relation with that 
which is quite other than itself, independent of itself. 
"The face to face is established starting with a point 
separated from exteriority so radically that it maintains 
itself of itself, is me. " This 'I' is "the mode in which 
the break up of totality, which leads to the presence of 
the absolutely other, is concretely accomplished". The 
alterity that belongs to the essence of the other is 
visible only from an I. But if separation is needed for 
exteriority - as a point of departure for alterity - the 
movement of separated being towards exteriority is not the 
reversal of separation - the return to the one. For the 
Other is the infinite being; the movement of separation 
is not on the same plane as that of transcendence. 
But the infinity of the other tells us that the image 
of separation as a 'point of departure' is misleading; for 
if the other is accessible only from a 'me', requires a me, 
that is a separated self - "the light of the face is 
necessary for separation". The 'light of the face' which 
provokes separated being, sets separated being on its way 
"not by some force of opposition and dialectical evocation, 
but by the feminine grace of its radiance" Levinas calls 
the idea of infinity. 
This very intricate and paradoxical notion, the 'idea 
of infinity' plays a central part in Levinas' thinking. 
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Very briefly, it bears upon the way in which a separated 
being can entertain the idea of what is absolutely other - 
without compromising this separation, or this otherness. 
The idea of infinity arises from that most paradoxical 
'relation' between same and other, in which the separated 
being turns out to contain in itself more than it can 
contain; it suggests an overflowing, but one for which no 
image of vessels is adequate. The 'grace' of the idea of 
infinity allows us to speak of the 'infinite being' being 
'present' within totality. The separated being initiates 
itself, is its own beginning (hence it is 'abitrary') yet 
it does not, and could not originate the idea of infinity, 
which it receives, which is 'placed' in it. 
It is the idea of infinity which allows Levinas to 
propose that 
The interiority that ensures separation (but not 
as an abstract rejoinder to the notion of 
relation) must produce a being absolutely closed 
over upon itself, not deriving its isolation 
dialectically from its opposition to the Other. 
And this closedness must not prevent egress from 
interiority, so that exteriority could speak to 
it, reveal itself to it... 
The idea of the infinite is very substantially influenced 
by the discussion of the Idea of God in Descartes third 
meditation. The relation between interiority and exterio- 
rity, writes Levinas, "where the transcendence of the 
relation does not cut the bonds a relation implies, yet 
where these bonds do not unite the same and the other into 
a whole, is in fact fixed in the situation described by 
Descartes, in which the 'I think' maintains with the 
infinite it can nowise contain and from which it is 
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separated a relation called 'idea of infinity"'. This 
idea of infinity which reveals the I and the infinite 
without merging them "revealing them as two distinct moments 
of evidence mutually founding one another, characterizes 
the very meaning of separation". "Descartes discovers a 
relation with total alterity irreducible to interiority 
which nevertheless does not do violence to interiority. " 
The idea of infinity, that is, the appearance of the other 
in us suggests an overflowing; yet it is an overflowing that 
exceeds its own image, that is, which the image of a liquid 
overflowing a vessel does not describe. 
The idea of infinity, the infinitely more 
contained in the less, is concretely produced 
in the form of a relation with the face. And 
the idea of infinity alone maintains the 
exteriority of the other with respect to the 
same, despite this relation. Thus a structure 
analogous to the ontological argument is here 
produced: the exteriority of a being is 
inscribed in its essence. But what is produced 
here is not a reasoning, but the epiphany that 
occurs as the face. 
The alterity of the other now has been alluded to in 
various ways. The other who exceeds the idea of him in me 
by an infinite distance appears before us as unmediated - as 
the face to face - necessarily beyond the grasp of thought. 
But the self cannot not think the infinite, since the idea 
of infinity is autochthonous with separated being - which 
therefore - thinks more than it thinks. The face cannot be 
comprehended, thought, possessed, or otherwise assimilated 
to the same. It resists assimilation or possession - not 
through the enormity or unsurmountability of possession's 
task, as the mountain resists my powers to climb it or the 
stars in the immensity of space exceed my reach. Levinas 
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speaks of the 'ethical resistance' or non-resistance of 
the face which speaks to us (for the face is simultaneous 
with language) and in its expression resists the violence 
of possession "not with a very great resistance, with some- 
thing absolutely other... ". "The expression the face 
introduces into the world does not defy the feebleness of 
my powers, but my ability for power... The face speaks to 
me and thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate with 
a power exercised, be it enjoyment or knowledge. " In the 
'infinite resistance to murder', which tells in the 'total 
nudity of his defenceless eyes', in his face, in his pri- 
mordial expression, is his first word: You shall not commit 
murder. 
The alterity of the other, therefore, is further 
illustrated by his non-equality or asymmetry of height. 
The other is not my equal. Intersubjective space displays 
a 'curvature' which 'inflects distance into elevation'; 
exteriority states itself, commands, speaks from a height 
and a lowliness - from a 'glorious abasement' whereby the 
other is 'nearer to God', than myself. Were it not for 
this dimension of height, a further articulation of separa- 
tion, we would not be able to look at the other without 
'burning our eyes'. "In the dimension of height in which 
his sanctity, that is, his separation is presented, the 
infinite does not burn the eyes that are lifted unto him. " 
The face is not sensible; it is disincarnate and does 
not belong within the sensibility of enjoyment or vision. 
Vision is contrasted with discourse, and it is discourse 
which eventuates the relation with the other. The vision 
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of the face is not the 'plastic image' of appearance, but 
speaks in an offering which is language, the 'primordial 
donation'. The essence of language is the relation with 
the other, which consists in speaking the world to the 
other. The face - expression - opens the primordial 
discourse, in soliciting a welcome and a response. "The 
face, pre-eminently expression, formulates the first word; 
the signifier arising at the thrust of his sign, as eyes 
that look at you. " But the expression of the other, which 
is language, does not 'bridge' the distance of separation; 
on the contrary, speech both proceeds from absolute diffe- 
rence and establishes absolute difference. Language is 
precisely the manner in which the self may be with another, 
without reducing him to what he is not, that is, while 
still leaving his otherness intact. The transcendent 
relation which is language is not to be thought of as a 
union with the infinite, the transcedent, with the other 
who addresses, where language is the medium of participa- 
tion. The transcendence of egoism is not a puncturing 
of the egoic shell by the pointedness of language, but a 
calling from an asymmetry of height which brings egoism 
into question, into account, into responsibility, to which 
only an I can respond. 
Conversation, from the very fact that it 
maintains the distance between me and the 
Other, the radical separation asserted in 
transcendence which prevents the re-con- 
stitution of totality, cannot renounce the 
egoism of its existence; but the very fact 
of being in conversation consists in recog- 
nizing in the Other a right over this egoism, 
and hence in justifying oneself. Apology, 
in which the I at the same time asserts it- 
self and inclines before the transcendent, 
belongs to the essence of conversation. 
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It is clear that the advent of the other introduces 
a change of situation which is not simply the socializing 
of a delinquent ego, or the dissolution of monadism in the 
pluralism of company. The ethical relation, a relation 
"with a reality infinitely distant from my own reality, yet 
without this distance destroying this relation, and without 
this relation destroying this distance" does not become 
"an implantation in the other and a confusion with him". 
The relation does not add the dimension of 'others', but 
witnesses an essential metastasis from sorcery to reality, 
or from phenomenality to being, which is a breaking through 
the screen of appearances. The face of the other does not 
offend or curtail the freedom of autonomous, separated 
being; it calls it to responsibility and founds it. It 
is - despite its separation, its ipseity, its autonomy - 
by virtue of the relationship with the other, or'the idea 
of infinity - that man, "withdrawn from the elements; 
recollected in a home, represents a world to himself". 
But at the same time, it is because of this relation, 
because of the other that "man does not permit himself to 
be deceived by his glorious triumph as a living being, and 
unlike the animal can know the difference between being 
and phenomenon, can recognize his phenomenality, the penury 
of his plenitude... ". Levinas accuses Heidegger of a 
comprehension which subordinates the relationship with the 
Other to the relation with being in general. On the 
contrary, argues Levinas it is the relation with the Other 
which commands Being. "Being is enacted in the relation 
between men. " Being is exteriority. 
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"As long as the existence of man remains interiority 
it remains phenomenal. The language by which a being 
exists for another is his unique possibility to exist with 
an existence that is more than his interior existence. " 
Dwelling 
The dwelling is spoken of by Levinas as a concretization 
of separation, where dwelling is the very mode of maintaining 
oneself. To be separated and to dwell somewhere are equi- 
valent, separation is produced positively in the localisation 
of dwelling. 'Separation is an economy. ' 
To separate oneself, not to remain bound up 
with a totality, is positively to be some- 
where, in the home, to be economically. The 
'somewhere' and the home render egoism, the 
primordial mode of being in which separation 
is produced, explicit. 
The home is the 'first concretization' - and one through 
which the world is seen. From the intimacy of the home 
arises the objective world; "concretely speaking, the 
dwelling is not situated in the objective world, but the 
objective world is situated by relation to my dwelling". 
The dwelling elaborates the withdrawal from the 
elements in immediate enjoyment, and opens an orientation 
towards the future which is suggested by the notion of 
'recollection'. Recollection, concretized as dwelling, 
takes further that hollowing out of interiority by 
'enjoyment', in a suspension of immediacy. In the 
'recollection of itself' of separated being "produced con- 
cretely as habitation in a dwelling or a home" a 
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postponement, or a delay, arises. Levinas speaks of the 
'extra-territoriality' which makes the interiority of the 
home 'in the midst of the elements of enjoyment with which 
life is nourished' - as a 'delightful lapse' in the onto- 
logical order. The dwelling is a 'perpetual postponement' 
overcoming the insecurity of life (by sheltering from the 
elements, preparing for the morrow by establishing labour 
and possession). "The domiciled being... accords itself a 
delay. " Recollection is a 'having time' - to be conscious - 
to exist recalled - 'is precisely to have time'. Recollection 
"designates a suspension of the immediate reactions the 
world solicits... "; in the home, which concretizes 
recollection, "immediate enjoyment is ajourned and delayed", 
and the 'plenum of the elements' is broken "in opening in 
it the utopia in which the I recollects itself in dwelling 
at home with itself". The pause of dwelling, recollection, 
resembles a recouler pour mieux sauter; the notion of taking 
stock may be appropriate in the light of Levinas' discussion 
of dwelling and possession; for the dwelling is the primary 
appropriation, and condition for all property, all possess- 
ion, all labour. 
The privileged role of the home does not 
consist in being the end of human activity 
but in being its condition, and in this sense 
its commencement. The recollection necessary 
for nature to be able to be represented and 
worked over, for it to first to take form as 
a world, is accomplished as the home. Man 
abides in the world as having come to it from 
a private domain, from being at home with 
himself, to which at each moment he can 
retire. He does not come to it from an inter- 
sideral space where he would already be in 
possession of himself and from which at each 
moment he would have to recommence a perilous 
landing. But he does not find himself brutally 
cast forth and forsaken in the world. Simul- 
taneously without and within, he goes forth 
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outside from an inwardness (intimite). Yet 
this inwardness opens up in a home which is 
situated in that outside. 
The habitation, or the dwelling is a break, a delay, 
a lingering, an epoch;, a moment which hovers, as a medi- 
tation or recollection, and which affords a distance between 
the elements and the I, and the I and its future. This 
opening, or space of recollection is characterized by the 
gentleness and warmth of its intimacy -a warmth or gentle- 
ness which comes from the upsurge of another, who is the 
feminine being. 
That the gentleness in which recollection is lived is 
not simply a decoration produced by the separated I, is 
suggested where the field of intimacy is characterized by 
its hospitality and welcome. "The interiority of recollection 
is a solitude in a world already human. Recollection refers 
to a welcome. " It is this inhabitant that inhabits the 
essential interiority of the home, the 'welcoming one par 
excellence, welcomes in itself' that Levinas refers to as 
the feminine being. 
By the feminine being Levinas explicitly and clearly 
does not refer to the empirical woman, nor to the 'role of 
woman'. He speaks of the feminine, in his analysis, as 'one 
of the cardinal points on the horizon in which the inner 
life takes place', and of the 'dimension of femininity' 
which remains open within the dwelling, as its very welcome. 
Feminine alterity is not transcendence and language, but 
yet is a revelation in which the presence of the other is 
revealed, simultaneously with this presence "in its 
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withdrawal and in its absence", a simultaneity which "is 
the very essence of discretion". The feminine alterity is 
situated on another plane than language and 
nowise represents a truncated, stammering, 
still elementary language. On the contrary, 
the discretion of this presence includes all 
the possibilities of the transcendent relation 
with the Other. 
The Other who welcomes in intimacy is not the 
you (vous) of the face that reveals itself in 
a dimension of height, but precisely the thou 
(tu) of familiarity: a language without 
teaching, a silent language, an understanding 
without words, an expression in secret. The 
I-Thou in which Buber sees the category of 
interhuman relationship is the relation not 
with the interlocutor but with feminine alterity. 
In dwelling we are referred to welcome, to possession, 
and finally to gift, or hospitality - where what is 
possessed is the world, and what is given is the word 
which speaks it. The dwelling breaks with natural existence, 
in a fashion which leaves the separated being 'circulating 
between visibility and invisibility', answering to a 
silent language. But this separation does not mark the 
dispersal of the elements, but rather makes possible, 
through labour, their appropriation or possession. The 
two organs whereby this appropriation primarily is affected 
are the eye and the hand. 
In the 'eye' we allude to the ambiguities of distance 
whereby the separated being, in taking up its habitation, 
is separated from the elements. The eye of the inhabitant 
is symbolized by the window, which is the way in which 
dwelling is open upon that from which it separates. 
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The ambiguity of distance, both removal and 
connection, is lifted by the window that makes 
possible a look that dominates, a look of him 
who escapes looks, the look that contemplates. 
The elements remain at the disposal of the I, 
to take or to leave. Labour will hence forth 
draw things from the elements and thus discover 
the world.... With the dwelling the latent birth 
of the world is produced. 
With the hand, the grasp, of labour, a domain is opened 
up which is no longer enjoyment, sensibility, but mastery, 
domination, disposition. 
An organ for taking, for acquisition it gathers 
the fruit but holds it far from the lips, keeps 
it, puts it in reserve, possesses it in a home. 
The dwelling conditions labour. 
The access to the world is produced in a move- 
ment that starts from the utopia of the dwelling 
and traverses a space to effect a primordial 
grasp, to seize and to take away. The uncertain 
future of the element is suspended. The element 
is fixed between the four walls of the home, is 
calmed in possession. It appears there as a 
thing, which can, perhaps, be defined by tran- 
quility - as a 'still life'. This grasp operated 
on the elemental is labour. 
Every manipulation of a system of tools and 
implements, every labour, presupposes a primordial 
hold on things, possession, whose latent birth is 
marked by the home, at the frontier of interiority. 
The world is a possible possession, and every 
transformation of the world by industry is a 
variation of the regime of property. Proceeding 
from the dwelling, possession, accomplished by 
the quasi-miraculous grasp of a thing in the 
night, in the apeiron of prime matter, discovers 
a world. 
Possession - which now burdens the hand that possesses - 
is called into question by the Other. 
But in order that I am able to free myself from 
the very possession that the welcome of the Home 
establishes, in order that I be able to see 
things in themselves, that is, represent them 
to myself, refuse both enjoyment and possession, 
I must know how to give what I possess. Only 
thus could I situate myself absolutely above my 
engagement in the non-I. But for this I must 
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encounter the indiscreet face of the Other that 
calls me into question. The Other - the absolutely 
other - paralizes possession, which he contests by 
the epiphany in the face. He contests my possession 
only because he approaches me not from the outside 
but from above. The same can not lay hold of this 
other without suppressing him. But the untravers- 
able infinity of the negation of murder is 
announced by this dimension of height, where the 
Other comes to me concretely in the ethical 
impossibility of committing this murder. I welcome 
the Other who presents himself in my home by opening 
my home to him. 
The calling in question of the I, co-extensive with 
the manifestation of the Other in the face, we call 
language. 
The relationship with the Other is not produced 
outside of the world, but puts in question the world 
possessed. The relationship with the Other, trans- 
cedence, consists in speaking the world to the Other. 
But language accomplishes the primordial putting in 
common... it is the offering of the world to the 
Other. Transcendence is not a vision of the Other, 
but a primordial donation... The 'vision' of the face 
is inseparable from this offering lagnuage is. To 
see the face is to speak of the world. 
To recognize the Other is therefore to come to him 
across the world of possessed things, but at the 
same time to establish, by gift, community and 
universality. Language is universal because it 
is the very passage from the individual to the 
general, because it offers things which are mine 
to the Other. To speak is to make the world 
common, to create commonplaces. Language lays 
the foundations for a possession in common. It 
abolishes the inalienable property of enjoyment. 
The world in discourse is no longer what it is 
in separation, in the being at home with oneself 
where everything is given to me; it is what I 
give: the communicable, the thought, the universal 
.... The relationship between the same and the 
other, my welcoming of the other, is the ultimate 
fact. 
Dwelling and Hospitality 
My discussion of 'Concern and its Grounds' culminates 
in this expression by Levinas that hospitality is the very 
essence of the home. It is first of all worth quoting the 
following passage in full: 
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But the transcendence of the face is not enacted 
outside of the world, as though the economy by 
which separation is produced remained beneath a 
sort of beatific contemplation of the Other (which 
would thereby turn into the idolatry that brews 
in all contemplation). The 'vision' of the face 
as face is a certain mode of soujourning in a 
home, or - to speak in a less singular fashion - 
a certain form of economic life. No human or 
interhuman relationship can be enacted outside of 
economy; no face can be approached with empty 
hands and closed home. Recollection in a home 
open to the Other - hospitality - is the concrete 
and initial fact of human recollection and 
separation; it co-incides with the Desire for 
the Other absolutely transparent. The chosen 
home is the very opposite of a root. It indicates 
a disengagement, a wandering (errance) which has 
made it possible, which is not a less with respect 
to installation, but the surplus of the relation 
with the Other, metaphysics. 
But the separated being can close itself up 
in its egoism, that is, in the very accomplishment 
of its isolation. And this possibility of for- 
getting the transcendence of the Other - of 
banishing with impunity all hospitality (that is, 
all language) from one's home, banishing the 
transcendental relation that alone permits the I 
to shut itself up in itself - evinces the absolute 
truth, the radicalism, of separation. Separation 
is not only dialectically correlative with trans- 
cedence, as its reverse; it is accomplished as a 
positive event. The relation with infinity 
remains as another possibility of the being re- 
collected in its dwelling. The possibility for 
the home to open to the Other is as essential to 
the essence of the home as closed doors and windows. 
Separation would not be radical if the possibility 
of shutting oneself up at home with oneself could 
not be produced without internal contradiction 
as an event in itself, as atheism itself is pro- 
duced if it should only be an empirical, psycho- 
logical fact, an illusion. 
Where welcome or hospitality are not present within 
dwelling, or economic life, where separated being remains 
shut up within itself, this is possible only because the 
invocation of separation 'leaves room' for processes of 
being of this sort; for a separation which 'remains 
separated and capable of shutting itself up against the 
very appeal that has aroused it' at the same time remains 
capable of 'welcoming this face of infinity with all the 
297 
resources of ego-ism: economically'. The claim that the 
essence of the home is the welcome of hospitality is not 
to say that the home fulfils its nature in receiving 
guests; but that its justification is not economic. 
"The 'vision' of the face as face", writes Levinas, 
"is a certain mode of soujourning in a home". This certain 
mode we may now call 'hospitable'. However, we need not by 
any means consider ourselves to be 'applying Levinas', or 
to be 'Levinasian' simply because in 'hospitable dwelling' 
we find the key theoretical terms that we have been looking 
for. In the following chapters we shall continue with our 
theorizing on 'hospitable dwelling'; but now more clearly 
set within the laboratory from which it emerged, and couched 
in terms other than those written sources which came to 
inform it. 
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Introduction to Part Three 
We may now consider how the (theoretical) orientation 
which the previous chapters provide may inform us as to the 
living out, working, or 'practice' of therapeutic commu- 
nities. The word 'discipline' is perhaps preferable to 
'practice', insofar as it conveys the idea of an instruction 
or teaching as well as a work; moreover it avoids the 
suggestion that this chapter stands in relation to those 
which proceeded it as 'practice' stands to 'theory' in 
the sense that, a theory having been provided we may now 
discuss its application. For it is, I have argued, a 
'practical science' with which we are here concerned, a 
discipline whose aim is to engender a well-being on the part 
of those who surrender to its exactitudes; a discipline 
which proceeds as a showing or bringing into view, through 
dialogue, those considerations which have bearing upon the 
nature of enlightened conduct and fulfilling action, which 
is fitting or appropriate to its particular circumstances. 
In discussing this discipline, I shall direct my 
attention predominantly towards one particular household. 
This household, which I shall subsequently refer to as 
Portland Road, or the Portland Road house, was founded in 
1971, and ran for some eight years. It was envisioned, 
founded and inspired by one person: Dr. Hugh Crawford. 
Dr. Crawford did not himself live there, yet his position 
within the house, throughout its life, was central. 
Indeed, the story of this household is to a very great 
extent to do with the manner in which he gathered around 
him a group of people who were personally drawn towards 
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him, and to the work to which he devoted the last years of 
his life. Hugh Crawford died in 1980. 
Dr. Crawford took his medical degree at Glasgow 
University in 1953, and undertook subsequent psychiatric 
training in Canada. After working within institutional 
psychiatry both in Canada and the United States, and on the 
basis of this work being elected to a Fellowship of the 
Royal College of Physicians of Canada, Dr. Crawford returned 
in 1966 to the United Kingdom, and established himself in 
private psychotherapeutic practice in London. Although 
Dr. Crawford's psychotherapeutic orientation was psycho- 
analytic, he preferred, where called upon to employ some 
shorthand device, to characterize his own attitude as 
phenomenological. 
Soon after his arrival in London, Hugh Crawford 
accepted an invitation to membership of the Philadelphia 
Association, a charity which was set up by Dr. R. D. Laing 
and colleagues in 1965, and which addresses itself to the 
relief of what ordinarily is called mental illness. The 
Philadelphia Association popularly is identified with the 
'anti-psychiatric' movement; a more informative shorthand 
index of its common ground is offered by the word 
'phenomenology', and it is the thinking of this philosophi- 
cal tradition which, in particular informs those critiques 
of contemporary psychiatry for which the Philadelphias 
Association is known. 
The Philadelphia Association, possibly, is equally 
known for its work in the founding of therapeutic community 
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households, of which the first, Kingsley Hall, was set 
up in 1965. Since Kingsley Hall, the Philadelphia 
Association has fostered some eighteen therapeutic 
community households which have offered refuge and asylum 
to those who sought it. A recent publication of the 
Association claims that "the experience of the past seven- 
teen years has demonstrated that episodes of personal 
crisis, of seemingly inescapable distress and confusion, 
and of stark madness may for many people best be negotiated 
in the context of such dwellings". I hope in the course of 
the following chapters to show some of the considerations 
which may support such a claim. 
Whilst one may legitimately speak of a Philadelphia 
Association 'approach' to therapeutic communities, this 
does perhaps already invite a certain misunderstanding. 
From the first, each one of the member households of the 
Philadelphia Association has shaped its own characteristic 
style, its own way, determined not only by the styles of 
the psychotherapist or psychotherapists who have been most 
centrally involved, and by the people who have lived there, 
but also by the nature of the house and the circumstances 
under which it became available. Kingsley Hall was the 
first, and assumes a certain historical importance, but 
by no means have subsequent houses been engaged in some 
attempt to recreate the ambiance or ethos of that parti- 
cular dwelling. 
In these chapters, my attention will be directed upon 
the particular style of one of these households. To 
emphasize, however, this particular style, and moreover to 
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state at the onset the 'inseparability' of this style from 
that of the person who made possible its opening and who 
infused it with his own vision, might. on the face of it 
seem to place considerable limitations upon the scope of 
the thesis that. I am here defending. For my task is not 
simply to describe this one particular project, lived out 
in its own unique fashion and by its very nature unrepeat- 
able, so as to leave the reader merely with the impression 
that this was an 'interesting experiment'. My purpose in 
this thesis rather is to bring before the reader's consider- 
ation the claim that an inquiry into the nature of dwelling - 
and what it means to dwell hospitably - may itself open 
out, and open upon questions of what is entailed for the 
members of a household to live together therapeutically. 
The following two considerations will serve to justify 
the validity of my choice of approach to these questions. 
Firstly, the Portland Road household was, in its own 
way, engaged in precisely this inquiry. This inquiry was 
opened up in deed - as a lived work and not merely some 
theoretical exercise. I have stressed the 'style' of the 
house; it now remains to be emphasized that this 'style' 
was a way of working. Each of us will have our own style 
of writing or swimming - but only if we write or swim. 
The question of style cannot be separated from the question 
of how the house worked, how the household 'housed' and 
'held'. 
Since this work of the house is not some pre-ordained 
task, but was itself brought into view in the course of 
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its own working or unfolding, my aim in these chapters must 
be to draw attention to the way or style of this household, 
the manner in which it found its way, and the questions 
which it raised, rather than to present an account of con- 
clusions which have now been worked out. My task is to 
raise again the question or meditation which was re-opened 
within Portland Road, and which in subsequent ventures must 
be taken up afresh - what is the work of a household which 
is concerned to safeguard and open dwelling; a work which, 
if it is to be done well, might deem that household 
'therapeutic'. 
A second consideration may now be mentioned. In 
proposing to describe the fashion in which Portland Road 
identified and went about its business, my aim is not that 
of providing a model which might be followed, perhaps with 
some modications according to altered circumstances or up- 
dated in accordance with the wisdom which hindsight affords. 
My choice of Portland Road is not that of an example of 
the 'best' or the 'correct' way to run a therapeutic house- 
hold, for such bland and arrogant recommendation would make 
little more sense than claims to have discovered the right 
way to live. My choice of Portland Road is as an exemplar 
which serves very well to introduce a number of paradig- 
matic issues which must arise in the case of a great many 
households which aspire to be therapeutic communities, 
issues which have hitherto remained insufficiently discussed. 
Here, my account or description of Portland Road inflects 
more towards interpretation, in the sense that my emphasis 
shifts from the manner in which members of this household 
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attempted to realize the possibilities available to them, 
to the nature of the issues about which such realization 
may pivot. My emphasis upon the word discipline now 
shifts from that of a work or working to include an instruct- 
ion, or teaching; for here I am weaving into my account 
some discussion of a number of guiding principles, the 
usefulness of which subsequent ventures may confirm. 
The terrain through which such guiding principles might 
offer illumination has already been introduced. We have 
proposed as the ground to be cultivated or opened up in 
the course of a therapeutic community's working, that 'ethical 
ground' defined in terms of where people stand with regard 
to one another, what they mean to one another, how they 
treat one another, a ground which may open or come into 
view nowhere more originally than in the 'commonplace' where 
people live together. Such guiding principles as we now 
seek simultaneously bear upon the nature of the issues 
which arise or emerge in the course of living together, 
and the conditions within which such issues may more 
readily come into view. 
Some years after it had started, Hugh Crawford wrote 
that Portland Road is a house dedicated to the propositions: 
- That health is inseparable from freedom, and 
that freedom is predicated on the space and 
time for people to find themselves with each 
other; 
- that health is not achieved by prevention or 
intervention, that on the contrary these lead 
only to a runaway of escalating manoeuvres; 
- that given an opportunity, a person will make 
himself at home in conditions where he is not 
required to be a certain way but rather is 
free to find his way in an ambiance of concern; 
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- that when he is at home in this ambiance of 
concern he will be rooted in what he is 
doing and his being will flower into a world 
which he does not find strange. 
These four deceptively simple propositions serve very 
well as examples of what I am calling 'guiding principles'. 
As they stand, however, they remain rather too abstracted 
from the settings in which they might be contextualized, 
from which they emerged, and to which they proved illumi- 
native, to provide a constructive source of practical guidance 
to the unprepared reader. The work of contextualization, 
in the course of which guiding principles such as these 
exhibit more clearly their claim to being informative, 
will occupy the following chapters. 
Here, however, we may note that the questions which 
these propositions touch upon, and raise - questions for 
example to do with the nature of health and freedom - 
appear in a strong sense to be cultural questions. 'Cul- 
tural', that is, not simply in the sense that all questioning 
(all language) is cultural, nor in the sense that different 
sorts of answers will be offered by different cultures, but 
in the sense that persons in our culture fulfil themselves 
according to the manner in which they seek and live out 
answers to these questions. 
Part of what we understand by 'culture' refers to that 
power or source from which the members of the culture draw, 
and which thereby enables the various enigmas and riddles 
of life more creatively to be expressed and lived out. 
The living of a human life - that is, for a cultural and 
not a natural being - is very much to do with the manner 
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in which the individual is able to 'cultivate' this 
source, and in this cultivation, be 'cultivated', fulfilled 
or enriched. Furthermore, one might assess the vitality 
or richness of a culture by the degree to which it lends 
itself to this sort of cultivation, in carrying forward 
and opening those traditions which enable its members to 
cope with, for example, life's adversities, in a creative 
manner. The religious traditions of a culture are obviously 
instructive in this regard. 
The notion of 'homelessness' which I am using to 
embrace 'mental illness' has a very direct bearing upon 
this matter of culture, for in that homelessness and aliena- 
tion which is mental illness we may find very clear 
illustrations of an impoverished cultural belonging, such 
that the potentially creative cultural domains of work and 
play, and those cultural sources which open up the horizons 
of the world, seem to be closed off or inaccessible. The 
domain of 'home life', in the richness of its ordinariness, 
provides my central illustration. But as a very simple 
example of a 'cultural closure' or enclosure we might take 
the situation of a patient attending his periodic psychia- 
tric review, where the sources which inform those responsible 
for his management and treatment remain, for him, a closed 
book. Far from accepting that this knowledge bandied about 
by the psychiatric priesthood must be of a 'special nature', 
a private currency, we must assume that in any authentically 
therapeutic situation those sources and traditions which 
are informative and illuminative will be shown forth in 
the light of their truthfulness, and in words which, in 
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sounding to the depths, resound and ring true. 
I have spoken of Hugh's preference to regard his own 
approach as 'phenomenological'. I now suggest that this 
phenomenological orientation, which was a beckoning gesture 
to the household, might claim to have been culturally en- 
riching, both in the sense of opening out upon such cultural 
questions as I have mentioned, to do with the way we lead our 
lives, and in the sense of drawing upon and rendering accessi- 
ble an enormously powerful cultural source, that of the 
Western critical, meditative philosophical tradition. Here 
the metaphor of 'opening the book' may be an apt one. Yet 
it is not to be understood in some sense that phenomenological 
texts were required reading, for most people in the house 
had no particular interest at all in the formal study of 
phenomenology. The text which was, in the first place, 
addressed within Portland Road was the ordinary, the everyday, 
and that which was opened up in the everyday conversation 
of the house. But the way in which this conversation moved 
through chatter to attentive or meditative or thoughtful 
speaking, and wandered between the silence of the unspeakable 
and that of stillness was considerably enabled by Hugh's 
pointing toward and showing the accessibility to all of 
those sources and traditions which had illuminated him. 
And this notion of the accessibility of the sources is 
itself rather central to phenomenology. This discipline is 
concerned, very roughly, with a ', letting be seen' of 'that 
which shows itself'. Insofar as there exists a discernible 
school, or better, movement, to which phenomenologists 
belong, this is not to be identified with some pool of 
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knowledge from which they draw, or even some set of pro- 
cedures whereby this pool might be augmented. The pheno- 
menological method is to be understood as an orientation 
of thoughtfulness towards the sources or origins of our 
knowledge, which always remains to be taken up for oneself. 
It is realized as a radical return to the world of which 
accumulated knowledge speaks, the world which I live, 
which at the same time always transcends me, and to which 
I am an opening. Thus the phenomenologist does not address 
himself, as is sometimes supposed, to an analysis of the 
'contents of consciousness', but endeavours to speak faith- 
fully of the world as it shows itself, appears, according 
to his manner of engagement. In these chapters I am 
centrally concerned with a phenomenological showing, that 
is, with a showing which opens in the same movement the 
manner as well as the matter of its disclosure. 
One cultural source of especial importance may finally 
be mentioned: our language. The text of the 'lebenswelt', 
the lived world of the everyday, is inseparable from ordinary 
language; and part of becoming familiar with, and at home in 
the world is to do with knowing, and being at home in the 
words by which the world is shown and bodied forth. It is 
no accident that the volume which took pride of place amongst 
the rather peculiar assortment of books which lined the 
shelves of the kitchen - and the only one which the house- 
hold collectively bought - was Eric Partridge's 'Origins'. 
There is little doubt-that the many occasions upon which 
this fine etymological dictionary was brought out and 
enjoyed, prepared the house to recognize that it had found, 
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in 'dwelling', a root it had been looking for. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
FOUNDATIONS 
The beginnings 
Hugh's hopes and plans to start a community household 
go back at least to the time of his return to England. The 
occasion for the realization of this venture came about when 
a roomy Victorian house, set in a recently shabby but 
suddenly fashionable North Kensington street became avail- 
able to him for the charitable purposes of his choice. The 
house was held in trusteeship by Dr. Crawford for an in- 
definite period; there was therefore complete 'security of 
tenure', and no constraints were placed upon the manner of 
its occupation. The property consisted of a basement and 
four floors, together with a small walled garden. The base- 
ment was never much used by the house, except in later 
years as a yoga room. A year after its opening, an arrange- 
ment was made between the house and the Philadelphia 
Association on the basis of which the basement space was 
used by the latter for meetings, study and training seminars, 
and for its office. 
Upstairs, and effectively at the heart of the house, 
there was a large kitchen-dining room. A large window at 
the back faced onto the garden, access to which was gained 
by a makeshift arrangement of planks, eventually to be 
replaced by a well constructed balcony and wooden stair. 
On the other side of the kitchen, partition doors opened 
into a spacious livingroom, which was carpeted and furnished 
mainly with large cushions. The other three floors con- 
tained seven bedrooms, two of which were quite spacious, 
311 
and served upon occasion as double or even three-person 
rooms. The top three bedrooms were constructed out of 
the unused attic space, when, after two years, the need 
for more space arose. Although small, they were made 
attractive with bare pine and large dormer windows. 
The physical condition of the house was to change very 
considerably during the years of its inhabitation by the 
community. In the beginning, life in the house was quite 
lacking in ordinary comforts. The property was in a very 
rough state of repair; there was makeshift wiring, no 
plumbing, and only the most rudimentary kitchen facilities. 
Each of the rooms was urgently in need of decorating. 
Notwithstanding their own personal difficulties, an over- 
riding priority for the three people who lived in the house 
for the first year was that of making the place minimally 
habitable. Gradually - and particularly over the next two 
years - the house took shape, and the lower floors at least 
came to be adequately repaired, quite attractively decorated, 
and in a certain easygoing style, comfortable. The quality 
and finish of the decorating became more rough and ready, 
at least in the stairways and landings, as one moved up- 
stairs and away from those areas in most frequent use. Some 
jobs were never completed throughout the entire life of 
the house. The bathroom door, for example, never fitted, 
and could not close properly, let alone lock. 
At the end of the first year, only one person remained 
in the house; and thereafter it was some while before the 
few people who subsequently moved in established more than 
a minimal degree of cohesiveness. Although the original 
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members did not come to be known to most of those who 
subsequently lived there, some of their traces remained, 
as did founding stories which became etched into the fabric 
of the house. One young woman, for example, had spent many 
hours of her time painstakingly, by hand, stripping the 
downstairs partition doors. Another spent equally many 
hours carrying' generations' accumulation of rubbish, lumps 
of concrete, etc., from an area of the garden which sub- 
sequently became the lawn. There were endless stories 
about the obtaining of particular pieces of furniture (some 
of the most successful of which were obtained from builders' 
skips), and about who had done what to which room. 
Labours of love such as these, which indicated a con- 
cern for the house, and showed a preparedness on the part 
of those who lived there to 'put themselves out' in their 
investment in its welfare, without doubt contributed to 
the degree to which the house became conducive to an inti- 
mate inhabitation. A great deal of care went into the 
most 'mundane' work to do with the setting up and shaping 
of the house. There was generally a reluctance to call in 
tradesmen to do the work of repair and decoration, except 
where this was quite beyond the skills of those who lived 
there. 
The manner in which the household gradually came to- 
gether from being in its original 'primitive' condition 
illustrates a 'principle' which was established from the 
beginning - that the house was, and would become, simply 
what those who lived there were able to make of it. It 
was from the beginning concerned with possibilities; there 
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was no final plan of how it was going to be, no blueprint 
of how it was going to be inhabited. The physical property, 
for example, would become as comfortable, or remain as 
spartan, as those who lived there preferred or chose, or 
were able, by their own endeavours, either singly or 
together, to bring about. 
In fact, the style of the house always retained a 
basicness and simplicity. It was never a house in which 
technological artifacts played a major part, and many of 
what might ordinarily be regarded as the 'comforts' of 
modern living were conspicuously absent. There was no 
central heating, and above the ground floor most of the rooms 
were draughty and in winter, decidedly chilly. The house- 
hold never showed much interest in obtaining a television 
set, and stereo systems only made an occasional appearance, 
never becoming established as a part of day to day life. 
There was generally a preference for making even crude 
music rather than listening to recordings. It was only 
after very heated and extended discussion that a refrigerator 
was permitted entry into the house; this was several years 
after the house had started, at a time when, for the first 
time, a couple with a child moved in. 
Something of the style of the household may be illus- 
trated by the various rituals and traditions which became 
established within it. A very simple example of a 'tradi- 
tion' which arose within the house from its earliest years 
concerned locks and doors. Few of the rooms of the house 
possessed locks. People did not ordinarily lock the doors 
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of their rooms. Had anyone fixed a Yale to his door it 
would doubtless have invited comment and discussion, for 
it would have appeared conspicuous in running somewhat 
counter to the ethos of the house. Had a person abused 
this basic trust - assuming for the moment that this prac- 
tice did in fact reflect a trust and not merely serve to 
deny its absence - and intruded, against their wishes, into 
another's room, he would usually have been put in his place 
fairly quickly. Different people did, of course, feel very 
differently about their privacy; for some people, the space 
of their rooms was utterly private or even sacred, for 
others much less so. 
Needless to say, the threshold of the front door had 
considerable significance within the house. It was, in 
fact, unlocked almost all of the time, day and night, a 
state of affairs about which everyone seemed to be quite 
content, or even feel proud, for it was felt to some degree 
to be a marker of the 'openness' of the house, a measure 
of confidence of its inviolability. As it happens this 
'open door' was never seriously taken advantage of by 
intruders or burglars, for whom, as we have suggested, there 
would in any case have been slim pickings. 
Other sorts of 'traditions' might be mentioned, most 
of which bear upon such matters as would be important in 
any household. Particularly important, for example, are 
those to do with food, and these will be touched upon in 
subsequent pages. For the moment we may notice that the 
traditions which develop in a community household such as 
Portland Road, and which play an important part in the 
314 
of their rooms. Had anyone fixed a Yale to his door it 
would doubtless have invited comment and discussion, for 
it would have appeared conspicuous in running somewhat 
counter to the ethos of the house. Had a person abused 
this basic trust - assuming for the moment that this prac- 
tice did in fact reflect a trust and not merely serve to 
deny its absence - and intruded, against their wishes, into 
another's room, he would usually have been put in his place 
fairly quickly. Different people did, of course, feel very 
differently about their privacy; for some people, the space 
of their rooms was utterly private or even sacred, for 
others much less so. 
Needless to say, the threshold of the front door had 
considerable significance within the house. It was, in 
fact, unlocked almost all of the time, day and night, a 
state of affairs about which everyone seemed to be quite 
content, or even feel proud, for it was felt to some degree 
to be a marker of the 'openness' of the house, a measure 
of confidence of its inviolability. As it happens this 
'open door' was never seriously taken advantage of by 
intruders or burglars, for whom, as we have suggested, there 
would in any case have been slim pickings. 
Other sorts of 'traditions' might be mentioned, most 
of which bear upon such matters as would be important in 
any household. Particularly important, for example, are 
those to do with food, and these will be touched upon in 
subsequent pages. For the moment we may notice that the 
traditions which develop in a community household such as 
Portland Road, and which play an important part in the 
315 
'holding' of the community, may degenerate from being 
possible fertile sources of conversation or discussion - 
still open - to being matters of rigid dogma, and hence, 
in a sense, closed. To some extent, this tendency towards 
rigidification may depend upon the 'elders' of the house, 
that is, those who have been there longest and who, there- 
fore, almost inevitably by virtue of this assume a certain 
authority in carrying forward the tradition and showing 
newcomers 'the ropes'. Some people however, lived at 
Portland Road for considerable periods of time - three or 
four years for example - whilst at the same time doing 
their utmost to deny or disown such authority as they might 
have possessed through knowing the ways of the house well. 
Other people took up this sort of responsibility with quite 
different degrees of sureness, flexibility, awareness of 
their own and other peoples' limitations, and so on. 
What I have called here the 'traditions' of a house- 
hold are in certain respects rather like 'rules'. They 
convey to the visitor, for example - 'this is the way we 
are used to doing things here'. They do not ordinarily 
arise, however, as the implementation of principles or 
regulations. It was never, for example, laid down as some 
'house rule' that doors must not be locked, that people 
should attend meetings and eat together, or that TV is not 
allowed, although the house did indeed shape itself around 
issues of this sort. 
I have stressed that Hugh's position was very important 
in the setting of the style of the house; again, not in the 
sense of dictating rules or procedures, but in showing 
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guiding principles whereby the house might more fruitfully 
find its own way. The proposal that a household must find 
its own way is, of course, itself a 'guiding principle', 
and furthermore, one of some subtlety. For it does not 
suggest that the house simply be left to its own devices, 
any more than it implies that one way is as good as another. 
As a very general principle, the emphasis at Portland Road 
was upon 'letting be' rather than upon regulating, ruling 
or administering. Perhaps rather than a 'principle' this 
might be thought of as a 'tone' which reverberated through- 
out the house, a fundamental tone which was set by Hugh. 
It was also the tonic which this doctor prescribed. 
The Portland Road Association 
During the eight years'of the life of Portland Road, 
some sixty people lived in the house for a period of more 
than a week. Those people who lived in the house were 
members of what was called the Portland Road Association. 
This 'formal' term offered a certain convenience for nego- 
tiations which arose between the household and the world at 
large; it was the name in which the bank account was held, 
and the name in which dealings with services such as gas, 
electricity, rates and telephones, were accomplished. 
The Portland Road Association did not formally 
characterize itself as a community, nor did its members 
usually regard themselves as having attained that degree 
of cohesiveness which the word perhaps suggests, or think 
of themselves as belonging to a community in the sense of 
317 
subscribing to some ideology of 'community' as a way of 
life. Although it was a 'communal household' members of 
Portland Road thought of themselves more as belonging to 
a household more than a community, and when speaking of 
themselves collectively, usually referred to this collect- 
ivity as 'the house'. 
Portland Road did not keep any formal records or 
statistics. No forms were filled in, on or by its inhabi- 
tants, nor did any medical records accompany the arrival of 
a new member. The only paperwork which occasionally was 
required in joining the house - apart from replying to 
letters from people making inquiries or expressing interest 
in living there - arose where people applying or writing 
from overseas needed a letter to assist their applications 
to stay in the country, or in the case of individuals making 
the move from mental hospital, reassuring the hospital 
authorities that their patient, if released, would be in 
a sufficiently supportive environment. Hugh's standing as 
a doctor usually enabled these negotiations to be conducted 
much more easily than might otherwise have been possible, 
particularly in the case of people trying to obtain 
release from hospital. 
The Philadelphia Association did at one time endeavour 
to gather some 'basic statistics' on all the people who 
were living in, or had lived in its member households, 
but this enterprise was never taken up very rigorously. 
Here, I do not offer any sort of detailed breakdown of 
the membership of the house, but merely propose to give 
some approximate indication of the make up of the Portland 
j 
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Road Association. 
Most of the people who came to live in the house made 
their way through some initial contact with the Philadelphia 
Association. They had heard of this charity, either through 
the writings of R. D. Laing, through public talks, or by word 
of mouth, and from its office were directed towards the 
households. Some came to the house through Hugh's practice; 
when he felt it was appropriate he might suggest to a 
patient that he or she get in touch with the house, and 
themselves take it from there. Occasionally he took a more 
active part in paving the way for a person's coming to the 
house; a person who is acutely psychotic, for example, 
obviously is unlikely to be able on his own to enter into 
any subtle negotiations which may be entailed in joining 
or entering a community. 
Many of the people who lived in the house did not 
fall readily into any convenient identifiable diagnostic 
categories. At the same time, however, the various 
expressions of distress which were so clearly to be heard 
there were such that anyone with a particular predilection 
for the identification of diagnostic elements would no 
doubt have found no shortage of 'material'. Roughly a 
third of those who lived in the house had previous been 
in mental hospital, most commonly with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia or psychotic illness. Several people came 
to the house at the onset of an acute psychotic episode, 
although not in these cases from mental hospital, but from 
their ordinary living situations, introduced to the house 
by friends or relatives who were anxious to prevent their 
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hospitalization. Many people had been in individual psycho- 
therapy for longer or shorter periods prior to their arrival 
in the house, and most of the people who lived in the house 
were, at one time or another during their stay, in private 
psychotherapy. 
The sixty people who lived in the Portland Road house 
were made up of men and women in more or less equal numbers. 
Some degree of balance was obviously felt to be desirable; 
in fact, it never became particularly skewed in one direction 
or another for any length of time. Nearly one half were 
from overseas, from Western Europe, North and South America, 
New Zealand and Australia. Perhaps two thirds of the in- 
habitants fell within the age range between twenty-five and 
thirty-five, although there were a few who were well into 
middle age. Most people were single, and had never 
married, although at different times there were two families 
in the house each with children, and each of which lived in 
the house for more than one year. Altogether, roughly a 
half of all the people who lived in the house lived there 
for more than one year, and two people lived there through- 
out the larger part of the life of the household. People 
came from a variety of backgrounds, rich and poor, educated 
and less educated, working or professional class; there was, 
however, a preponderance of the white, educated middle class. 
Some people had never worked in their lives, and had 
established themselves only most precariously in the-world 
at large; others were well set up in professional careers. 
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Assuming Membership 
Let us assume that a person wants to move into the 
house. He telephones, a meeting is arranged between himself 
and at least one member -a conversation has begun. We 
must ask something of what this conversation is about. 
First of all we must note that the sort of conversation 
which takes place will vary a great deal, according to the 
particular circumstances in which it takes place. I have 
already remarked that the physical property of Portland Road 
changed through the years, and particularly in the earlier 
phases; it now must be stressed that the ambiance of the 
house changed too, according to different periods of its 
life. At times empty, at times full, at times smug and 
inhospitable, at times deeply welcoming; the state of the 
household at these different times, the ebbing and flowing 
of its 'libido', the state of its 'economy', crucially 
determine the sort of response that the visitor will 
receive. Whether or not a person has just left the house, 
and the circumstances under which they departed (which may 
dispose the household to seek a 'replacement' as quickly as 
possible) may effect very importantly the way in which a 
visitor is received. To enter a community when it is living 
through a time of great fragility, or where it is gathering 
itself together having just survived some particularly 
testing period is - other things being equal - to enter 
into a different order of conversation from that which opens 
up in a community which is in robust or expansive mood, or 
one which is enjoying a period of great vitality. 
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Secondly, the sort of conversation which takes place 
will obviously vary depending upon the manner and circum- 
stances of the visitor; where, for example, he is 'coming 
from', what he brings with him, what are his expectations, 
hopes, fears, and so on. People approached Portland Road 
in quite different ways. They came, for example, from 
different backgrounds, through different routes, at different 
stages of their life and with different doors open and closed 
to them, undergoing different sorts of sufferings, and with 
quite varied expectations as to what the house was, and how 
it might help them. The notion of 'community' in itself, 
doubtless, raises all sorts of expectations and anxieties 
and triggers a whole wealth of phantasies; doubly so when 
this community is in some way expected to be 'therapeutic'. 
Approaching this household with a view to asking to 
join could not have been a light decision, or an easy 
occasion for anyone. To present oneself thus to the house 
entailed a person's admitting, to some degree, that he 
needed 'help', that he had come to the end of his wits, or 
his tether, that his life was unendurably lonely, miserable, 
painful, unhappy, that he wanted now to come in out of the 
cold. For most people who moved towards the house, this 
was the occasion, writ large, where they were most ill-at- 
ease, most unsure of themselves, most frightened: finding, 
feeling, negotiating their way through something, into 
something vital, with others, where the consequences-of 
being accepted or rejected might equally be terrifying. 
People approached and tried to find their way through 
these difficulties in their own particular fashions, the 
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hale and heartiness of some contrasting with the helpless- 
ness evidenced by others. Some people - and by no means 
the less 'disturbed' - were highly sensitive to the nuances 
of the situation in which they were engaged. Others, for 
example, rather imposed themselves upon the house; their 
manner of arriving was by demanding. They might insist, 
right away, for example, that they be told whether there 
was a 'vacancy', failing altogether to grasp to acknowledge 
that the issue of their moving in was necessarily one of 
some subtlety, and not predicated simply upon there being 
an 'empty room'. 
People had different interests in the house, or in 
coming to the house, and different ways of expressing their 
interest, whether it was in the first place a matter of 
seeking to meet their need or fulfil their desire. Some 
people simply wish to wean themselves off psychiatric drugs, 
and felt quite understandable fears about being able to do 
this by themselves, on their own. Some people felt that 
they had something to go through, their wishes in some cases 
being coloured by previously published accounts of 'inner 
voyages'. Others rather vaguely proposed that they 'wanted 
to live with other people'. Some people felt that they 
needed a safe basis upon which to extend what they had 
already begun to open up in their psychotherapy. People 
varied enormously in the degree to which they were able to 
articulate their concerns - what they were on about, where 
they stood, where they were coming from, what they were 
looking for, and so on. Some people - and again by no means 
the least disturbed - were able to speak very coherently 
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on these matters, about themselves. Other people found 
speaking difficult, but managed to say all they needed, 
very well, with the minimum of words. At least one person 
was literally speechless and moved into the house without 
having uttered a single word; she remained in a sense passive 
in the midst of a conversation which went on around her, 
between the household and those for whom she had become a 
'problem'. 
The usual procedure whereby a person became a member 
of the Portland Road household essentially was this. Who- 
ever expressed an interest in moving in would be invited to 
one or more meetings, in the course of which everyone in 
the house, as well as Hugh, would have an opportunity to 
meet him or her. On the basis of these meetings, and what 
emerged in the course of the ensuing conversation, the 
household would together come to a decision as to whether 
or not they wished the person to join them. However, it 
must be pointed out that this procedure varied considerably, 
according to circumstances. How - and even in some cases, 
whether -a person found his way into the house depended 
upon such 'arbitrary' considerations as who answered the 
telephone when he first made contact, and what were the 
circumstances of the meeting which followed: was it a hurried 
chat, or was it extended over a whole evening, and included 
an invitation to a meal. Or was it, as sometimes happened, 
adjourned to the pub across the road. 
It usually happened - and particularly when the house 
was relatively full - that a visitor would initially meet 
and spend some time with two or three people who were able 
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to make themselves available, as well as whoever just 
happened to be around, and on the basis of how things 
worked out with them, perhaps over several meetings in the 
course of which he might meet others in the community, be 
invited round to one of the twice-weekly evenings when Hugh 
visited the house, and everyone, ordinarily, was present. 
Having got this far, and the members of the house having had 
some opportunity to discuss their thoughts and feelings about 
the matter, amongst themselves, a decision would sometimes 
be taken there and tnen, in the course of the evening. More 
often than not, these decisions took longer, or would 
effectively be taken by the visitor, who might get fed up 
with waiting, or who would take the household's deferment 
of decision - sometimes realistically - as a 'no'. 
Whilst people made their own different approaches to the 
house, and were received according to varying arrangements 
and circumstances, the one inescapable fact remains that a 
person's joining the household was predicated upon some 
interpersonal negotiation between that person and members of 
the household. Negotation suggests a'f inding of one's way 
towards or through, and also an unfolding in the fullness 
of its own time; the etymology of the word suggests that 
negotiations are best conducted at leisure. In order to 
stress the interpersonal nature of these negotiations, their 
being negotiations between, and furthermore to emphasise 
that they were not simply matters of logistics, but were 
concerned to bring into view the intricate issues about which 
they turned, I shall refer to this negotiation as a dis- 
course, a conversing, or a conversation. The situation of 
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a person wanting to move into the household shows itself 
first of all in the opening of a conversation, to which, 
if it is to proceed, the house must show itself to be open. 
What was this conversation about? 
The purpose of the conversation was in a sense, simple 
enough: it was an occasion or opening for the visitor, who 
was a stranger, and those who already lived in the house, 
to get to know something of each other. But this meeting 
has a context; it is already taking place somewhere, in a 
private household, the members of which regard as their 
own home. The stranger has been invited to speak in the 
shelter and safety of the home. This is already a gesture 
of hospitality. 
It may, however, amount to little more than a gesture. 
In Portland Road, occasions when a person visited, with a 
view to moving into the house, were by no means always 
conducted hospitably. There were times when, for example, 
a person might take a telephone call, invite a visitor 
round that evening - and then neglect either to tell anyone 
else, or to be there himself to receive him. There were 
times when a visitor might find himself, in all innocence, 
caught between the crossfire of hostilities which had been 
going on long before his arrival. There were times, too, 
when no-one wanted to meet visitors; as the time approached 
people would slink off to their rooms, leaving some indi- 
vidual having, as best he could under the circumstances, to 
play host. Not only that: the degree of inhospitality which 
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prevailing upon occasion was such that the one who took it 
upon himself to meet with the guest might find himself being 
cruelly teased by some particularly resentful people for 
being a 'sucker' (an accusation which might indeed contain 
some 'truth') or being criticised for the manner in which 
he had conducted the meeting. This gort of meanness of 
spirit, however, was certainly not typical of the welcome 
with which visitors were received by the household an a 
whole. 
These meetings which took place in the house, between 
those who lived there, and some person who was interested in 
joining their company, were in the first instance an 
occasion for the people concerned to got to know something 
of each other. One of the considerations which emerges 
in any 'getting to know' - or which is in some ccnsos a 
condition of any getting to know - is that of liking. One 
question, therefore, which was of overriding importance in 
deciding whether a now person be accepted into the house 
was - do the members of the house find themselves liking 
the visitor, do they 'take to' him, find him ' nymp, athiquo' , 
like 'the cut of his (or her) jib'? Those questions, 
presumably, the visitor may well be asking, and with equal 
relevance, about his hosts. It is not difficult to coo 
why those initial dispositions, of simply liking or taking 
to the other, or not, for perhaps at least, liking 'enough') 
are important, for they have to do with come other person, 
with whom one proposes to live, to share the intimacy of 
one's own home - and not merely endure some transitory 
dealings. It would indeed be a mark of some severe alienation 
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to be indifferent to the matter of who one lives with; it is 
for most people a most important and highly personal concern. 
Ordinarily we take exception to the idea of living with people 
who make our flesh creep, with strangers, or with those with 
whom we do not feel the least at ease. In any case, we could 
hardly expect that a healthy, happy household will flourish 
where its members predominantly put up with one another, or 
tolerate one another - however well-intentioned, in so doing, 
they may be. 
Although this is a most important consideration, the matters 
which it raises are not absolutely simple or straightforward. A 
person's feelings towards, for example of liking, disliking, 
feeling happy about, and so on, are of paramount importance in 
deciding who moves into the house - but the matter does not 
simply end there. In a community which aspires to foster well- 
being, and which sees this as entailing some degree of critical 
self-awareness, it may not be quite sufficient to let important 
matters, the consequence of which may be quite far-reaching, be 
decided just by taking account of predominant or prevailing 
feelings. For these feelings may be merely passing whims or 
fancies, or they may for that matter be deeply perverse. People 
may have good or bad reasons for their feelings; a feeling of 
dislike for someone may reflect some blind prejudice, or may 
be a highly discerning intuition. Distinctions of this sort 
may well emerge in the course of ordinary conversation; but 
they must, to some degree, be opened up in the course of those 
special household meetings which were set aside precisely to 
attend to those matters which were not always 'simple or 
straightforward'. 
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In any case, might it not be, upon occasion, the very 
best thing for two people to live together, who cannot stand 
one another, when the very sight of the other makes the 
blood boil - and to see this through? Here, presumably, 
a great deal depends upon the lived context, upon the ambi- 
ance of the household as a whole, and its capacity to hold. 
The healthier the house, it has been proposed, the greater 
the range of conflict which it can fruitfully accommodate, 
absorb or contain. This leads us to a second set of con- 
siderations. After questions of personal liking, disliking, 
questions of whether the people in the house take to the 
visitor or not (and whether he takes to them), there arise 
questions as to what is possible, right or best for the 
household as a whole, given its strengths and limitations, 
at any particular time. These considerations bear upon, 
for example, what the house is 'up for', what the house 
can take on, has room for, time for in each particular 
instance; but they also must be approached with some far- 
sighted weather eye alerted to the 'future' of the house, 
a future life which, it is to be hoped, will extend 
beyond the particular make up of its present occupancy. 
Again, these questions as to what is best for the household 
as a whole may be by no means simple or straightforward. 
I have emphasized that the circumstances of the house 
varied according to different periods or phases in its life. 
In the beginning there were only two or three people living 
there, whereas at one subsequent time there were thirteen. 
One consideration which therefore was highly relevant to 
the question of a person's wanting to move into the house 
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was - how much room or space does the house have at this 
particular time? But again, this question is not quite so 
straightforward. It does not boil down to the simple matter 
of how many rooms are unoccupied, and how many 'vacancies' 
there might therefore be. Members of Portland Road did not 
usually speak in terms of the house as having 'vacancies', 
since people did not live in the house on the basis of having 
completed some tenancy agreement. The people who lived 
there did not lease rooms; they joined and became members 
of a household community. Many people who left the house 
did indeed leave a palpable sense of 'absence', but these 
'absences' by no means automatically assumed the nature of 
'vacancies'. 
Whilst the fact of whether there were any unoccupied 
or unlived-in rooms at any time was a highly relevant con- 
sideration, the question of how much 'space' the house had 
on any occasion depended very largely upon what was going 
on within it, who was already living there, what they were 
'into' and what it opened up or upon. It depended as much 
as anything upon the mood and spirit of the house at the 
time. There were times when the house, whilst not full, 
did not at all feel in a position to take on a new member, 
its primary task being that of surviving its own immediate 
predicament, or overcoming some particular state of 
fragility. These phases usually were short lived. There 
were other phases of tiredness and dreariness, when the 
household might well have welcomed the freshness which a 
newcomer might introduce, but now there would be a dearth 
of visitors, or nothing came of such meetings as did take 
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place. There were times, again, when the house was full, 
with all the rooms taken, and at the same time a place of 
such vitality that it was eager to admit new members, them- 
selves in great need, making it necessary to double up in 
some of the bedrooms. At one time, there were three people 
sharing one bedroom, made easier by the construction of a 
loft bed, and two people sharing two of the others. Most 
of the time, all of the rooms were occupied. 
Since a community household is not some fixed thing - 
an unchecked institutional growth which turns out some 
'constant' service for its residents, but is a living matrix, 
the household libido or 'economy' ebbs and flows, advances 
and withdraws, expands and contracts. In accordance with 
these rhythms, the space and time of the house will open 
and close, inspire and dis-spirit. Here I refer to a lived 
space and lived time, to those lived structures of intention- 
ality which open according to where people stand with respect 
to one another, and what they mean to one another. The 
time and space which people might have for one another is 
not one which might simply be allocated, but opens in 
accordance with the vicissitudes of desire or concern, as 
and how this becomes opened in intercourse. 
The discussions which took place at Portland Road 
about the issue of someone joining the community, did not 
cease or become concluded at the point where the visitor 
left, but went on between those who already were living in 
the house. Seldom would it happen that they all felt the 
same way, or that even at the end of their deliberations 
they would be in a position to speak to the visitor with 
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'one voice'. Nor was there any reason to suppose that they 
should. People took to one another in their own different 
ways, according to their tastes, styles and sensibilities. 
At any time, people were likely to have had quite different 
ideas as to whether they wanted a particular person to join 
the house, and to have had a variety of different reasons 
for feeling as they did. The following through, and opening 
up of these ideas and reasons invariably led the house into 
areas of conversation which broadened far beyond the original, 
precipitating issue. Here we may briefly suggest why these 
conversations could, upon occasion, become so extended. 
These conversations, in the first place, raised matters 
of judgement, taste and discernment; it was precisely over 
such matters that people who lived in the house typically 
felt markedly unsure of themselves. Thus people very 
commonly found themselves unable to decide, or to make up 
their minds - to commit themselves to a point of view, or 
even to venture an opinion. Some people tended to be unable 
to say 'no', others unable to say 'yes'. Particularly in 
gatherings or meetings, when what they said might be 'taken 
up' by Hugh - however lightly - they commonly found them- 
selves unable to dare to 'think out loud' or to speak 
freely, or to address themselves to anyone. 
These meetings did indeed bring into play a variety 
of matters, questions and issues which people under any 
circumstances might find it difficult to open up in con- 
versation. In the course of these discussions people 
inevitably found themselves evidencing or owning up to 
attitudes and feelings which they might prefer to have 
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remained undisclosed. People were shown or were seen, 
in what they said and did, not only to be capable of kind- 
ness and openheartedness, but also to be taking up attitudes 
of selfishness, meanness, grudgingness, and so on. Having 
themselves moved into the house, they might want to adopt 
the complacency of 'I'm alright Jack', or its obverse: 
'Everything's alright by me - what difference does it make? ' 
They found themselves accused or 'guilty' of jealousy, envy, 
resentment; or otherwise shown up or teased out in ways 
which made them embarrassed, ashamed or afraid. 
The areas of difficulty which these conversations 
touched upon, or opened up, were precisely those areas 
which were for most people the occasion for their moving 
, into the house in the first place. People moved in, as I 
have suggested earlier, because they were profoundly home- 
less, because they were 'untogether', because they were 
deeply troubled, because they had in some sense 'lost their 
way'; because they had, standing in their way, what Hugh 
would call 'unfinished business'. Nowhere more clearly 
than in these conversations or discussions was the nature 
of this 'unfinished business' brought into view. Those 
who lived in the house were still not at home with them- 
selves, with one another, in the world. Neither did they 
tend to find themselves (which amounts to the same thing) 
at home in language, able to speak freely and with sure- 
ness, of where they stood with one another. These con- 
versations, therefore, taking place in the house, sometimes 
in the modality of 'not being able to put off any longer', 
which were precipitated by the interest shown by a visitor 
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to the house in himself moving in, could upon occasion 
become very 'heavy' and weighed down, painfully silent, 
endlessly confusing, and seem to get nowhere. The stark 
silence which so commonly followed any attempt to initiate 
such conversations became known as the 'Portland Pause'. 
Here we may comment briefly upon Hugh's position in 
these conversations. First of all, he did not live in 
the house, and this alone enabled him to speak from a 
position of some 'detachment'. There is little question 
that from his position, and with his awareness, he was 
usually able to see, more clearly than anyone else, the 
movement or interplay which was going on within the house, 
and to speak of this play surely and provocatively. His 
position in the house was at the same time that of psycho- 
therapist, and here his work was centrally concerned to 
open up, encourage, make possible a free discourse. 
Ironically, of course, his very presence in the house - 
which we may in shorthand characterize as 'interpretative' - 
showed in the first instance precisely how 'unfree' the 
discourse in fact was. 
We shall discuss 'interpretation' subsequently. For 
the moment we may note that this word by no means suggests 
some position of disavowal or disownment of one's own 
interests. Thus, for example, whilst Hugh generally left 
members of the house to sort things out for themselves, as 
far as possible, or to let them 'get on with it', and his 
reluctance to 'take charge', he never left anyone in any 
doubt as to his interest (here the word is not strong 
enough) in the house thriving. On innumerable occasions he 
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made no attempt to withhold his clear opinion as to what 
was good, fitting or best for the house, or his criticisms 
as to how people were conducting themselves in respect of 
this good. His discernments, suggestions and criticisms 
usually carried enormous weight - and nowhere more clearly 
than over the difficulties of coming to a decision about 
a new member. His personal inclination always was to 
encourage the house in the direction of 'taking on' rather 
than playing safe, at the same time reminding the others 
that finally it was their decision; and that he did not 
have to live there. Without doubt, the house would not 
have chosen to take on so many 'difficult' people as it 
did, without Hugh's nudging or urging. "The world is made 
up of two kinds of people, the freaked out and the cooled 
out", he would say, "and they both need each other very 
badly". 
In discussing these considerations, we have so far 
placed emphasis upon the household's desire with respect to 
the new member rather than his desire shown towards the 
community. We might say that this is taken for granted or 
presupposed by his arrival at the door. Many people, how- 
ever, arrived at the house wishing to move in, when the 
nature and direction of their desire was far from clear. 
Some people came to the house, whose sufferings were beyond 
question, but whose primary concern seemed to be'to do with 
cheap accommodation. Some people were in blind flight from 
some or other painful situation. Others came with already 
fixed ideas, (political, ideological) as to how the house 
should be, which stood rather hopelessly in the way of their 
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being able to discern how it, in fact, was. In some cases 
it would be quite clear to the house that such a person was 
knocking at the wrong door; in other cases the conversation 
which ensued would show something more favourable in the 
situation. As a very general principle, it was more or 
less taken for granted that it made little sense for a person 
to move into the house where those who already lived there 
did not feel some desire on his part to enter their dis- 
course, their dwelling, and not merely their 'house'. However, 
we may add that some people came to the house in states of 
such extreme need that the question of their desire was 
quite premature. One example would be the woman who arrived 
so distressed as to be quite unable to speak. The situation 
here is perhaps in some ways like that of being in a position 
to offer bandaging to someone who is bleeding to death; 
having negotiated this particular crisis, the question of 
their desire will remain to be seen. 
Having seen that the question of how people found their 
way into the house opens into a consideration of the con- 
versation which took place in the house, pivoted about this 
issue, we may now turn our attention from the 'content' of 
this conversation more towards its 'nature'. A conversation, 
perhaps, suggests a beginning and an end. We might, there- 
fore, now speak of a conversing, a dialogue or an inter- 
course if we are to make it clear that any particular 
conversation - such as the one 'about' the question of a 
new person coming into the house - is articulated into and 
out of a pre-existing and 'ongoing' discourse. This dis- 
course, moreover, is of a very particular nature. 
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I have repeatedly stressed the '-place' of this 
conversation, that it takes place, or is set within a 
dwelling. It is not the conversation of a 'group' of 
people who gather together upon certain occasions, or about 
some purpose, as though 'dwelling' were a purpose. However, 
it is not sufficient to say merely that it is 'set' within 
a dwelling. We might say, rather, that the dwelling, as 
dwelling, opens as this conversation, a conversation which 
stays with things, which always, through all its wanderings, 
remains to be taken up. In order to point toward that 
appropriation which pertains between the conversation and 
its matters, its substance and its grounding, its time and 
its place, whereby we might indeed talk of the conversation 
being dwelled, in deed and in word, we might briefly con- 
sider what might be termed the textures of household life, 
textures which are woven into the very fabric of economic 
being. 
Textures 
By using the word 'textures' I wish to emphasize, first 
of all a sense of the materiality, substantiality, or 'stuff' 
of life in a household. Another word we might use is 
'grain', or even, perhaps, nitty-gritty. At the same time, 
I wish to bring out the fact that different 'textures', or 
different grains of texture, different matters, correspond 
with different sensibilities, touches and tastes. One 
cannot fell a fine texture with a coarse touch, or vice 
versa. Here we touch upon matters of subtlety; the subtle 
itself being a particular texture, or sub-text, which is 
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finely woven. I am emphasizing 'texture' here to suggest 
that sense of interweaving of matter and matters, of things 
and stories, whereby a world comes into being. It is as 
well to remember here, too, that all textures have a seamy 
side. 
Of particular relevance to our present study is the 
matter of 'ordinary' textures, or what we might call the 
textures of ordinary life. My 'being at home' in my own 
home which is in a sense taken for granted is very much a 
matter of my being woven into a story, a history and a 
mythology which has a particular substance or 'density'. 
In my own home I am surrounded by my things. Here, for 
º ý°°ýexample,, is a book on the shelf which has etched into it 
my childhood scribblings. I close my eyes and sniff its 
pages... and forgotten chapters of my life suddenly re- 
open. Here on the desk in front of me are various bits and 
pieces; this stone picked up from that beach, this pot with 
its seed struggling to germinate, these various precipi- 
tates of enthusiasms. Take them all away, and I would 
survive; but the fabric of my life would be rather more 
bare. 
These most commonplace furnishings of my life, which 
are for the most part taken for granted - they go without 
saying - silently give themselves to provide the infinitely 
rich tapestry of the ordinary. If we wish to discover what 
a nightmare life might become in its absence, we may learn 
from accounts of various de-realized experiences where 
'things' are reduced to mere objects, and in this objecti- 
fication return mocking and obscene, to haunt us. Such as 
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these are extreme states of homelessness. Needless to say, 
different peoples' lives are textured in different ways - 
most of us doubtless would feel ill-at-ease and disoriented 
in a desert environment, whose 'text'" would be read and 
sensed quite differently by nomads and bedouins. Closer to 
home, certain 'total' institution environments provide 
examples of 'textures' which many of us will find decidedly 
alien - whether we think of this in terms of its surfaces 
which typically are smooth, shiny, and holdless, its uni- 
formity of light, its characteristic 'wall' of heat - all 
of which contribute towards a certain soporific blandness. 
Here I am primarily concerned with those textures 
which have a particular bearing upon our sense of being at 
home, and with suggesting how these textures are in- 
extricably woven into the nature of the discourse which 
arises within the home, and into which, equally, we are 
woven. I shall illustrate this by discussing something of 
the particular interweaving of conversation and context 
which characterized Portland Road. 
Almost invariably, the focal gatherings or conversa- 
tions which took place in the house took place in the 
kitchen, around the table or around the fire. The fire, 
which was kept going continuously throughout the winter 
months, was itself the source of seemingly endless light- 
hearted conversation. It was of the type known as a 
'Pither', and was not unlike an old-fashioned pot-bellied 
stove; this particular one was somewhat temperamental by 
nature, and depended for its most efficient working upon 
the controls being set in a certain fashion, upon which 
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there was much disagreement amongst the ': experts'. After 
a number of improvisations upon the theme of table - one 
of which was a large telephone cable drum extracted from 
a builders' skip - the house eventually had made a long 
refectory table, and it was around this table that business 
would be conducted. More often than not, some sort of meal 
would be phased into this gathering, even if the meal was 
a simple one of bread and humous, salads and so on. From 
time to time these salads would include lettuces, radishes 
and tomatoes produced, with a considerable sense of triumph, 
from the garden. The style of these meals would take on 
different nuances, depending upon who was around, what was 
going on, and so on. Different people in the house had 
their own styles of cooking, even their own way of making 
and serving a pot of tea, or coffee. One visitor to the 
house, who lived in Paris, would arrive from time to time 
with armfuls of fresh cheeses, which would be set upon with 
great relish. These various evenings ranged through every 
inflection of mood; there were long nights of celebration, 
and evenings of great sadness, evenings of boredom and 
excitement. Inevitably, the conversations were accompanied 
by endless cups of tea or coffee, sometimes wine, occasionally 
whisky. 
It was the practice for many years at Portland Road 
to hold hatha - yoga classes twice a week. These classes, 
which were usually held in the basement, were taught by a 
young yoga teacher who belonged to the Philadelphia Asso- 
ciation network, and who came to be a friend of the house. 
They were usually held in the early evening, on days when 
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Hugh visited the house. Doing these simple yoga postures 
and exercises together, where people are brought together 
in a situation of a certain intimacy (although not everyone 
in the house chose to take part in these classes) again 
simply illustrates the contextualization of these evenings. 
For such an activity inevitably phases into, and disposes 
towards, a certain order of conversation. The very meta- 
phors of hatha-yoga - stretching and getting straight - apply 
equally well to the tone of many of these conversations. 
Now these sort of 'contextualizations' of a conversation 
are ordinary enough; but it is precisely the most 'ordinary' 
or 'common or garden' sort of things to which I wish to 
draw attention. Here I shall briefly take up one single 
thread of this text or texture, as an example: the bread 
upon the table. What in the world could be a more ordinary 
thing than a loaf of bread? It might well, however, be 
a perfectly defensible claim that this most ordinary thing, 
this staff of life, bears the story of civilization. 
The making of bread was one of those more-or-less 
everyday activities which took place at Portland Road - 
just as it does in innumerable other homes. Bread making 
was introduced into the house by Hugh - and the culture 
took. It is illustrative of a particular emphasis he 
placed upon self-reliance, upon simplicity, and upon the 
'organic'. Hugh always hoped, and indeed spoke of this 
long before the project was started, that a person could, 
if he or she wanted, live very simply or basically and 
inexpensively within the household. Thus, whatever refine- 
ments might be lacking, he hoped that those who lived in 
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the house would always manage to see to it that 'basic 
foods' (grains, pulses, vegetables; the wherewithal to make 
simple but nourishing meals) would always be there. For 
the first few years at least, the house was predominantly 
vegetarian, although by no means 'hard line'. And although 
it did lapse at times from the ideal of ensuring basic 
provisions, there was nearly always a large sack of fresh 
wholemeal flour in a corner of the kitchen. 
A simple wholewheat recipe having found favour within 
the house, breadmaking became indelibly established as 
one of the rituals of Portland Road. The aroma of bread- 
making, and of freshly baked bread became one of the most 
distinctive house smells, and the imagery of yeast and 
fermentation alludes most powerfully to the atmosphere of 
the house at that time, when there was indeed a yeast in 
the air. 
I should perhaps endeavour to make it clear that 
breadmaking was not introduced into the house as some sort 
of 'therapeutic activity', or as some sort of occupational 
therapy designed to encourage people to get into something 
with one another, to keep their idle hands busy, or to 
prepare them for reality, through gaining some experience 
of 'cooking'. Neither was it introduced in accordance with 
some ideology of diet and healthy living -a healthy mind 
in a healthy body - or of 'self-sufficiency'. No more 
need we assume that where conversation is taken up and 
enjoyed by a group of people it must serve some further 
purpose, such as getting to know one another. However 
subtle a distinction it may be, that between something 
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which is introduced as a means towards an end, and something 
which is shown, in enjoyment, as a good for the sake of 
its 'goodness' (which may, however, indeed open out an 
area of vitality, of companionship and nourishment) is as 
immediately discernible to the taste as the difference 
between homemade bread and 'Mother's Pride'. 
The making and breaking of bread provides one simple 
example of what I am calling the texture of this household. 
This one particular thread could be followed further, or 
any number of others could be taken up in order to illustrate 
the fabric of day to day life within the house. The bread 
provides a good example of texture, since homemade bread 
does indeed have a characteristic texture, grain and taste; 
it has something to 'get one's teeth into'. I have chosen 
the example of bread specifically to stress this matter of 
taste; that conversation is very much a matter of taste, 
and that a conversation which gathers or brings together 
that which is before one in front of one's eyes - and which 
is now on the table - already speaks of, and with, a 
certain taste. 
1 
"'Socrates 
observed once that one of the diners stopped eating bread, and 
ate the other food alone; apropos of the conversation which was about 
the meaning of words, he said, "Men, we must say what is meant when a 
man is called a glutton"... "If someone eats his food without bread (and 
he is not in training, but does it for pleasure) do you think he seems 
to be a glutton or not? " 
"It is hard to see who else would be called a glutton", was the reply. 
Socrates answered, "I think he could be called a glutton quite justly". 
Socrates used to say that in the attic dialect, the term 'to dine 
well' meant simply to eat, and that the term 'well' in the phrase 'to 
dine well' meant that which did not harm to the body or soul. " 
Xenophon. Recollections of Socrates. Book 3, Chapter 14, Xenophon 
(1965) pp. 102-103. 
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An Abiding Conversation 
Conversations belong. Here I am concerned with con- 
versation which belongs and takes place at home. In the 
various cadencies of this conversation we may hear tell - 
nowhere more clearly - of what it is to be at home in the 
world. And in such conversation, from whose gestation 
emerges everything that is or ever was said, we may recog- 
nize, according to the spirit which moves it, and precisely 
in its ordinariness, a very considerable power to awaken 
on the part of those who enter it or are drawn to it, a 
sense, or a recollection of what it is to be in the world. 
The extension of such conversation, opened as hospitality, 
may be decisive in facilitating that turnabout whereby 
waywardness leads to a homecoming. 
For this sort of conversation, which is so interwoven 
with the textures of the home, we might reserve the term 
abiding conversation. This first of all speaks of its 
temporality, of its being quite other than a conversation 
which has a beginning and an end, or which can be arranged 
at one's convenience. It is this temporality which we have 
in mind - when we describe - by way of contrast - the 
programming of time typical of the therapeutic community: 
the large group meeting followed by an endless series of 
small groups and prearranged activities. What I am calling 
here an abiding conversation will remain to be taken up in 
each person's own time, that is, the time of his own abiding. 
By 'abiding' conversation, however, I wish also to draw 
attention to an epistemological significance which is 
already suggested by the interchangeability - in certain 
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contexts - of 'knowing' and 'being at home with'. 
Part of what I mean is already suggested by the word 
'conversation'. The root of the word 'verse' - of which 
conversation is a compound - is centrally to do (we might 
say 'again') with the notion of 'turning'. Amongst the 
various twists and turns which this root follows1 we may 
note the Latin uersus (turned towards, facing cf. 'versus') 
whose passive form uersari comes to mean 'to be turned 
often', "hence to be situated, to dwell, hence to be engaged 
in or occupied with, with pp uersatus meaning 'familiar with, 
versed in"'. The term which I have suggested - an abiding 
conversation - merely emphasises that familiarity, 'being 
versed in' which is at the same time an engagement, a 
situation, and a dwelling, to which all knowing, and all 
understanding is a return. 
'Partridge, E. (1966) pp. 769-771. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
AN AMBIANCE OF CONCERN 
A Community of Interest 
In the preceeding chapter, I cited from the writings 
of Hugh Crawford, as examples of informing or guiding 
principles, these propositions to which Portland Road was 
dedicated: 
Given an opportunity, a person will make himself 
at home in conditions where he is not required 
to be a certain way but rather is free to find 
his way in an ambiance of concern; 
and that when he is at home in this ambiance of 
concern he will be rooted in what he is doing 
and his being will flower into a world which he 
does not find strange. 
I now turn to an explication of what is meant here by 
an 'ambiance of concern' and a discussion of some of the 
questions which surround this notion. We must ask, too, 
what it means to 'find one's way' in an ambiance of concern, 
and what conditions facilitate the emergence of such an 
ambiance. 
I have already, in part two of this thesis, provided 
an introduction to this discussion of 'concern'. Following 
Heidegger, I have argued that man is not merely 'subject' 
to the biological and psychological (or sociological) pro- 
cesses of sentient life, such as may be investigated by 
the empirical methods of natural science, but stands out, 
in his mode of being-in-the-world, apart from the natural 
world, as a being who dwells. Man's dwelling, moreover, 
is already 'concerned' - not in the sense of being burdened 
with 'concerns' or of undergoing'subjective experiences' 
of 'caring' - but in that more primordial sense of openness 
to Being which is the possibility of having a world, whether 
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or not we find it burdensome; in the sense in which 
Heidegger's Dasein is the 'clearing' or the 'there' of 
Being, or the disclosure which makes possible the 'there'. 
Here, the claim that dwelling is 'concerned' roughly 
approximates to Heidegger's earlier formulation of the 
Being of Dasein as 'care'. (Sorge. ) In each case we are 
speaking of ground or source structures of concern; man, 
that being for whom Being is a question, (who can ask what 
it is, to be), whose being is in question (who can ask what 
it is, for him, to be) ; who dwells, and by virtue of dwelling, 
of being mortal, knowing his time, has time for; who stands 
in language, appears - is concerned, and speaks of those 
matters which are of his abiding concern. 
But the claim that Dasein is concerned, or that dwelling 
is concerned, by no means ensures that man, in his dwelling, 
in fact lives 'concernedly' - any more than the claim that 
man lives in language ensures that man gives himself over to 
the claim which the logos exerts upon him. Indeed it is 
precisely because man dwells and because 'concern' is a 
structure of dwelling, that any life may be lived out in 
a variety of fashions of waywardness. We have proposed 
that it is in the very nature of dwelling that man, the 
being who dwells, wanders and is forgetful. 
The emphasis upon Portland Road as a dwelling, there- 
fore, makes no claim that, as if by some magic, the inhabiting 
of this dwelling is now lived out thoughtfully, care-fully, 
considerately, as 'concern', or that, through some 'natural 
unfolding' of dwelling, an ambiance of concern, where 
people live together kindly and considerately, is guaranteed 
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to follow. It is of course common knowledge that people 
may share a dwelling, live together in close contact or 
'intimacy', for example as members of the same family, and 
at the same time exhibit a gross and conspicuous lack of 
concern for one another. Statistics inform us that most 
acts of violence occur within the home. 
At the same time, however, the example of Portland Road 
as a place of dwelling does set us on our way towards a 
discussion of an 'ambiance of concern'. In describing this 
household so far, I have drawn attention to some 'minimal 
conditions' which have a bearing upon the sense of 'being 
at home'. I have suggested that certain texturings - and in 
the first place, textures of 'ordinariness' - play a most 
important part in the matter of 'feeling at home'. Or if 
our situation is one of a 'homelessness', they may serve 
to remind us of what we have been missing. But these 
texturings have a further bearing upon the nature of concern 
- if we are right in speaking, as in an earlier chapter, of 
concern as a world which opens as we are drawn towards it. 
For showing concern is not a matter of 'merely living' and 
then 'being concerned' - but is already shown in that which, 
in our living, we stay with. The manner in which we inhabit 
our home already shows our concerns. 
An ambiance of concern suggests a concern which in 
some way goes 'round' or 'about'; we may expect an ambiance 
of concern to have a certain 'atmosphere'. We may speak 
of ourselves as being 'in' an ambiance of concern; and this 
suggests a different situation from that where a collectivity 
of people, arranged side by side, are absorbed each in their 
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own concerns. So far, we have indicated something of how 
this 'about' may be understood by speaking of the household 
as a living context. This living context is not held 
together by those who belong to it endeavouring in some 
way to 'be concerned' so much as their going about their 
ordinary business. 
I have already mentioned the 'ordinary business' of 
eating, suggesting the obvious: that it is not merely 
'calorific intake' which provides 'nourishment'. Nourish- 
ment, equally is to do with the company in which we eat, 
and the fashion in which this company takes part in the 
sacrament, and with what else is woven into the meal. The 
essentially convivial nature of eating is illustrated by 
the near impossibility (except when, as we say, we are 
'starving') of preparing, eating and enjoying a meal by 
oneself, without descending into a mode of parody. 
"Persons are not simply in front of one another; they 
are along with each other around something", writes Levinas. 
"It is through participation in something common, in an 
idea, a common interest, a work, a meal, in 'a third man' 
that contact is made. "1 It is this 'around something' which 
provides such an important starting point for our discussion 
of an ambiance of concern. Portland Road indeed gathered 
'around' an idea, a common interest, a work, a meal - and 
a 'third man'. But this particular gathering held together 
as a household. Again, it is to the 'common interests' of 
a household, the nitty-gritty of lived context to which, 
1Levinas, 
E. (1978) p. 159. 
349 
in the first place, we must turn. 
If a first consideration, in our discussion of 'concern' 
is with that communality of interest which is expressed in 
the notion of household, we must now direct our attention 
more specifically to the way in which this communality of 
interest may be opened up as a 'householding'. A household 
community is already a place where common concerns will 
show themselves, but households will vary considerably in 
the degree to which they may be open to these concerns, to 
their being taken up, or for that matter, questioned. 
Portland Road was addressed to the opening up of 
possibilities of living concernedly. These possibilities, 
as we have argued in the first chapters, may well be closed 
off to varying extents, firmly and stubbornly, precisely in 
those places which are especially designed and custom built, 
equipped and staffed as places of concern or caring. 
Institutions which conduct themselves on 'therapeutic 
community lines' or adopt 'therapeutic community methods' 
typically - and notwithstanding their well-intentionedness - 
show themselves to be missing that ground or culture where 
the germinal possibilities of concern might 'take root'. 
Here, the probabilistic structures of the 'organizational' 
pre-empt the germinal power of the organic. Portland Road 
started from the assumption that a household, from its 
very founding and through its gathering exhibits already 
a latency, a generative source, which, through a cultivation 
of thoughtfulness and sensibility, may flourish and bear 
fruit. 
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But now we may anticipate a difficulty. We have 
suggested that an ambiance of concern may arise, as the 
realization of a latency or potential, where people are 
gathered together about, or within a household, under 
conditions conducive to their finding themselves at home 
with one another. As very general 'guiding principles' 
pertaining to these facilitating conditions we have stressed 
the importance of 'letting be', or making space for people 
to find their own way with one another; emphasizing, for 
example, that an 'ambiance of concern' cannot simply be 
'organized' or 'set up'. 
At the same time, we have made it quite clear that the 
people who were drawn to Portland Road were not 'together', 
and that they were drawn to the household for that very 
reason. How then does an ambiance of concern - which pre- 
sumably will turn out to be an ambiance within which people 
are in some way attentive to one another and to the way in 
which they treat one another - arise in the case of a house- 
hold whose members are 'untogether', whose world of concern 
has narrowed down to those pressing and urgent matters to 
do wtih their own immediate sufferings? How will an ambiance 
of concern open up between people who are 'alienated', if 
by this term ambiance of concern we are to understand a 
concern which opens up between one person and another? 
We shall address ourselves to the ramifications of 
this question in subsequent pages. For the moment we may 
express it in the form of a riddle: how does a person who 
have never experienced concern - experience concern? Con- 
densed in this way, it suggests that a person who comes to 
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the house is being asked, 
that which he cannot do. 
doxical 'requirement' may 
situation, where a person 
freely (his symptoms beinc 
to 'free associate', that 
speak spontaneously. 
or even required, to do precisely 
This same sort of highly para- 
arise in the psychotherapeutic 
who typically cannot speak 
an 'unfree' speaking) is 'asked' 
is, let his thoughts wander, 
But when we say that a person is 'untogether', we do 
not mean that he has no concerns or concern - rather we 
are saying that the world of his concern, or the unitariness 
of his world is in some way 'untogether'; or that he is out 
of tune with his desire. We are saying that in some senses 
such a person is not at home in the world (notwithstanding 
the existence of any number of regions in which he may be 
streetwise) or not at home with himself, or, perhaps most 
fundamentally, with another. This position of being 
'untogether' or 'all over the place' may itself become the 
occasion of great concern, just as a person may be deeply 
and agonizingly concerned at his or her 'lack of concern'. 
Several people came to the house insisting that they 
did not feel anything, or no longer 'cared' any more, where 
they manifestly did care sufficiently about their lives to 
make this move towards the house, despite the great anxiety 
which this caused them, and their fears as to what they 
might 'get into'. Perhaps they did not feel any concern 
for anyone else. Yet they have now put themselves in a 
position where others have (albeit so far, minimally) shown 
a concern for them. How, or whether, this tentative 
beginning will in the course of time open up, and something 
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come of it, will in the case of each person, wait to be 
seen. A first step has already been taken by entering 
a place within which the twists and turns of this question, 
and the issues about which it pivots, may themselves come 
into view, a place within which this question may be opened 
and freely asked. The opening up of the question of con- 
cern is already the opening of concern. It is already 
opened where any gathering holds together and allows that 
which belongs within the domain of dwelling: dwelling's 
forgetfulness, waywardness, carelessness. 
We may now 'flesh out' this discussion of 'concern' 
by taking up something of the style of day to day life. 
As grist to the mill of the everyday we may consider 
equally peoples' concerns and their 'unconcerns', or lack 
of concern, their cares and their carelessness, their 
absence as well as their presence. For we may be sure 
that in any community household people will in one way or 
another 'concern' one another whatever they do, and that 
this will be no less true where people, for one reason 
or another prefer to 'withdraw' rather than take an 'active 
part' in what is going on. 
Money 
There was above all just one unwritten rule of the 
house at Portland Road: that each person pay his rent. 
The money was, strictly speaking, a membership fee, and 
for this reason, because it was not payment for the rental 
of a room, it was usually referred to as 'dues' rather 
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than rent. The importance of this money was obvious. In 
the first place, it was the only source of income which 
the house had; it depended for its continuing upon each 
person paying his way. Payment of this money, moreover, 
was on incontrovertible token or marker of a person's desire 
to stay in the house; it was an ante into the conversation. 
People ordinarily paid these dues at the monthly 
business meeting, which would always be scheduled for one 
of the evenings when Hugh visited. Each person's payment 
was the same: in 1980 this amounted to twenty pounds per 
week. This included all the costs of running the house, 
fuel bills, maintenance, repairs, and so on, but did not 
include food, which was arranged and worked out separately. 
People took it in turns to collect the cheques, com- 
plete the most rudimentary book-keeping, bank the cash, 
and fulfil such other tasks as fell to the treasurer. Beyond 
paying, their rents, it was at business meetings that people 
claimed for household expenses for which they were out of 
pocket, such as bills, paint and maintenance materials, 
replaced kitchen equipment, cushion covers, and so on. On 
smaller items - new mugs, plates or bowls, for example - 
or on materials the necessity Of which was beyond question 
(the replacement of glass for a broken window) people would 
simply act on their own initiative. Other items (e. g. 
whether to paint a particular room a certain colour) would 
usually depend upon agreement which might sometimes await 
hours of conversation. 
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Many of the people who lived at Portland Road survived 
on the most meagre of incomes, such as were provided by 
social security payments, or gained from - often demeaning - 
part-time or casual work. People therefore did from time 
to time lapse slightly in their payments to the house. Here, 
however, there was no question of getting away with a free 
ride. Again on a number of occasions the situation arose 
where, at business meeting time, a member of the house would 
not be in any position or state of mind conducive to the 
discussion of money or other such practicalities. The house 
usually was able to accommodate this sort of circumstance 
without undue difficulty, by making sure, one way or another, 
that the matter could safely be deferred. In the eight 
years of the house, only one person bluntly refused to pay 
the dues. When the woman concerned had become more than 
two months overdue with her payments, and after repeatedly 
having refused to discuss the matter, she was asked to leave. 
Food 
Although it was by no means a house of gluttons, the 
rituals associated with food, at Portland Road, assumed a 
very considerable importance. Partly so, because mealtimes, 
and particularly, the occasion of the evening meal, tended 
to be the times when people gathered together. It was 
very much in accordance with the spirit of the place-that 
the kitchen and the table be communal, and mealtimes an 
occasion or opportunity for people to enjoy some degree 
of conviviality. The principle that 'companionship' is 
an important part of eating well was more or less assumed. 
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It would of course be perfectly possible for a house to 
adopt a system whereby each person have his own little 
locker or shelf in the kitchen, which he could stock up 
with items of food of his own choosing, for his private 
'consumption'; but such a household would hardly be expected 
to enjoy companionship in the same way or to the same 
degree. Such an arrangement, encouraged in some therapeutic 
residential settings, would to most people probably not 
feel agreeable. At the same time, it would not be sensible 
to imagine that a convivial ambiance is going to come about 
merely because a rule is laid down requiring people to eat 
together. 
The way that the food money was worked out varied a 
little according to different phases or times of the house, 
but the basic principle which remained was very simple. 
It was a system which could happily accommodate - and in 
some ways encouraged -a communal table; yet it had 
sufficient flexibility to allow, up to a point, anyone who 
wanted to 'do his own thing'. All food, more or less, which 
passed through the kitchen, was regarded as communal, and 
belonged to everyone - irrespective of whoever had bought 
it. Each person kept a record of what he or she had spent 
on this communal food, and at the end of each week (or 
sometimes, month) the total cost of this food was divided 
among all those who were living in the house, those who 
had spent more than the average receiving a rebate from 
those who had spent less. Each person's contribution to 
the cost of the food usually turned out to be relatively 
small; it was always possible to live inexpensively at 
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Portland Road. 
One advantage of this system was its simplicity. Any 
person in the house was free to help himself to any food 
which he might find in the kitchen - since it was in effect 
his. If, for some reason a person preferred to eat on his 
own - which some people did, some of the time - he could 
usually make do well enough without spending anything beyond 
his share in the 'collective amount'; without, for example, 
having to go out himself and shop. If people did prefer to 
do their own provisioning, privately, buying foods to their 
own personal tastes and eating them on their own, they were 
free to do so. They would, however, find themselves paying 
for this privilege, over and above their 'ordinary' share 
of the expenses, since 'carry outs' and other items of food 
bought simply for oneself were not usually included within 
the communal food budget. In fact, even where some people 
had much more money than others, spending on food was usually 
kept within the 'common wealth', and this sort of private 
feasting was not usual. At the same time, however, there 
were endless discussions, mostly of a rather light-hearted 
nature, as to what constituted legitimate food expenses, 
what sort of 'luxury' foods might be included within the 
budget, whether drink was a food, and so on. For the most 
part, the arrangement which the house came to, which assumed 
a certain amount of trust, was never abused, and people were 
not required to submit receipts at the weekly or monthly 
reckonings. 
The provisioning, and buying of food, was usually quite 
well planned. Periodic visits were made, in the house van, 
357 
to a wholefood yard, and regular visits to the local market, 
for vegetables and so on. Most of the time the house was 
well enough stocked, at least with basic foods, and so the 
rather casual approach to the actual preparation of meals 
did not result in anyone having to go hungry. But casual 
it unquestionably was. In fact, although the evening 
gatherings did indeed constitute a particular sort of 'focus' 
to the day, and became an-indelible structure of the rhythm 
of the house, such meals as were got together on these 
occasions were, as often as not, a result of some few people, 
or one person, getting something together with what was 
available, at the last minute, rather than as a result of 
some farsighted planning. At the same time, however, people 
would quite regularly - either by themselves or with one or 
two others - announce their intention to cook something on 
a particular evening, buying the particular ingredients they 
required and preparing some special meal or other. The house 
never showed a great fondness for any 'organized' system, 
such as a 'meal rota' - the price which was paid for this 
preference was that, inevitably, the tasks of cooking fell 
to some people more than others; and a rather thankless task 
this would sometimes turn out to be. Some people hardly 
ever turned a hand to these matters, but for different 
reasons. In some cases laziness and selfishness were con- 
spicuously in evidence - these might meet with responses of 
teasing or sarcasm, or sometimes, after long periods of 
silent 'putting up with', with outbursts of indignant 
anger. In other cases, people were too 'freaked out', 
depressed or otherwise pre-occupied with their own miseries 
to engage very helpfully in day to day chores, and in these 
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cases - although they might equally be permeated with 
selfishness or laziness -a rather different response might 
seem to be called for. In instances such as these, for 
example, innumerable openings or opportunities would arise 
for people to extend towards one another simple gestures of 
helpfulness and thoughtfulness. Some people, particularly 
those who were more easy going by disposition, or more aware 
of the limitations of others, inevitably were more alert to 
these opportunities. Other people, on the other hand, found 
the apparent indifference of others towards the general dis- 
order or even chaos which frequently characterized the 
domestic scene, to be unbearably irksome; they would find 
themselves to be constantly nagging or goading others to 
'get it together' - or else silently and long-sufferingly 
taking it all upon themselves. 
Similar considerations as apply to the preparation of 
food also applied to the various other household chores 
and tasks; washing up, tidying and cleaning, attending to 
minor repairs, decoration, keeping the fire in, and so on. 
Again, there was no rota or formal division or organization 
of labour - these various tasks were attended to and 
accomplished according to whomsoever was moved, or was 
nudged or persuaded into taking them on. People attended 
to these tasks to very different degrees, according to 
their inclinations, capabilities, and so on. Again, people 
attended to these tasks in very different fashions; light- 
heartedly, good-naturedly, uncomplainingly, long-sufferingly, 
guiltily, resentfully; also, people in doing these jobs 
differed very much in their ability or willingness to invite 
or ask other people to help them. It was not unknown for 
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some people to hog or take over for themselves in a rather 
greedy fashion some unpleasant chore, whilst complaining 
bitterly meanwhile that no-one ever helped them. 
Habits 
In describing the fashion in which people came to sit 
round the table, we have been presenting an example of the 
habits characteristic of that household. Discussion of what 
is habitual is most important in an inquiry into what it is 
for a community or a household to be 'concerned'. In order 
to open discussion of the sort of care which the community 
exhibits, we need not set about some psychological inquiry 
into the true intentions or inner dynamics which motivate 
people's conduct, so much as notice the way they behave. 
Behaviour, or behaving is not just something that we 'do', 
any more than it is the 'response' to 'stimuli'; but it 
speaks equally of a bearing towards and of a 'hold' on 
things, or even the 'having' (be-having) of a world. In 
this sense, behaviour is 'inhabiting', or a holding and 
being held by a habitat. Here again, we are stressing the 
'fit' or 'fittingness' which pertains between our habits 
and our habitat. 
Our 'habits' are our 'second nature'. Once acquired, 
of course, they may come to possess a certain 'momentum' 
of their own, so that we cannot stop or discontinue with 
many of our habits just because it is now our wish. Our 
habits, however much we may want to change them, may be 
as recalcitrant to our will as any other 'disposition', 
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such as chronically bad posture, attitude or stance. 
The 'embodiment' of habit is well illustrated by technical 
skills of one sort or another. A pianist who takes up 
formal tuition with a teacher, where hitherto he was. content 
merely to 'muddle along', may have to spend a considerable 
and arduous period of time 'unlearning' all sorts of wrong 
habits before the keyboard of his instrument opens up as 
a field of possibility in which he is now more free to move, 
or express a more full range of musical values. 
Our habits, in many senses, become our way, although they 
might equally be said, upon occasion, to get in our way. 
When I speak of the habit or habits of a household, I do 
not have in mind simply the various quirks and idiosyncrasies 
of its members (for example the 'good' or 'bad' habits which 
they may bring), but more the 'way' that the household has 
become or evolved in its day to day being. I am suggesting 
that which has become habitual as a way of being together, 
or in this case, living together. Habits, or in the sense 
that I am now speaking, 'co-habits', may range from deep 
and long-established traditions (this is the way we do 
things) to the particular style of the moment, passing habits, 
which simply reflect the way things are at the present time. 
In either case, the particular habits of a household which 
prevail at any time will certainly colour, and may most 
decisively determine the manner in which a newcomer to the 
house takes up his position there. Such associations, 
friendships or intimacies as may open up between himself 
and the others do not occur in some vacuum, but in a lived 
context, from within a matrix of intentionality which 
already has a history and a 'way', and which may importantly 
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determine the possibilities of whatsoever may arise. Indeed, 
it is difficult to imagine what might be achieved were the 
'ideal' of a 'clean slate' to be sought after. For habit - 
this is the way we do things here - far from being merely 
some 'negative residuum' in many senses constitutes that 
hinge upon which the very possibility of 'opening' pivots. 
I have already mentioned some of the traditions and 
rituals of Portland Road. I shall now turn to a discussion 
of some ordinary, everyday habits, to give some idea of how 
the house, in its everydayness, was inhabited. I shall 
limit my comments to one 'family' of habits to do with the 
'time' of the house: more specifically I shall try to bring 
out some different senses in which the 'lingering' of the 
household became a 'waiting'. 
Now the house aspired to cultivate habits of attentive- 
ness, watchfulness, proposing that health and well-being 
are inseparable from freedom and interpersonal responsibility 
- and that they may be generated in a household whose members 
are attentive to the vicissitudes of living together. It is 
interesting to see how we may arrive at 'waiting' from 
'attentiveness'. 
'Waiting' is in fact a most interesting word, which 
comes from the Sanskrit vagas or vajas, meaning strength or 
vigour. From the Latin root we find vigour (strength, being 
in good health) vigil (wide awake) and such words as 
reveillez: wake up! From the Germanic: watching, being wide 
awake. We may say that to wait is to wake, to be watchful, 
(to wait upon, to be ready), and in this sense most befitting 
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a community which proposes to live 'therapeutically'. It 
is, furthermore, an attitude most befitting the role of 
the patient, one who is patient, who waits, allows or 
suffers. 
The Portland Road household provided many striking 
examples of attentiveness, and willingness to attend. In 
many ways, the general-preparedness on the part of people 
to put themselves out in attending to others - for example, 
staying up through the night when the occasion demanded - 
was quite unusual. There were many occasions of stirring, 
awakening and dawning, which in many cases were the fruits 
of a patient and watchful waiting for the right moment, or 
the right opening. When I speak, however, of the habit or 
habits of waiting being entrenched with Portland Road, I do 
not have in mind, primarily, that vigour, or potency, of 
being awake. It was rather a 'deficient mode' of attentive- 
ness or wakefulness which in many ways most immediately 
characterized the ambiance of the household. it was less 
an awaiting from the watchtower, an awaiting for the 
messenger's beacon, or the first light of dawn - than the 
waiting of the prisoner, the awaiting of release, the killing 
of time. It was more the waiting of people who were not 
yet free to wait. 
Very simply, for example, many people at Portland Road 
spent a great deal of time 'hanging around', 'doing nothing', 
waiting for the next cup of tea, waiting for the next 
distraction, or, during one particular phase, waiting for 
opening time. Inevitably, this sort of 'waiting' tended to 
be particularly characteristic of those individuals who did 
363 
not have any work, which was on average about a third of 
the house. Here, people tended to get up very late, and 
spend the next three hours 'waking up. '. But they were by 
no means the only 'waiters'. Sunday, when most people were 
around, tended equally to be a day of waiting, characterised 
much of the time by a similar restless, uneasy boredom. It 
was the exception rather than the rule for people to maintain 
some interest or enthusiasm of their own, -for example a sport 
or artistic activity, which had a power to take them outside 
of the house and enable them to return refreshed, or to 
take them outside of their pre-occupation with themselves 
and one another. Several people were engaged in studies of 
one sort or another, but tended for the most part to find 
the prevailing 'restlessness' of the house singularly ill- 
conducive to study. 
Evidence of this 'living in waiting' was usually every- 
where to be seen. "Put off what you can for as long as you 
can" - this might have seemed at times to have been one of 
the house mottos. There was as often as not a pile of 
dishes in the sink, waiting to be washed up. Such minor 
chores as arise from time to time in any household - un- 
blocking the sink, changing a lightbulb, mending a fuse - 
tended to remain to be done, rather than immediately being 
attended to. There were invariably, too - and of course 
folded into these very details -a great many things which 
remained to be said, and which were all the more conspicuous 
in their being unspoken. 
A particular inflection to much of this 'waiting' 
which people were engaged in was - waiting for the other 
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person to make the move. Thus one common structure of 
waiting arose where someone - or everyone - was waiting for 
the other to... cook a meal, paint the wall, set a tone, show 
a way, know what to do; or perhaps most painful of all, 
simply dare to speak of what might be on his mind. Whether 
through their self-consciousness, their self-doubt or fear 
of getting it wrong, or through mean-ness of spirit, people 
frequently found it enormously difficult to take a stand, 
or commit themselves unequivocally to some course of action, 
or initiate conversation about matters which patently needed 
to be discussed. Thus: 'I'm not going to move a finger if 
no one else does', 'I'm not going to put my foot in it', or 
'I'm not going to be the one to open my mouth' were quite 
common attitudes. A further, and vicious, twist to tighten 
this spiral of inactivity arose where people watched 
(waiting! ) enviously, resentfully and gleefully for those 
who did move to stumble and fall. 
Insofar as these ways of waiting were rather endemic 
to Portland Road, habitual and so highly infectious (how 
quickly a new member will get the hang of it! ) - the ambi- 
ance of the house was much of the time listless, depressed, 
torpid, languid - depleted of energy. But where it was 
depleted of energy, this was largely because so much energy 
was invested in waiting, hanging around, doing nothing, 
putting things off, killing time, and so on. The waiting 
that I have talked about was far from being resting or 
restful, but was in many ways consuming or draining of 
energy. Here again we see a connection between vigour and 
waiting; one of the many senses in which the ambiance of 
the house was deeply paradoxical arose from this sense 
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which it gave of enormous energy, at times closed in on 
itself, like a black hole; a density which could, from 
within itself, evidence little lightness. 
For lightness of touch, the house counted upon its 
psychotherapist. Another form which 'waiting' took in the 
household, therefore, was 'waiting for Hugh'. Whilst it 
would be quite misleading to suggest that movement within 
the house was only initiated by Hugh, or that everything 
awaited his arrival, it would be equally misleading to gloss 
over the significance of the shift of tone and of nuance 
which characterized the conversation or intercourse when he 
was present, or to deny that people tended to wait upon his 
every word. I have mentioned his lightness of touch, and 
might equally speak of the playfulness which typified much 
of the time when he was present. Nevertheless, his presence, 
in the first place, introduced a note of 'seriousness' into 
the conversation, as is befitting an occasion set aside 
specifically for 'therapeutic work'. There was a tendency, 
accordingly, to some degree, not to take things seriously 
except when he was around. This was particularly - and 
ironically - the case in those 'heavier phases of the 
household, where people would 'put off' all but the most 
trivial conversation until some occasion when Hugh was 
present, and often avoid it as long as possible, even then. 
All sorts of rationalizations for 'waiting' or passivity 
were forthcoming. There were, for example, many variations 
upon the theme of - 'the enlightened man does not act until 
the moment is right'. The notion that an action which is 
not 'right' is wrong, doubtless, is one to be taken, in its 
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place, very seriously, and it is notion of some considerable 
subtlety. But the waiting of Portland Road was often far 
from a subtle waiting in 'readiness', and it is a long way 
from oracular utterances such as this to: 'I'm not going to 
do the washing-up until I'm in the right mood'. The delicacy 
of one's feelings is of course a rich source for righteous 
justification, and some people exploited this to its fullest 
extent. At one time a little astrological circle started up 
within the house, and this opened up new and undreamed 
possibilities for justifying the deferment of initiative. 
For some of the people who lived in the house, passivity 
took a predominantly 'active' form, where, for example, they 
were constantly on the go trying to mobilize others, or to 
get things done. Here, a highly 'active' person might still 
be considered passive insofar as his actions were not free 
or autonomous, or insofar as he was not moved by his desire 
so much as his wish to please, his anxiety to be seen to 
be doing something, his inability to stay or remain, or 
indeed precisely his fear to wait. Some people whose dis- 
position was of this nature were at the same time constructive 
and useful about the house; others merely made nuisances of 
themselves, constantly meddling in other people's business 
and getting in the way, whether or not they were trying to 
be helpful. 
Manners 
Our manner is our way of going about things; the word 
(manus, hand) suggesting our holding or handling of the 
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world. Such distinction, therefore, as we may wish to draw 
between 'habits' and 'manners' is in many ways an arbitrary 
one. 'Manners', however, usually refers to the way in which 
we go about things with one another, to the hand which we 
extend, or refrain from extending, to another. 
We may surely assume that the sort of manners which 
people display towards one another are vitally important in 
determining the particular ambiance characteristic of that 
company. The question of manners must be doubly important 
in the case of a community which aspires to live healthily 
or well. What possible sense does it make, for example, 
to imagine some community which claims to offer therapeutic 
treatment for its members if it does not recognise or attach 
some importance at least to the minimal notion of ordinary 
human decency? It is ironic that the 'helping attitude' of 
the 'caring professions' is particularly prone to lapsings 
from 'ordinary human decency', where, for example, in 
Heidegger's terminology, solicitude 'leaps in'. Some 
illustrations of this have been provided in the first chap- 
ters. But by no means was Portland Road exempt from this 
leaping in of solicitude, where, for example, people took 
it upon themselves, in their 'helpfulness' to extrude the 
mote from the eye of the other. 
We might easily draw up, as a starting point, some 
list or catalogue of 'bad manners' which were either deeply 
characteristic, or else occasional, within Portland Road - 
and a long list it would no doubt be. In many cases these 
would be of a rather extreme nature, and touch not only 
upon people's finer sensibilities, but upon areas of rather 
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gross offensiveness, such that the question might starkly 
arise of when 'enough is enough'. 
One young man, for example, a highly sensitive and 
artistically talented individual, who had spent several 
years in mental hospital undergoing treatment for his 
severely schizophrenic condition, was in the habit of 
exposing himself to the company and quietly and rather 
whimsically masturbating, only to give up after a minute or 
two, usually with a little sigh, or an ironic shrug. When 
this first started happening, it was met with an appalled 
silence. Subsequently, and when the futility of trying to 
discourage him had become quite apparent, and since he was 
in many ways quite well liked, his habit came to be treated 
by most people with a certain acceptance. On occasions when 
he went out in the company of others in the house, for 
example to a party, it caused considerable embarrassment 
and offence, just as it did on those occasions when he was 
visited, in the house, by his parents. People very soon 
refused to go anywhere with him. But within the company of 
the house his masturbating came to be, if not exactly, 
ignored, more or less taken for granted; it became the object 
of a certain amount of dry amusement and good-natured teasing. 
In the course of this, it was hoped, he might find his way 
through to a way of being with others which was somewhat 
less masturbatory. But this did not prove to be so. He ran 
away from the house, and was brought back several times; and 
finally found his way 'home' to the back wards. 
There were three occasions when a person went clearly 
beyond the bounds of what the house found acceptable, each 
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involving a matter of serious physical violence. In each 
case the individual concerned was immediately required to 
leave the house, since it had become clear to others that 
they were not safe in his or her company. Two of the attacks 
were made by people who had been living in the house for 
some time, and they were rather unexpected, although the 
person in each case was extremely disturbed. Neither of 
these attacks was made with any 'implement', no-one was badly 
hurt, and in each case it was with some regret that the 
person was asked to leave. This was not so in the case of 
the third attack, which was altogether more severe; it was 
made with a bottle, and the victim only just escaped being 
permanently disfigured. Her attacker was the young woman 
who was referred to earlier as having joined the house with- 
out having said a word, and the attack took place some weeks 
after her arrival, during which time she still had hardly 
spoken. She had, however, in the meanwhile already alerted 
the attention of others to the possibility of her becoming 
violent, to the extent that the house had resolved to keep 
a close eye on her all the time. It was in a moment of 
slackening of this resolve that her attack was suddenly 
made, and although the complete story was never finally 
unravelled, it seemed that her victim - who carried on 
living in the house - did to some extent 'ask for it'. The 
household, which was very full at this time, was extremely 
shaken by this incident, which took place at a time when 
many people otherwise felt things to be going well. It is 
perhaps significant that the decision on the part of the 
house to accept this woman as a member was the only occasion 
where the house went ahead despite Hugh's clearly voiced 
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misgivings. 
Here we have touched upon areas of conduct which go 
far beyond 'bad manners' or even 'gross offensiveness'. 
It may not, however, be stark or crude violations of common 
decency which are most telling of the manner in which a 
community can become debilitated or sapped of spirit. More 
important, perhaps, are those examples of 'everyday' way- 
wardness, whereby people fail to consider or to take account 
of one another, in ways which may become so subtle as to 
pass almost un-noticed and certainly unspoken. 
Examples of this sort of thing, which often were far 
from subtle, arose at Portland Road where people failed to 
let one another know of their intentions or plans, or failed 
to keep in touch with one another over simple things. In 
some cases, for example, people would leave the house for 
a few days, or a weekend, without letting anyone else know 
that they were going away, or where they were going to. Or 
where they did tell someone, leaving this person to inform 
the others, he or she would forget to do so. Much more 
commonly, people failed to let one another know whether or 
not they would be in on some particular evening or occasion, 
with the result that whoever was bothering to cook a meal 
or be there for a visitor had no way of knowing who all was 
going to be around. Or people would forget to put food 
aside for someone who would be coming in later. Where these 
sort of examples of forgetfulness and bad manners prevail 
to a sufficient extent, the situation within the house as 
a whole may approximate to that state where no one feels he 
may count upon anyone else, or where people assume that 
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everyone else is indifferent to their presence, or absence. 
This situation, of course, is highly conducive to 'self- 
perpetuation'. Most informative within this 'self- 
perpetuation' may be subtleties and nuances of manner, quiet 
'little murders' of day to day forgetfulness, unkindness, 
thoughtfulness; nuances of gesture and intention which close 
doors, close conversations. When these minutae of violence, 
these little banalities of evil themselves become so much 
a characteristic of the prevailing discourse so as to be 
taken for granted, so as to be a 'collective' second nature, 
it is then that a household may give a most distressing sense 
of 'floundering' or having lost its way. But this emphasis 
may be reversed; and it may require very little by way of 
gesture to set things again under way. There is little in 
the 'therapy' of a community that is more powerful than the 
most simple acts of kindness, thoughtfulness or decency, 
which may be conveyed by the simplest of gestures, the finest 
nuances of language. If I am repeatedly stressing the 'nega- 
tive' this does not mean that the power of kindness was not 
felt at Portland Road, or was missing. On the contrary, it 
was precisely because some degree of kindness always remained 
that the unkindness could be endured. I do not refer 
necessarily to kindness which finds its expression in some 
'act'; it might simply be the kindness of remembering. This 
is clearly rather important in the case of people who stand 
at the very fringes of any membership. 
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Friendship 
Some discussion of the phenomenon of friendship is 
necessary to any understanding of what is a healthy or 
flourishing household community. What, first of all, is the 
place of friendship within such a household? We might recall 
the importance of friendship in Aristotle's discussion of 
human well-being, and his claim that "friendship seems to be 
the bond that holds communities together". Friendship here 
translates hp ilia; we must pass over discussion of links which 
may be discerned, in Greek thought, between the eikos, and 
philia. 
l 
Nor is. it possible here to enter into the full 
intricacies of Aristotle's discussion of friendship. We may, 
however, consider some of the 'elements' of friendship which 
bear most immediately and importantly upon our inquiry into 
the nature of a prospering household. 
First of all, by invoking the notion of 'friendship' we 
are indicating a state of affairs where people enjoy one 
another's company, and take pleasure in being together. 
Clearly, this is not all there is to friendship, since 
people might take pleasure in one another's company under all 
sorts of circumstances where they would not consider one 
another to be friends; where we speak of a friendship we 
suggest, for example, some degree of endurance in time, and 
not just a passing pleasure. But - and this is crucial in 
our present study - where people do not take any delight in 
being together, or enjoy some degree of conviviality and 
companionship, but are merely tolerating or putting up with 
1See, 
for example, the discussion of friendship in Plato's psis. 
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one another, or are dutifully and earnestly trying to help 
one another, we hesitate to characterize this association 
as being one of friendship. 
A further ingredient of friendship, a second character- 
istic of the bond which holds friends together is that of 
mutual regard or concern between the persons, such that each 
cares for, or holds dear, the other, for his own sake. It is 
clear from Aristotle's discussion of friendship that this 
consideration holds true even of those friendships which are 
delineated primarily by the pleasures or advantages which 
are enjoyed by the respective partners in the friendship, for 
example a friendship such as a sporting partnership which is 
occasioned or cemented by some particular shared interest or 
activity. 
1 
Again, therefore, where people are merely using 
one another for their own gain or pleasure, or advantage, in 
the absence of concern for the well-being of the other, whether 
or not they enjoy one another's company within this associa- 
tion, we do not feel called to characterize this as a 
friendship; the nature of the bond, at any rate, is not that 
of hp ilia. It is precisely this sort of association which 
is suggested by accounts of therapeutic communities which 
recommend a 'social', 'community' or 'interpersonal' approach 
to psychiatry on the grounds that people need feedback from 
one another to help them with their psychological problems. 
Finally, friendship must have some direct bearing upon 
the question of the degree to which people will find living 
in a 'therapeutic community' to be worthwhile. We may assume 
1See Cooper, J. M. (1980). 
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that living in such a community - particularly where it 
proposes as its therapy the attentiveness of examined life - 
will not be easy. In the struggle to surrender to this 
most arduous of disciplines, profound disheartenment and 
dispiritedness are inevitable. But in these dark nights of 
the soul, notwithstanding their structures of solitariness, 
life around will carry on. The distinction here, however, 
between finding one's self to be merely one in a seriality 
of individuals each out for his own, and finding oneself to 
be, however 'distantly', with kindred spirits, companions, 
fellow travellers on the same way, may be decisive. This 
particular inflection of 'friendship' stresses that commu- 
nality of interest which may remind one of the continuing 
sense of the worthwhileness of it all, which may expand one's 
own particular concerns by placing them in the context of a 
broader, collective concern, which is itself a source of 
pleasure and interest. It is this sense of friendship, too, 
which we may have in mind when we think of 'belonging'. 
I have mentioned three facets of friendship which seem 
to have some bearing upon the ambiance or the ethos of a 
community. These place emphasis, in turn, upon the enjoy- 
ment one feels in the company of friends, the regard with 
which one is disposed towards one's friends, and the 
encouragement which one will find by virtue of belonging 
to a communality of interest. We have suggested that 
friendship is not only desirable, but may be necessary to 
the well-being of a community. We may now consider the 
importance of friendship at Portland Road, and in particular 
we must ask what especial considerations applied there, 
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such that friendship may have been 'problematic'. 
In the first place we must make it clear that friendship 
did indeed enter into our life of Portland Road. People got 
to know and to like one another, and they did so in ways 
which opened beyond the immediate context of the house, for 
example, going on holiday together, or getting to know one 
another's families. A number of enduring friendships were 
made, some of which survived long after the community. Members 
of the household would enjoy one another's company, or would 
enjoy being together; they took pleasure in the pursuit of 
common interests, and enjoyed a degree of companionship 
which unquestionably was worthwhile. The company was on 
many occasions convivial, enjoyable - fun. People turned 
to one another, and asked of one another, and put themselves 
out for one another - enjoying some degree of give and take 
which was not simply calculative or exploitative but was 
grounded upon a genuine liking and respect. 
Yet no sooner have we made the claim that Portland Road 
was, in some respects at least, a place of friendship, than 
we must subject it to radical qualification. Friendship at 
Portland Road was far from being a simple matter; such was 
the situation there that friendship showed itself to be, in 
many ways, highly paradoxical. This paradox may be expressed 
quite starkly by suggesting that the people who came to the 
house were not yet free to have friends. Or the formulation 
might be reversed: they were not free because they had no 
friends. This sense, that a person may not be free without 
having friends is itself suggested by the etmymological 
kinship of the words. 
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Portland Road was not characterized by that degree of 
coming and going, or movement, of friends, buddies or 
partners which we might expect of a house made up mainly of 
young and single people. Even those who were sociable by 
nature tended not to introduce friends to the house. 
Parties were relatively infrequent, invitations to friends 
to join the rest of the house, say for a meal, were equally 
rare. Whatever friendships were formed within the house, 
therefore, had something of a quality of 'shared insularity' 
about them; people in the house tended not to have outside 
friends who were regular visitors, or with whom they chose 
to spend a great deal of their time. Factual considerations, 
such as the point that so many of the members came from over- 
seas, and that few had settled or established themselves in 
London prior to moving into the house, doubtless contri- 
buted to this relative insularity. But more telling reasons 
have to do with the dispositions of the inhabitants, and 
the personal circumstances which drew them to the house in 
the first place. 
This 'friendlessness' was of course highly relevant to 
the ambiance which was found within the house. Its nuance of 
a shared insularity could sometimes shade into a 'celebration 
of being different', or even to a sense of barricading the 
doors against the world, or against a mad world. The ship 
of fools became a ship of pride. 
There is a deep irony to the idea of a community of 
the friendless - and much of the friendship was deeply 
permeated with irony. An 'ironic friendship' might arise 
where two people each backing in retreat from the world 
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'bump into' one another. They might like one another well 
enough, and have a lot 'in common'; but if a friendship is 
to flourish there must come some turn about, or change of 
heart, whereby each is able to face the other, and thereby, 
the world. There were innumerable variations played out 
upon the theme - 'I wouldn't want to join any club that 
would have me as a member', predicated upon a sense of 
personal worthlessness, or arising from a position felt, to 
some degree, to be one of hopelessness. 
I have suggested that the state of need in which many 
people found their way to the house was such that they 
were not yet free to have friends, or to find themselves open 
to the give and take of friendship. A further paradox which 
presented itself within the house may be put equally 
starkly; that they were at the same time not free not to 
have friends. Thus, whilst I have stressed that the ambi- 
ance of the house was indeed one of 'friendliness' in many 
ways which are not lightly to be dismissed, it was at the 
same time true that this ambiance was in some respects 
'undifferentiated'. If the opening up of friendship, or 
belonging, was for many people 'problematic', the attain- 
ment of 'singularity', or that emergence, standing back or 
'leaving', whereby one might be in a position to 'allow' 
friendship, was equally 'problematic'. People tended not 
to enjoy being on their own, not to take pleasure in their 
own interests, and to find their own solitariness unbear- 
able. Where people found neither their own company, nor 
that of others, to be vital or refreshing, a state of 
conviviality would arise which was far from being a singular 
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belonging, but was maintained within a highly ambivalent 
nether region, which people found equally hard to leave, 
and hard to enjoy. Living together in this fashion, to 
the extent that it prevailed, had something of a sense of 
compromise. Contributing to this compromise, too, was some 
sense of having to be friends with one another, or having 
to assume friendship where it obviously was forced, strained 
or premature; of approaching friendship quite uncritically, 
or paying any price for maintaining some degree of, or even 
illusion of it. Partly, perhaps, through some recoil at the 
alternative, which might seem to be an endless and prolonged 
emnity with a person one sees and is up against day after 
day. For surely, to be on good terms with those one lives 
with is highly to be desired. 
I have so far omitted from my account of friendship 
the matter of sexual pairings and partnerships within the 
house. If this matter is conspicuous by its absence, so, 
for the most part, were such affairs. Perhaps the most 
obvious reason why people did not enter into sexual partner- 
ships with one another more than they did might be that they 
were not 'together' enough or sure enough of themselves to 
face the consequences of this coming into open discussion. 
They might have been very wary of risking the criticism, 
scorn, envy, jealousy of others, or of allowing to be 
brought into view the various implications of what they were 
into. The house was singularly ill-suited to the casual 
affair. The atmosphere of the house was, furthermore, one 
of such highly charged incestuousness that the consequences 
of any full-blown sexual entanglement which was not sure 
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of its ground might well have seemed altogether too much. 
True as they are, these reasons possibly miss a further 
point. Portland Road highlighted the difficulties of 
sustaining a sexual relationship within a context whose 
discourse is so pervasively that of analysis. The house- 
hold as a whole was in this sense like psychoanalysis, 
which is extra-ordinary in that it is a relationship about 
relationships, and not some paradigm of relationship. In 
the same way, one might say that Portland Road was not a 
house for relationships; it would miss the point to think 
of it as a setting which set out to provide the wherewithal 
to achieve the goal of healthy, solid relationships on the 
part of all those who were drawn 'there. And in this sense, 
Portland Road might be said to have been, if not exactly 
unliveable, at least in the colloquial sense of the word - 
impossible. 
An Ambiance of Concern 
Our discussion of an ambiance of concern has been set 
within the 'common interest' of the household. If we pro- 
pose now to formulate some tentative 'conclusions' as to 
what is meant by an 'ambiance of concern', we might begin 
by pulling' together some of the threads which have emerged 
in the course of discussing this one particular household, 
all of which have some bearing upon the nature of a 'thriving 
household'. A thriving household, or a healthy economy, 
we may surmise, obtains where the bases of nourishment and 
protection, shelter and security are provided by the members 
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of a household who live together in some fashion which 
they themselves shape, and for which they take responsibility. 
Each member of the household will feel that he has a place, 
and a part to play; that he has a voice to be heard; and 
that his presence within the household is integral to the 
well-being of the household as a whole. That is, each 
person will articulate, in his own way, into a structure of 
belonging. 
The members of the household, in going about their 
business, and attending to the various demands made upon 
them, will at the same time be attentive to one another, 
to one another's needs, circumstances and preferences (from 
each according to his means, to each according to his needs) 
and attentive to the interplay which is going on between 
one person and another. Furthermore, this sort of attentive- 
ness will be habitual; it will be a part of the ethos or 
character of the house, and will neither need to be worked 
out at each moment, nor come about by obeying some rules of 
conduct. Finally, living in the household will feel to 
be worthwhile; the people who live together will find some 
degree of enjoyment in one another's company. Living to- 
gether in such a house will be enjoyable for its own sake, 
not merely as a means to an end, or some burden or duty to 
be discharged. 
Does this tentative notion of a 'healthy economy' 
satisfactorily bring together all of those considerations 
which pertain to an 'ambiance of concern' - and so enable 
us to understand more clearly what may be therapeutic about 
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community households? It would seem not. For does not 
this 'healthy economy' quickly descend into the caricature 
of a 'happy home', suggesting the snugness, coziness and 
satisfaction of a well feathered nestT Can we not easily 
imagine a household which runs smoothly, efficiently and 
happily - but which is at the same time egoic, complacent, 
smug? We may, in fact, be seriously misled if we think of 
an ambiance of concern in terms of some balmy warmth in 
which people are nice to one another - something which 
completes and is then completed. The ripples of disturbance 
which these images of placidity invite will be considered 
more in the following chapter. 
But the same direction to our argument -a direction 
which leads to a consideration of disturbance - is already 
suggested by our existing account of Portland Road. So 
disturbing was this household that it most conspicuously 
failed to meet the above 'criteria'. Are we forced to 
conclude, therefore, that Portland Road did not exemplify an 
'ambiance of concern'? This very term appears in a list of 
propositions to which this house was dedicated. Does this 
mean that this household fell far short of its aim, or 
somehow lost its way, and that others which are conducted 
in the same spirit equally are condemned to fail? 
I have characterized those sufferings which brought 
people to Portland Road, very broadly, under the headings 
of disorder of waywardness of habit and manner; ways of 
rigidity, fixation, repetition and denial which stood in 
the way of open, spontaneous and free discourse between 
one person and another. It would be naive to expect that 
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these longstanding tendencies, dispositions and habits - 
such as illustrate what it is to be 'untogether' - might 
suddenly become transcended merely by joining a community 
such as Portland Road. People did not suddenly find them- 
selves transformed upon entry into the community in some 
fashion such that they suddenly behaved openly, thoughtfully 
or straightforwardly. Far from this being so, as I have 
shown, it was conspicuously the case that-people exhibited 
varying, and sometimes extreme degrees of 'closedness', 
selfishness, and so on; so much so that most people at one 
time or another felt the house to be a hell, and indeed 
spoke of being there 'for their sins'. 
It would be equally naive to expect that all the 
troubles of the house would one day be sorted out or 
resolved, so that it would finally become easy and trouble 
free. For as people left the house and moved on to other 
things, new people would arrive, bringing with them 'fresh 
troubles'. Notwithstanding the experience which the house- 
hold built up over the years, and which was carried forward 
by Hugh and some of the longer staying members, the house 
was in a sense always at a beginning. 
What, then, is left of our 'ambiance of concern'? In 
the first place, a household which does not simply admit 
others on the basis of their 'winning ways', or on the 
basis of their being required to be some particular way, 
but allows equally their wayward ways, their errors and 
perversities, is already on the way to being a place of 
concern. But here, everything depends upon the nature of 
the 'allowing', or letting be. 'Letting be' is not mere 
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indifference, any more than is the concern which 'lets be' 
a concern which requires things to be other than the way 
they are. What is 'untogether' will be allowed, or where 
people come to the house showing a lack of concern for 
others, this too will be allowed in a concern which starts 
off with an acknowledgement of how things are. 
I have mentioned the instance of an individual who 
repeatedly and openly masturbated in the company of the 
house. This was rather an extreme behaviour, and one which 
betokens a deeply narcissistic lack of concern for others. 
The concern which was shown towards this person did not 
take the form of forbidding this behaviour or requiring him 
either to change his ways or else leave the house - for this 
had been the story of his life. It was a concern which made 
clear to him - for the most part quite 'lightly' - that 
he was indeed blinding himself to the other in his way of 
going about things, but which at the same time made it quite 
clear that there were other things going on in the house 
which he was welcome to engage in, and which might in the 
longer run prove to be more fruitful and enjoyable. We 
know that he finally declined this invitation, but we have 
no way of knowing what value its having been extended may 
have had for him. 
Hugh wrote of Portland Road that it 'proposes merely 
not to silence the unspeakable'. We may speak of the house 
as being concerned to admit or let into its conversation 
what has hitherto not been admitted or allowed (for example 
what is 'repressed' or 'unconscious'), or what already 
intrudes into the conversation precisely in not being said. 
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Rather than being ex-communicated, for example as a 
'symptom', the untold or the unspeakable will now take its 
proper place in the prevailing discourse; or the homeless 
will now find his way towards home. But perhaps this begs 
the very question of concern's hospitality, assuming that 
the prevailing conversation is open, or 'wants to know', and 
is not itself 'unspeakable' in its unconcernedness. I have 
made it clear that this particular household at times lapsed 
significantly from any apparent open-ness or concernedness, 
becoming closed in on itself, languid and depressed, silent. 
Where, now, does concern begin? 
Again, concern is forced to start with the way things 
are. Always, the house starts from where it is. If, at 
any time, the household finds itself 'unconcerned' - so 
must it be. No amount of wishing that it might be otherwise, 
or frantic activity predicated upon such a wish, will 
change this. If everyone is unconcerned, then the members 
of the household will find themselves living in the hell of 
their own lack of concern. The deeper their lack of concern, 
the more hellish the way they will find themselves living. 
But it is precisely 'concern' which takes stock of this 
state of affairs, and finds this now to be an 'object of 
concern', if only through the starkness of being up against 
it. It was a concern about the very hell of unconcernedness 
which finally would shock the house into its senses, or into 
a recollection which came about precisely through allowing 
this possibility to arise. 
It was this very open-ness to possibility which makes 
it perhaps more accurate to speak, instead of hell, of 
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purgatory. It was indeed a possibility for the house to 
live 'unconcernedly' - and this must be the case within a 
concern which 'lets be'. But while the possibility of 
'unconcernedness' was always open, it was at the same time 
a possibility which that very open-ness to possibility let 
be seen, come into view, or be shown. It is only within 
some 'ambiance of concern' that the very question of 
'unconcern' will arise, not as a problem to be got rid of, 
but as a conversation to be opened. 
I have so far suggested a number of 'minimal considera- 
tions' which have bearing upon the emergence of an ambiance 
of concern. In presenting this inquiry within the context 
of a household, I have brought into view a 'communality of 
interest' about which concern and concerns gather. My aim 
here has been to introduce what may be called an 'epistemology 
of dwelling' -a way of knowing one's way about in the sure- 
footedness of inhabiting, and a way of knowing one another 
which is a being at home with. 
In discussing the manner in which this way may be 
opened up, as a way of being with one another which is 
thoughtful and attentive - concerned -I have suggested a 
number of issues about which this pivots. I conclude that 
a concerned ambiance is not simply some state of inter- 
personal well-being which is accomplished and having been 
accomplished remains to be bathed in, or maintained in some 
equilibrium. Rather, it is to be seen in terms of the 
possibilities which arise, and the manner in which they are 
taken up. I have spoken of the 'letting be' within which 
possibility arises, and in particular the letting be which 
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discloses 'unconcern', which then becomes a provocation to 
concern. We must now consider in more detail how this 
provocation may be taken up, and what responsibilities 
accompany 'letting be'. We must inquire first of all into 
that which invokes and provokes response, and secondly, 
into the nature of the reply. 
387 
CHAPTER TEN 
THE RESPONSE OF HOSPITALITY 
Hospitality and the Other 
I have chosen, as my heading for this chapter, the 
response of hospitality. Why response: are we not more 
accustomed to think of the 'giving' of hospitality, as an 
invitation, an initiating act, a first gesture? The word 
'hospitality' carries dominant nuances of opening one's 
home to, sharing one's table with, of receiving a guest. 
Thus we speak of someone as 'hospitable' who makes us feel 
at home in his or. her home. It by no means implies that 
such hospitality cannot be 'spontaneous' to say that it 
invariably obeys the various rituals and conventions of the 
particular society in which it is set. 
These particular nuances of hospitality, as that which 
is shown to the guest or visitor invited to one's home, are 
crucially present throughout the following discussion. The 
nature of hospitality, however, must be more fully elabo- 
rated. 
A consistent feature of mythological accounts of 
hospitality is the setting of the humble or modest abode. 
Typically, it is a peasant's hut, a byre or even a stable. 
The lofty status of the guest relative to that of the host, 
furthermore, is hidden, or disguised. 
Hospitality, according to many of these stories, is 
a humbling. Humble, like 'homo' comes from 'humous', the 
earth, the ground. Hospitality is a bowing, a placing of 
oneself on the ground, before the other. This is very 
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reminiscent of the 'face to face' relationship discussed 
so fully in Levinas -a 'relation'which is of its very 
nature 'asymmetrical'. This discussion orients us quite 
fundamentally to our understanding of 'hospitality'. In 
the following discussion, however, I do not restrict my use 
of this term to those senses in which it is used by Levinas. 
Three slightly different 'senses' of hospitality which are 
present in the following discussion may briefly be mentioned. 
1) Hospitality to the stranger, the 'outsider'; hospi- 
tality which is 'extended' to the wanderer or the 
stranger - in whatsoever transitional or transitory 
state, and contemporary guise he or she may appear. 
The ancient and 'hermetic' tradition of hospitality 
brings into view the thresholds of the dwelling or 
home, the marking and de-marking of boundary, the 
drawing, re-drawing and withdrawing of boundary. 
Hospitality arises at a simultaneous heightening 
and slackening of boundary. It refers to a trans- 
ition or turn whereby the stranger, the enemy or 
inamicus, the host or hostile one - becomes the 
guest -a boundary crossing whereby the guest and 
the host become one. 
2) 'Inner hospitality' - that is, the hospitality which 
people within a household show or extent to one 
another. The hospitality which is there to be extended, 
the hospitality which the house shows to itself. 
3) The 'hospitality' of language. What is 'admitted' 
or allowed into the conversation. What is sayable, 
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speakable, or what must be left out to await the 
intermediary of hermeneutics, interpretation. 
Language and Articulation 
We are concerned in these chapters with the opening up 
of the 'interpersonal' or the 'between', as this was 
exemplified within the Portland Road household. We are 
concerned at the same time, and equally, with that which 
stands in the way of this opening, or with that which 
comes between, and thereby itself calls to be opened up. 
We are concerned with the question of 'how people treat 
one another' seen in terms of the 'responses' which they 
make towards one another, and with that which occasions, 
or calls forth, different responses. We are interested, 
too, in peoples' accounting to one another, counting upon 
one another, and calling one another to account. And 
throughout this discussion we are concerned with questions 
of 'language', with the nature of language and the power 
of language. We are concerned with what is said, what is 
put into words, no less than what is not said, what is 
unspoken or unspeakable. We are concerned with what is 
gathered into conversation, and what is left out; with 
articulation and disarticulation. 
'Articulating' is commonly used more or less synony- 
mously with 'speaking', although it inflects towards the 
meaning of 'spelling out' or even detailing. To articulate 
is to speak or voice. But articulation is at the same 
time a joining, or membering, a bringing together or a 
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union. We speak of someone articulating his position or 
his point of view, bringing it, and bringing himself, into 
the open, into an open ground. Becoming a member of any 
company is an articulation, that is, an engaging or gearing, 
or phasing into a discourse, and a 'world'. We may of 
course think in some senses of a person articulating into 
an 'interpersonal space' without saying a word. The foot- 
baller whom we mentioned earlier may very precisely and 
with a high degree of sophistication, skill and sureness, 
be articulating into the play around him, embodied as it 
is in the gestures - the various movements, plays, parries, 
etc. - of his fellow players. 
Many forms of dancing - for example country dances - 
display most elegantly the articulation of movement and 
gesture between persons, movements themselves articulated 
into and obeying the formal structures, or grammar, of the 
dance, itself articulated by the music. It is perhaps 
fanciful to speak of the 'music' of a household, yet within 
any household will be found themes and variations, harmonies 
and disharmonies, points and counterpoints, accords and 
discords - phased in and out of rhythm - and according to 
his response or responsiveness to the phasings of this 
music, a person who belongs to the household will be arti- 
culated or geared into, or attuned to, what is going on 
there. A person who is predominantly attuned to the 
echoes and reverberations within his own mind will in a 
certain sense be 'out of it', or 'disarticulated'. 
We may now note some nuances of 'disarticulation'. 
Commonly a failure of some sort or other to find the right 
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words or allow them to come to one, or to speak, is 
suggested; we call, for example, a person inarticulate, 
when he cannot give a good account of himself. A dis- 
articulation is a break; it may merely be a phasing which 
itself is a phasing into further articulations (e. g. a 
syntactical break) or it may suggest a more enduring 
'separation' or coming apart. We may characterize a 
conversation between two people as 'disarticulated' where, 
for example, neither person is able to hear, recognize, or 
acknowledge the other. If one person through frustration 
or despair resorts to gestures and gesticulations these may 
provide clear articulations of a disarticulation. Actions 
and gestures of one sort or another may speak very well of 
what is otherwise not being said; consider, for example, 
parapraxes. 
The following highly condensed account of a conversation 
illustrates some of these remarks. 
A number of people were seated around the table at 
Portland Road, finishing a meal. An exchange takes place 
between two people, whom I shall call A and B. A asked B 
to pass the salt. B did so, but subtly passed it 'short', 
leaving A still having to reach out across for it. This 
simple action might easily have passed un-noticed; on this 
occasion it caught the attention of a third person, who, 
quite good naturedly, found the right word to characterize 
B's reply to A's request. It was grudging. A conversation 
opens up. In the course of this, B comes to acknowledge, 
rather shamefully and painfully - but also grudgingly - that 
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indeed, not only was this particular response 'grudging', 
but that his attitude or stance towards, generally, has 
for the most part been 'grudging'. 
This pervasive 'grudgingness' was confirmed by others 
- it turned out to have been shown in many different ways, 
for example through dealings with money, with food, in a 
lack of willingness to respond to various invitations which 
people felt they had extended. The person I have called B 
had been living in the house for several weeks, yet had 
never quite 'unpacked', and kept himself very much to 
himself. Yet when he was around, he usually had endless 
complaints to make about the house - although quite mildly 
and even subtly expressed - and about other people who 
lived in the house. One of these complaints was that he 
was always left out of things; yet this was the first 
occasion, it seemed, when he came to recognize something of 
his own contribution to this state of affairs, that is, to 
assume some responsibility for the position in which he 
found himself. 
This example, simple though it is, illustrates well 
enough a conversation opening up, and bringing in, weaving 
in, or including a person who had been, in some senses at 
least, keeping himself apart, or out of things. in this 
conversation the issue or matter is raised, of the manner 
in which this person, B, is present in the company. This 
particular question arose quite appropriately - it was 
quite fitting and timely that the matter came up, since it 
was already in the conversation, unspoken, and yet arti- 
culated, in a rather alienated fashion, in this gesture. 
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What entered the conversation already belonged within the 
conversation, in this instance. 
What came of this conversation is another matter. I 
am by no means claiming that this particular person suddenly 
ceased to be 'grudging' in his manner or attitude, or that 
he now found himself at home in that company for which, 
hitherto, he had held back. Nor is it to suggest that this 
sort of conversation is in some way typical, as if all new- 
comers to the house were in some way challenged or confronted 
if or when their behaviour did not meet up to expectations. 
Some people spent considerably longer in the house before 
unpacking their bags, without entering any more than the 
most glancing, fleeting conversations with others; they 
succeeded in keeping themselves very much to themselves 
without being 'confronted' about this. 
I have spoken of 'openings' and invitations to con- 
versation. But by no means were all the conversations at 
Portland Road either 'open' or 'inviting'. On occasion, 
people's overtures to one another, or their endeavours to 
open up matters of consequence, to speak of what was going 
on, or what was on their mind, effectively closed off con- 
versation or dialogue, and came to nothing. There were, 
needless to say, innumerable ways in which a person's 
'openings' might have been less than 'open'. A person might 
open something up, or speak of something, for example, as 
a way of not speaking about something else, or he might 
speak to someone 'through' someone else. Many of the 
overtures which people made to one another were much less 
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invitations than accusations, complaints and demands, or 
ragings, often highly displaced. Furthermore, of course, 
such conversations as took place were contextualized, and 
so that what came of them, or what they led to, or opened 
upon depended enormously upon what conversations or goings 
on had preceeded them. 
Upon occasions, 'accusations' may be 'to the point', 
and appropriate, where, for example, they express a heart- 
felt and justified indignation. An accusation will come 
differently from someone whose very style is accusing, whose 
position is one of 'offended against', a person, for example, 
who never takes account of how he himself is implicated in 
his own accusations, but who nevertheless 'stands accused' 
by his own words and actions. A person may place expectations 
upon others that he himself is unable to meet, and then 
accuse them bitterly when these accusations are not met, 
or when he himself is called to task. A person who con- 
stantly berates others, scorns or dismisses them for their 
various shortcomings, may of course be perfectly 'correct' 
in his observations, in his reporting or detailing of their 
trespasses and errings, without, however, telling the truth, 
or standing in the truth. 
Interpretation 
We may take it as a self-evident 'principle' that 
truthfulness is crucially entailed in living well, and that 
the members of a therapeutic community which is to thrive 
must conduct themselves towards one another in some way 
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which is oriented to or open to truth, to the telling or 
showing of truth, or to the eventual 'outing' of the truth. 
It is, however, equally evident that the telling or showing 
of truth is often far from being a simple or straightforward 
matter, and this is likely to be particularly so in a 
therapeutic community, where people, characteristically, may 
not be in the habit of being straightforward with one another, 
and where situations arise which, far from being simple, 
are infinitely complicated, and made all the more so by 
peoples' evasiveness with regard to the truth. This is not 
to say that the people in Portland Road were in the habit 
of telling lies to one another in the ordinary sense in 
which we may regard others as untrustworthy or deceitful. 
People may, of course, be scrupulously and meticulously 
honest with one another in the sense of behaving reasonably 
and correctly, at the same time as conducting themselves 
in some degree of 'closedness' to the truth of where they 
stand with regard to one another, or what they mean to 
each other. They may, furthermore, be involved in various 
'reaction formative' modes of relationship, where precisely 
the careful correctness of their behaviour betokens its 
underlying structures of inauthenticity. 
The notion of 'truth' which is suggested by 'authen- 
ticity' or by speaking of the 'truth' of a relationship, is 
different in important respects from the truth of adequation 
or correspondence between reality and its representations. 
1 
And so, consequently, will the showing or revealing of this 
1See 
Heidegger, M. On the Essence of Truth. In Heidegger, M. (1978). 
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sort of truth take a different form. A community whose 
members are concerned to live truthfully or abide by the 
truth, does not proceed by 'observing' itself, and checking 
the correctness of its reportings or recordings against 
'reality' - in the fashion in which a scientist may attempt 
to arrive at a true representation of the world. Were it 
to proceed on the assumption that truth is decided by the 
correctness of its reportings and its correspondence with 
the facts, a community might well be tempted to invest in 
video equipment so that the truth of what was going on would 
now be there for all to see. Except of course that this 
objectifying mode would now characterize the 'reality' of 
the situation -a reality which the objectifying mode would 
itself be unable to show forth. 
The truth which is of the essence in psychotherapy, 
and in any therapeutic community - is grounded in the 
self-given-ness of things. Such truth is realized, or 
fulfilled, where persons stand in the grounding of this 
truth, or situate themselves within - take responsiblity 
for, answer - the truth of the situation. The blunt truth 
of many situations which arise in therapeutic communities 
may well be unspeakable - and these situations may there- 
fore continue to await that realization whereby they are 
shown forth in their self-given-ness - by being spoken, 
articulated, brought into the open. A holding back from 
the truth now permeates the truth of this situation, and 
according to the manner in which this truth is withheld, 
will arise various possibilities of untruthfulness of lying. 
But lying is not simply the obverse of telling the truth; 
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the two are not symmetrical, related as the correct and 
the incorrect account. Lying is grounded in truth, and 
the opening-up, or laying bare of 'untruthfulness' entails 
a retracing of the steps whereby we are misled from the 
original experience, or realization of truth. 
Insofar as truth is grounded in the showing forth of 
being, it is never final. The truth is realized - but its 
realization is never complete; an illusion which is main- 
tained only by the illusion of man as absolute spectator. 
A community may be oriented towards the true - but never 
will arrive, in the sense of achieving some totalization 
of its own truth, some co-incidence with itself, or perfect 
self-understanding. We may speak. of a community living, 
or living out the truth in its manner of coming into 
being - but this very fact of its truth being lived ensures 
that it always awaits further realization. 
At the same time, situations will arise within any 
therapeutic community whose truth urgently calls for 
elucidation or explication. Such situations may refer 
primarily to one particular person, and the position which 
he takes up towards the world and towards others. A person, 
for example, may decide one day to leave the community, 
when the truth of the matter might be that he never, in 
fact, 'arrived', and certainly never made himself at home. 
It may be important, therefore, if his leaving is not merely 
to be the negative of a negative, that this truth be made 
accessible to him, so. that he might finally arrive at some 
position from which he might be more 'free' to leave, or 
free to stay. Rather than acknowledging his own 
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disarticulatedness, he may insist that the others in the 
house, despite their earnestly persuading him to stay, 
are for the most part uncaring and unsympathetic, and 
whatever truth there may be to these claims will it is 
to be hoped, come to light in the opening up, or elucidating 
of this, possibly highly complex, situation. Innumerable 
examples of situations such as these arose at Portland 
Road, situations whose truth originally was quite obscure, 
and which only began to emerge in the course of lengthy 
and often laborious conversation. 
Consider, for example, the situation of the house 
being 'full', and therefore not in a position to take any 
new members. On the face of it this might be a perfectly 
reasonable explanation of the fact that a succession of 
visitors have been turned away with very little discussion, 
or have been received rather unwelcomingly. In the course 
of the conversation becoming opened up, however, it emerges 
that this explanation, notwithstanding its being quite 
reasonably consistent with the 'fact' of the situation, 
at the same time conceals the fuller truth. It may, for 
example, emerge that the 'fullness' of the house is in 
fact felt to be more of an emptiness, and that the inhospi- 
tality shown to visitors is in fact secondary to the pre- 
vailing 'inhospitality' which the members of the house are 
for the most part displaying towards one another. The 
stark truth of this situation may be quite clear for-all 
to see - the house might be a shambles, with nothing being 
done, and no-one around. Or it might itself be concealed 
in a number of fashions. People might be quite active in 
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getting their own 'thing' together, but without having 
anything to do with one another. Or the emphasis within 
the house might shift in the direction of some desire for 
the 'quiet life' at any price. Here, there might be a 
sudden interest in decorating the house and making it 
more comfortable, which (however much it might be 'desirable) 
nevertheless speaks of a prevailing wish to impose a certain 
'gloss' over a situation which is far from comfortable. 
Another situation within the house which called for 
some degree of elucidation arose where two or more people 
found themselves in some or other 'entanglement' with one 
another, or remained at some particularly wearying 'impasse' 
whatever they might try to do about it. These entanglements 
- sometimes deep 'primal' struggles with one another - need- 
less to say had upon occasion the most profound and far- 
reaching effect upon the rest of the household, where, for 
example, they silently pre-empted the opening of conversa- 
tion. At the same time, these struggles inevitably were 
vehicles or instruments which carried resonances which were 
already in play within the house - so that other people 
might have various investments in maintaining this state 
of affairs, and ensuring that it remained 'unspoken'. In 
this sense, the house closely resembled a hanging 'mobile', 
in which the movement of each part was precisely keyed 
into the movements of each of the others. 
Discussion of situations such as these, and the manner 
in which they were approached and brought to some degree of 
resolution, leads quite naturally to the matter of 'inter- 
pretation'. Situations such as I have touched upon, of 
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course, are such as give rise, typically, to quite 
different 'interpretations'. Someone 'interprets' the 
house as being too full, another interprets it as being 
too empty; someone interprets another's behaviour in a 
certain way - for example, as being 'grudging', and so on. 
Interpretation here is rather like a 'reading' of the 
situation; or the person interpreting the situation is 
showing what he 'makes of' it. And although it is a reading 
of the situation, by no means is it always a reading which 
demands to be spelled out in words. My getting up and 
leaving a tedious discussion, and the manner in which I do 
it, equally is an 'interpretation', just as is, for that 
matter, the play of bored gestures which I express if I 
decide to stay. Interpretation shows what things mean to 
us, and what we mean by things. And because the meanings 
of the world are inexhaustible, horizons which I can never 
get before or beyond, we might be said to be 'interpreta- 
tive beings', beings who have a history, tell stories, or 
speak themselves into the world. 
In the hermeneutic tradition of psychoanalysis, inter- 
pretation comes to mean more than merely a 'reading'. In 
the first place, interpretation here is called in precisely 
when the 'text', the text of the everyday, does not lend 
itself readily to any clear reading, when it is in some 
fashion obscure or hidden. Thus, for example, 'inter- 
pretation' is required to throw light upon the meaning of 
actions which otherwise appear unintelligible to their 
agent, or where his own account of his behaviour patently 
does not ring true, for example in the case of a rational- 
ization. A rationalization is an account of or an accounting 
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for some action which may be quite consistent and 'correct', 
but which at the same time conceals its own intentions. 
The classic example of a behaviour which calls for inter- 
pretation is of course the dream. Here, the dreamer creates 
the text which he himself is unable to decipher. 
Psychoanalysis here makes the distinction between 
latent and manifest contents; interpretation now becomes a 
'procedure which... brings out the latent meaning in what 
the subject says and does'. 
1 
The latent meaning is usually 
understood to refer to repressed elements which reside 
within the individual's unconscious, and which, through 
interpretation, become accessible to consciousness. This 
movement, of making the unconscious conscious through 
interpretation, is often thought of as occurring within 
some intrapsychic domain; it is spoken of, for example, as 
a widening of the patient's endopsychic perceptual field. 
This can be enormously misleading. 
Psychoanalytic interpretation differs from philological 
hermeneutics, not only in that the flaws in its text are 
not 'incidental', but also because the text to be addressed 
itself originates and emerges in dialogue, shows itself in 
the articulation - disarticulation of the therapeutic 
dialogue, and is recovered in the course of this dialogue. 
It is in this text-context, in the relation of the dialogical 
situation, that the 'repressed elements' come between, and 
in the course of interpretation, working through and so on, 
show themselves in their coming between. The unconscious 
is not 'in one's mind', any more than is consciousness. 
1Laplanche, 
J. and Pontalis, J-B. (1980) p. 227. 
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"The unconscious is in the world between us, the invisible 
structure of the visible. "1 The dialogical nature of the 
analytic situation, wherein interpretation finds its 
potency, follows from the 'dialogical nature' of repression, 
which is expressed in relation to a situation of dialogue. 
Any interpretation is contextualized. But we must say 
more than this: its text is inseparable from, is woven into 
and out of its primary context, that of the relation between 
the persons engaged in the interpretative work, or play. 
An interpretation arises 'between'. For this reason, it is 
perhaps misleading to think of 'an' interpretation as the 
paradigm of interpretation; rather, any 'interpretation' 
may be seen as arising from within a relationship which is 
itself a way of being together that is interpretative. 
If we think of interpretation as a 'reading', it is 
at the same time a 'sounding' and a 'resounding'. It is a 
'telling' reading, which has a power to bring its particular 
-text 'alive' in the very moment of its showing. It is the 
'here and now' of interpretation - its timing and its 
timeliness - and its being to the point, that is, to do 
with essentials, which is crucial, and which draws attention 
to the originary nature of interpretation. Interpretation 
is a showing or present-ing; a showing, for example, of 
how a patient's words reveal, speak of, or invoke his whole 
world. The potency of language in interpretation - its 
power to awaken - arises from the fact that words are not 
being used to represent 'contents', but point to and draw 
1Romanyshyn, 
R. D. (1982) p. 159. 
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from sources and origins. Here, for example, language 
shows how the world 'originally' appears to the patient; 
buried, as it is, not in the past but in the present. 
Interpretation is using language to present the 
patient's prereflective world to him, to offer 
him insight, to reveal to him that that is where 
his essence lies. The world has to be mediated 
to him, as it failed to be adequately mediated 
by his parents. It directs attention, not to 
this or that attribute of his world, but, by means 
of a shock, to a circumspective whole, that pre- 
sents itself as focalized in this or that event. 
l 
Interpretation, then, is a showing of what shows 
itself in the between of dialogue, in its fullness; a showing 
by responding, of what the unfolding or revealing of the 
dialogue is saying. Interpretation is resonant to, and 
sounds, the pre-articulate stirrings and murmurings of 
the pre-reflective, lived world - the lebenswelt - in which 
truth or essence are grounded, in such a manner as to open 
the possibility of some re-integration of the chatter of 
everyday being with its silent pre-reflective sources. 
Interpretation, therefore, is closely akin to Socratic 
maiutics or midwifery, in - in the face to face of dialogue 
- being present at, and in the service of the emergence or 
appearing of essential meaning, or truth. It is this 
attending or attentiveness which, in the therapeutic 
situation opens the possibility of patient and therapist 
finding themselves together as participants in the truth 
of their situation. 
'Heaton, 
J. M. (1972). 
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In Portland Road, Hugh took up or occupied a position 
which was, in a strong sense, interpretative. On the cross- 
roads, or trivium, of this common place, the dwelling - 
within which he was both at the centre and the outside - he 
played the part of Hermetic intermediary, through whose 
mediation the boundaries of relationship emerge, and 
through whose words, in what they show, a guidance is offered 
through those enigmas which arise at the limits of what may 
be spelled out. The 'interpretative mode' in this house 
was lived out, in the first place, on those particular 
evening gatherings when Hugh was 'in attendance'. These 
meetings, punctuating as they did the 'ongoing'or abiding 
conversation of the house, took up its themes and sub- 
themes and allowed them to be brought into a fuller and 
deeper articulation. But the very fact of the belonging 
of these conversations 'at home', their gathering round 
the same table as the 'everyday', their phasing into the 
time and times of the house, their interweaving of text and 
context, suggest an opening up of the boundaries of inter- 
pretation which distinguishes this from any ordinary 
analytic situation. The household lived in a manner which 
was itself 'interpretative'. The essential space of the 
house, and its time - the space and time, for example, 
which show themselves in opening up between - were dis- 
closed by the 'interpretative' words, gestures and actions 
of those who lived there, as being realized now in this 
way, now in that; and very powerful interpretations these 
could be. The response of hospitality is an ''interpretation' 
which shows a ground of meeting, and each person belonged 
within a household which was concerned with some realization 
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of hospitality, which was concerned to 'show' hospitality. 
The everydayness of the house was not some neverending 
darkness to which formal meetings suddenly brought light; 
rather the interplay of the visible and the invisible, of 
appearance and non-appearance, of hiding and showing, of 
remembering and forgetting - permeated the households 
staying. Echoes of conversations would linger in the house 
- echoes of 'interpretations' half heard and half under- 
stood, whose full realization awaited the fullness of time. 
For some people, as for the entire household, the truth of 
some interpretation was as barely discernible as "A wind-born 
echo of a distant call". (Heidegger. ) 
The realization of interpretation's truth may call for 
hard work. Here we may make use of the psychoanalytic notion 
of 'working through'. 'Working through' in psychoanalytic 
writings refers to "a sort of psychical work which allows 
the subject to accept certain repressed elements and free 
himself from the grip of mechanisms of repression. It is 
a constant factor in treatment, but it operates more 
especially during certain phases when progress seems to 
have come to a halt and where a resistance persists despite 
its having been interpreted". ' Here, our preference is 
to speak of a thoughtful, or a reflective work, rather 
than a 'psychical', just as it seems more correct to think 
of the 'repressed material' to be worked through not as 
belonging to some cut-off psychic part, but as belonging to 
an area of my life which I hold at a distance, refuse to 
1Laplanche, 
J. and Pontalis, J-B. (1980) p. 488. 
406 
bring into discourse, and thereby maintain in incapacitating 
attachment. But in any case, it is first of all necessary 
that this 'repressed material' be in some way shown; that 
what is disowned, and refuses to come into co-existence 
be brought into view, disclosed and spoken of. Working 
through follows interpretation. 
But we have seen that the time and timing of inter- 
pretation is of the essence. A person, or a group of people, 
may not yet be 'ready' for an interpretation which it none- 
theless invites. Between the interpretation and its dawning, 
between the hearing and the realization, between the showing 
and the seeing - comes the work of 'working through'. Working 
through, if it is to be successful, bears the fruit of 
insight, the co-inciding of thought and being. The truth 
dawns; suddenly... gradually... finally... eventually. The 
penny drops. There occurs a realization -a seeing of what 
hitherto was only known. At this point, the patient - or 
the household - may become free not to repeat. 
Working Through 
Through the notion of 'working through' - inseparable 
as it is from 'interpretation' - we may approach one essential 
component of the work of the house. To be sure, there 
was always more 'ordinary' work of one sort or another to 
be done which was equally essential; and yet as I have 
already made clear, the most everyday things and matters 
were in many ways the very 'stuff' of working through, or 
the material with which the house worked. And thus the 
407 
kitchen was in many ways the 'alchemical workshop' of the 
house. 
At the same time, it is true that each person's task 
was different, according to the particular nature of his 
or her own 'unfinished business'. Each person's way of 
being is of course different, and so is the fashion in which 
he loses his way, or comes no longer to know his way about 
in the world. So too, what gets in the way shows itself to 
differ from person to person. 
A dwelling is a place where these various singularities 
of being belong together. We might say that the way of 
being human is that of a singular belonging, and that where 
a therapeutic community is able to help a person, it is 
partly through enabling him to realize his singularity in 
belonging. We have spoken of the 'way' of a household or 
therapeutic community, suggesting that this way is shaped 
or unfolded according to the fashion in which people find 
their way with one another, or find themselves at home with 
one another. Here we arrive at the ground to be worked 
through. In Portland Road, what, above all, called to be 
worked through were matters such as - what people 'got into' 
with one another, what they found themselves living out, 
and meaning, with one another, whether this was enjoying 
or enduring, or injuring. A particular inflection to this 
was a working through occasioned by a person now wanting 
to get out of something that he found himself into with 
someone. 
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I may turn to some illustration of the 'working 
through' of Portland Road, by addressing myself to the 
theme of 'withholding', a holding which is 'from' or 
'against', at the same time as being 'with'. The many 
possible variations upon this theme include - holding back 
from..., withholding oneself, keeping oneself to oneself, 
withhold one's voice, keeping things in the dark. In this 
theme - as general as it is - we touch upon issues which 
bear upon the singlemost 'symptom' common to all members of 
the house, and to the household as a whole; insofar as we 
may think of a symptom as showing itself or announcing 
itself precisely in the manner in which it is withheld, or 
not yet brought forth into 'communication' or articulated 
into language. Insofar as a person has not yet found a way 
to speak of his sufferings - by no means is this simply a 
reporting of his 'problems' or saying what is the matter 
with him - or open up that which he finds himself 'in' or 
up against, by bringing this, or allowing this into the play 
of discourse, this very withholding will remain as a 'symptom' 
to be shown and worked through. 
A very obvious example of the 'withholding' which 
showed itself within Portland Road occurred when, upon 
evening gatherings with Hugh, the chatter suddenly stopped 
and the room was held in silence. This was the 'Portland 
Pause' - and a long and painful pause it often proved to 
be. Sooner or later it would be broken; perhaps falteringly, 
and punctuated by further long silences, or perhaps some 
crucial 'shift' would occur, and the conversation suddenly 
take off. 
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This silence, we may note, was in a sense already 
powerfully 'interpretative' - prior to its situation 
becoming taken up, opened out and 'interpreted' in the 
course of discussion. In its tellingness, it showed, 
precisely where everyday chatter might serve to obscure 
this fact, how unsure was the prevailing discussion within 
the house, how guardedly it was entered, how permeated it 
was with undercurrents which no-one dared voice. Again 
and again this silence, and that of which it spoke, was 
'worked through', only to arise again, as a never-ending 
point of departure. Different themes would arise, be taken 
up and opened out, weaving in each person in turn into the 
conversation. Some people remained for the most part on 
the margins of these conversations, although for each, 
sooner or later, his 'time' would come - whether this would 
be a 'turn' in the hot seat, or a turn to tell his story, 
or bring himself into the story of which the household was 
a telling. 
As a specific example of a 'withholding' I have men- 
tioned the instance of 'grudgingness', pointing out that in 
the case of the person who particularly exemplified this, 
grudgingness showed itself repeatedly in one situation 
after another. Some of the structures of this grudgingness 
began to open out. Within his own family, his presence 
had been begrudged, and in many ways he still felt himself 
to be 'on the outside, looking in', and stubbornly main- 
tained himself in this position. He took up work as a 
window cleaner. In the course of getting into things, to 
some extent, with others, he gradually became more aware 
of his position - and now-the manner in which others were 
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less than inviting towards him, and showed some degree of 
grudgingness towards him, equally came into view, were 
brought into the conversation, and worked through. 
Another member of the house, a highly sensitive young 
woman, kept herself to herself, and withheld from the 
community by living her life in the modality of 'sulking'. 
This, however, was no 'ordinary' sulk, such as a person 
might sooner or later be teased out of by simple kindness 
or good-natured playfulness, but a deeply entrenched, and 
profoundly unyielding attitude towards the world, which, 
notwithstanding her obvious capacity for momentary play, 
entailed a far reaching denial of desire. Although she 
was a very significant figure in the house, and made her 
presence very well known, her position was always one 
of great fragility; and although most people were fond of 
her, this was tempered by a certain impatience, since she 
was always on the brink of leaving. In fact, she left the 
house on a number of occasions, to a world which was able 
to offer her little solice; she would come back, but still 
remained always at the edge of things. As often as not, 
she would eat on her own; and when, in the summer, most of 
the household spent a few weeks in a cottage in Wales, 
she camped in the field alongside. She succeeded in 
weaning herself off psychiatric drugs, and although she 
did not ever quite make herself at home in the house, she 
was able to make use of it as a secure enough and provoca- 
tive base from which she could engage in psychotherapy. 
If she herself only tended to enter the conversation on the 
edges, a great deal of conversation was taken up with 
discussion of the household's various responses towards her, 
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with the manner in which people either gestured invitations 
and made openings for her, or else, perhaps with the best 
of intentions, only succeeded in turning her away. 
Here we touch upon a further facet of withholding 
which equally, and sometimes especially, may show itself 
to call for thoughtful attention. I refer to those possi- 
bilities of withholding - keeping back, hiding or concealing 
- which, on the face of it may appear as a coming forward 
in solicitude or helpfulness: a caring or concerning which, 
despite its well-intentionedness, is merely, or largely a 
'going through the motions'; a trying which is indeed 
'trying'. We now turn to consider some of the responsibi- 
lities of 'helping'. 
The Responsibilities of Helping 
A certain amount of confusion possibly arises within 
the 'helping professions', from assuming that there is 
some autonomous activity in which people can engage them- 
selves - of 'helping'. 
' 
It may well be that professionalized 
helping lends itself particularly to that position being 
arrived at (in the face of a person's helplessness) whereby 
1This is referred to by one author as 'exhibiting helping behaviour'. 
This author develops a Helping Scale, by compiling lists of different 
'helping behaviours', and administering it to over two hundred 
psychiatric patients. In the subsequent factor analysis, three 
factors emerge. These are (1) a Friendship factor (for example 'one 
patient tries to show another that he cares about him'); (2) a 
Directive Teaching, factor ('one patient helps another by getting 
him to follow a schedule') and (3) a Supportive Enhancement of Self- 
Esteem factor (for example, 'one person treats another as a competent 
and responsible person'). Moos, R. H. (1974). 
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people find themselves having to be seen to be doing 
something - helping - in some fashion such that those 
possibilities of standing back and letting be, and of what- 
soever might come of this, are unquestioningly pre-empted. 
l 
Rather than it being some proprietary activity, I believe 
it is the case that 'helping', like 'hurrying' or 'caring', 
and unlike 'singing' or 'bicycling', is an example of what 
is termed by Gilbert Ryle an 'adverbial verb'. 
2 
That is to 
say, there is no such activity as 'just' helping or 'just' 
hurrying - when we characterize a person as helping, we 
are saying in effect that he is doing this or that, help- 
fully, that is, with a view to offering aid, or comfort, 
or assistance. Likewise, when a person is hurrying, he 
is... eating his breakfast, going to work..., with a view 
to getting it over as quickly as possible. The injunction 
- Help! (like - Hurry! ) thus differs from - Sing! or 
Bicycle! - and tells us in effect to do something, such 
as the particular situation demands (throw a rope, apply 
first aid). Beyond whatever it is that I now find myself 
doing, and the manner in which I do it, we may look in 
vain for some additional activity which is a 'helping'. 
Ryle's coining of the term 'adverbial verbs' arises 
within his discussion of 'thinking'. He argues that this, 
too, is an example of such a verb; and he is, I believe, 
illuminating, and more or less correct. Without going into 
his various arguments, we may note that doing something 
thoughtfully is in many senses very close indeed to what 
1See 
Goldberg, A. and Rubin, B. (1964). 
2Ryle, 
G. (1971). 
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we mean by helping. Helping someone, or behaving help- 
fully in some situation, is rather like using our wits; 
it is doing what, in our most discerning judgement, is 
most fitting, appropriate - or called for. And in many 
situations, of course, what is most fitting or appropriate - 
and therefore helpful - is that we simply get on with our 
own business. 
It is hardly necessary to point out that innumerable 
situations arose within Portland Road which lent themselves 
to helpful responses of one sort or another. A very simple 
example of a helpfulness which in itself was quite modest - 
but by no means insignificant - was illustrated by one 
person who could always be relied upon to wash the mugs, 
put on the kettle and keep the tea flowing. This is a very 
ordinary example of her style of helpfulness, which showed 
itself in an unflagging but sensitively unobtrusive atten- 
tiveness to basic details, such that the right things would 
invariably appear at the right time, at hand. She was 
helpful in her capacity to gauge and acknowledge the order 
of things, and to stand in the service of this order. 
Another simple example of a helpfulness which helped things 
keep going in the face of enormous difficulties is provided 
by another person who, as a matter of course and without 
having to think about it too long, replaced the succession 
of window panes which became smashed when things started 
flying around. And innumerable other examples of helpful- 
ness, by getting on with, and attending to things, without 
any particular fuss, including rather thankless jobs, could 
also be mentioned; just as in most other households, this 
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sort of helpfulness is usually simply taken for granted, 
but they are nonetheless vital ingredients in what it is 
for any community to be 'therapeutically helpful'. 
People in Portland Road were also helpful in their 
more 'immediate' attentiveness to one another, in innumerable 
ways. And here again people differed enormously as to how 
helpful they were or proved to be in different situations 
with one another, according to-how much time they had for 
one another, how straightforward, or open to these situations 
they might be; how aware of themselves vis-ä-vis others they 
were, how sure of their ground, and surefooted in finding 
their way about. Obviously, a person is going to be much 
more likely to find himself in a position where he can 
respond constructively to a situation where another is in 
some way asking for help, where he is able to bracket off 
his own immediate anxieties and worries sufficiently to 
read the situation, and act accordingly. 
A most important aspect of being helpful is that of 
knowing one's limitations. Indeed, recognizing, and where 
necessary, making clear to others the limitations of one's 
capacity to respond may itself be enormously helpful. 
Where a person presents himself to others as being helpful 
in the absence of any track record which supports this, 
all sorts of possibilities arise whereby he may succeed in 
making a situation very much worse. A person who mends 
broken windows may be helpful; but where he takes this on 
and then breaks panes as quickly as he tries to fit them, 
or gives up halfway, he might well have spared everyone a 
lot of inconvenience by simply calling in the glazier, in 
414 
sort of helpfulness is usually simply taken for granted, 
but they are nonetheless vital ingredients in what it is 
for any community to be 'therapeutically helpful'. 
People in Portland Road were also helpful in their 
more 'immediate' attentiveness to one another, in innumerable 
ways. And here again people differed enormously as to how 
helpful they were or proved to be in different situations 
with one another, according to-how much time they had for 
one another, how straightforward, or open to these situations 
they might be; how aware of themselves vis-a-vis others they 
were, how sure of their ground, and surefooted in finding 
their way about. Obviously, a person is going to be much 
more likely to find himself in a position where he can 
respond constructively to a situation where another is in 
some way asking for help, where he is able to bracket off 
his own immediate anxieties and worries sufficiently to 
read the situation, and act accordingly. 
A most important aspect of being helpful is that of 
knowing one's limitations. Indeed, recognizing, and where 
necessary, making clear to others the limitations of one's 
capacity to respond may itself be enormously helpful. 
Where a person presents himself to others as being helpful 
in the absence of any track record which supports this, 
all sorts of possibilities arise whereby he may succeed in 
making a situation very much worse. A person who mends 
broken windows may be helpful; but where he takes this on 
and then breaks panes as quickly as he tries to fit them, 
or gives up halfway, he might well have spared everyone a 
lot of inconvenience by simply calling in the glazier, in 
415 
the first place. And where a person merely goes through 
the motions of being helpful, without in fact knowing what 
he is doing, or taking on, his attempts at doing the right 
thing may have very serious consequences. 
A young woman who moved into the house, for example, 
asked another member to take care of her psychiatric drugs, 
feeling that she could not, herself, handle them responsibly. 
She subsequently hit a very evident bad patch, asked for 
her drugs back, and promptly took an overdose, from which 
she was lucky to recover. The person who had 'helped' her 
had kept his conversations with her entirely to himself, 
not considering that the matters she was raising were 
worthy of some discussion with Hugh and the rest of the 
household. In the course of this whole episode subsequently 
becoming opened up, it turned out that a precipitating 
factor in her action had been the thoughtlessness of 
another 'helpful' person in the house, who had led her to 
expect some dependability from him which was not, when it 
came to it, evident. 
Helping may become decidedly unhelpful where a person 
gives help-in denial of his own need of help. A person 
may, for example, engage in a greedy giving, or a caring 
which is 'consuming', or permeated with pity or proud 
condescension. His much vaunted concern for the other may 
be little more than a concern at the other's capacity to 
arouse his own anxiety, and so in his caring he may now 
be engaged largely in'a controlling of one sort or another. 
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The following illustration touches upon many of these 
issues to do with 'helping'. The questions which this 
episode raised, from day to day, suggest something of the 
manner in which the household found its way towards doing 
what seemed to be right, what seemed to be most helpful - 
in the face of another person's seemingly complete helpless- 
ness. 
Peter was a young man of twenty-three when the house- 
hold first met him. He had been in and out of mental 
hospital since leaving school, being diagnosed either as 
catatonic schizophrenic, or else suffering from a severe and 
chronic depressive illness. Outside of hospital he had 
lived for periods on his own, and succeeded in holding onto 
short-term and casual jobs; he had also stayed for a period 
in a therapeutic community run by a large organization. He 
displayed many of the features of the classic 'revolving 
door' syndrome. He had undergone intensive and extensive 
treatments of E. C. T., together with heavy medication, without 
any lasting signs of improvement. He had now come to feel 
that these treatments had damaged his brain, his capacity 
to 'think', and any further treatment was probably going to 
be the 'last straw'. There was some reason to believe that 
the hospital from which he released himself was in fact 
proposing to offer him a leucotomy. 
Through the help of a social worker who had taken some 
interest in his case over the years, he found his way to 
Portland Road. He arrived from hospital one evening, by 
ambulance. He looked quite wretched, and had very little 
to say for himself beyond stating that he wanted to 'withdraw', 
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to 'think'. He maintained that he had been trying one way 
or another to withdraw over the past few years, but never 
had been allowed to go through with this. Peter was 
accepted into the house without too much further ado, and 
moved in a few days later. He pottered about the house for 
a couple of days, but gradually retreated to his attic 
bedroom. 
He was to spend the next two years in bed, virtually 
without moving. He would have been described in hospitalese 
in the following sort of terms: withdrawn, negativistic, 
bodily obsessed, incontinent of urine and faeces, lacking 
in affect... 
There were occasions during these two years, parti- 
cularly towards the end, when he would speak to whomever 
was present with him. From these brief conversations, and 
from the jottings which he would from time to time leave 
beside his bed, others in the house managed to glean some 
rudimentary idea of what he was on about. It all seemed 
to pivot upon his wish to withdraw. He wanted to be left 
utterly alone and uninterrupted, so as to be in a position 
to 'find himself'. Throughout his life, he felt, he had 
been little more than what others had expected of-him. Now 
he was engaged in some last ditch attempt to retrieve, from 
the silent depths of his solitude, that which there might 
just be left of his own self. 
He claimed that his life was utterly in balance, on 
the edge, and that, in order to survive, he had to remain 
absolutely still. He insisted on being left completely 
418 
alone. He required absolute silence while he 'thought'. 
Every sound represented an agonizing distraction. Every 
move he made was agonizingly critical. Every word that 
he spoke was at risk of his life. 
In his writings he again described something of the 
delicate balance he was trying to maintain: 
I desperately need to put all my energy into 
facing my anxieties full in the face and battling 
against any retreat into distractions such as 
'displaced anxieties' which prevent me from 
coping with my real anxieties, make me lose my 
grip on reality and put me in a state of panic. 
Noise is a 
. 
particular threat to me as it is an 
external distraction I cannot fight, preventing 
me from thinking and furthering my moments of 
panic. A loud bang in the night shatters my 
vision leaving me in a terrifying darkness for 
about two hours while I work my way back to 
clear vision. 
How could this household 'help' Peter? Presumably, by 
taking him at his word, allowing him to do just what he 
seemed to want above all - to withdraw. But how is this 
request to be interpreted? Peter asks for nothing save to 
be left alone. But he asks this of a company, with whom 
he had now chosen to live. It is at least a paradoxical 
request. Does the house acquiesce to it by ignoring him? 
It is difficult to 'ignore' someone so 'close' and yet so 
far. Do people tip-toe past his bedroom door out of con- 
sideration for his rather extraordinary sensitivity to 
noise? Or is this merely playing into some grandiosity? 
At what point might others find it appropriate to step in? 
Should they wait for him to ask? Do they wait until the 
smell from his room becomes no longer bearable? Should 
the house let him starve to death? At one time he was down 
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to five or six stones, wasted and emaciated, stinking, 
covered with bed sores, crawling with bugs. When is enough 
enough? 
There were endless conversations in which these matters 
were discussed - and in this sense Peter for a long time 
occupied a position which was quite central within the 
house, a fact of which he was doubtless rather well aware. 
People showed different degrees of interest in having any- 
thing actively to do with him, but for the most part there 
was a general agreement as to the sort of approach to take 
towards him. This was to interfere as little as possible; 
but at the same time to assume - in the absence of any 
instruction to the contrary -a freedom to interpret 
Peter's request to be left alone, as people thought best, 
and not necessarily 'literally'. Two people in particular 
made it their business to keep an eye on him; they left 
food by his bedside, which in minute quantities he would 
eat, and they kept him from becoming too filthy. They 
encouraged some minimal movement of his limbs, and also 
gave him periodic baths, carrying him, silent, limp, and 
with an expression of long-suffering agony on his face, 
to and from the bathroom. 
There were many difficult decisions to make. His 
parents kept visiting, with a view to seeing him. Had 
they done so, there is little doubt that they would have 
taken him away, there and then, and possibly had the house 
closed. Should they see him? What does Peter have to 
say about the matter? Nothing. So the question is put 
to him, roughly in this way: "Peter, your parents are here. 
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They want to see you. You won't say one way or another 
whether you want to see them, so it's not easy to know 
what to do. But you did say when you came here that you 
wanted not to be disturbed, and so we shall assume, then, 
in the absence of any contrary indication, that you don't 
want to see them now, and we'll tell them so. " 
What does the house do in August, when almost everyone 
is planning to go away to the cottage in Wales? Again 
Peter is consulted, and this time he is quite clear: he 
doesn't want to go, he wants to be left alone. But the one 
or two people who are staying behind certainly don't want 
to look after Peter. So Peter comes along, bundled into 
the back of the Volkswagon van with his shitty mattress and 
stinking blankets. The cottage is smaller than the Portland 
Road house, and now there is absolutely no chance of Peter 
getting any quiet at all. And so now there is another 
little tent in the field - in the opposite corner of the 
field - and here Peter spends his days screaming at the 
sheep, because now they are interfering with his 'thinking'. 
Peter's situation was a very serious one indeed; he 
was probably quite right in thinking that his life was 
so delicately balanced. The household, too, walked a very 
fine line with Peter. The fact that it finally worked out 
well is in part due to the fact that the household didn't 
take it all that seriously: in many ways his stay in the 
house was a source of much amusement, of which he was well 
aware. It was without doubt most important to his eventual 
re-articulation or recovery that, despite his pleas to be 
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left alone he found himself in a place where life, in some 
degree of vitality and quirkiness and not just in the sombre 
earnestness of 'helping', carried on around him. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
SANCTUARY 
Crises 
In some senses the state of Portland Road was always 
critical, and certainly in the sense of being testing, 
discerning. There were, however, throughout the life of 
the house some times which were more critical than others, 
just as there were times which were testing in different 
ways. In the beginning, for example, there were moments 
when the house seemed particularly fragile, uncohesive, 
faltering - to the extent that it seemed quite possible that 
it would never get 'on the ground'. These were critical 
times quite different from those endured in later years, 
when, for example, the local council tried to have the house 
closed, or when there arose certain 'crises of complacency', 
when the holding-together of the household was in many senses 
no less fragile, but the sedimentation of habit offered many 
of the members more by way of secondary gain. 
In this chapter I am concerned with one particular sort 
of crisis - and the response which was forthcoming - occasioned 
by the arrival of some person at the onset of an acute psy- 
chotic breakdown. There seems to be every reason to believe 
that this will indeed be a most critical episode in any 
person's life, a state of profound helplessness in which 
the individual may well be in some very considerable. peril. 
These were 'critical periods' for the household, too, 
in that its capacity to hold, to offer hospitality, were 
tested to the limit; and indeed the house did not attempt 
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this on its own. In these critical times, the household 
turned to the supporting network of its immediate friends 
in order to be able to hold it all together. 
It is not my purpose in this chapter to enter into any 
detailed discussion of the nature of psychosis, or of the 
factors which might lead to or precipitate psychotic epi- 
sodes. These various matters are discussed in considerable 
detail elsewhere, from different standpoints and with 
differing degrees of theoretical soundness. My task here 
is the more modest one of providing an account of how this 
particular household responded to the circumstance of a 
person finding his way to the house at the onset of a severe 
psychotic breakdown, showing symptoms which would indicate 
a diagnosis of acute schizophrenia. 
During the life of the house, there were five occasions 
when its membership included some person who was quite 
clearly and unequivocally, acutely psychotic, and in each 
of these cases the person came or was brought to the house 
at the onset of the psychotic breakdown. In two of these 
cases, the house proved to be unequal to the task of holding 
or containing the person, and thereby allowing their episode 
to take its unimpeded course. Consequently, each of them 
ended up being heavily medicated; in one case in mental 
hospital, in the other, in the hospital wing of a women's 
prison. In the remaining three cases, the person stayed 
and was held within the house for the full duration of 
this psychotic episode, and for the weeks which immediately 
followed. They enable us to glimpse, therefore, something 
of the wholeness of the episode, which was known in the 
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house - in keeping with the vernacular of the times - as 
a 'freakout'. 
Of these three people who 'freaked out', two were 
already patients of Hugh, who had been seeing him for some 
weeks before their coming to the house. Each of them had 
previously undergone medical treatment for earlier psychotic 
episodes, and by means of drugs their difficulties had been 
temporarily held at bay. They entered therapy, however, on 
the assumption that their troubles had by no means finally 
been resolved; they anticipated further psychotic turmoils, 
as subsequently proved to be realistic. The third person, 
who, although like the others was English, was working over- 
seas at the time of his breakdown. At that point he was 
temporarily sedated, flown over to London and immediately 
brought to Portland Road by members of his family who had 
had some earlier contact with the Philadelphia Association. 
This is not the place to enter into any detailed 'case 
history' of each of these persons. I shall make no attempt 
to fill in the family background, nor to describe the circum- 
stances of each or any of these people prior to their 
arrival in the house. They are not presented, therefore, 
to provide evidence for any particular 'theory of schizo- 
phrenia'. I leave these considerations aside, not because 
they are unimportant, but because they lie outside the 
immediate scope of this discussion, which is concerned to 
provide further illustration of what I have called the 
response of hospitality. 
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It might be helpful to approach the description of 
these three freakouts by way of suggesting three phases 
into which the events of the episode seemed to fall. These 
are somewhat reminiscent of the phases of a well-constructed 
drama: beginning, middle and end. There is first of all 
that phase in which the person seems to be 'getting into' 
something. What, at this point tends to call attention, and 
usually invite 'intervention' is the seemingly peculiar, 
extra-ordinary or 'out of character' nature of this 'some- 
thing'. If this progression continues, there follows a 
period in which the person remains in some 'state' which 
he has not entered, a state in which the person is mani- 
festly no longer amenable to reason, or responsive to 
the solicitudes of others. Finally, there comes a phase 
or stage of 'coming out of it', and of re-articulation into 
the familiar, everyday of ordinary world. I shall follow 
this approximate 'order of events' in my description, prior 
to raising some questions as to what this 'freaking out' 
is all about; and in the course of raising these questions 
I hope to suggest why people in this therapeutic household 
were moved to respond as they did. 
Freaking out: Getting into it 
In the case of each of the people who freaked out at 
Portland Road it was clear, over the days or even weeks 
prior to their arrival in the house, that there was 'some- 
thing afoot'. To their friends or partners, to their 
associates at work, or others around them they seemed to be 
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behaving rather peculiarly, unexpectedly, impulsively, out 
of character. They showed signs of breaking with their 
usual patterns of behaviour, with their typical habits and 
ways - for example by staying up all night or by always 
being on the go; by making constant nuisances of themselves, 
or by treating their friends and associates uncharacteristi- 
cally offhandedly, rudely or inappropriately. 
Another sign or indication that something rather odd 
was afoot was a constant pre-occupation with a number of 
particular notions or ideas. Invariably, these bore 
especially upon the individual's family, with his place 
in the family of origin, and with crucial events, or stories 
of events in the family. Typically, there was an unswerving 
determination to arrive finally at some fundamental 'truth' 
to do with the person's family, and his own place in it. 
Very powerful feelings were associated with these 
pre-occupations. For example, a very considerable degree 
of guilt, that the person concerned was the 'black sheep' 
of the family, or that he had 'let down' the family, or 
disgraced them in some terrible way. Or that he had 
killed them, or they had killed him, or that everyone 
would have to be killed. 
There was, secondly, and often interwoven with this, 
an obsession with 'cosmic' ideas, for example with awesome 
and mysterious forces, mystical powers, with planetary 
histories, cosmic and mythical struggles, with visions of 
the birth and the end of the world, and with cosmic 
unfoldings. In the case of one person, these two areas of 
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obsession came together in a pre-occupation with the meaning 
of his Jewishness. He felt that he had betrayed his 
tradition, and that now some awesome burden of responsibility 
fell upon him singlehandedly to fulfil the destiny of his 
people. The person who was flown in from overseas had 
become increasingly preoccupied - to the consternation of 
his fiancee - with the sacred geometry and astronomical/ 
astrological importance of the place where he was living and 
working, and found a repeated confirmation of its significance 
from his reading of the bible. It was a characteristic of 
each of these individuals that minute details of things 
around them, ordinarily of no especial significance, would 
become woven into the fabric of their ideations. 
It was, more or less, in this phase, which I am calling 
'getting into it', that each person who was to freak out at 
Portland Road arrived at the house. They displayed, bla- 
tently, many of the classical symptoms of schizophrenia, 
being 'out of touch with reality', showing 'inappropriate 
affect', delusional ideas, and so on. It would be more 
accurate, however, to speak of their wavering or vaccillation 
between realities; now he is more or less his 'old self', 
able to engage in a familiar way in quite ordinary conver- 
sation, now he is 'off again'. If they were deluded, they 
moved between being 'in' and being 'out of' their delusions, 
between being here and being there, as though being unable 
finally to commit themselves to either position, and at the 
same time unable to transcend their opposition. 
In keeping with this vaccillation, their behaviour was 
- and became increasingly so - restless, flighty, frantic. 
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They tended to be on the move, endlessly in and out of 
rooms, in and out of the house. They were unable to settle 
into any of those activities which usually are able to 
take a person 'out of himself', such as reading a newspaper. 
Their suggestions or proposals often became grand or flam- 
boyant: one person for example, was insistent in wanting to 
call the B. B. C. and get them to come and document what was 
going on in the house. Another wanted to take everyone out 
for an enormous feast. Their periods of manic activity 
would be interspersed with moments of great quietness and 
introspection or reflection, or periods of weeping, sobbing 
or bemoaning. There occurred also sudden periods of agi- 
tation, outburst of anger, sudden flare-ups of rage or 
seemingly wanton destructiveness. No one was ever hurt or 
seriously threatened, but a considerable amount of furniture 
and fittings were destroyed or damaged. Above all, again 
and again, windows would be smashed. Often the person would 
take a considerable gleeful delight in being awkward, 
difficult, stroppy, bloody-minded, impossible; a delight 
in the wild 'freedom' of being crazy. 
Staying with it 
At a certain point, each of the people who freaked out 
seemed to cross some crucial threshold, or undergo some 
transition, such that they were, or seemed to be, no. longer 
'getting into' something, or frantically trying to turn from 
getting into it, but now, 'in it'. One behaviour which 
in particular seemed to mark this transition was that of 
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the person taking off all his or her clothes. From now on, 
the person would remain more or less naked for the duration 
of his or her freak-out. 
This transition - from getting into, to being into - 
although in some ways subtle, was quite discernible. The 
person for example, no longer seemed to be caught up or 
engaged in a flight, in a franticness or running away. They 
now seemed to be completely held by, or caught up within 
some 'movement' which had an autonomy, and within which 
personal volition seemed to play a negligible part. No 
longer were there sudden furtive dashes to the door, or 
careful little subterfugres to escape from the house when 
no one was looking. The individual did not attempt, in 
fact, to manipulate or influence or control others at all, 
nor to take delight in being crazy or wanton. They did 
not engage in any reciprocity of conversation, nor in any 
manner of personal relation with one another. They were 
no longer articulated into interpersonal space. 
In each of the three cases that I am primarily concerned 
with, this phase lasted approximately two weeks. Throughout 
the greater part of this period, the individual who was 
freaking out remained, or was contained within the kitchen, 
the centre of the house. 
One person in fact hardly budged, for an entire fifteen 
days and nights, from a spot in front of the kitchen stove. 
This stove, when its controls were set in a certain way, 
would roar in a most exciting fashion, as well as put out 
a considerable amount of heat. It proved to be an object 
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of endless fascination for this person, a sacred object 
or an altar. During the days and night that he hovered, 
naked, before this stove - with no more than the occasional 
few hours of sleep, and almost no food - he kept up an 
almost continual incantation. He chanted, in strong, loud, 
rhythmical, strident tones, his own 'Finnigans Wake'. 
Within this mantric incantation seemed to be encoded, in 
a wordplay of enormous richness and subtlety, all possible 
and impossible bits and pieces of his life, all the bits 
and pieces of his possible and impossible lives. In phase 
with the rhythms of this chant, uttered in the same constant 
stresses of metre, he moved his arms and swung his body 
in sudden, cutting, swooping, punctuating gestures; he 
would suddenly jab and stab his hands towards anyone near 
him or anyone who approached him, stopping within a fraction 
of an inch of their face, staring into their eyes. 
The others, although less relentlessly active during 
their episode, tended not to remain so fixed to the one 
spot. Although held for the most part within the kitchen, 
they chose at times to wander about the house, and would no 
doubt easily have wandered off down the street had they 
been permitted. They found other favourite places within 
the house where they sometimes would remain for hours on 
end. One young woman kept returning to the coal cellar 
where she would curl up in the darkness. Another - who did 
not remain to see the episode through - spent one entire 
evening wallowing in the compost heap at the foot of the 
garden, while the rest of the household carried on its 
conversation around the-fire, from where they could still 
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keep an eye on her. She finally came in through the kitchen 
window, naked and covered from head to foot in revolting 
smelling green slime - and quite ecstatic with the experi- 
ence. 
They, too, kept more or less constantly on the go, day 
and night, for no less than two weeks, with mere snatches 
of sleep, and no more than the occasional. morsels of food. 
They also, at times, kept up a running monologue, but 
again this in no way resembled conversation. They seemed 
to move, sometimes very quickly, through a great variety of 
moods; appearing sometimes to be petrified, terrified or 
horrified, sometimes awestruck or incredulous - and at 
other times highly amused. 
Coming out of it 
Just as there seemed to be a discernible threshold, 
at whose crossing a person seemed now to be unequivocally 
'into' his psychosis, so there seemed to be a similar trans- 
ition 'out' of it. I have suggested that in the case of 
those people who stayed in Portland Road long enough for 
events to be allowed to take their natural course, this 
point was arrived at after around two weeks. At around this 
time, they would tend gradually to quieten down, to sleep 
for longer periods, and to show more interest in food. They 
would sometimes seem to be running out of steam, and would 
hint or suggest that they were beginning, or ready to come 
out of it, and to re-articulate back into the world. The 
particular way in which this re-articulation came about was 
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different for each person, and there may well have been 
a precise 'moment of re-entry'. I shall briefly describe 
this transition as it occurred in the case of the person 
who chanted in front of the fire. 
It is first of all necessary to fill in some of the 
immediate background. Some months prior to his stay in 
the house, that is, in the summer of 1973, the Philadelphia 
Association network had been visited by a middle aged 
American psychotherapist, based in New York, named Elizabeth 
Fehr. This woman had in the course of her work with a 
psychotic patient chanced upon a technique which she came 
to refine and refer to as 'birthing'. This technique 
remained very simple; essentially it precipitated her subject 
through his own movement down the length of a fifteen foot 
mattress, culminating, through a lot of wriggling and 
squirming, in a climactic 'birth'. Elizabeth Fehr's 
surprised claim was that a good many people found the 
experience of submitting to this simple procedure strangely 
and unexpectedly liberating - and in some cases dramatically 
so. In the course of her visit to the Philadelphia Asso- 
ciation, Elizabeth Fehr spent one evening at Portland Road, 
in the course of which she 'birthed' everyone living in 
the house. 
The prevailing impression which this experience left 
was that, whilst it was not some pivotal event, or a pro- 
found 'liberation' whose effects reverberated deeply 
throughout one's entire being, it was none the less 
interesting and rather worthwhile. No doubt the generally 
'favourable' impression which this birthing experience left 
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was largely due to the fact that everyone in the house 
rather took to Elizabeth in the short time that they spent 
with her. In any event, she left her fifteen foot mattress 
with the house when she left, and it became somewhat of a 
sacred object, its use being reserved for special occasions. 
The 'metaphor' and imagery of birth had from the first been 
present in the house and so she did not leave that - but 
she re-kindled it and gave it a distinctive new inflection. 
So it was that towards the end of his freakout, when 
this person seemed to be 'coming down', that the birthing 
mattress made its appearance on the scene, on the first 
occasion since her leaving. This was not simply to enable 
some sort of rebirth to be ritualized; its appearance was 
invited as much as anything by the increasingly insistent 
writhing and twisting movements of his body which he was 
making, and for which this mattress seemed ready made. He 
seemed in particular to keep wanting to make some kind of 
arching movement with his back, which he never quite 
managed to bring about. Over a day or so, and on a number 
of occasions Hugh engaged with him in a sort of 'wrestling' 
on this mattress, and in the course of this he again kept 
coming back to the same movement, which still would elude 
him. Then one time, quite suddenly and dramatically, in 
the course of this wrestling he flipped over backwards, 
opened his eyes, and called Hugh by name. 
That was the turning point. It was not simply the 
end of his upheavals,. from which this individual was to 
recollect himself over the following days, weeks and months; 
but it was a first contact, a point of entry, and a 
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beginning. The subsequent movement was that of a returning. 
This gradual returned was punctuated by innumerable moments 
and phases of disorientation, shifting perspective, wander- 
ing, of strange senses of the familiar and familiar senses 
of the strange. And although these experiences were now 
set again within 'the world', this period immediately 
following his psychotic episode during which the individual 
was beginning to take up anew the threads of his life, 
was just as much crucial a period of his life, and just 
as much a period of very great vulnerability. No less 
now than in the wild heights of his psychotic freakout 
is he in need of the holding of the house. 
We now turn to consider something of the manner in 
which the house, on these occasions of freaking out, and in 
these situations, was able to hold. But first of all we 
must ask how behaviour such as I have described in the 
previous pages, and whose revealing is possible only within 
a holding, is to be interpreted. 
No direction home 
What are we to make of this situation, where a person 
gives every reason to believe that he is going to freak out. 
Few people would disagree with the proposal that a psychotic 
episode is in some senses at least, and whatever else it 
might be, a disintegration. In the case of the people that 
I have mentioned, there seemed to be a falling apart of 
their entire world. Not only were they unable to maintain 
or keep up any of their former activities or interests, 
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and unable to maintain any effective contact with any 
other human beings; they were so manifestly and acutely 
'untogether' as to be utterly helpless. No longer was there 
for them any ordinary world to be simply taken for granted, 
to get on with. The acutely psychotic person clearly 
evidences some sort of radical breaking up or disintegration 
of the unitariness of his world, a fragmentation of whole- 
ness, such that his hold on things seems to collapse. To 
use the phrase of Merleau-Ponty, an acute psychotic episode 
provided an illustration of a collapse of the 'intentional 
arc', 
' 
so that the world no longer appears as the familiar 
setting or context of our intentions and desires, as a 
living unity, but in this breaking down or falling out 
becomes fragmented, alien, obscene or mocking. 
But the world which we inhabit, are at home in, the 
familiar everyday world whose wholeness or unitariness or 
integrity we take for granted, is an interpersonal world; 
and not just in the sense that we find ourselves 'in' it 
with others, but in that deeper sense of its being opened 
up or realized through language, through intercourse between 
one person and another. No Other: no world. So if we 
speak of the world of the acutely psychotic person 'falling 
apart', we speak equally of a dis-membering of the inter- 
personal, of a radical break or disarticulation in the 
threads of belonging, which hold the world together. 
But why let this happen? Why be so heartless as to 
allow a person to 'fall apart' when this might so easily 
1See 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). 
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be prevented by the prescribing of anti-psychotic or 
tranquillizing drugs? 
We must leave aside any full discussion of what 
precipitates or occasions this disintegration. We may 
assume, however, that a person who suffers a psychotic 
breakdown, however much it might appear to arise, like 
others of life's misfortunes, 'out of the blue', has already 
arrived at some position in his life from which a 'break- 
down' is an understandable and intelligible evolution, and 
follows 'naturally'; and that the circumstances in which 
he finds himself dispose him, or force him into this final 
move. There is every likelihood for example, that the 
sense of ontological security, or of being at home in the 
world, or interpersonal sureness which such a person enjoys 
is, at least in some senses, precarious. He might, for 
example, be living his life in some such temporal modality 
as 'holding at bay', holding together, or holding on. Such 
a person characteristically might be unable to surrender 
or let go, until the circumstances of his life occasion 
his arriving at some position or threshold, from which 
letting go can be put off no longer; and it now becomes a 
'falling apart'. There might be some 'last straw', or it 
might be more a matter of some 'readiness' of time, such 
that, in some sense, a person's 'time' has now come; a time 
which may be a 'time' of his life, or a time of a recovery 
of his life. 
If ä psychotic episode is indeed a falling apart, or 
the coming apart of a life, a being-in-the-world - then it 
is as well to be clear what purpose medical intervention 
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may, or may not serve. Medical treatment here has a value 
or usefulness to control, 'tbanquilize' a situation which 
gives every indication to be getting out of control, or 
whose containment is beyond the capacity of such people as 
are available. But it is important not to misunderstand the 
limit of this usefulness. There is no drug which has a 
power to patch a life together; no technology which can 
glue together unstuck being. To imagine -that medical- 
technological intervention here could be a healing is as 
naive as would be the sewing of leaves back onto a tree to 
bring back summer. 
Medical intervention acknowledges that there is no 
time, no team, no safe place, to 'let things be'. This may 
well be perfectly realistic. But now woven into this 
acknowledgement, is the assumption that there is no sense, 
no intrinsic validity in letting things be; that it is not 
only not possible but not desirable. 'Let it be' now 
conveys strong nuances of the uncaring irresponsibility 
of 'let it bleed'. It is however only in that holding 
together which lets be that whatever 'sense' there may be 
to this situation will emerge, only in the concernedness 
of 'letting be' that help may come, from itself, out of 
helplessness. 
We are supposing that the acutely psychotic person 
is undergoing some experience which is a radical falling 
apart or disintegration; that his way, or way of being is 
now so radically untogether that we feel he is no longer 
'in the world' as we might ordinarily understand this, 
for example as a responsible agent or free subject, as a 
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person whose perspectives blend with my own upon a common 
landscape, or who is articulated into an interpersonal 
space. If he is not in 'the world', where then, we might 
ask, is he? He is clearly, as he stands in front of the 
fire, naked and raving, or as he scutters around the house 
muttering - out of touch with others, and shows no recog- 
nition of people he knows well, for example friend, parent 
or spouse. We may want to reason with him; suggest that 
it's getting late and why don't we all get a good night's 
sleep. But he is not amenable to reason, and in this sense 
too, out of touch. We may want to speak with him to ask 
him what he's up to, or what it's all about, but again, he 
is beyond the invitations of language. 
Each of the people who freaked out at Portland Road 
spoke a great deal in the course of their episode. They 
did not, however, speak to anyone. They did not, for 
example, refer to themselves by using the personal pronoun 
'I', nor did they address others by name. Rather than 
engaging in a discourse, speaking to and with, they found 
themselves speaking in a company who were gathered around 
them, or staying with them; not speaking from the common 
ground of this company, or from a 'between', but speaking 
over or beyond. The company was staying with a person who 
was not 'with' them; and again we might ask where he is. 
The word 'psychosis' suggests that he may have 
retreated to that most paradoxical of sanctuaries - the 
mind. Yet it is not some final or even temporary 'inner' 
resting place to which his withdrawal from the world has 
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led; in turning from the world he has not found himself in 
a haven in which he will forever be left in peace. On the 
contrary, what is most conspicuous about the person who is 
freaking out is that he is caught up, swept up, or taken 
away by something; that he is quite helpless in the face of 
some order of experience which is clearly enormously power- 
ful. It seems to be much less a 'state' of mind, or a 
'place' that the freaking out person has got himself into, 
than a movement whose coursing he is quite unable to resist. 
Here we may quote these now-famous words of Gregory 
Bateson: 
It would appear that once precipitated into 
psychosis the patient has a course to run. He 
is, as it were, embarked upon a voyage of dis- 
covery which is only completed by his return 
to the normal world, to which he comes with in- 
sights different from those of the inhabitants 
who have never embarked on such a voyage. Once 
again, a schizophrenic episode would appear to 
have as definite a course to run as an initiation 
ceremony -a death and a rebirth - into which the 
novice may have been precipitated by his family 
life or by adventitious circumstances, but which 
in its course is largely steered by endogenous 
process. 
l 
The Healing Journe 
I hesitate before quoting these words of Bateson; not 
because I do not think that his statement essentially is 
correct,, and true of some, probably most, acute psychotic 
episodes. My hesitation rather is based upon a number of 
misunderstandings to which statements of this sort commonly 
give rise, whereby madness is glamorized or romanticised,, 
1Bateson, G. (1961) p. (xiv). 
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or else subjected to a humanistic trivialization. In the 
face of the evidence, there is, I believe, no reason to 
doubt that, for a great many people, a psychotic episode 
can be, or if allowed, could be a saving, visionary experi- 
ence, a revelatory breakthrough, or a 'healing journey' 
of death and re-birth. There is little likelihood of such 
a claim receiving serious attention within the prevailing 
psychiatric dialogue; and this constitutes a negative 
danger. Yet is there not equally a danger of the visionary 
journey becoming taken up and eagerly accepted by the 'new 
enlightenment' - the humanistic face of the same mafiosi? 
What Merleau-Ponty has to say about the danger of a too- 
ready acceptance of psychoanalysis applies equally to 
Bateson's 'voyage of discovery': 
When we see what can happen to a civilization 
in which psychoanalysis is too well tolerated; 
in which psychoanalytic concepts, weakened and 
banalized, have lost their enigmans, and 
furnish the themes of a new dogmatism; in which 
the doctrine, learned in elementary school and 
having become an institution, fashions mental- 
ities that resemble it too much, that seem to 
verify it, but that actually mask, precisely 
under an accelerated and superficial analysis, 
an unconscious of the second degree; when we 
see all this, we must ask ourselves whether it 
is not essential to psychoanalysis -I mean for 
its existence as therapy as well as verifiable 
knowledge - to remain, not exactly a dis- 
reputable enterprise or a secret service, but 
at least a paradox and an interrogation. It is 
psychoanalysis that has unveiled the oedipean 
infrastructure of science and technology and of 
'accidental' understanding. What will become 
of all this if the tamed sphinx soberly takes 
its place in a new philosophy of enlightenment? 
1Merleau-Ponty, M. Preface to Hesnard's L'Oeuvre de Freud. In 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1969) pp. 81-87. 
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This metaphor of the 'healing journey' served Portland 
Road very well, by way of offering some sort of bearings 
in and towards a situation which to most people, naive as 
they were to it, was bewildering and alarmingly strange, 
disturbing and upsetting, relentlessly provocative, and 
enormously delicately balanced, and uncertain of outcome. 
It invited people, and perhaps enabled them to make more 
sense of a situation which, being a situation of 'madness', 
is usually regarded as being, by definition, senseless. 
It oriented people to the possibility that the person who 
was freaking out might yet himself, within his disorientation, 
be oriented. 
This rather 'bare' metaphor may easily be fleshed out, 
furnished or opened up in various ways. Various traditions 
offer different 'landscapes' within which to interpret or 
understand this mythical journey. Within the Judo-Christian 
tradition, for example, the 'regressions' of psychoanalysis, 
the 'individuation processes' of analytic psychology, or 
the quests of Romance legend come immediately to mind. 
The importance or relevance of these various mythologies 
may be confirmed by returning to the first hand account 
and 'data' of psychotic experience, such as has, for 
example, been done by John Perry. 
1 
The very 'general' assumption which prevailed within 
Portland Road was that the 'endogenous healing process' of 
an acute psychotic breakdown is a 'journey' or 'quest' 
whose fundamental 'issue' is that of origins. Woven into 
1Perry, 
J. W. (1976). 
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this issue are questions to do with the source of one's 
own being, with conception, birth, coming into the world, 
appearance, recognition - and 'identity'. This journey or 
quest may force itself under certain circumstances; where, 
for example, these most original questions of a person's 
life, to do with his being and coming into being, and to 
do with the time of his being, his time, his past and his 
future - finally remain senseless, without meaning, 
impenetrable. The family history, for example, might 
remain a closed book. Where there is still no sense to 
these questions, wherever in the world he turns to, and 
where they nonetheless continue to ask themselves, then a 
person might find himself turning in some way elsewhere 
than the world. 
The question of origins is often thought of as being 
an oedipal question. Where do I come from? Where do I 
fit in? What was going on between my mother and my father 
whereby I came into the world? The issue is to do with 
my birth, my arrival, my advent into the world, my place 
in the human chain. 
It is not because the child has the same blood 
as his parents that he loves them; it is 
because he knows he is their issue or because 
he sees them turned towards him, and thus 
identifies himself with them, conceives of 
himself in their image, and conceives of them 
in his image. For Freud, the ultimate psycho- 
logical reality is the system of attractions 
and tensions which attaches the child to 
parental images, and then through these to 
all the other persons, a system within which 
he tries out different positions in turn, Ithe 
last of which will be his adult attitude. 
1Merleau-Ponty, 
M. (1964) pp. 227-228. 
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This oedipal quest is a putting together of the world in 
terms of the infinite, transforms of the triangle. Answer- 
ing: who am I? in terms such as: who am I like? Who do I 
like? What have they got that I haven't got? And so on. 
Suppose these oedipal riddles are too terrible or 
baffling to be faced, where one was not born or conceived 
in desire, or where one is abandoned to the riddle, left 
with a quest but no base or starting place, and no one to 
await one's return. Where the oedipal question becomes 
'what is there when there is no-one there? ' then the task 
is that of putting the world together by oneself. This 
seems to be one central task with which a person who is 
freaking out may be engaged; that is, conceiving and giving 
birth to oneself, by oneself, bringing oneself into being, 
before intercourse, without intercourse. 
Holding 
In discussing the manner in which Portland Road 
approached and accommodated 'freakouts', our emphasis 
might be placed in the first instance upon what the house 
did not do. A person freaking out was not a situation 
calling for crisis intervention. The household endeavoured 
to offer itself as a place of sanctuary, within which the 
person who was freaking out would be protected from inter- 
vention, and would be safely sheltered and held. Thus he 
would be enabled and allowed, as far as possible, to go 
through whatever it was he 'had to' go through. The 
apparent simplicity of such a proposal, however, is 
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enormously deceptive. 
To ensure sufficient safety and protection for a person 
who is freaking out, such that it becomes even remotely 
possible for his episode to be permitted to run its course, 
will be extremely testing for any household. Where the 
household arrives at some prevailing agreement that the 
endeavour is worthwhile, this is only a beginning. 
It seems clear, for example, that one simple requirement 
will be that of one other person being there with the 
individual who is freaking out, all of the time. It is 
neither sensible nor responsible to allow him to be left on 
his own. This is not simply to provide him with the 
reassuring presence of 'company' - since the acutely psychotic 
person seems to be 'indifferent' to the company around him. 
On many occasions, they showed no sign at all of recognizing 
those who were closest to them. The company of another is 
first of all necessary to ensure that the patient does not 
injure himself or anyone else, either deliberately or 
accidentally. On several occasions people became particularly 
alerted to the possibility of self-injury, and it seems to 
be obviously sensible to keep sharp knives and broken glass 
out of the way, and to be particularly careful with fire. 
Whoever was around had to be highly alert and watchful all 
the time. One woman at one time, where there were several 
people with her, suddenly jumped through the kitchen window, 
to land at the foot of the concrete well some twelve feet 
below. She was naked, and it seemed miraculous that she 
emerged with hardly a scratch, and seemingly quite unper- 
turbed. Perhaps this sort of toughness and resiliance, of 
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which there were many examples, is the source of the 
legendary strength of"the madman. 
The company of at least one other person was necessary 
at all times to prevent the person from leaving the house 
and going out into the street, which would inevitably lead 
to their hospitalization within a very short period. At 
times, this task could occupy the full attention of a 
number of people where, for example, the individual had to 
be physically held, restrained, or sat on. This was parti- 
cularly likely during the franticness which often character- 
ized people's 'getting into it' stage; and where this went 
on for hours or even days at a time, it sometimes proved to 
be more than the house could contain, even with outside 
help. It is hardly necessary to add that watchful and 
attentive company was also necessary to keep damage to the 
property to a minimum, to make sure that the house itself 
continued to be at least minimally habitable by the others. 
At Portland Road, a twenty-four hour rota was arranged 
-so that at least one person was responsibly around, all of 
the time. During the evenings, and often during the day- 
time as well there would usually be a number of people 
around in the natural course of events, and here filling 
the rota was not ordinarily a problem. Night-time was more 
difficult, particularly as most people preferred to main- 
tain vigil in twos and threes, rather than being on their 
own. Those who actually lived in the house quickly became 
exhausted; even where they were not on the 'staying up' 
rota, the chances of being woken up for one reason or 
another in the course of the night, were very great. It 
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was largely because the household became so exhausted that 
it'became necessary tö call in friends from the Philadelphia 
Association network in order to keep up the rota. People 
who came round and spent often considerable periods of 
time included psychotherapists, trainees and students of 
the Philadelphia Association, members of other households, 
people who had previously lived in P. A. households, as well 
as friends of those who were living in the house, and 
friends and relatives of the patient. 
Some people, quite understandably, were much better 
than others in attending to these situations. Some people, 
although well meaning, invariably provoked or otherwise 
'wound up' the patient, or in some cases allowed him to 
wander off, to be picked up by the police. Others were 
altogether steady and reliable. Qualities which seemed to 
be important for the 'attendants', other than that most 
important consideration of their not being made too anxious 
by the situation, were the capacity of having some sense of 
what the patient might be going through or into, so as to 
respond to them in a manner befitting their state of mind - 
and the possession of a great deal of common sense. 
The occasion of a person freaking out, in the manner 
that I have described, was in some senses a 'suspension' 
of the normal life of the house. The overriding priority 
of the house was that of holding its weakest member, who 
was so starkly helpless and vulnerable: and at times this 
'holding operation' became reduced to the bare essentials 
of providing a wall of bodies between the patient and the 
outside world. But this holding itself had to be supported 
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in all sorts of ways. One crucial job within the house, 
for example, was that"of setting up and maintaining the 
rota. This job did not only entail a lot of telephoning 
and arranging, but also keeping the other people in the 
house in the picture as to who was expected when, and making 
sure that they were welcomed and introduced to the situation. 
This was not such an easy task as it sounds, and it took a 
lot of time for the person who usually took it on. The 
telephone, for example, was usually yanked off the wall 
within the very earliest days of any freakout, and many 
of the most simple and ordinary things became immeasurably 
harder. 
But the house's holding together meant too, in many 
ways, 'business as usual'. Life did not suddenly stop. 
There was still food to buy, and meals to get together - 
and especially so that so many visitors were coming to 
the house. Because of the devastated state of the kitchen 
throughout much of the time, food tended to be very simple 
and basic; and to prepare even the most rudimentary of 
meals could be at times a very considerable achievement. 
One of the most important tasks which now required 
attention was that of attending to repairs of one sort or 
another, and applying first aid to various points in the 
house. The sound of breaking glass, for example, is 
indelibly associated with these occasions. On each of the 
freakouts, a great many windows were broken, sometimes 
several times over. So far as was possible, these usually 
were mended straight away, unless, as sometimes was the 
case, it was apparent that they would immediately be broken 
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again. The downstairs rooms had shutters, and this eased 
the task of preventing'or postponing the breaking of 
windows - until the shutters were broken. The damage, 
typically, was not restricted to broken windows: plates, cups 
and saucers, kitchen equipment, lampshades, bannisters, 
and most other fittings and furnishings, as well as the 
walls, floors and ceilings themselves, would sooner or 
later be subjected to direct attack of one sort or another. 
At times the scene within the house was one of unimaginable 
devastation. 
It would be quite misleading to give the impression 
that - whether because of 'nonattachment' or indifference - 
those who lived in the house happily sat back and watched 
their home progressively being reduced to ruins. On the 
contrary, so far as was possible, or so far as made sense 
given the nature of what they had taken on, people did as 
much as they could to make sure that did not happen. One 
way that they did this was by trying, as far as was possible, 
to limit the battle zone to the kitchen area. When it 
seemed likely, or inevitable that some serious smashing was 
on the way, the room was quickly stripped of most moveable 
objects. Beyond this, and beyond restraining the person as 
best one could, according to one's common sense and one's 
reading of the situation, it was recognized that there was 
not a lot one could do; a certain amount of damage was 
unavoidable. 
Without doubt these freakouts were difficult, testing 
and maddening times for everyone in the house. At the 
same time, however, they were also exciting times, 
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invigorating, intensely powerful, challenging, stirring, 
deeply moving. Although people took part in it all to 
different extents - some preferring still to keep in the 
background - these occasions tended to have a unifying effect 
upon the house, which in some ways was more 'brought to- 
gether' at times of crisis than at any other times. The 
house was dramatically 'awakened' - for in no way now was 
this a time of 'waiting' or hanging around - and people 
tended to find these times liberating, and freeing, for 
themselves. Some people came into their own, rallying round 
in moments of crisis in most unexpected ways, pleased, 
perhaps, at finding themselves in a position of being able 
to do something useful or helpful, and pleased to find 
themselves taken out of their preoccupation with their own 
miseries. 
The evening meetings and gatherings played a most 
important part in the 'holding' of the household on these 
occasions. Often they proved to be something of an 'occasion'. 
There would sometimes be more than two dozen people gathered 
together in the kitchen; in the course of the wanderings of 
the conversation the original 'purpose' for getting together 
would be forgotten, and far from being some chore of baby- 
sitting these evenings could be light-hearted and enjoyable, 
even celebratory. Hugh frequently would stay until the 
early hours of the morning, most nights of the week. A 
great deal of conversation would be taken up with some 
opening out of what seemed to be going on with, or around 
the person who was freaking out. Most people, as one would 
expect, were quite naive to these situations, prior to 
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coming to Portland Road, and so Hugh's guidance was 
extremely important. 
He made it quite clear that what he supposed the 
person to be into was quite 'conjectural', and that it 
would be most presumptuous for anyone to claim an 'under- 
standing' of their experience. At the same time he made 
it clear that even in the face of one's own ignorance, there 
are worse and better ways of responding, and conducting 
oneself. He stressed the importance of basic things, such 
as keeping the house going, bringing in help, not letting 
everyone get too tired, and trying to make sure that the 
patient did not become dehydrated, by making sure they took 
some drink. His emphasis was placed much more upon 'holding' 
than 'understanding'. At the same time he drew attention 
to details that might otherwise not have been noticed, such 
as things that the patient was saying or doing which invited 
some particular interpretation. It was without doubt 
because of Hugh's suggestions, encouragement and inter- 
pretations of the situation that the house was prevented 
from making the most enormous blunders. 
On a number of these evenings relatives of the patient 
were also present. In one case, the wife; in another, a 
brother and sister-in-law; in a third, a mother and brother. 
The relatives were quite understandably bamboozled as to 
what on earth was going on, but were sufficiently reassured 
by Hugh not to want to interfere. In some cases they 
played rather an important part in the proceedings, parti- 
cularly in the days and weeks following the episode. 
a 
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That period immediately following his psychotic 
episode when the patient was picking up again some of the 
threads of his life was equally a crucial time, and a period 
of some vulnerability. The survivors of the episode emerged 
reeling, shattered, incredulous - in some ways quite dis- 
oriented 'between worlds'. For one reason or another, they 
tended to want to get back to their normal lives rather 
'too quickly', before the storms had entirely settled, and 
before they had had time to take some account of what had 
been going on in their lives culminating in their freakout. 
After all that nakedness came a certain amount of embarrass- 
ment. The people who freaked out, too, were in many ways 
rather 'straight' or conventional, and so they tended to find 
themselves less than at home in this communal setting, and 
rather eager to return to work, and their old haunts, as 
soon as possible. 
Hugh was always keen that they should continue to stay 
on in the house for a while, as he felt that this was a time 
when a great deal of very valuable 'therapeutic work' could 
be accomplished. At this point, for example, there were 
usually rather important reverberations throughout the 
families concerned, and this was not a time to be frittered 
away or wasted, or passed over in some flight back into 
'reality' or 'health'. 
The importance of staying on in the house for a period 
rather than trying to return as quickly as possible to 'old 
ways' became starkly clear after the first freakout. The 
young woman concerned was very much one of the old 'blue- 
stocking' school, very straigth and conventional, from a 
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rather joyless and formal county background. She had done 
well at Oxbridge, and was quite successful at her work, a 
Civil Service statistical office, and seemed to be living 
precisely that life which her background expected of her. 
But she did not have close friends, and was not at all 
happy. When she consulted Hugh she had already been treated 
in hospital for a psychotic episode, and she lived in con- 
siderable anxiety that she was going to become psychotic 
again. Her freakout in the house was, in its earlier 
stages, very wild and destructive; she got through it all 
only to become, when it was all over, extremely depressed. 
It seemed that some door had now closed forever on her old 
ways; they had in many ways always been 'empty' or less 
than fulfilling - but now there really was no-one, and 
nothing there, for her, in her old world. And although she 
had perhaps now glimpsed some other possibility, indeed 
some possibility of her being more 'herself', the doors 
onto this possibility had not yet opened more than the 
merest chink. She was now rather caught between a past 
which was now closed, and a future which she could not 
yet imagine. She was still in therapy, but at the same 
time very much alone. She did not yet know anyone in the 
house very well. She appeared very lost and forlorn, and 
enormously vulnerable. The role which the house might have 
played at a time like this was obviously crucial, since 
upon this depended to a very great extent the 'where', the 
'into what' and 'with whom' of her re-articulation back 
into the interpersonal world. If she finds herself in the 
midst of a thriving, vital and attentive household at this 
point, her task, we may safely assume, is going to be 
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considerably eased. As it happened, very much against 
Hugh's better judgement she was persuaded to go away for 
a short break with her family. In the course of a 'shooting 
weekend' on a county estate she took her life. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
RETURN TO THE COMMUNITY 
Care in the Community 
Administrative thinking at the present time places a 
considerable and increasing emphasis upon the 'community' 
as a focal point for the provision of treatment for the 
mentally ill. Government policy which is aimed towards the 
provision of more 'community based' psychiatric services 
is spelled out in a number of recent publications. The main 
long term aim of D. H. S. S. policy, for a comprehensive range 
of psychiatric services provided within each Health District, 
was broadly set out in the Government's White Paper of 1975, 
'Better Services for the Mentally Ill'. Most of the ideas 
in this paper were drawn from experiences of the most pro- 
gressive mental hospitals over the past twenty years, but 
the command paper was distinctive in drawing together a 
comprehensive view of the future and arguing for the long 
term aim of securing a new pattern of psychiatric provision 
based essentially "in the community". Thus it was proposed 
that an integrated network of facilities and services 
should be developed to meet the wide range of needs for 
assessment, treatment, rehabilitation, accommodation and 
employment arising in each locality. The centre of this 
work was to be in the community with the 'specialist team' 
using the traditional mental hospital as just one resource 
until the development of new local facilities made it 
entirely redundant. 
This same emphasis is expressed further in the 1981 
consultative document 'Care in the Community'. 
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A gread deal has already been done to enable 
more people to be cared for outside the hospi- 
tal, but more could be done if resources of 
money and manpower were available. In the 
longer term a further shift in the balance of 
resources from hospital to the community ser- 
vices is desirable. ' 
It is expressed again by the various contributors to the 
European workshop held under the auspices of the National 
Association of Mental Health in 1980. For example: 
Mental health care in future must consist of a 
thorough and integrated network of in-patient 
and extra-mural facilities ranging from non- 
professional to highly professional facilities. 
This will be much more than the mere sum of all 
the alternatives we have now... The present day 
shift from a medical to a multi-disciplinary 
approach must be stimulated. The fears that 
many psychiatrists have about this are not 
founded. Psychiatrists will have to give up a 
great deal and rightly so, but their knowledge 
and experience will remain indispensable. 2 
The dominant model for future psychiatric services in 
the community seems to involve the 'multi-disciplinary 
team'. See for example the D. H. S. S. publication 'Mental 
illness: Policies for prevention, treatment, rehabilitation 
and cure', 1983.3 
The main long term aim of DHSS policy for mental 
health services, including services concerned 
with abuse of alcohol and drugs, is the creation 
of a comprehensive range of psychiatric services, 
provided, where the NHS is concerned, within a 
District and in the context of a Regional plan 
which takes account of District needs and 
resources. Such a service is only possible if, 
in identifying and meeting needs with District 
resources, it takes full account of the 
1D. H. S. S. (1981). 
2Trimbos, 
C. (1980). 
3D. 
H. S. S. (1983). 
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contribution social, educational, housing, employ- 
ment and all other voluntary and statutory services 
can make. It is important to develop, in consult- 
ation with other services providers and consumers, 
a pattern of service which will enable all these 
involved to work together and relate closely to 
the changing needs of mentally ill people and their 
families. 
Although much of the cost and the majority of 
resouces in the health service are concentrated under 
the hospital roof, a comprehensive service requires 
resources in the community away from the hospital. 
Psychiatrists and other professionals are in- 
creasingly involved in the patients' home setting 
and in working in health centres and with primary 
health care teams away from their hospital base. 
The primary care teams and associated community 
support services are crucial to the care of the 
large number of people with mental health problems 
not always diagnosed as such - who have no or no 
continuing contact with specialist services. 
A community psychiatric nursing service is an 
important component of health service provision 
in the community. The nurses work as members of 
a multi-disciplinary team in a variety of settings 
e. g. health centres, day hospitals, psychiatric 
departments. Their aim is to provide help outside 
the hospital and so prevent unnecessary admission 
to hospital, and to provide a nursing after care 
service following discharge from hospital. 
1 
Despite the confident tones with which phrases like 
'community based multi-disciplinary team' tend to be uttered 
and proclaimed, we find little evidence to suggest that the 
concept of the 'community' has anywhere adequately been 
elucidated, or that very much sense is made of the word 
beyond its value as a political slogan. Perhaps a first 
question to ask concerns the degree to which, and circum- 
stances under which, those who are already vested with 
very considerable powers to treat the mentally ill are 
going to be prepared to hand these powers over to 'the 
community'. It is a consultant psychiatrist who supplies 
1Ibid. 
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us with an image of the consult 
the conductor of the orchestra: 
orchestra'. 
1 The community 'in 
is 'important but subordinate'. 
therefore, who calls the tune. 
ant in the community team as 
and it is already a 'clinical 
the sense of extra-hospital' 
We need not wait to ask, 
We will surely acknowledge that different climates of 
opinion, fashions, and political and economic situations 
favour different orientations and attitudes towards 'mental 
illness', and encourage different approaches towards its 
amelioration. At the same time, however, it would be quite 
premature to assume that the prevailing climate within which 
psychiatry is practised will be changed in any essential way 
simply as the result of some policy decisions emanating 
from government departments. We certainly cannot take for 
granted that a community based psychiatric service is going 
to differ in any essential way from one that is located 
within the hospital; on the contrary we might well anticipate 
that they will be, in all essential respects, the same. 
Community based treatment, including home treat- 
ment, is a clinically effective and cost efficient 
alternative to in-patient treatment for a signi- 
ficant proportion of individuals requiring immediate 
in-patient treatment. Moreover, when appropriately 
constituted, community based treatment is a 
clinically effective and cost efficient alternative 
to hospital based treatment for either preventing 
or minimizing some chronic disability. There is 
agreement on the kind of patient who can benefit 
from community based treatment: we refer to 
individuals diagnosed as having a functional 
psychiatric disorder who are destined for in-patient 
treatment. There is consensus too about the settings 
in which community based treatment can be established 
... The main difference between the community 
based 
1Langley, 
G. E. (1983) p. 67. 
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and hospital based programmes concern the 
locale of treatment, the continuity of treatment, 
and the degree of flexibility achieved in the 
roles of treatment staffs. Depending upon what 
elements comprise the community based treatment, 
different results follow. Also, elements of 
community based treatments can be combined in 
different ways and still be effective... 
Sufficient evidence is available now to consider 
implementing community based treatment more widely. 
Community based psychiatry is, in the words of one of 
its advocates "adapting the techniques developed in hospital 
for use outside". 
2 It is 'the same' in that it identifies 
a 'problem', and then mobilizes expertise in order to do 
something about it. It is a system of 'care delivery', 
whose special feature is its 'adaptability', treatment 
programmes now being 'tailored to suit each client's 
individual needs'. 
One must realize that hospitals and community 
are two different states. The needs of the users 
and suppliers differ and the approaches used 
need to be tailored differently. 
3 
What we find to be most conspicuously missing within 
these discussions of 'community based mental health pro- 
grammes' is any acknowledgement of a notion of community 
which is endowed with its own generative potential or 
creative source. This is certainly understandable, and 
perhaps inevitable within a thinking whose frame of refer- 
ence is 'administration'. Whilst it is important to acknow- 
ledge the importance of what is achieved by social 
'Fenton, 
F. et al. (1982) p. 16- 
king, 
J. K. (1979) p. 211. 
3Butterworth, C. A. and Skidmore, D. (1981) p. 29. 
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administration, it is crucial to take note of that which 
cannot be administered. As an example of one fundamental 
source which by its very nature resists administration I 
have discussed in some detail the 'dwelling'. We shall 
now take up some issues which bear upon the relation between 
the dwelling which offers hospitality, and the community 
at large. We shall approach this by way of a brief recon- 
sideration of the 'therapeutic community'. 
The Therapeutic Community Approach 
In many cases therapeutic communities illustrate very 
well some of the contradictions implicit in 'care in the 
community'. In what ways do therapeutic communities tend to 
be based 'in the community'? I have already argued that the 
notion of the 'therapeutic community' - or the therapeutic 
community approach - is very misleading, insofar as, con- 
tained within these notions, we find a widely differing 
variety of practices and ideologies. So far as there is 
talk within the literature of the therapeutic community as 
a method which may be employed in settings such as hospitals, 
day centres, residential homes, and so on, this can only be 
understood as indicating a rather vague inclination to- 
wards a certain jargon, a set of rather muddled techniques, 
and a very strong emphasis upon group activities of one sort 
or another. The 'therapeutic community method' does not 
refer to a 'way' which is a way of 'community'; for it is 
'community' which so conspicuously remains undiscussed. 
Nor does it place any particular emphasis upon the way that 
it is 'in' the community. 
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As far as their place within the community at large 
is concerned, therapeutic communities tend in fact to 
remain rather conspicuously 'set apart'. The fact of their 
being 'set apart' from the community at large, and enclosed 
within their own metaphor of treatment is fully in keeping 
with the clinical model upon which they are constructed and 
the hospital setting within which they arose. They are, so 
far as is possible, uncontaminated; and have as their purpose 
the sanitary practice of getting the patient in shape for 
his return to the world. In the therapeutic community, this 
is sometimes called 're-entry'. 
Thus we find a characteristic importance attached to 
the notions of 'socialization' or 'resocialization' - that 
is, preparing the individual for the ordinary, social world. 
In Main's classic (1946) paper, the therapeutic community 
is seen as having its eventual aim 'the resocialization of 
the neurotic individual for life in ordinary society'; 
' 
Jansen speaks of placing a 'strong emphasis on resocialising 
people'2 - and so on. Indeed, one of the themes within the 
therapeutic community literature concerns the conflict 
between 'therapeutic' and 'socialization' goals. 
To the extent that a therapeutic institution 
engenders in its patients values that are at 
variance with those of the outside social world, 
patients who have successfully adapted to 
treatment must be 're-socialized' prior to 
their discharge. The very experience of 
socializing patients to the institution may 
entail important therapeutic gains, but these 
'Main, 
T. (1946) p. 66. 
2Jansen, 
E. (1980) p. 118. 
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may be lost in the post hospital period if the 
norms adopted for treatment are not appropriately 
revised in preparation for the world outside. 
l 
A good. example of this is provided by the therapeutic 
community 'social'. These activities "are aimed primarily 
at fitting an individual to a social context outside the 
hospital 
... the socials are rationalized almost entirely in 
terms of their aim of assisting individuals towards normal 
patterns of social interaction". 
2 
The socials "approach 
'normal' extra-hospital types of situation - with dancing, 
small-talk, card playing, group games, and entertainment 
programmes". 
3 
However, these socials, "unlike those of the 
ordinary man's life, occur nightly and often impel a kind 
of interaction that would not necessarily apply outside the 
unit, and which might actually lead to trouble in post- 
hospital adjustment". 
4 
I have mentioned in my first chapters some of the ways 
in which therapeutic communities are structured rather 
differently from the 'ordinary life' for which they are 
meant to be a 'preparation'. These communities, for example, 
tend to see the therapeutic living situation in terms of 
an image of an ongoing group, a group whose every flicker 
contains 'therapeutic potential'. This very sense of 
everything being 'therapy' or in the service of 'therapy', 
of course, at once sets the situation apart from one which 
1Rapoport, 
R. N. (1960) p. 286. 
2Ibid. 
p. 91. 
3Ibid. 
p. 87. 
4Ibid. 
p. 81. 
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arises ordinarily within the community at large. And this 
idea of the therapeutic community being a world apart - 
standing apart from and opposed to 'ordinary society' - 
is taken almost to be one of its defining characteristics. 
We are describing a part of the global human 
network which has been hived off, as it were, 
from the rest of the social network for 
treatment purposes, and it is the actual 
physical acts associated with hiving off, and 
the creation of the external boundaries that 
make it a community. 1 
They are sensitively aware of the treatment 
world in which they are immersed, but take 
less account of the outside world. These 
worlds are willy-nilly different and function 
according to drastically different norms. 2 
This notion of a 'world apart' - an autonomous, self- 
sufficient condensation of health-providing, where 'every- 
thing is. treatment', is expressed most starkly in the 
following claim of Maxwell Jones: 
In my opinion, a therapeutic community is 
compatible with a maximum security unit. It 
is what happens within the restricted area, 
in terms of relationships and social learning 
which is important; and not the presence of 
locked doors and armed guards. 3 
It is of course Jones' extreme psychologism, and the notion 
that psychological process represents some final and absolute 
truth which is somehow culture free, which leads him to make 
this absurd statement; a statement which prescribes, in the 
name of treatment, the most profound dissociation, and 
whose phrase 'within the restricted area' seems to bear a 
1Crocket, 
R. (1979) p. 134. 
2Rapoport, 
R. N. (1960). Quoted in Jansen, E. (1980) p. 46. 
3Jones, 
M. (1968a). 
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rather uncanny reference to the human mind. 
The Therapeutic Community Household 
In this thesis, my way of approaching the 'therapeutic 
community' has been through the notion of the household. 
I have at the same time, and in some senses, contrasted 
the household with the 'therapeutic community'. That which 
I have suggested might be 'therapeutic' about a household 
differs in some crucial respects from what typically is 
thought to be therapeutic about 'therapeutic community'; 
and those things which I have identified as being especially 
important within a community household are not usually 
thought of as being worthy of mention within the literature. 
However, I do not see any particular reason to insist upon 
making some hard and fast distinction between 'therapeutic 
communities' and 'therapeutic households', and this thesis 
is not to be understood as presenting the argument for such 
a distinction. Although, after'some twenty or more years 
of experiment, a rough 'gestalt' has emerged which we 
identify as the 'therapeutic community' or the 'therapeutic 
community approach', it is my argument that this notion 
remains essentially a muddled one, whose muddles are in no 
way lessened by exercising a proprietory claim over the 
words 'therapeutic community'. There remain, I would like 
to insist, many other ways in which the notion of thera- 
peutic community may be understood. The same holds for 
households. I assume that there may be very many ways for 
households to be therapeutic, and so it would be regretable 
if this writing contributed to some tendency or fashion 
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to start talking of the 'therapeutic household model'. 
In placing a discussion of the household at the 
centre of an inquiry into the 'therapeutic community' I 
have merely obeyed the maxim of first things first. Thus 
orientated, we might now briefly extend our discussion of 
the therapeutic household by considering it more in the 
context of the community at large. And firstly, I propose 
that there is a need within the community at large for 
such places. 
That more or less everyone within the community at 
large needs a place which he can 'call home',. a place which 
is his, and where he belongs seems to be beyond question. 
And so my emphasis first of all is upon the household as a 
place where people live, where they may unpack and stay. 
A household is made up of the people who live there, with 
one another, where living is the way we 'goon being'. The 
members of a household get up, go to bed, eat, sleep, go 
to work or stay at home - enjoy life's pleasures, endure 
its drudgeries, meet its challenges, and so on. And in 
this, there is no difference between a therapeutic community 
household and any other household in the street. In each 
case the people who live there do what they want to do, 
as they want to, they pursue whatsoever they are drawn to 
in whatever fashion they like, with whomsoever they want - 
if they want to. They generally get on with their own 
business, as well as they are able, according to the various 
constraints, demands and obligations which govern their 
lives. 
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This differs rather strikingly -I repeat - from the 
situation of the typical residential therapeutic community. 
These tend not to be places where people first of all 
simply 'live' - go on being - and get on with their lives 
as best they are able. They tend rather to be places where 
the examination of life comes first; and places where 
people's 'living there' is, in a sense, incidental. And 
symptomatic of this, we find the textures of such places to 
be singularly threadbare. For the clinical nature of these 
places pre-empts (sometimes subtly, sometimes grossly) their 
'economic' possibilities, since first of all they are places 
of treatment, where the mentally ill or psychologically 
disturbed may be cured or re-socialized; and if these 
people live there this is in a sense only because this now 
enables their treatment to be continued round the clock. 
But if our starting point is with the household as a 
place where people live - this is not simply the end of 
the matter. For having emphasised what is 'ordinary' about 
therapeutic households, we must now ask how, and in what 
senses they might differ from any other house, from the 
one next door, Perhaps the most obvious difference is simply 
that of the door or opening which such households may extend 
to the wider community: the concern with hospitality. But 
hotels, hostels and 'homes' are also, in their own way, 
concerned with hospitality; here our concern is with the 
hospitality of 'therapeutic' households. This difference or 
distinctiveness of which we are speaking is confirmed by 
the fact that the typical household probably does not 
include the word 'therapeutic' within its conversation; and 
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certainly most households do not offer this sort of self- 
description as an opening to the community at large, such 
that strangers in need of sanctuary come - metaphorically - 
knocking at the door. Our question now becomes: who then 
is likely to be drawn particularly by this sort of opening? 
Who amongst the community at large needs this sort of 
opportunity to find their way? 
We may consider examples of individuals who are drawn 
to a household which is sensitive to these needs under three 
approximate headings. First of all, there are individuals 
whose position in the world is one of some precariousness, 
individuals whose 'homelessness' or 'untogetherness' - 
whilst not yet having reached a point where they draw 
sufficient attention to themselves to warrant psychiatric 
intervention - renders them somewhat vulnerable to insti- 
tutional predatoriness. Individuals, that is, who are at 
some risk or hazard of being forced into some institutional 
model of treatment, either with or without their consent. 
Such an individual may express or voice his sufferings in 
any number of ways; he may be lonely, unable to work, 
depressed and dispirited, at a loss or quietly desperate. 
Persons in such situations may find the urgency of their 
position to be curiously invisible, for whilst the individual 
is not able to fit into the utilitarian mode of a 'pro- 
ductive life', his symptoms may not yet have reached the 
point where they match his G. P. 's model of a broken thing 
to be repaired. Such an individual might seem an obvious 
candidate for psychotherapy, yet this might not be an 
opening which presents itself to him; or he might not be 
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able to afford it; or he might not yet have secured the 
necessary 'base' from which to take this step. 
Some individuals may be drawn to such a household 
where they have already 'been through' some or other 
institutional psychiatric process - but it has not worked. 
They may be in hospital, and anxious to get out. They may 
have been released from hospital, and unable to endure the 
imminent prospect of having to go back for more. They may 
be on psychiatric medication of one sort or another and 
sufficiently aware of its blunting effects upon their 
consciousness to want to wean off at any cost - and fully 
aware that they cannot do this on their own. Such indi- 
viduals may have long psychiatric histories, or they may 
have had a single breakdown for which the treatment was not 
sufficient to assuage the fear of its future occurrence. 
Finally, individuals may be drawn to such a household 
who are neither at risk of 'becoming' mentally ill, nor 
recovering from their treatment, but may be looking for 
something which is otherwise missing from their lives, and 
which they feel that living in a community household might 
be able to offer. They may feel that they stand to learn 
a great deal from the opportunity to live with others in 
a more challenging way. They may already be in psycho- 
therapy, but want to broaden the base of their psychotherapy 
in some way, or extend their horizons - perhaps wanting to 
be 'found out' in what hitherto they have got away with. 
Such persons may turn out to be pillars of strength in the 
household - or to be as disturbing as the most disturbed. 
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In each of these cases, the individuals who approach 
the household will tend to be in their early adulthood - if 
only because the young are less likely to be set in their 
ways, more likely to be open to the possibilities of a fresh 
life ahead of them, and 'up for' the sort of give and take 
that communal living entails. They will tend to be single. 
But whatever their situation, circumstances and need, 
arrival at the household is simply a first step - and from 
then on whatever comes of it will be a matter for negotiation 
between the visitor and those who live there. I have dis- 
cussed some of the issues about which such negotiations may 
pivot, distinguishing between this sort of interpersonal 
negotiation and the formalities and impersonalities of an 
'admissions procedure'. There is no need for the candidate 
to be accompanied by whatever psychiatric record he may 
have accumulated, since this information becomes redundant 
in the business of getting to know one another. Any 
dealings arising at the interface between the household 
and administrative bureaucracy (for example social services) 
may be minimal, and quite unobtrusive. The household need 
not find its thinking cluttered by diagnostic mumbo-jumbo, 
not because of some carefully contrived anti-diagnostic, 
or anti-stigmatist stance, but because these notions are 
transcended - which is to say that they simply do not 
arise or materialize in the realities of living together. 
A most important aspect of any 'therapeutic household' 
is to do with the way it was started, set up, or founded. 
The paradigm case, in the Western world at any rate, of 
'setting up home' is the family. Yet the situation of a 
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therapeutic household is not that of a family; for, although 
there are many possible mappings of family on to community, 
and many ways in which families and communities may be very 
like one another, and each like to keep things 'in the 
family', the bonds which hold people together are not the 
same. 
However, it is quite clear that living together, 
sharing a home, creating a household dwelling is not the 
exclusive privilege of families or paired couples; it is 
not at all uncommon for students, for example. And clearly, 
there is no reason in principly why any group of people, 
whatever their situation, interests or concerns, might not 
set up or establish a community household and enjoy the 
possibilities of conviviality and companionship which this 
might afford. And in this sense, this might well be 
highly 'therapeutic'. There are, however, considerable 
difficulties in the way of a number of individuals by 
themselves, setting up and getting together for themselves 
a household which has some specific aspiration or intention 
to be 'therapeutic', or in which the notions of psycho- 
therapy are indelibly etched. For one thing, it takes a 
certain amount of time, money and negotiatory clout to 
get a house together; and whatever difficulties there may 
be will probably be magnified where there are a number of 
people who may not know or trust one another well. And 
even where people do know one another very well, the 
difficulties of living together as a community or communal 
household are notorious. We may conclude that people who 
are 'untogether' are rather unlikely to be able to get 
471 
such a project successfully on its way; or, where they do, 
maintain it without some sort of guidance or encouragement 
from some other or others who have some experience of these 
difficulties; and who know what they are doing. 
I shall mention two considerations which may take the 
possibility of the setting up and flourishing of a thera- 
peutic household more realistic, but which, again, point to 
a certain difference between the 'therapeutic household' 
and the one next door. The first of these is the facilitating 
or enabling network. By this notion I have in mind a 
mediating context between the household and the community 
at large, or a para-community between the household and 
the broader community. The mafia, a church, or a religious 
group, a cult-following of some sort or another, and a 
student body are possible examples of a facilitating 
network. In that most interesting era of American psychiatry, 
that of moral treatment, the ethnic community provided an 
excellent example of a facilitating network which mediated 
between the therapeutic communities which sprang up, and 
the broader society. Indeed, it was largely because of the 
erosion of ethnic cohesiveness that these particular 
communities, from which we can learn a great deal, began 
increasingly to fail. Another example, which again has 
an important place within the history of psychiatry, is 
provided by the Quakers; here, therapeutic communities arose 
from within a network of Friends. 
Whilst the nature and the role of the enabling network 
is one of considerably subtlety, the essential point that 
I wish to make can be expressed quite simply: that a 
472 
therapeutic household is not likely to prosper in the 
absence of the support or 'backing' of a network or 
culture of like-minded people, or people who share the spirit 
of the thing. They will have the weight to help obtain 
what a small group of individuals otherwise might not (e. g. 
a property), the know-how to administer what needs admini- 
stration, and experience and broader perspective to draw 
upon when it comes to weathering the inevitable difficulties. 
A second consideration which may be of crucial impor- 
tance to the begetting and well-being of a therapeutic 
household is the involvement of a psychotherapist. Although 
in some ways something of the role of psychotherapist has 
in the past been played by family physician, and parish 
priest, a household is without doubt distinguished from 
its neighbours when someone who does not himself live there 
is involved in the house in some capacity in which he or 
she is concerned to help those who live there do so more 
thoughtfully and attentively, and so more creatively and 
enjoyably. The experienced psychotherapist is the mediator, 
the boundary-crosser par-excellence. Amongst the boundaries 
at which his attendance may be most important are those 
between the household and relatives, neighbours, doctor 
and possibly institutions, as well as between household 
and supporting network. 
Amongst possible ways in which a 'therapeutic house- 
hold' may be different from any other, I have mentioned 
three. These refer to the particular 'opening' which such 
a house may present to the world, the wider network or 
group through which such opening may be mediated, and by 
473 
whose help it may be sustained, and the involvement, within 
the household, of a psychotherapist. These are very general 
or broadly conceived considerations, and would in any case 
vary very much from house to house. They are not to be 
thought of as defining attributes. So far as what goes on 
within such households, we may assume that this differs even 
more from house to house - and so the question of how it 
may differ from 'ordinary' houses becomes very difficult to 
answer. I have given a fairly detailed account of something 
of what went on within one 'therapeutic household'. And 
within this account is woven one answer to this question 
of difference, which stresses the simultaneity of difference 
and sameness, arguing that what goes on within therapeutic 
households is perfectly ordinary, but that the notion of 
'ordinary' quite happily expands to include areas of 
experiencing which might otherwise become segregated to the 
clinic. I have argued that this capacity of a household to 
include within its order, its own disorderings, is both 
ecologically sound, and can be interpersonally energising. 
The word 'ecology' serves to stress the fact that a 
therapeutic household is not simply an isolated, self- 
sufficient cell of well-being. The flourishing of such 
households may itself have a very significant bearing upon 
the well-being of the wider community upon which they depend. 
For when no ways of responding to the cries. of suffering 
seem to be available to the society which occasions them, 
other than a massive, and highly organized programme of 
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community tranquilization, 1 it is not only the sedated 
patients who become robbed of their remaining consciousness. 
Psychiatric sedatives work in both directions; their 
effects radiate. Remarkably little is required, logistically 
and financially, to encourage ways of living within which 
these cries do not need so relentlessly to be stifled, 
as a number of households have by now made clear. Perhaps 
it is now time to make sure that their voice is more clearly 
heard. 
Retrospect 
Having made various claims for the 'therapeutic house- 
hold' we may now turn to the question of evaluation. How 
are we to assess or evaluate these households? How are we 
to decide whether or not the various claims which have been 
made as to the fruitfulness of this approach are substan- 
tiated? Quite simply: do people who live in these houses 
'get better'. With this question belongs another. If 
people do in fact get better as a result of living in one 
of these households, can we identify or isolate the parti- 
cular factors which play the more important part in this 
improvement, so that subsequent households will be able to 
conduct themselves in the light of this accumulated know- 
ledge? With these questions in view I shall return to the 
particular case of Portland Road, although at the same time 
1These 'long-acting depot' antipsychotic drugs 'have such a prolonged 
action because they are only slowly absorbed from the depot into the 
circulation'. (Lader, M. 1979, p. 39. ) For 'depot' read 'new commu- 
nity psychiatric resource centre'; for 'circulation' read 'community'. 
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I shall make reference to, and comparison with, other 
member households of the Philadelphia Association. 
I have stated repeatedly that Portland Road's claim 
was not that of having discovered or developed any new 
method or way for the treatment of mental illness. The 
house may claim, however, with some sureness, to have 
recognized the importance of certain conditions under which 
people who are disorientated and disarticulated from one 
another will be more likely to find their way, articulate 
or gear into the world. The practice of the house therefore, 
was informed not by 'new discoveries' but by rather con- 
servative 'home truths' or 'ethical' guiding principles 
such as I have discussed in some detail in part three. 
When the question of evaluation is raised, a first 
thing to note, then, is what claims are not being made. 
The opportunities or possibilities onto which Portland 
Road may have presented an open door may have no appeal 
at all for a great many people. The Philadelphia Asso- 
ciation's claim, that 'for many people' the sort of ambiance 
typical of its member households is a good one, or one which 
is conducive to the negotiation of critical periods in 
one's life, should not therefore be read as a boast that 
this is the answer for everyone. At the same time, the 
'for many people' does not refer to a certain range of 
psychiatric diagnostic categories for which this method 
is suitable. 
Furthermore, even for those people who are drawn to 
such a household, who 'take to' and are 'taken to' by 
those who already live there so that they stay - there is 
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no question of these 'conducive conditions' being provided 
like a service. Examples of these 'conditions' include 
the texturings of the household; but a text only comes alive 
in its being read, or lived. Similarly, a conducive 
environment is one which is 'responsive'; but a responsive 
environment is very far from being one which leaps in with 
activities and therapeutic strategies of one sort or 
another; rather it speaks, and so may remain silent. A 
responsive environment may do nothing. A remark which we 
quoted earlier spoke of psychiatric patients "needing a 
social matrix ready made for them". 
l 
This is precisely 
what a great many patients, at any rate, do not need. They 
have not yet found a ground; but such a ground does not 
simply 'await'. It may open up, in the fullness of time, 
where people are free to find their way with one another. 
And in this connection I have discussed in some detail 
the notion of an 'ambiance of concern'. I have made it 
clear that a household is an organic entity which cannot 
simply switch on concern, or bring in staff to be 'con- 
cerned'. There is all the difference in the world between 
'providing' conditions, and striving to ensure that the 
intricacies of 'finding one's way' will be acknowledged, 
and that the presence of an experienced therapist will 
ensure some attentiveness to questions of justice, and 
some encouragement and help towards the opening up of those 
often very difficult issues which arise in the course of 
people finding their way with one another. 
1Huessy, 
H. (1980) p. 367. 
477 
Clearly the question of evaluation becomes rather 
more complex than it might at first seem when we entertain 
a notion of 'therapeutic' which is to do with finding one's 
way, or perhaps 'being oneself'. Can these complexities 
be overcome by agreeing upon some 'unequivocal' criteria of 
'improvement', and in a carefully controlled study comparing 
the progress of individuals in hospital with that of a 
therapeutic community household, against these criteria? 
A well-thought out and executed study of this nature could 
only be welcomed. The methodological difficulties facing 
such a study would, however, be very considerable; and in 
any case can we be sure that very much is going to be 
determined by the results? The paradox of evaluating a 
household such as Portland Road by means of empirical study 
is this: that without careful and critical theoretical work, 
which interprets the empirical study, its findings would 
be meaningless; but at the same time this careful inter- 
pretative and conceptual work will probably render the 
empirical study un-necessary. 
A much better way of introducing the question of 
evaluating the work of a household than that of presenting 
statistics might be to present a number of thorough and 
detailed 'case studies' - or stories. It would not matter 
particularly whether these were the striking 'successes' 
of a household, or its 'failures'. For the value of such 
a study would be to show in detail the issues which are 
at stake and the considerations which have bearing upon 
them, to show how clearly they were seen and how surely 
and boldly negotiated, and perhaps to suggest to the reader 
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what may, and what may not be spelled out. 
Difficulties of 'evaluation' become more apparent 
still if we are asked what specific therapeutic factors con- 
tribute most towards the 'successes' of a therapeutic house- 
hold. Perhaps this sort of question is particularly invited 
by my account of Portland Road, where I present a number of 
considerations to do with the household's being therapeutic, 
only to make it clear that these considerations were by no 
means met, all of the time. Does this mean that some sort 
of uncertainty is, or should be, an intrinsic feature of a 
therapeutic ambiance? Do we confirm Skinner's claim that a 
maximally reinforcing schedule turns out to be one with an 
in-built component of randomness? Can we conclude that a 
household may function 'well enough', or be a 'good enough 
dwelling' with only some of these factors operating; and, 
if so, which are the important ones? 
Taking up these questions effectively entails re- 
iterating and amplifying or expanding upon points which 
already have been made. First of all, it has been suggested 
that what is determinative for a therapeutic household is the 
nature of the issues which, in living together, become opened 
up, and taken up; these issues define the household much 
more than the attributes or properties which it possesses. 
Now, perhaps, our answer turns upon the distinction we might 
make between an essentialist and an attributive definition 
of therapeutic household; here, between a way of living 
which is orientated towards the truth or the heart of the 
matter, and a method to be broken down into a multiplicity 
of salient factors or ingredients such that subsequent 
.. a 
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analysis might lead to more and more effective replication. 
Is this merely a flight into mysticism -a mystification? 
Writing, quite rightly, of the weaknesses of the 'spot the 
winner' evaluative studies which 'consider the processes 
that might affect outcome' but 'are unable to isolate any 
clear causal factors', Manning' claims that, 'the dilemma 
is that unless the change-inducing techniques can be 
described in sufficient detail to reproduce them, then the 
knowledge that some unknown thing is effective is not very 
useful'. But our dilemma, here, is not between change 
inducing techniques and 'some unknown thing'. A way will 
remain unknown only until it is taken up, originally - re- 
searched. My task in these chapters has been to suggest, 
through a showing, some of the more essential matters of 
which this wayfaring might be mindful or thoughtful, and 
also some of the particular terrains through which its 
negotiation has proved worthwhile. 
Secondly, and furthermore, the empirical unanswerability 
of this question follows from the fact of the singular nature 
of each household. Here, for example, we touch upon 
differences of circumstance which are not merely consequent 
upon the different figures involved, but upon the times in 
which their endeavours were set. Kingsley Hall, after all, 
was a phenomenon of London in the sixties. The subsequently 
established Archway households were a group of short-life 
properties existing in close proximity to one another; 
during the lifetime of these community households different 
1 
Manning, N. (1979) p. 304. 
A 
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therapists became involved. Throughout the life of Portland 
Road, the presence of Hugh Crawford was clearly quite cen- 
tral to the community, which was very profoundly moved and 
enthused by his particular visioning. His presence, in 
fact, was highly charismatic - and it would be difficult 
to imagine the work, and the results, of Portland Road 
without taking this consideration fully into account. But 
fortunately - if only because they are hard to come by - 
the presence of a particularly charismatic leader proves 
not to be essential to a therapeutic community, for other 
people may show themselves to be attentive to what matters, 
and capable of a thoughtful guidance in a more ordinary 
way. There are things to be said in favour of a household 
having a charismatic leader, and things to be argued against 
the having of a highly charismatic central figure. But in 
any case, requirements of this sort can hardly be made to 
order. 
Regretably, perhaps, certainly predictably, the 
Portland Road household did not survive long after Hugh's 
death. But in the last two years before its end, Portland 
Road was already, quite organically, spawning a second 
household in the Oxfordshire countryside. This household, 
which continues to thrive, is very different in many respects 
from Portland Road, although what the house is 'on about' 
remains fundamentally the same. It continues to be a 
member household of the Philadelphia Association. Its 
psychotherapist, who spends a morning there once a week, 
has his own, very distinctive, style; and this style, in 
its turn has a most important bearing upon the way in 
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which the members of the community live together, and 
accomplish their work. The house is set in some four 
acres of land, making it effectively a smallholding. It 
has - now - an attractively laid out and productive 
vegetable and herb garden, keeps chickens, goats and 
ducks, and ventures from time to time into more ambitious 
enterprises and schemes to do with practical self-sufficiency. 
The produce of the land contributes significantly towards 
the feeding of the household; and the interweaving of house, 
garden and animals, and the various projects which the 
outbuildings house, contributes enormously to the unique 
textures of this particular household. The house is much 
larger than Portland Road; it has, for example, five 
entrances, making it easier, in some senses at least, for 
people to come and go. It happens to have shaped out within 
it two spacious kitchens, so that people are in many ways 
less on top of each other. All in all, it is probably much 
easier for people quietly to get on with their own thing, 
in a rather more leisurely time, than ever it was in Portland 
Road. Whilst we may think of the various pluses and minuses 
which may be weighed against one another, we must acknowledge 
that these different situations will be conducive to diffe- 
rent people. Whilst the Oxfordshire household has, upon 
occasion, extended its hospitality to extremely disturbed 
individuals, its distance from the rest of the Philadelphia 
Association network has made the household, quite under- 
standably, somewhat wary of its limitations with regard 
to some of the more extreme situations of holding or con- 
taining what in Portland Road were called 'freakouts'. 
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Whilst the households of the Philadelphia Association, 
therefore, differ quite markedly one from another, one 
thing which they have in common is a network, and a culture, 
of which they are the fruitions. In the course of things, 
whereby this culture is maintained and evolved, those who 
take a supporting part in the continuation of its work 
engage regularly in conversation about the households. Here, 
the common ground of what the households are 'on about' 
again may become opened up. It is hoped that this present 
work may, in some small way, contribute towards an extending 
of this conversation. 
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